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The SEVEN
MILITARY
CLASSICS
of ANCIENT
CHINA

translation and commentary by

RALPH D. SAWYER

with Mei-chiin Sawyer

BASIC BOOKS
A Member of the Perseus Books Group

New York

To our parents

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Published in 1993 in the United States by Westview Press, Inc.,

Boulder, Colorado

Published in 2007 in the United States by Basic Books,

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Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Wu ching ch’i shu. English.

The Seven military classics of ancient China = [Wu ching ch'i shu|

I translation and commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer, with Mei-chiin Sawyer,
p. cm. — (History and warfare)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN: 0-8133-1228-0

1. Military art and science — China — Early work to 1800.

I. Sawyer, Ralph. II. Sawyer, Mei-chiin. III. Title. IV. Title: Wu
ching ch’i shu. V. Series.

U101.W8413 1993

355.02— dc20 92-39146

CIP

Paperback: ISBN-13: 978-0-465-00304-4; ISBN-10: 0-465-00304-4

10 9 8 76 5 4 3 2

Contents

Preface to the Paperback Edition

Preface

A Note on the Translation and Pronunciation

xvii

Chronology of Approximate Dynastic Periods

xix

General Introduction and Historical
Background of the Classics

1 T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings

Translator’s Introduction, 23
Text, 40

2 The Methods of the Ssu-ma

107

Translator’s Introduction, 1 1 1
Text, 126

3 Sun-tzu’s Art of War

145

Translator’s Introduction, 149
Text, 157

4 Wu-tzu

187

Translator’s Introduction, 191
Text, 206

5 Wei Liao-tzu

225

Translator’s Introduction, 229
Text, 242

vii

viii

Contents

6 ^Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung 277

Translator’s Introduction, 281
Text, 292

7 Questions and Replies Between T’ang T’ai-tsung
and Li Wei-kung 307

Translator’s Introduction, 31 1
Text, 321

Appendixes

Appendix A: The Chariot, 363
Appendix B: The Horse and Cavalry, 367
Appendix C: Armor and Shields, 369
Appendix D: The Sword, 371
Appendix E: Military Organization, 373

Notes

Notes to the General Introduction, 377
T'ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings, 389
The Methods of the Ssu-ma, 4 1 0
Sun-tzu's Art of War, 420
Wu-tzu, 453
Wet Liao-tzu, 460

Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung, 482
Questions and Replies Between T’ang Tai-tsung
and Li Wei-kung, 487
Notes to the Appendixes, 508

Selected Bibliography

Glossary of Selected Terms with Chinese Characters
Indexes

Index of Strategic and Tactical Principles, 545
General Index, 549

513

533

543

377

363

Preface to the Paperback Edition

China has been markedly transformed over the fifteen years since the
original preface to Seven Military Classics was written. The economy has
expanded at an unprecedented rate, unrelenting modernization affects virtu-
ally every dimension of life, and the physical and intellectual horrors of the
Cultural Revolution have become fading, albeit still painful, memories.
Achievement of superpower status seems assured, but whether the PRC’s
ascension will foster worldwide prosperity or entail pervasive destruction
remains uncertain.

Paradoxically, even as modern cities proliferate and the latest technolo-
gies are adapted, many aspects of its long-forgotten, vociferously deprecated
traditional culture have not only reappeared but also been deliberately revi-
talized, in a desperate attempt to suppress escalating social unrest and retard
a zealous plunge into corruption and hedonism. Even Confucianism, long
viewed as a feudal anathema, is being brandished as a reformist tool by dra-
conian authorities in the vacuum created by Marxism’s demise.

Amid this turbulent milieu, China’s classic military writings have soared
in popularity and become virtually ubiquitous. Works such as the Art of
War and Six Secret Cachings now appear in many guises, ranging from
heavily annotated scholarly editions through cheap vernacular paperbacks.
Comic book and lavishly illustrated editions of immense fame and popu-
larity abound, and versions purporting to apply their contents to every
conceivable realm proliferate. Numerous military terms have entered the
language while the concepts and principles ground strategic thinking and
continue to affect the mindset, shaping and delimiting the very categories of
thought and response. The contents also provide essential materials for
lengthy martial arts dramas, crucial themes for movies, and vital content for
other mass media presentations.

More significantly, the classic military writings are playing an important
role as the PRC consciously reformulates its martial doctrine to create

Preface to the Paperback Edition

“contemporary military science with unique Chinese characteristics.” As
discussed in our Tao of Deception , PRC think tanks such as the Academy of
Military Science are examining every passage for concepts and tactical prin-
ciples that can be adopted to the contemporary battlefield so as to ensure
that China’s comparatively deficient armed forces will, through unexpected
and unorthodox measures, be able to wrest a localized advantage and prevail.
In conjunction with paradigm battles abstracted from its three-thousand-
year military history, the seven books that are contained in the Seven Military
Classics, previously confined to the martial realm, thus enjoy unprecedented
readership and vibrancy.

Ralph D. Sawyer
2007

Preface

Kecent decades have witnessed explosive growth in American and Euro-
pean interest in the Far East. Books and articles about China have enjoyed
popularity since the 1970s; those on japan, especially on Japanese manage-
ment practices, have proliferated since the early 1980s; and those focusing
on business in terms of “corporate warfare” and theories of strategy, includ-
ing Asian practices and their underlying philosophies, retain currency. The
writings of Musashi, the famous Japanese swordsman, and Sun-tzu, the an-
cient Chinese military theorist, have been repeatedly translated, investigated,
and discussed. However, as interesting as they and a few books from the
martial arts have proven to be, the vast Chinese military corpus-despitc its
historical importance and contemporary significance— remains unknown in
the West.

Chinese military thought probably originated with neolithic village con-
flicts four or five thousand years ago, perhaps even as mythologized in the
clash of legendary cultural heroes and Sage Emperors. Subsequently, because
men were compelled to direct their ingenuity toward combat, weapons were
developed, tactics evolved, and power structures arose. Eventually, domi-
nant figures— perhaps clan or lineage chiefs commanding more-warlike peo-
ples— imposed their wills over other groups and widening domains and
some groups became significant political powers. At the dawn of the histori-
cal age, as preserved in early written materials and revealed by artifacts, fre-
quent, intense clashes were already occurring between these contending
forces as they evolved into states and as powerful individuals sought to es-
tablish sole rule over the realm and to found dynastic houses. Thereafter the
scope of battle expanded; the strength and effectiveness of weapons in-
creased; and military organization, tactics, and technology all developed.
Eventually, battlefield lessons and command experience became the focus of
conscious study; efforts were made to preserve the insights and avoid the er-
rors of the past; and the science of military tactics and strategy was born.

Preface

xii

xiii

By the second century B.c. China had already passed through a thousand
years of almost unremitting conflict and had been brutally unified into a
vast, powerful, imperially directed entity. Along the way, skilled command-
ers appeared, and major battles were fought. Campaigns became intermina-
ble, and the scale of destruction was immense, consuming both men and the
thoughts they had committed to writing. However, among the small number
of military writings that survived until unification, there were six major
ones, including Sun-tzu’s famous Art of War. They continued to be studied
and transmitted down through the centuries until the remnants were col-
lected and edited in the Sung dynasty around twelve hundred years later.
Combined with a Tang dynasty work, they compose the Seven Military
Classics, a compilation that comprised the orthodox foundations for mili-
tary thought and the basis for the imperial examinations required for martial
appointment.

In the early 1970s, archaeologists excavating the Han dynasty tomb of a
high-ranking official discovered a large number of immensely valuable texts
written on remarkably well preserved bamboo slips. The military works
among them include major portions of several of the Seven Military Classics
and extensive fragments of Sun Pin’s Military Methods. Although this
book — by Sun-tzu’s descendant — appeared in the bibliographic listings com-
piled in the Han dynasty, it had apparently vanished in the Han and been lost
for over two thousand years. This important find thus increased the total ex-
tant military materials from the ancient period to eight classic works in all,
supplemented by a few hundred other writings of various, but definitely
later, dates.

Although tactical studies continued to be written throughout Chinese his-
tory, much of the vast military corpus has undoubtedly been lost over the
centuries through carelessness, natural disasters, deliberate destruction, and
warfare. However, ancient epigraphic materials and such early historical re-
cords as the Tso chuan and Shih chi also chronicle the exploits of generals
and kings; the Twenty-five Histories preserves extensive information about
men and actions; and Warring States philosophical works contain discus-
sions of military issues. Thus resources abound, but only a part of the histor-
ical writings, including the complete Tso chuan, and essentially two of the
Seven Military Classics (Sun-tzu’s Art of War — three major versions, several
minor ones — and the Wu-tzu — which appears as an appendix to Griffith’s
translation) have been translated and published.

Far from having vanished and being forgotten, these ancient Chinese mili-
tary works have extensively influenced twentieth-century thought and are
experiencing a new vitality in Asia. Not only in the military realm — through-

out the century they have been thoroughly studied in Japan and China — do
they continue to be discussed, but also in the business and personal spheres
their resurgence is particularly evident. In the 1980s a management book
that revived Sun-tzu’s thought and employed the revitalized figures of several
ancient martial heroes to instruct companies in the basics of business and
marketing became a bestseller in the draconian Communist environment of
the People’s Republic of China and eventually in capitalist Hong Kong as
well. Japanese companies have regularly held study groups to seek insights
that may be implemented as corporate strategy. Koreans, enduring intense
international pressure to revalue their currency, open their markets, and sub-
mit to trade limitations just when prosperity is attainable, are discovering
strategies for international business warfare in these books.

In Taiwan, where companies confront a situation similar to Korea’s,
books applying the thoughts of the ancient strategists to life, business,
sports, and the stock market have suddenly surged in popularity, even
though modernists have ignored and scorned them for decades. Perhaps
more astounding is the penchant of Japanese writers to apply principles and
tactics from the Seven Military Classics to all the complexities of modern so-
ciety; they use such tactics, for example, for successful human relations, ro-
mantic liaisons, and company infighting. In addition to at least one scholarly
translation, several new paperbacks offering simplified renditions and popu-
larized expansions of selected teachings arc published annually in Japan.
The ubiquitous salaryman may be seen reading them while commuting to
work, and there are even comic-book editions to satisfy those so inclined.
Naturally, tactics from the classics also frequently appear in novels, movies,
and on television, and their words are quoted in contemporary media
throughout Asia.

There is a great temptation, given the extensive materials rapidly becom-
ing available from diverse sources, to undertake a truly comprehensive intro-
duction to the entire military enterprise in Ancient China. Many topics criti-
cal to understanding strategy, tactics, and the evolution of military thought
merit exploration and analysis. However, we have consciously focused upon
depicting the historical context and reviewing the essential material aspects,
such as armor and weapons, rather than ineffectually sketching comprehen-
sive intellectual issues. Although we have not totally neglected the latter, ex-
ploring topics such as the relationships of Taoism and military thought in at
least cursory fashion in the introductions and the extensive notes, these areas
must largely be consigned to another work and to expert monographs. Simi-

xvi

Preface

this work, and the survivors from Harvard would perhaps be astonished to
learn that 1 have been carrying on the Chinese tradition of private scholar-
ship over these many years.

Whereas 1 am responsible for the translations, introductions, and notes,
Mei-chun Lee (Sawyer) has not only been an active participant in our discus-
sions and studies over the years but also undertook numerous burdens asso-
ciated with the detailed research of such historical issues as the evolution of
weapons. She also contributed immeasurably through her insightful readings
of the translations and the tedious investigation and comparison of various
modern commentaries. Her collaborative efforts greatly aided my under-
standing of many issues and improved the overall work significantly, all
while she continued to fulfill her responsibilities in our consulting opera-
tions.

Finally we would like to thank Westview Press, in particular, Peter Kracht,
senior editor, for his efforts on this project. We have benefited greatly from
Westview’s editorial support and from the intensive, detailed reading of the
translation provided through their auspices by Professor Robin D.S. Yates.
Many of his numerous emendations and general suggestions substantially
improved the work, and all his criticisms stimulated a careful reexamination
of the texts and many additional materials; nevertheless, final responsibility
for their evaluation and integration, where accepted, remains with the trans-
lators.

Others who assisted, especially in locating articles and textual materials in
the United States and Asia, include Miao Yong-i, Marta Hanson, Yuriko
Baer, Anton Stctzko, and Zhao Yong; Lorrie Stetzko provided expertise on
horses and the intricacies of riding; and Bob Matheney and Max Gartenberg
essentially made the project possible. We express our deep appreciation to all
these people and to Lee T’ing-jung, who has honored the work with his cal-
ligraphy.

Ralph D. Sawyer

A Note on the Translation
and Pronunciation

The translation is based upon and rigorously follows the so-called Ming
edition of the (Sung dynasty) Seven Military Classics, which contains and
benefits from Liu Yin’s consistent commentary — the chih-chieb, or “direct
explanations” — throughout all seven books. However, although many of his
comments are illuminating and even critical to understanding the actual
text, scholarship continued to advance, and over the centuries, a few valu-
able commentaries and several variant editions that have furthered the pro-
cess of understanding — particularly of the Art of War — have come out.
Where the Ming text appears obviously defective, recourse for emendation is
made first to the Sung edition and then to other variants. Full information on
the individual variants employed is given in the introduction and the notes
for each book, and the basic editions are listed in the bibliography.

We have sought to employ judiciously contemporary scholarship irrespec-
tive of its political perspective and to integrate insights provided by archaeo-
logical discoveries. The discovery of early versions, although dramatic and
invaluable, precipitates the problem about which text to translate: the “origi-
nal” versions, which entail numerous problems of their own, or the Sung
Seven Military Classics edition, which has been historically available and in-
fluential for nine centuries. Because most of the Seven Military Classics have
not previously been translated, we have chosen to make the traditional edi-
tion available first. Accordingly, we have used the newly recovered textual
materials to make emendations only where they resolve highly problematic
or completely incomprehensible passages, always annotating appropriately.
Although we have refrained from indiscriminately revising the traditional
text, significant differences between the newly recovered fragments and the
historically transmitted edition are generally recorded in the notes.

In providing a translation for a general readership, rather than a some-
what more literal (and some would claim precise) version for sinologists, we

xviii

A Note on the Translation and Pronunciation

hope to emulate the vibrant translations of Professor Burton Watson and
thereby make these amazing texts accessible to the widest possible audience.
We have thus avoided military jargon because, apart from the thorny ques-
tion about each term’s appropriateness, such terms would render the transla-
tion less comprehensible to anyone lacking military experience or unac-
quainted with military history.

Unfortunately, neither of the two commonly employed orthographies
makes the pronunciation of romanized Chinese characters easy. Each system
has its stumbling blocks and we remain unconvinced that the Pinyin qi is in-
herently more comprehensible than the Wade-Giles ch’i, although it is cer-
tainly no less comprehensible than / for r in Wade-Giles. However, as many
of the important terms may already be familiar to Western readers and pre-
vious translations have employed Wade-Giles, we have opted to use that sys-
tem throughout our work. Well-known cities, names, and books — such as
Peking — are retained in their common form, and books and articles pub-
lished with romanized names and titles also appear in their original form.

As a guide to pronunciation, we offer the following notes on the signifi-
cant exceptions to normally expected sounds:

t, as in Tao: without apostrophe, pronounced like d
p, as in ping: without apostrophe, pronounced like b
ch, as in chuang: without apostrophe, pronounced like /'
hs, as in hsi: pronounced sh
j, as in jen: pronounced like r

Thus, the name of the famous Chou dynasty is pronounced as if written
“jou” and sounds just like the English name “Joe.”

Chronology of

\pproximate Dynastic Pen

Dynastic Period

Years

LEGENDARY SAGE EMPERORS

2852-2255

HSIA

2205-1766

SHANG

1766-1045

CHOU

1045-256

Western Chou

1045-770

Eastern Chou

770-256

Spring and Autumn

722-481

Warring States

403-221

ch’in

221-207

FORMER HAN

206 B.C.-8 A.D.

LATER HAN

23-220

SIX DYNASTIES

222-589

SUI

589-618

t’ang

618-907

FIVE DYNASTIES

907-959

SUNG

960-1126

SOUTHERN SUNG

1127-1279

yOan ( Mongol )

1279-1368

MING

1368-1644

ch’ing ( Mattchu )

1644-1911

General Introduction and
Historical Background of the Classics

Military thought, the complex product of both violent war and intellec-
tual analysis, suffered from disparagement and disrepute during almost all
the past two millennia in Imperial China. Ignoring the original teachings of
onfuc.us, self-styled Confucians eschewed— whether sincerely or hypocrit-
ically the profession of arms and all aspects of military involvement from
the Han dynasty on, growing more vociferous in their condemnation with
the passing of centuries. However, regardless of these people’s civilized and
cultured self-perception, the nation could not be without armies or generals
particularly ,n the face of constant “barbarian” threats and ongoing conflicts
with volatile nomadic peoples. Accordingly, a number of early military trea-
nses contmued to be valued and studied and thereby managed to survive,
while the turmoil of frequent crises inevitably fostered generations of profes-
sional military figures and additional strategic studies. Yet compared to the
Confucan classics and various other orthodox writings, the military corpus
remained minuscule, numbering at most a few hundred works.

Individual chapters of several writings by influential philosophers of the
Warring States period ,403-221 B.c.), 2 such as Lord Shang, also focused
upon military matters often with radical impact,’ Many famous thinkers,
including Hsun-tzu and Han Fei-tzu/ pondered the major questions of gov-
ernment administration and military organization; motivation and training-
the nature of courage; and the establishment of policies to stimulate the’
state s material prosperity. The Tso chuan and other historical writings simi-
arly record the thoughts of many key administrators and preserve the out-

mes of famous strategies, although their presentation of battlefield tactics is
minimal.

A number of the ancient strategic monographs became relatively famous
and scholars in the Sung period (circa a.d. 1078) collected, edited, and as-
sembled the six important survivors, augmenting them with a T’ang dynasty

General Introduction and Historical Background

book; the final product was the Seven Military Classics. Thus codified, the
seven works thereafter furnished the official textual foundation for govern-
ment examinations in military affairs and concurrently provided a common
ground for tactical and strategic conceptualization.

Despite incessant barbarian incursions and major military threats
throughout its history, Imperial China was little inclined to pursue military
solutions to aggression— except during the ill-fated expansionistic policies
of the Former Han dynasty, or under dynamic young rulers, such as T'ang
T’ai-tsung, during the founding years of a dynasty. Rulers and ministers pre-
ferred to believe in the myth of cultural attraction whereby their vastly supe-
rior Chinese civilization, founded upon Virtue s and reinforced by opulent
material achievements, would simply overwhelm the hostile tendencies of
the uncultured. Frequent gifts of the embellishments of civilized life, coupled
with music and women, it was felt, would distract and enervate even the
most warlike peoples. If they could not be either overawed into submission
or bribed into compliance, other mounted nomadic tribes could be em-
ployed against the troublemakers, following the time-honored tradition of
“using barbarian against barbarian.” 6

According to Confucian thought, which became the orthodox philosophy
and prescribed state view in the Former Han, the ruler need only cultivate his
Virtue, accord with the seasons, and implement benevolent policies in order
to be successful in attracting universal support and fostering stability. Natu-
rally, there were dissenting views, and even Mencius (371-289 b.c.), the sec-
ond great Confucian, advocated punitive military expeditions to chastise evil
rulers and relieve the people’s suffering. However, except under rulers such
as Sui Yang-ti (reigned a.d. 605-617), who sought to impose Chinese suzer-
ainty on external regions — and thereby impoverished the nation — military
affairs were pressed unwillingly; most of the bureaucracy tended to disdain
anything associated with the military and the profession of arms.

Evolution of Conflict and Weapons in China

The Shang

Over the centuries Chinese military thought mirrored the evolution in weap-
ons, economic conditions, and political power while creating the framework
for strategic conceptualization and stimulating the development of battle-
field methods. Tactics appropriate to the dawn of the historical Shang period
changed in response to increased manpower, greater speed and mobility, and

Genera! Introduction and Historical Background

the invention of more-powerful shock and missile weapons. However, a criti-
cal kernel of thought that focused on basic questions, including organization,
discipline, evaluation, objectives, and fundamental principles, retained its
validity and continued to be applied until the Ch’in eventually conquered
and unified the empire, thereby signifying the end of the Warring States
period.

The Shang dynasty was a theocratic state whose power arose initially
from, and continued to depend upon, the military skills of the nobility, in
conjunction with its religious beliefs and institutions. 7 The populace was ef-
fectively divided into four classes: ruling families; royal clan members, many
of whom were enfeoffed or served as officials, and other members of the no-
bility; common people, who were essentially serfs; and slaves. 8 The king ex-
ercised great power over a central area and enjoyed the allegiance of various
lords in the peripheral territory. The nobility, which was educated and cul-
tured, lived in well-organized cities marked by massive complex buildings,
such as palaces and temples. 9 The common people, who dwelled in semi-
earthen huts, farmed or practiced various specialized crafts during most of
the year, although they were also required to provide conscript labor and
even to mobilize to assist military campaigns.

Bronze technology advanced rapidly from the official inception of the
Shang (traditionally dated as 1766 b.c., when T’ang I mounted his victori-
ous campaign over the Hsia) until its collapse at the hands of the Chou,
about 1045 b.c. 1 " Intricately detailed ritual vessels, essential to the ancestor
worship that underlay the king’s power, provide dramatic evidence of the
technological achievements and the government’s effective management and
monopoly of productive resources." Although the weapons for the nobility
were fashioned primarily from bronze, the raw materials for agricultural im-
plements and the arms carried by the commoners were largely confined to
stone, wood, and animal bones. 12 Millet and, later, wheat, were the staple
crops, and they were stored in centralized granaries after harvesting. Rice
was known, but it remained an expensive luxury even for the ruler because it
was cultivated mainly in the south. 13 The level of material culture had pro-
gressed sufficiently to sustain cities with large populations based upon orga-
nized farming and systematic exploitation of the hunt. Some animals — such
as sheep, oxen, pigs, and dogs— had been domesticated, 14 and both silk and
hemp were produced. Vessels for ordinary use were made of pottery, which
was marked by intricate designs.

Prior to the Shang dynasty, armed conflict essentially consisted of raids by
and engagements between neolithic villages, although certain clan chiefs ap-

General Introduction and Historical Background

parently developed local power bases and some regional strongmen
emerged, such as those who founded the Hsia dynasty. However, with the
rise of the Shang and the imposition of significant central authority (al-
though not administration), a royal standing army of about a thousand was
maintained. The number could be expanded as needed: The subservient lin-
eage chiefs and state rulers would be ordered to furnish supporting armies.
Although the king normally commanded in person, a rudimentary military
bureaucracy with specialized officials already existed. 15 A royal campaign
against border enemies might require three to five thousand men, and a cam-
paign directed toward an insolent state as many as thirteen thousand. Mili-
tary actions required from a few days to perhaps three months; the actual
battles generally were settled in a single confrontation, although engage-
ments lasting several days have also been recorded. 1 The army was divided
into three sections — left, right, and middle 18 — formed from two types of
units: loosely organized infantry, conscripted from the privileged popu-
lace, 19 which acted in a supporting role; and chariots, manned by the nobles
fulfilling their martial responsibilities as warriors and sustainers of the state.

Shang warfare objectives included the imposition or reinforcement of
royal suzerainty, the mass capture of prisoners, and the seizure of riches.’"
Control over areas outside the central core continued to be imposed through
a vassal-like network, rather than through integration under a centrally ad-
ministered bureaucracy. Plunder increased the wealth of the royal house and
also furnished the means to reward loyal service. Some prisoners were en-
slaved and forced to work in either agricultural or domestic tasks, but large
numbers were sacrificed as part of Shang religious ceremonies. 21

During the several hundred years of Shang rule, bronze weapons formed
an integral part of every Shang warrior’s arsenal. 22 The preferred weapon
was the ko (halberd, or dagger-ax), 23 supplemented by spears 24 and the com-
pound bow. 2 ' Bronze-tipped arrows, propelled by reflex bows whose pull
may have reached 160 pounds, provided effective action at a distance. Dag-
gers and hatchets were available for close fighting; leather armor and large
shields— the latter used in coordinated fighting tactics— offered considerable
protection against shock weapons and projectiles. Bronze helmets were
fabricated to deflect missiles and glancing blows, and thin bronze plates were
affixed as outer protection on both armor and shields. According to Warring
States theory, weapons were usually of mixed type, providing the means for
both aggressive and defensive action at close and long ranges. However, the
sword evolved slowly, apparently from daggers or perhaps the dagger-ax,
and true swords did not become common until the middle of the Warring
States period. 2

The chariot functioned as the basic fighting unit during the late Shang,
Western Chou, and Spring and Autumn (722-481 B.c.) periods; it remained
important until well into the Warring States (403-221), when it was gradu-
ally supplanted by large infantry masses and eventually, during the third cen-
tury B.C., began to be supplemented by the cavalry. Chinese tradition por-
trays the Shang as having employed seventy chariots during the campaign of
rectification to oust the evil Hsia dynasty. 28 However, twentieth-century ar-
chaeological discoveries, supplemented by textual research, indicate that the
chariot, rather than being an indigenous development, did not reach China
from Central Asia until the middle of the Shang dynasty — approximately
1300 to 1200 b.c . 29 Initially, the use of chariot was probably confined to cer-
emonies and transportation and only gradually was expanded to the hunt
and eventually to warfare. Epigraphic materials provide evidence that the
Shang relied upon infantry units of nobility to confront their enemies even
after the integration of the chariot into their military organization. In fact,
throughout the Shang, the chariot may have remained a prestige symbol; its
function during military engagements was restricted to providing transport
mobility and serving as a command platform rather than constituting a sig-
nificant military weapon.

The chariots of the late Shang and subsequent Chou periods normally car-
ried three men: the driver in the center, the archer on the left, and a warrior
with a dagger-ax on the right. Five chariots constituted a squad, the basic
functional unit, and five squads composed a brigade. Each chariot had a
complement of 10 to 25 close-supporting infantry, with an additional van-
guard of perhaps 125 men in later times. 30 A Shang team consisted of two
horses, and the rectangular chariot rode on two sturdy, multispoked wheels.
Training for warfare included large-scale royal hunts that utilized chariots,
although given the difficulty of developing driving skills and the fighting ex-
pertise appropriate to a racing chariot, far more practice must have been nec-
essary. 31 It was an expensive weapon that required craftsmen to build and
maintain; thus its use was confined to the nobility, minimally supported by
conscripted commoners. Battles accordingly resolved into a number of indi-
vidual clashes, with personal combat supposedly governed by appropriate
ceremonial constraints (probably a later romanticization). A few scholars
have seen references to hunting on horseback in certain sentences, but these
claims are generally discounted: The horse was employed only in conjunc-
tion with the chariot. However, lacking stirrups and a saddle and hampered
by his long robes, the mounted rider could not become an effective military
element until the third century B.c.

General Introduction and Historical Background

The Chou

The Chou came to power by overthrowing the Shang in a decisive battle at
Mu-yeh after many years of stealthy preparation and the gradual expansion
of their power base through carefully wrought alliances, the submission of
some smaller states, and the subjugation of other clans and peoples. Possibly
descendants of the Hsia , 32 the Chou originally dwelled to the north but had
been forced south into the Wei River valley by more-aggressive peoples . 33 As
the Chou were situated on the periphery of Shang culture, they were able to
assimilate many of the material and cultural achievements of Shang civiliza-
tion in relative freedom while successfully developing a strong agricultural
base, indigenous technology, and their own cultural identity. External bar-
barian pressures stimulated their military skills, organizational abilities, and
tactical thought simultaneously, and the Shang even entrusted them with the
task of subjugating rebellious peoples in the west, which allowed the Chou
to increase their military prowess . 34 When they mounted their final cam-
paign against the debauched, enervated Shang, the Chou’s weapons and im-
plements were similar to the Shang’s. Perhaps the only Chou innovation was
the extensive employment of chariots, facilitating more-rapid movement and
the conveying of greater quantities of weapons and supplies . 35 The Chou’s
victory probably stemmed in large part not only from the Shang’s disorgani-
zation but also from the exhaustion suffered by the Shang in fighting off hos-
tile nomadic peoples to the north and east and from their large-scale com-
mitment to a southern military expedition at the moment of attack . 36 The
Chou’s overall campaign and tactics (particularly if the Book of Documents
and the Six Secret Teachings preserve any reliable material) approached the
conflict from a new perspective— abandoning ritualistic, formal combat for
effective revolutionary activity . 37

The Chou kings were confronted with the immediate problem of ruling an
empire of disparate peoples and far-flung territories with only a small Chou
population. Although the Chou had apparently enjoyed the allegiance of
roughly eight hundred states in the final campaign against the Shang, many
had also opposed them. These enemy peoples, the tens of thousands of
Shang nobility, and even the populace of their own allies all had to be effec-
tively controlled, and smoldering rebellions quenched. Immediately after the
famous battle at Mu-yeh, King Wu had the T’ai Rung secure the Chou hold
over the surrounding area. Next, when returning to the capital, the Chou
vanquished a number of recalcitrant states lying along the corridor of their
march . 38 Finally, the Western Chou consolidated their rule through several
political and military measures, the most important of which was the en-

feoffment of powerful clan members among both allied and dissident states.
Each person so enfeoffed would establish a collateral family line and would
emigrate with his family members, retainers, and military forces. They
would constitute a Chou enclave among the local people and would immedi-
ately construct a walled town, which would function as the Chou military,
political, economic, administrative, and cultural center . 39

The Chou also forced thousands of Shang noble families to emigrate to the
eastern capital region, where they could be adequately supervised and con-
trolled, although they were allowed to retain most of their own officials, cus-
toms, and laws . 40 Thereafter, the early Chou kings imposed their rule and
consolidated their power through close connections with all the vassals thus
established. The obedience of these feudal lords was ensured by their partici-
pation in clan activities and power, was reinforced by their military and po-
litical inferiority, and was emphasized by their relative isolation — all of
which necessitated mutual cooperation under the king’s directives. The
Shang’s theocratic character was displaced by a more worldly approach, al-
though the Chou king preserved and emphasized his right to sacrifice to the
ancestors, whose intimate involvement in state affairs remained necessary,
and to Heaven, which had sanctified Chou’s revolutionary activity.

In addition to maintaining six royal armies 41 and posting garrison units
throughout the realm, the Chou also incorporated eight armies from the
vanquished Shang and could summon the forces of their own vassals as nec-
essary. These units were still composed essentially of nobility, although they
were assisted by commoners, personal retainers, and servants in a secondary
role. No doubt the shih — minor descendants of the ruling house, younger
sons of earls and dukes, and other members of the lesser nobility — also fur-
nished many of the combatants and foot support. Throughout the Western
Chou period, the actual fighting was conducted by men of rank and was
marked increasingly by mutual deference and respect, with the chariot domi-
nating as the focus of power and mobility.

The Western Chou

Following the final conquest of the peripheral areas and their integration un-
der central authority through the imposition of a feudal system, the first few
hundred years of the Western Chou period witnessed no dramatic changes in
military technology or strategy. Armor more suited to the increasingly active
role played by infantrymen appeared and evolved, thanks to improvements
in tanning and leather-working capabilities. Coincident with the consistent
advances in metallurgical skills, the shape of weapons continued to evolve
slowly, becoming longer, stronger, and more complex, eventually resulting in

General Introduction and Historical Background

the development of the true sword, which appeared in limited quantities by
the end of the Western Chou in 771 B.c. However, long weapons persisted —
for fighting either from chariots or dismounted — with the halberd (dagger-
ax) predominating.

After only four generations, the central power of the Western Chou began
to erode, dissipated partly by fatal expansionist campaigns into the south.
Early on, the Western Chou became preoccupied with barbarian threats
from the north and west, and they were impoverished as the kings continued
to grant fiefs and rewards to the loyal vassals who sustained the government.
Consequently, the feudal lords gradually rose in power, and although still re-
luctantly obedient to the king’s demands, they became increasingly self-con-
scious about their regional identities, particularly as they interacted with lo-
cal peoples and cultures. The ruling house was also plagued by weak and
incompetent rulers, some of whom had obviously forgotten that King
Chou’s debauchery was among the justifications cited when King Wu
presumptuously claimed the sanction of the Mandate of Heaven. Eventually,
in 771 B.c., a Chou king, restored to the throne through the efforts of vassal
states, was compelled to move the capital ignominiously to the east to avoid
barbarian pressures and prolong the myth of dynasty. Ironically, one of his
defensive actions was to enfeoff the ancestors of the state of Ch’in as a re-
ward for their horsebreeding efforts, in the expectation that they (who were
semibarbarians themselves) would form a bulwark against the nomadic tide.

The Spring and Autumn

The Spring and Autumn period (722-481 b.c.), named after the famous
Confucian classic chronicling the era, witnessed the rise of state power, de-
velopment of internecine strife, and destruction of numerous political enti-
ties. At its inception, descendants of the various Chou feudal lords still ruled
in most states, generally in conjunction with other members of their immedi-
ate families and the local nobility. Although they appeared to exercise su-
preme power, their positions depended largely upon the kinship system and
the state as extensions of the greater clan. With the Chou’s continued de-
cline, the states were effectively freed of their subservient status and there-
fore were able to exercise increasing independence in their activities. Their
new assertiveness reflected not only the shift in the balance of power from a
central authority to peripheral actors but also the distinct weakening of the
original ties of kinship upon which enfeoffment had been based. The passing
of generations, combined with the inherent difficulties of traveling to the
capital to participate actively in the Chou court, had contributed to this es-
trangement. Although the feudal lords continued to seek Chou sanctification

and strongmen later appeared to wield power as hegemons in the dynasty’s
name, their acquiescence in major political and military affairs had to be
sought — rather than being mandated — by the king. Freed of old constraints,
the feudal lords focused on internal strife and interstate conflict instead of
devoting themselves to performing the duties of vassals.

The locus of state power also tended to shift from the enfeoffed ruling
house to the contending parties. From the beginning to the middle of the era,
the ministerial families — mostly collateral descendants of the first feudal
lord — grew more powerful. In many states they even wrested control of the
government from the legitimate line, only to exterminate each other in the
next century. By the end of the period the surviving states all had effective
despots — either members of the founding family who had managed to
reseize power or survivors from one of the great families that had usurped
the throne. Because more than a hundred states were annexed or extin-
guished during the Spring and Autumn period — with their ruling clans and
great families reduced to commoners, enslaved, or killed — much of the origi-
nal feudal nobility ceased to exist. 42

As a result of the predatory campaigns of the stronger states, the scope of
warfare in the Spring and Autumn period increased dramatically. It necessar-
ily involved greater numbers of peasants as integral elements because it
could not depend solely upon the nobility. Sustained combat, at least on
open terrain, apparently remained centered on the chariot supported by in-
fantry forces, which grew more and more numerous. Concepts of chivalry
initially prevailed, and the ethics of battle dictated adherence to the li (forms
of propriety), although conscripted infantry were little bound by them.
Within a century, however, only the foolish and soon-to-be-defcated were
burdened by the old code of ethics, and the ancient style of individual com-
bat — despite personal challenges still offered to instigate battles — was out-
moded. 4 ’

Early in the period, campaign armies consisted of roughly several hundred
to a thousand chariots, accompanied by perhaps ten thousand men. How-
ever, by the end of the Spring and Autumn period in 481 b.c., the strong
states of Ch’in and Ch’i fielded approximately four thousand chariots each,
supported by forty thousand infantrymen. Cavalry remained unknown, and
in 541 b.c. the Chin commander even compelled his reluctant chariot forces
to dismount and — as infantrymen — engage barbarian foot soldiers. 44

Combat weapons throughout the period were similar to those of the West-
ern Chou, with the infantrymen depending more upon spears and short
swords than the dagger-ax (halberd), which was the weapon par excellence
of charioteers. 45 Metalworking skills continued to advance, resulting in

General Introduction and Historical Background

stronger, sharper, larger, and more-deadly combat tools. Yet bronze technol-
ogy remained the norm, with the newly discovered processes of iron and
steel technology (in the late Spring and Autumn period) confined largely to
the production of agricultural implements. 46

Wars occurred frequently, and even the most powerful state, should it fail
to prepare its defenses and train its soldiers, could be vanquished. Conse-
quently, the recognition and retention of individuals proficient in the mili-
tary arts became essential, and rewards — including position, honors, and
rank — for valor, strength, and military achievements were initiated. Basic
physical qualifications for members of the standing army and for those se-
lected to more elite units were maintained. 4

As talent grew in importance, resulting in social mobility, bureaucracies
staffed by capable individuals began to expand, supplementing and then dis-
placing government by members of the ruler’s clan and the entrenched nobil-
ity. More-direct forms of administration, through the establishment of dis-
tricts rather than through enfeoffment, apparently emerged, permitting the
central government to wield greater power over the entire state. Peasants
slowly began to gain land tenancy instead of being serfs; they prospered eco-
nomically as property gradually became a transferable commodity rather
than the sole possession of the king.

The Warring States Period

At the beginning of the Warring States period in 403 B.C., the pace of events
accelerated. The conflicts of the Spring and Autumn period had segmented
China into seven powerful survivor-states, 48 each contending for control of
the realm, and fifteen weaker states for them to prey upon. The feudal lords
had by then evolved into despotic monarchs who were compelled to nurture
the development of extensive economic and political bureaucracies just to
survive. In order to suppress external threats effectively, virtually every ruler
had to expand his state’s agricultural base. The immigration of disaffected
people from other states was encouraged by policies providing them with
land, and tenancy and landownership continued their swift development.
After 500 b.c. iron implements came into general use, and drainage and irri-
gation projects vastly increased the food reserves — and therefore strength —
of some areas. Trade and commerce flourished, and as a result, a class of in-
fluential merchants arose, although they continued to be officially despised.

During the Warring States period, the scale of conflict surged phenome-
nally, sustained by the increasing agricultural productivity and expanding
material prosperity. In the Shang a few thousand men once had constituted
an army, whereas now the weaker states easily fielded 100,000 and the

strongest, in the third century B.c., reportedly maintaining a standing army
of nearly a million, is said to have even mobilized 600,000 for a single cam-
paign. In the battle between Ch’in and Ch’u the total number of combatants
apparently exceeded a million, an astounding figure even after discounting
for inaccuracy and exaggeration. Numerical strength had become critical,
for in the previous campaign Ch’in, with 200,000 soldiers, had suffered a se-
vere defeat. Naturally, casualties also escalated rapidly, with 100,000 from
Wei dying at the battle of Ma-ling in 341 B.C.; 240,000 in the combined
forces of Wei and Han perishing at I-ch’Ueh in 295 B.C.; and 450,000 men of
Ch’u being slaughtered at Ch’ang-p’ing in 260 b.c. Campaigns of such mag-
nitude required lengthy periods for logistical preparation, mobilization, and
engagement. Instead of a few days or weeks on the march, with perhaps a
couple of days in battle, as in the Shang, months and even years were neces-
sary, with the battles raging for tens of days, or stalemates persisting for a
year or more.

Managing the employment of such vast resources and manpower de-
manded great expertise, and the profession of arms quickly developed.
Whereas the newly free masses were generally registered and subjected to
military training on a seasonal basis and were conscripted for combat when
needed, the army’s core had to be composed of practiced, disciplined officers
and soldiers. Drill manuals and deployment methods, as well as the tactics
they would be designed to execute, suddenly became indispensable. An ex-
tensive body of military theory appeared, stimulated not only by battlefield
and training requirements but also by new political theories and individual
philosophies. Numerous military books — remnants of which survive — were
no doubt composed during the early part of the Warring States, and their
theories found rigorous employment thereafter.

The commander’s qualifications and responsibilities also changed during
the period, with strategy becoming so complex that the replacement of a gen-
eral could, and frequently did, result in an army’s defeat and the endanger-
ment of an entire nation. Although rulers continued to meddle in army mat-
ters — with catastrophic results — often at the instigation of jealous ministers
or corrupt officials acting on behalf of foreign powers, in general, profes-
sional officers who specialized solely in military affairs appeared. Early in the
Warring States period the ideal commander was normally an effective, even
exemplary, civilian administrator, such as Wu Ch’i, but toward the end, the
civilian realm became increasingly estranged from the realities of warfare. 49

During the Shang and early Chou periods, battles were fought on agricul-
tural and otherwise open, undefended terrain, with mobilized armies en-
countering only scattered cities during their advances. Some fortifications

General Introduction and Historical Background

seem to have always existed — such as the famous thick neolithic and Shang
dynasty stampcd-earth walls that are still being discovered — but forces
could essentially roam through the countryside unhampered until encoun-
tering them. In the Warring States period the feudal lords undertook the ex-
panded defense of borders, constructing “great walls,” ramparts, forts, and
guard towers throughout the countryside to defend the entire territory
against incursion. 50 States protected their land more than their people, and
the objective of warfare changed as each state sought not to capture prison-
ers and plunder for riches but to vanquish its enemies by seizing their lands,
exterminating their armies, gaining political control of their populace, and
administratively annexing their territory.

Fortified cities, previously military and administrative centers, grew enor-
mously in significance as industry, trade, and population all flourished, and
they became focal points in the road network. Accordingly, whereas in the
Western Chou and Spring and Autumn periods it was advisable to circum-
vent these isolated cities rather than to waste men and resources besieging
and assaulting them, their capture or destruction now assumed critical im-
portance. Techniques for assault and defense advanced simultaneously, with
siege engines, mobile shields, battering rams, catapults, mobile towers, and
similar mobile devices appearing in substantial numbers. Specialists in the
technologies of assault and defense were needed: The Mohists, who created
and mastered defensive techniques and measures, became famous for their
dedication to assisting the targets of aggression. Therefore, Sun-tzu’s con-
demnation of besieging and assaulting cities had become outdated by the
time of Sun Pin’s analysis of vulnerable and impregnable targets in his Mili-
tary Methods. 5 '

The growth of mass infantry armies was also accompanied by the perfec-
tion and widespread use of the crossbow during the fourth century b.c .; 32 by
further developments in articulation, deployment, and maneuvering capabil-
ities; and by the reluctant adoption of barbarian practices to create the caval-
ry. 55 Under constant pressure from mounted steppe horsemen, various per-
ceptive commanders and rulers realized the need to develop their own
cavalry. Although the history of the horse in China is still emerging, it ap-
pears that in 307 b.c. King Wu-ling of North Chao, over vehement
objections, deliberately — to facilitate adoption of the cavalry — forced on his
troops the “barbarian style of dress” (short jacket and trousers) instead of
the indigenous and much-revered long coat of the Chinese. Since the fifth
century mounted horsemen had apparently been challenging the Chinese
states. The skill of riding probably evolved from Iran and the steppe region,
and foreign horses had long been famous in China for their speed and endur-

ance. Wu-ling created the first known cavalry, immediately providing the
state with a vastly increased offensive potential.

The saddle, when there was one, was extremely primitive — only a rolled
blanket, and stirrups did not appear until the end of the Han. Consequently,
the rider was burdened with the task of simultaneously controlling his horse
and either shooting his bow or striking with his shock weapon. The effec-
tiveness of the horsemen, acting from such an unstable platform, was inevi-
tably limited and stemmed more from their great speed and mobility than in-
herent fighting power. However, the development of the cavalry — mentioned
only briefly in the military books prior to T’ang T’ai-tsung — freed armies
from being confined to open, chariot-accessible terrain and allowed their
diffuse deployment in ravines, valleys, forests, hilly fields, and mountains,
fully exploiting the terrain. 54 Supported by vast hordes of armored
infantrymen wielding spears, crossbows, and swords (possibly of iron), 55
warfare on an unprecedented scale suddenly became both possible and inevi-
table. In the final century of conflict, the third century B.c., which witnessed
the growth and decisive triumph of Ch’in, massive campaigns requiring hun-
dreds of thousands of men executing both “explosive” and “persisting” strat-
egies decimated the populace and the countryside. In those days the strate-
gies and methods of the famous tacticians were repeatedly tested and applied
and were proven to have a timeless validity.

The State of Wei

The history of Wei, an important participant in the politics of the era, reflects
the evolution of military affairs during the Warring States period. Wu Ch’i 56
became a famous general and military administrator in Wei, whereas both
Mencius, the early Confucian standard-bearer, and Wei I.iao-tzu, reputed
progenitor of the military classic bearing his name, squandered their persua-
sive skills on King Hui. One of the seven powers in the Warring States
period, Wei had become an independent political entity in 434 B.c. when
three powerful families carved the large, formerly mighty state of Chin into
Wei, Chao, and Han. In 403 b.c. the Chou king recognized the de facto rul-
ers as feudal lords, and in 376 B.c. they completely exterminated the rem-
nants of the Chin ruling house. Situated in the central part of China between
the contending powers of Ch’in to the west and Ch’i to the east, Wei was the
strongest of the so-called three Chin. Initially, the capital was at An-i, but the
fertile plains area in which it was located lacked such natural defenses as
mountains and ravines, and the government suffered from constant pressure
from hostile neighbors in all directions. When the government was strong

General Introduction and Historical Background

and prosperous, it could retain control over the West Ho region and thus
fend off any threat from the belligerent Ch’in; when weak — through the rul-
er’s ineptitude or some disaster — it suffered repeated defeats in the incessant
warfare. Furthermore, whereas Ch’in had been successfully stymied by the
strength of the great Chin, once the latter was segmented, the successor
states — indifferent to mutual cooperation — lacked the power necessary for
independent survival.

King Wen, who reigned from the inception of Wei until 387 b.c., realized
the need for talented advisers and welcomed worthy men irrespective of their
regional origin. Li K’o, one of the outsiders who responded to this policy,
was appointed to high office and had great impact. He rewrote the laws, pro-
mulgated measures to increase agricultural production, established private
property, and fostered a stable commodity-price policy. Hsi-men Pao focused
his efforts upon irrigation, thereby greatly increasing the nation’s wealth.
Wu Ch’i, appointed commanding general, conducted numerous successful
campaigns against the Ch’in and secured the defense of the West Ho region.
King Wen’s son King Wu continued Wu Ch’i’s basic policy, thereby compel-
ling the other Chin states of Han and Chao to respect Wei’s might and pros-
perity, although Wu Ch’i was ignominiously forced by court intrigues to flee
for his life.

Unfortunately, King Hui — who assumed power in 370 B.c. — was more
successful in antagonizing people than in employing them, and he forfeited
the services of many talented individuals, such as Lord Shang (who subse-
quently was instrumental in strengthening Ch’in). Instead of nurturing har-
monious relations with his neighbors, he appears to have constantly an-
noyed them, greatly exacerbating the pressures and conflicts on all sides.
Furthermore, he eventually lost the West Ho region, thereby opening the
state to incursions by Ch’in, and was forced to move the capital to Ta-liang,
thereafter calling the state Liang.

Two famous battles illustrate the nature of warfare in this period. The
first, at Kui-ling, stemmed from King Hui’s desire to recoup losses suffered at
the hands of Ch’in in the west. Wei’s army, under the command of P’ang
Chiian, attacked Chao in the north. Finding itself hard-pressed, Chao re-
quested aid from Ch’i, in the east, on the premise that as Chao presented a
natural barrier and defense against Wei, it would be strategically advanta-
geous for Ch’i to support Chao’s efforts. Although the Ch’i ruler assented.
Sun Pin — the famous strategist whose book has recently been rediscovered —
advised waiting for the two antagonists to exhaust themselves, thereby en-
suring maximum gain with minimum risk and effort. In 352 B.c., under the
command of T’ien Chi, Ch’i mobilized an army to effect an indirect strike at

the Wei homeland, the critical city of Ta-liang, in accord with the principles
of “first seize what they love,” “attack vacuity,” and “strike where undefend-
ed.” P’ang Chiian, flushed with his victories in Chao, reacted as predicted,
racing back to mount a counterattack. Ch’i then feigned concern and with-
drew to its chosen battlefield to await the Wei army, thereby following a
number of basic tactical principles from Sun-tzu and Sun Pin, such as “with
ease await the tired.” From its fortified positions and high terrain Ch’i was
able to quickly defeat the exhausted Wei army, inflicting severe casualties at
minimal cost.

Some years later, Wei found itself being increasingly squeezed by a newly
vigorous Han, to the south, Ch’in, to the west, Ch’i, to the east, and Chao, to
the north. King Hui embarked on a campaign against Han, which had be-
come formidable through the administrative efforts of the famous theorist
Shen Pu-hai and by forming an alliance with and returning to Chao the cities
previously lost. P’ang Chiian, again entrusted with command, struck di-
rectly at the Han capital. Han, as Chao had before, sought aid from Ch’i, cit-
ing the benefits of mutual defense. Again Sun Pin advised waiting for the
forces to decimate each other, further weakening Wei. Han mounted a total
defensive effort but lost five major battles in succession and was forced to
submit to Ch’in in a desperate effort to survive. Ch’i then sallied forth, fol-
lowing the previous strategy, with Sun Pin as strategist and T’ien Chi in com-
mand. P’ang Chiian immediately abandoned his campaign in Han, turning
back toward his home state. Meanwhile, King Hui mobilized all his re-
sources, placing his son in command of the home-defense troops, with the
sole aim of seeking a decisive confrontation with Ch’i.

Under Sun Pin’s direction the Ch’i armies, which were advancing into Wei,
followed the dictum “be deceptive.” P’ang Chiian arrogantly believed the
men of Ch’i to be cowards who would flee rather than engage mighty Wei in
battle. Therefore, Sun Pin daily reduced the number of cooking fires in the
encampment to create a facade of ever-increasing desertion. He also effected
a tactical withdrawal to further entice P’ang Chiian into the favorable ter-
rain at Ma-ling where the Ch’i commander concealed ten thousand
crossbowmen among the hills. P’ang Chiian, apparently afraid that he
would miss an opportunity to inflict a severe blow on the retreating Ch’i
army, abandoned his heavy forces and supply train and rushed forth with
only light units. Arriving at night, the combined Wei forces were ambushed
as soon as they penetrated the killing zone. In addition to being decisively de-
feated by Ch’i’s withering crossbow fire, 100,000 Wei soldiers needlessly
perished because of their commander’s character flaws and hasty judg-
ment. 57

General Introduction and Historical Background

Thereafter^Wei not only never regained its former power but also suffered
numerous incursions by the now-unchecked mighty Ch’in, which would
eventually subjugate all China. In 340 B.c. Wei was forced to cede 700 // to
Ch’in after sustained defeats, and felt compelled to move its capital to Ta-li-
ang to avoid the incessant danger. Although a strong figure occasionally
emerged to effect a temporary resurgence in Wei’s strength, its territory con-
tinued to shrink until the state, together with the royal house, was finally ex-
tinguished in 225 b.c.

The Military Writings

In order to appreciate the great value and inherent importance of the Chinese
military classics, one should note several brief historical and political points.
First, military works were not normally permitted in private hands, and their
possession could be construed as evidence of a conspiracy. (Possession of the
T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings — a book advocating and instructing revolu-
tion — would be particularly fatal.) Second, almost all these teachings were at
first transmitted down through the generations, often orally and always se-
cretly. Eventually they were recorded — committed to written form on bam-
boo slips — and sometimes became public knowledge. Government scribes
and designated officials gathered the slips for state use, depositing them in
imperial libraries, where they were so highly valued that they were exempted
from the infamous book burnings of the Ch’in dynasty. Once stored away,
they were accessible to a few professors of the classics, a restricted number of
high officials, and the emperor himself. Even these privileged individuals
might still be denied access to the critical writings, especially if they were re-
lated to the imperial family.

Even after the teachings were recorded in manuscript form on bamboo,
silk, or eventually paper (after the Han dynasty), patriots sometimes felt
compelled to remove them from public domain. General Chang Liang, who
played a fundamental role in the overthrow of the tyrannical Ch’in dynasty
and in the establishment of the Han, for example, supposedly had the sole
copy of the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung, from which he had person-
ally profited, buried with him in his casket. According to one tradition, how-
ever, the text resurfaced when his tomb was vandalized in the fourth century
a.d. Another example is the well-known (although perhaps apocryphal) re-
fusal of Li Wei-kung, a famous strategist and effective general, to provide the
T’ang emperor with more than defensive knowledge and tactics. In the view
of Li Wei-kung, strategies for aggressive action should not be disseminated

because, with the empire already at peace, they could only aid and interest
those who wanted to precipitate war and incite revolution.

The seven military books, as they have been traditionally arranged in the
Seven Military Classics since the Sung dynasty, are

Sun-tzu’s Art of War

Wu-tzu

The Methods of the Ssu-ma (Ssu-ma Fa)

Questions and Replies Between T’ang T’ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung

Wei Liao-tzu

Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung

T'ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings

Although uncertainly abounds regarding the authorship and dates of several
of the classics, as well as to what extent they are composite books drawing
upon common ground and lost writings, the traditional order unquestion-
ably is not chronological. Sun-tzu’s Art of War has generally been considered
the oldest and greatest extant Chinese military work, even though the pur-
ported author of the Six Secret Teachings — the T’ai Rung — was active hun-
dreds of years earlier than the (possibly) historical Sun-tzu. Materials pre-
served in the Ssu-ma Fa reputedly extend back into the early Chou; the Wu-
tzu may have been recorded by Wu Ch’i’s disciples, although suffering from
later accretions; and the Three Strategies probably follows the Wei Liao-tzu ,
yet traditionalists still associate it with the T’ai Rung. Accordingly, one pos-
sible order (with many caveats and unstated qualifications) might well be

initial period Ssu-ma Fa
Art of War

SECOND PERIOD Wu-tZU

third period Wei Liao-tzu

Six Secret Teachings
Three Strategies

t’ang-sung Questions and Replies

Biographies of the purported authors, along with summary discussions of
the evidence for ascribing dates of composition to particular periods, are
found in the introductions to the individual translations. Much of the evi-

General Introduction and Historical Background

dence is tenuous and often circular, and the systematic study of the evolution
of strategic thought and military concepts remains to be undertaken. How-
ever, the preceding sequence — although possibly infuriating Sun-tzu advo-
cates — seems sustainable in the light of both traditional textual scholarship
and recent tomb discoveries. The relative order of books in the third period
(which probably coincides with the latter half of the third century B.c.) re-
mains to be defined. ss Although we recognize these chronological issues, for
purposes of continuity in introducing essential historical material and devel-
opments, our order of presentation places the Six Secret Teachings first, dis-
cussing the T’ai Kung as an active participant in the great Chou drama that
would affect and color Chinese history for three millennia. The Ssu-tna Fa,
which makes frequent references to Chou practices, follows, and then the
Art of War. The Wu-tzu, which might have been composed close to the time
of the Art of War, completes the early Warring States works. Thereafter, the
sequence continues in likely chronological order, with the Wei Liao-tzu, the
Three Strategies, and finally the medieval Questions and Replies.

T’ai Kung’s
Six Secret
Teachings

Translator’s Introduction, 23

I Civil Secret Teaching 40

1. King Wen's Teacher, 40

2. Fullness and Emptiness, 42

3. Affairs of State, 43

4. The Great Forms of Etiquette, 44

5. Clear Instructions, 45

6. Six Preservations, 45

7. Preserving the State’s Territory, 46

8. Preserving the State, 47

9. Honoring the Worthy, 48

10. Advancing the Worthy, 50

1 1 . Rewards and Punishments, 5 1

12. The Tao of the Military, 51

II Martial Secret Teaching 53

13. Opening Instructions, 53

14. Civil Instructions, 54

15. Civil Offensive, 56

16. Instructions on According with the People, 57

17. Three Doubts, 58

III Dragon Secret Teaching 60

18. The King’s Wings, 60

19. A Discussion of Generals, 62

20. Selecting Generals, 63

21. Appointing the General, 64

22. The General's Awesomeness, 65

23. Encouraging the Army, 66

24. Secret Tallies, 67

25. Secret Letters, 68

26. The Army’s Strategic Power, 68

27. The Unorthodox Army, 70

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

28. The Five Notes, 72

29. The Army’s Indications, 73

30. Agricultural Implements, 74

IV Tiger Secret Teaching 76

31. The Army’s Equipment, 76

32. Three Deployments, 79

33. Urgent Battles, 80

34. Certain Escape, 80

35. Planning for the Army, 82

36. Approaching the Border, 83

37. Movement and Rest, 83

38. Gongs and Drums, 84

39. Severed Routes, 85

40. Occupying Enemy Territory, 86

41. Incendiary Warfare, 87

42. Empty Fortifications, 88

V Leopard Secret Teaching 89

43. Forest Warfare, 89

44. Explosive Warfare, 89

45. Strong Enemy, 91

46. Martial Enemy, 91

47. Crow and Cloud Formation in the Mountains, 92

48. Crow and Cloud Formation in the Marshes, 93

49. The Few and the Many, 94

50. Divided Valleys, 95

VI Canine Secret Teaching 96

51. Dispersing and Assembling, 96

52. Military Vanguard, 96

53. Selecting Warriors, 97

54. Teaching Combat, 98

55. Equivalent Forces, 99

56. Martial Chariot Warriors, 100

57. Martial Cavalry Warriors, 100

58. Battle Chariots, 101

59. Cavalry in Battle, 102

60. The Infantry in Battle, 104

Translator’s Introduction

The Six Secret Teachings purportedly records the T’ai Kung’s political ad-
vice and tactical instructions to Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou dynasty in
the eleventh century b.c. Although the present book evidently dates from the
Warring States period (as is discussed at the end of this introduction), some
scholars believe it reflects the tradition of Ch’i military studies' and therefore
preserves at least vestiges of the oldest strata of Chinese military thought.
The historic T’ai Kung, to whom the Six Secret Teachings is nominally at-
tributed, has been honored throughout Chinese history to be the first fa-
mous general and the progenitor of strategic studies. In the T’ang dynasty he
was even accorded his own state temple as the martial patron and thereby at-
tained officially sanctioned status approaching that of Confucius, the re-
vered civil patron . 2

A complete work that not only discusses strategy and tactics but also pro-
poses the government measures necessary for forging effective state control
and attaining national prosperity, the Six Secret Teachings is grounded on —
or perhaps projected back into — monumental historical events. The Chou
kings presumably implemented many of these policies, thereby enabling
them to develop their agricultural and population bases, gradually expand
their small border domain, and secure the allegiance of the populace until
they could launch the decisive military campaign that defeated the powerful
Shang dynasty and overturned its six-hundred-year rule.

The Six Secret Teachings is the only military classic written from the per-
spective of revolutionary activity because the goal of the Chou was nothing
less than a dynastic revolution. Attaining this objective required perfecting
themselves in the measures and technologies of the time and systematically
developing policies, strategies, and even battlefield tactics not previously
witnessed in Chinese history. The Chou kings were compelled to ponder em-
ploying limited resources and restricted forces to attack a vastly superior,
well-entrenched foe whose campaign armies alone probably outnumbered
the entire Chou population. In contrast, many of the other strategic writings

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

focus on managing military confrontations between states of comparable
strength, with both sides starting from relatively similar military and govern-
ment infrastructures. Furthermore, although nearly all the military texts ad-
here to the basic concept of “enriching the state (through agriculture) and
strengthening the army,” many tend to emphasize strategic analysis and bat-
tlefield tactics rather than the fundamental measures necessary to create even
the possibility of confrontation . 3

The epoch-making clash between the Chou and Shang dynasties, as envi-
sioned by the Chou and idealistically portrayed in later historical writings,
set the moral tone and established the parameters for the dynastic cycle con-
cept. The archetypal battle of virtue and evil — the benevolent and righteous
acting on behalf of all the people against a tyrant and his coterie of parasitic
supporters — had its origin with this conflict. The Shang’s earlier conquest of
the Hsia, although portrayed as having been similarly conceived, occurred
before the advent of written language and was only a legend even in antiq-
uity. However, the Chou’s determined effort to free the realm from the yoke
of suffering and establish a rule of Virtue and benevolence became the inspi-
rational essence of China’s moral self-perception. As dynasties decayed and
rulers became morally corrupt and increasingly ineffectual, new champions
of righteousness appeared who confronted the oppressive forces of govern-
ment, rescued the people from imminent doom, and returned the state to be-
nevolent policies. Moreover, in the view of some historians, the Shang-Chou
conflict marked the last battle between different peoples because starting
with the Chou dynasty, military engagements within China were essentially
internal political clashes .' 1 However, confrontations between inhabitants of
the agrarian central states and the nomadic steppe peoples continued
throughout Chinese history, reflecting in part the self-conscious identity em-
phasized by the people of the central states in contrast with their “barbarian”
neighbors.

As portrayed in such historical writings as the Shih chi , 5 and in accord
with good moral tradition and the plight of the people, the Shang had
ascended to power by overthrowing the last evil ruler of the previous dy-
nasty— the Hsia . 6 After generations of rule, the Shang emperors— due per-
haps to their splendid isolation and constant indulgence in myriad plea-
sures— are believed to have become less virtuous and less capable . 7 Their
moral decline continued inexorably until the final ruler, who history has de-
picted as evil incarnate. The many perversities attributed to him included im-
posing heavy taxes; forcing the people to perform onerous labor services,
mainly to provide him with lavish palaces and pleasure centers; interfering
with agricultural practices, thereby causing widespread hunger and depriva-

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

tion; indulging in debauchery, including drunkenness, orgies, and violence;
brutally murdering innumerable people, especially famous men of virtue and
loyal court officials; and developing and inflicting inhuman punishments.
However, as the following brief excerpt from the Shang Annals in the Shih
chi records, the king was also talented, powerful, and fearsome:

In natural ability and discrimination Emperor Chou was acute and quick; his
hearing and sight were extremely sensitive; and his physical skills and strength
surpassed other men. His hands could slay a fierce animal; his knowledge was
sufficient to ward off criticism; and his verbal skills [were] sufficient to adorn
his errors. He boasted to his ministers about his own ability; he was haughty to
all the realm with his reputation; and (he) believed that all were below him. He
loved wine, debauched himself in music, and was enamored of his consorts. He
loved Ta Chi, and followed her words . 8 Thus he had Shih ChUan create new li-
centious sounds, the Pei-li dance [of licentious women), and the [lewd] music of
“fluttering down.” He made the taxes heavier in order to fill the Deer Tower
with coins, and stuffed the Chu-ch’iao storehouses with grain. He increased his
collections of dogs, horses, and unusual objects, overflowing the palace build-
ings. He expanded the Sha-ch’iu garden tower, and had a multitude of wild ani-
mals and flying birds brought there. He was disrespectful to ghosts and spirits.

He assembled numerous musicians and actors at the Sha-ch’iu garden; (he]
made a lake of wine and a forest of hanging meat, and had naked men and
women pursue each other in them, conducting a drinking feast throughout the
night. The hundred surnames looked toward him with hatred, and some of the
feudal lords revolted . 9

According to traditional sources, the Chou state was dramatically estab-
lished when Tan Fu, the Chou leader, emigrated over the mountains south
into the Wei River valley to avoid endangering his people and subsequently
abandoned so-called barbarian customs to embrace the agricultural destiny
of his ancestors. These actions immediately characterized him as a paragon
of Virtue and endowed the Chou — and subsequently China — with a seden-
tary, agrarian character. The Shi chi records it as follows:

The Ancient Duke, Tan Fu, again cultivated the [agricultural! occupation of
Hou Chi 1 and Duke Liu, accumulated his Virtue and practiced righteousness,
and the people of the state all supported him. The Hsun-yU of the Jung and Ti
[barbarians) attacked them, wanting to get their wealth and things, so he gave
them to them. After that they again attacked, wanting to take the land and peo-
ple. The people were all angry and wanted to fight. The Ancient Duke said,
“When people establish a ruler, it should be to their advantage. Now the barbar-
ians are attacking and waging war because they want my land and people. What
difference is there if the people are with them, or with me? The people want to
fight because of me, but to slay people’s fathers and sons in order to rule them, I

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

cannot bear to do it.” Then, with his relatives, he went to Pin, forded the Ch’i
River, the Chil River, crossed over Mt. Liang, and stopped below Mt. Ch’i. The
people of Pin, supporting their aged and carrying their weak, again all flocked
to the Ancient Duke below Mt. Ch’i. When the nearby states heard of the An-
cient Duke’s benevolence, many also gave their allegiance. Thereupon the An-
cient Duke discarded their barbarian customs, constructed walls and buildings,
and established cities to have them dwell separately. He set up officials for the
five offices. The people all sang songs and took pleasure in it, praising his Vir-
tue."

General Hsu Pei-ken, a twentieth-century Chinese military historian, be-
lieves the Chou easily managed to develop alliances with various peoples —
including disenchanted Hsia groups conquered by the Shang — because of
their agricultural heritage and specialization. In perpetuating the Hsia’s agri-
cultural offices, for many years the Chou had dispatched advisers to instruct
other peoples and states in farming practices and seasonal activities. This not
only garnered them respect and goodwill but also gave them an opportunity
to gain a thorough knowledge of the inhabitants, customs, and terrain out-
side the Wei River valley."

However, Chi Li — Tan Fu’s third son and heir through the virtuous defer-
ence of his two elder brothers — aggressively waged successful campaigns
against neighboring peoples and rapidly expanded the Chou’s power base.
At first the Shang recognized his achievements and sanctioned his actions,
granting him the title of earl, but he was eventually imprisoned and died at
Shang hands despite having married into their royal house. Although the his-
tory of Shang-Chou relations remains somewhat unclear, awaiting further
archaeological discoveries, several other members of the Chou royal
house — including King Wen — seem to have married Shang princesses. Gen-
erations before the Chou had migrated into the Wei River valley, commenc-
ing with King Wu Ting, the Shang had conducted several military expedi-
tions to subjugate the Chou. Shang kings had also frequently hunted in the
Chou domain but apparently grew apprehensive and abandoned this prac-
tice as Chou’s might increased. 1 '

In his old age. King Wen was also imprisoned by the tyrannical Shang
ruler for his loyal remonstrance, but he gained his freedom through lavish
bribes gathered by his family and other virtuous men . 14 The gifts presented
were so generous and impressive that King Wen, who continued to profess
his submission and fealty to the Shang, was even designated the Western
Duke, or Lord of the West. When the title was conferred, he was presented
with a bow, arrows, and axes — symbols of the attendant military responsi-
bilities that ironically required that he actively protect the empire from exter-

nal challenges. He immediately returned to his small state on the western
fringe of the Shang empire where the remoteness of the Wei River valley
proved immensely advantageous. Dwelling in essentially barbarian territory,
the people enjoyed the stimulus of vigorous military activity , 15 the harvests
of a fertile area, and the secrecy relative isolation allowed. Because King Wen
could implement effective policies to foster the state’s material and social
strength without attracting undue attention, Chou had the luxury of seven-
teen years to prepare for the ultimate confrontation . 16

The T’ai Kung

Into this state of Chou — insignificant when compared with the strength and
expanse of the mighty Shang, which continued to assert at least nominal
control over roughly three thousand small states and fiefs — came the eccen-
tric T’ai Kung, whose personal name was Chiang Shang. An elderly, some-
what mysterious figure whose early life was shrouded in secrecy, he had per-
haps found the Shang ruler insufferable and feigned madness to escape court
life and the ruler’s power. He disappeared, only to resurface in the Chou
countryside at the apocryphal age of seventy-two and become instrumental
in Chou affairs. After faithfully serving the Chou court for approximately
twenty years subsequent to his first encounter with King Wen, the T’ai Kung
was enfeoffed as king of Ch’i following the great conquest — as much to sta-
bilize the eastern area (and perhaps remove him as a military threat) as to re-
ward him for his efforts.

Apart from the T’ai Rung’s storied longevity, the initial interview between
him and King Wen is also marked by the mythic aura that frequently charac-
terizes predestined meetings between great historical figures. As recorded in
the Six Secret Teachings, the Grand Historian had noted signs portending
the appearance of a great Worthy and accordingly informed King Wen. The
king therefore observed a vegetarian fast for three days to morally prepare
for the meeting and to attain the proper spiritual state of mind. When he fi-
nally encountered him, the T’ai Kung quickly broached the ultimate subject
of revolution — of overthrowing the Shang — by responding to the king’s in-
quiry about fishing in allegorical terms. He then abandoned metaphors to
openly advise the king that the realm— indeed, the entire world— could be
taken with the proper humanitarian measures and an effective government.
Surprised by his directness, although probably assuming it was the working
of Heaven, the king immediately acknowledged the T’ai Kung as the true
Sage who was critical to realizing Chou dreams and resolved to overthrow
the Shang dynasty. Thereafter, the T’ai Kung served as adviser, teacher, confi-

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

dant. Sage, military strategist, and possibly commander-in-chief of the
armed forces to kings Wen and Wu over the many years necessary before fi-
nal victory could be realized.

The Shih chi chapter on the state of Ch'i contains a biography of its
founder, the T’ai Kung, that provides additional information and records the
developments that led to the famous interview (which purportedly is pre-
served in Chapter One of the Six Secret Teachings).

T’ai Kung Wang, Lii Shang, was a native of the Eastern Sea area. 17 His ancestor
once served as a labor director, and in assisting Yu in pacifying the waters, had
merit. In the interval between Emperor Shun and the Hsia dynasty he was en-
feoffed at LU, or perhaps at Shen, and surnamed Chiang. During the Hsia and
Shang dynasties some of the sons and grandsons of the collateral lines were en-
feoffed at LU and Shen, some were commoners, and Shang was their descen-
dant. His original surname was Chiang, but he was |subsequently| surnamed
from his fief, so was called LU Shang.

LU Shang, impoverished and in straits, was already old when, through fish-
ing, he sought out the Lord of the West (King Wen |. 18 The Lord of the West was
about to go hunting, and divined about |thc prospects]. What (the diviner] said
was: “What you will obtain will be neither dragon nor serpent, neither tiger nor
bear. What you will obtain is an assistant for a hegemon' 9 or king." Thereupon
the Lord of the West went hunting, and indeed met the T’ai Kung on the sunny
side of the Wei River. After speaking with him he was greatly pleased and said,
“My former lord, the T’ai Kung, said ‘There should be a Sage who will come to
Chou, and Chou will thereby flourish.’ Are you truly this |one] or not? My T’ai
Kung looked out | wang] for you for a long time." Thus he called him T'ai Kung
Wang, 20 and returned together with him in the carriage, establishing him as
strategist. 21

Someone said, “The T'ai Kung has extensive learning, and once served King
Chou [of the Shang]. King Chou lacked the Way (Tao|, so he left him. He trav-
eled about exercising his persuasion on the various feudal lords, 22 but didn't en-
counter anyone [suitable], and in the end returned west with the Lord of the
West.”

Someone else said, “LU Shang was a retired scholar who had hidden himself
on the seacoast. 2 ' When the Lord of the West was confined at Yu-li, San-i Sheng
and Hung Yao, having long known him, summoned Lu Shang. Lii Shang also
said, ‘1 have heard that the Lord of the West is a Worthy, and moreover excels at
nurturing the old, so I guess I’ll go there.’ The three men sought out beautiful
women and unusual objects on behalf of the Lord of the West, and presented
them to King Chou in order to ransom the Lord of the West. The Lord of the
West was thereby able to go out and return to his state.”

Although the ways they say Lii Shang came to serve the Lord of the West dif-
fer, still the essential point is that he became strategist to Kings Wen and Wu.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

After the Lord of the West was extricated from Yu-li and returned |to Chou],
he secretly planned with Lii Shang and cultivated his Virtue in order to overturn
Shang’s government. The T’ai Kung’s affairs were mostly concerned with mili-
tary authority and unorthodox stratagems, 24 so when later generations speak
about armies and the Chou’s secret balance of power [ ch'tian ,] 25 they all honor
the T’ai Kung for making the fundamental plans.

The Lord of the West’s government was equitable, (even] extending to settling
the conflict between the Yii and Jui. The poet (in the Book of Odes \ refers to the
Lord of the West as King Wen after he received the Mandate [of Heaven]. He at-
tacked Ch’ung, Mi-hsii, and Chtian-i, 26 and constructed a great city at Feng. If
All under Heaven were divided into thirds, two-thirds had (already] given their
allegiance to the Chou. 2 The T’ai Kung’s plans and schemes occupied the major
part.

When King Wen died, King Wu ascended the throne. In the ninth year, want-
ing to continue King Wen’s task, he mounted an attack in the east to observe
whether the feudal lords would assemble or not. When the army set out, the T’ai
Kung wielded the yellow battle ax in his left hand, and grasped the white pen-
non in his right, in order to swear the oath.

Ts’ang-ssu! Ts'ang-ssu . ,2S

Unite your masses of common people

with your boats and oars.

Those who arrive after will be beheaded.

Thereafter he went to Mcng-chin. The number of feudal lords who assembled of
their own accord was eight hundred. The feudal lords all said, “King Chou can
be attacked.” King Wu said, “They cannot yet.” He returned the army and made
the Great Oath with the T'ai Kung. 29

After they had remained in Chou for two years, King Chou killed prince Pi-
kan and imprisoned Chi-tzu. King Wu, wanting to attack King Chou, per-
formed divination with the tortoise shell to observe the signs. They were not
auspicious, and violent wind and rain arose. The assembled Dukes were all
afraid, but the T’ai Kung stiffened them to support King Wu. 10 King Wu then
went forth.

In the eleventh year, the first month, on the day cbia-tzu he swore the oath at
Mu-yeh and attacked King Chou of the Shang. King Chou’s army was com-
pletely defeated. King Chou turned and ran off, mounting the Deer Tower. They
then pursued and beheaded King Chou. 31 On the morrow King Wu was estab-
lished at the altars: The Dukes presented clear water; K’ang Shu-feng of Wei
spread out a variegated mat; the Shih Shang-fu [the T’ai Kung] led the sacrificial
animals; and the Scribe I chanted the prayers, in order to announce to the spirits
the punishment of King Chou’s offenses. They distributed the money from the
Deer Tower, and gave out grain from the Chu-ch’iao granary, in order to relieve
the impoverished people. They enfeoffed Pi-kan’s grave, and released Chi-tzu

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

from imprisonment. They moved the nine cauldrons, 32 rectified the government
of Chou, and began anew with All under Heaven. The Shih Shang-fu’s (T ai
Kung’s) plans occupied the major part. 33

Thereupon King Wu, having already pacified the Shang and become King of
All under Heaven, enfeoffed the T’ai Kung at Ying-ch’iu in Ch’i. The T’ai Kung
went east to go to his state, staying overnight on the road and traveling slowly.
The innkeeper said, “I have heard it said that time is hard to get but easy to lose.
Our guest sleeps extremely peacefully. Probably he isn’t going to return to his
state.” The T’ai Kung, overhearing it, got dressed that night and set out, reach-
ing his state just before first light. The Marquis of Lai came out to attack, and
fought with him for Ying-ch’iu. Ying-ch’iu bordered Lai. The people of Lai were
Yi people who, taking advantage of the chaos under King Chou and the new set-
tlement of the Chou dynasty, assumed Chou would not be able to assemble the
distant quarters. For this reason they battled with the T’ai Kung for his state.

When the T’ai Kung reached his state he rectified the government in accord
with their customs'' 1 ; simplified the Chou’s forms of propriety [//]; opened up
the occupations of the merchants and artisans; and facilitated the realization of
profits from fishing and salt. In large numbers the people turned their allegiance
to Ch’i, and Ch’i became a great state."

Then when King Ch’eng of the Chou was young, 1 '’ Kuan Shu and Ts’ai Shu
revolted, and the Yi people of the Hua River valley turned against the Chou. So
| King Ch’cngl had Duke Chao K’ang issue a mandate to the T’ai Kung: "To the
east as far as the sea, the west to the Yellow River, south to Mu-ling, and north
to Wu-ti, completely rectify and put in order the five marquis and nine earls.” 1
From this Ch’i was able to conduct a campaign of rectification and attack [the
rebellious!, and became a great state. Its capital was Ying-ch’iu.

When the T’ai Kung died he was probably more than a hundred years old. ...

The Grand Historian says: “1 went to Ch’i — from Lang-yeh which belongs to
Mt. T’ai, north to where it fronts the sea, two thousand li of fertile land. Its peo-
ple are expansive, 38 and many conceal their knowledge. It’s their Heaven-given
nature. Taking the T’ai Kung’s Sageness in establishing his state, isn’t it appro-
priate that Duke Huan flourished and cultivated good government, and was
thereby able to assemble the feudal lords in a covenant. Vast, vast, truly the style
of a great state!” 39

Despite this detailed biography of the T’ai Kung in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s gener-
ally reliable Shih chi, over the millennia Confucian skeptics even denied his
very existence. Others, perturbed by the confusing traditions regarding his
origin, consigned him to a minor role. Both groups justified their views by
citing the absence of references to the T’ai Kung in the traditionally accepted
archaic texts that supposedly provide an authentic record of these epoch-

making events — the Shang shu 40 and Ch'un ch'iu [ Spring and Autumn An-
nals. ) Thus, skeptics generally appear to follow the thinking of the second
great Confucian, the pedantic Mencius, in refusing to accept the brutal na-
ture of military campaigns and the inevitable bloodshed. 41 King Wu’s hercu-
lean efforts over the many years prior to the conquest, and his achievements
in imposing rudimentary Chou control over the vast Shang domain also tend
to be slighted. Consequently, the two figures historically associated with sa-
gacity, virtue, and the civil — King Wen and the Duke of Chou — are revered
while the strategist and final commander, the representatives of the martial,
are ignored and dismissed. However, after examining numerous stories and
references in disparate texts and winnowing away the legendary and mythic
material, other scholars and historians have concluded that the T’ai Kung
not only existed but also played a prominent role in Chou history — much as
described in the Shih chi biography. 42 Although the details of his initial en-
counter with King Wen seem likely to remain unknown, the T’ai Kung was
probably a representative of the Chiang clan with whom the Chou were mili-
tarily allied and had intermarried for generations. 41 No doubt, as with the
Hsia dynasty, whose formerly mythic existence assumes concrete dimensions
with the ongoing discovery of ancient artifacts, the T’ai Kung will eventually
be vindicated by historical evidence. 44

Policies and Strategies of the T’ai Kung

In order to realize their objectives of surviving and then conquering, the
Chou needed a grand strategy to develop a substantial material base, under-
mine the enemy’s strength, and create an administrative organization that
could be imposed effectively in both peace and war. Accordingly, in the Six
Secret Teachings the T’ai Kung is a strong proponent of the doctrine of the
benevolent ruler, with its consequent administrative emphasis on the peo-
ple’s welfare. He advocates this fundamental policy because he believes a
well-ordered, prosperous, satisfied people will both physically and emotion-
ally support their government. Only a society with sufficient material re-
sources is able to train and instruct its people, 45 to generate the spirit and
provide the supplies essential to military campaigns, and to establish the en-
vironment necessary to furnish truly motivated soldiers. Moreover, a benev-
olent government immediately becomes an attractive beacon to the op-
pressed and dispirited, to refugees, and to other states that are under the
yoke of despotic powers. It creates the confidence that if a new regime is es-
tablished, its rulers will not duplicate the errors of recently deposed evil
monarchs.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

The T’ai Kung’s basic principles, general policies, and strategic concepts
as expressed in the Six Secret Teachings are briefly summarized as follows . 46

Civil Affairs

Profit the People The T'ai Kung strongly advocates policies similar to
Mencius’s historically significant emphasis on the welfare and condition of
the people. Stimulating agriculture must be primary and should encompass
positive measures to increase productivity as well as conscious efforts to
avoid interfering with the agricultural seasons, thus minimizing the negative
impact of government actions. Virtues can only be inculcated in and de-
mands successfully imposed on the populace if an adequate material base ex-
ists. A prosperous, well-governed state inhabited by a contented people will
inevitably be respected by other powers . 4

Institute a Strong Bureaucracy and Impose Controls Although government
must be founded on moral standards and should assiduously practice virtue,
it can only govern effectively by creating and systematically imposing a sys-
tem of rewards and punishments. These policies must invariably be imple-
mented by a strong bureaucracy composed of talented men selected carefully
after insightful evaluation. Values inimical to the state, such as private stan-
dards of courage, should be discouraged. However, tolerance must be ex-
tended to allies and efforts made to avoid violating their local customs.

Rewards and punishments must be clear, immediate, and universal so they
will become part of the national consciousness. Although laws and punish-
ments should be restrained and never multiplied, those necessary to the
state’s survival should be rigorously enforced. Punishments should extend to
the very highest ranks and rewards to the lowest . 48 Only then will they prove
effective and will people be motivated to observe them regardless of their po-
s.itions and of whether their potential transgressions might be detectable.

Personal Example and Sympathy of the Ruler The ruler, and by implica-
tion all the members of government, should intensively cultivate the univer-
sally acknowledged virtues: benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, credibility,
sincerity, courage, and wisdom. Because all men love profits, pleasure, and
virtue and detest death, suffering, and evil, the ruler should develop and fos-
ter these in common with the people. Ideally, he must perceive their needs
and desires and avail himself of every possible source of information to un-
derstand their condition. Personal emotions should never be allowed to in-
terfere with the impartial administration of government, nor should the rul-
er’s pleasures or those of the bureaucracy become excessive, thereby

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

impoverishing the people and depriving them of their livelihood. The ruler
should strive to eliminate every vestige of evil in order to forge a persona that
contrasts dramatically with an enemy’s perversity, vividly presenting the
people diametrically opposed alternatives. Righteousness must always dom-
inate personal emotions and desires, and the ruler should actively share both
hardship and pleasure with his people and also project an image of doing so.
This will bind the people to him and guarantee their allegiance to the state.

Total Warfare One reason the Six Secret Teachings was excoriated over the
centuries is because the T’ai Kung insisted on utilizing every available
method to achieve victory, as did the historical figure — as conventionally
portrayed — in the Chou effort to conquer the Shang. Important measures in-
clude always anticipating the possibility of hostilities by consciously plan-
ning to employ the normal means of production for warfare 4 ' 1 ; feigning and
dissembling to deceive the enemy and allay suspicions; using bribes, gifts,
and other methods to induce disloyalty among enemy officials and to cause
chaos and consternation in their ranks; and further increasing the enemy’s
profligacy and debilitation by furnishing the tools for self-destruction — such
as music, wine, women, and fascinating rarities (jade carvings and the like).
Complete secrecy is mandated, and when the battle is joined, constraints
should not be imposed . 50

Military Affairs

Much of the book is devoted to detailed tactics for particular situations.
However, the T’ai Kung also gave advice on many topics, including cam-
paign strategy, the selection of generals and officers, training, preparation
and types of weapons, creation of new weapons, communications, battle
tactics, and organization. Many of his observations and strategies are obso-
lete, but others have enduring value. Articulation, segmentation and control,
independent action, and specialized weapons systems and their forces are
discussed extensively. The following particularly merit summary introduc-
tion.

The General The general must be carefully selected and should be properly
invested in his role as commander-in-chief with a formal ceremony at the
state altars, after which he is entrusted with absolute authority over all mili-
tary matters. Once he has assumed command, the ruler cannot interfere with
the general’s actions or decisions, primarily because valuable opportunities
might be lost or actions forced that endanger the army, but also to prevent

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

any officers from questioning the general’s authority by presuming on their
familiarity with the king . 51

Generals and commanders should embody critical characteristics in bal-
anced combinations to qualify them for leadership and be free of traits that
might either lead to judgmental errors or be exploitable and thereby doom
their forces. Several chapters enumerate these essential aspects of character
and their correlated flaws and suggest psychological techniques for evaluat-
ing and selecting military leaders . 52

Organization and Unity Both the military and civilian spheres must be
marked by unity and thorough integration if they are to be effective. Individ-
ual sections must be assigned single tasks, and an integrated system of re-
porting and responsibility should be implemented. A command hierarchy
must be created and imposed, with a full staff of general officers and techni-
cal and administrative specialists. 5 ’

Battle Iactics The T’ai Kung analyzes numerous battle situations and for-
mulates some general principles to guide the commander’s actions and his ef-
forts to determine appropriate tactics based on objective classifications of
terrain, aspects of the enemy, and relative strength of the confrontational
forces. 5 '' There are two basic categories: one in which the army is about to
engage an enemy, and one in which it suddenly finds itself at a disadvantage
in a forced encounter. The topics covered include selection of advantageous
terrain, assault methods against fortifications , 55 night attacks, counterat-
tacks, escape from entrapment, forest warfare, water conflict, mountain
fighting, valley defense, survival under fire attack, situations and topogra-
phy to avoid, techniques for psychological warfare, probing and manipulat-
ing the enemy, ways to induce fear, and methods for deception.

Despite the passage of millennia, certain prominent principles, strategies,
and tactics from the Six Secret Teachings retain validity and continue to be
employed in both the military and business spheres. Clearly, the most impor-
tant of these are deception and surprise . 56 To maximize an attack’s effective-
ness, unorthodox measures should be implemented to manipulate the enemy
psychologically and physically. Several techniques are possible, but among
the most effective are false attacks, feints, and limited encounters designed to
constantly harry deployed forces. Following these the main attack can be
launched, taking advantage of the enemy’s surprise and its expectation that
the attack is merely another ruse.

Additional tactics include inciting confusion in the enemy’s ranks,
through such tactics as disinformation, then taking advantage of the ensuing

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

chaos; overawing the enemy through massive displays of force; being aggres-
sive and never yielding the initiative; stressing speed and swiftness; availing
oneself of climatic and terrain conditions that trouble and annoy the enemy,
such as rain and wind; attacking from out of the sun or at sunset; and
mounting intensive efforts to gather intelligence. The enemy must be evalu-
ated and judgments properly rendered before a decision to attack or defend
can be made. Weaknesses in the opposing general should be fully exploited,
and assaults should be directed toward the enemy’s undefended positions.
Traps and ambushes need to be avoided but should always be deployed
when in difficulty. Forces should normally be consolidated for effective con-
centration of power rather than dispersed and weakened. Those who surren-
der should be spared to encourage the enemy to abandon its resistance. The
troops should be mobile, and their specializations should be fully utilized.
No general should ever suffer a defeat from lack of training or preparation.

Date and Authorship of the Text

The historic T’ai Kung’s relationship to the Six Secret Teachings remains
somewhat controversial and is marked by widely differing opinions. The
present Chinese title, T'ai Kung Liu-t’ao, first appeared in the “Treatise on
Literature” incorporated into the Sui shu— the history of the short-lived Sui
dynasty written in the T’ang era. Prior to this, both Liu Pei and the great gen-
eral Chu-ko Liang are noted by a San-kuo chih commentator as having high
regard for a book entitled Liu-t’ao . 57 Yen Shih-ku, the famous exegete (per-
haps erroneously) identified this work with another, similarly titled book ex-
tant in the Han dynasty that was thought to be a Chou dynasty historical
work . 58

The meaning of the title is not completely clear; however, the first charac-
ter, liu, incontrovertibly means “six.” The second character, t’ao, has the pri-
mary meaning of a “wrap,” or “cover”; within a military context it meant the
cloth wrapped around a bow or perhaps a bowcase used to carry it . 59 By ex-
tension it means “to conceal” or “to secret,” and by implication it probably
came to refer to the skills involved in using a bow in warfare and thus in mili-
tary arts in general. 6 " Thus, the Liu-t’ao should be understood as a book
containing six categorical discussions about the skills and tactics of warfare.
The title has occasionally been translated as the Six Cases. However, we have
opted to emphasize the aspect of wrapping things and thereby keeping them
secret together with the putative author’s role in teaching and advising and
have chosen the title Secret Teachings.

t'ai kung’s six secret teachings

Members of the Confucian school, including a number of prominent Sung
dynasty scholars, disparaged the Six Secret Teachings as a forgery of the
Warring States period, during which the other military writings were devel-
oped. 61 Thereafter, other pedants attributed it to the T’ang dynasty, vocifer-
ously denying it any claim to antiquity. Their main criticism focused on the
realistic nature of the work and the “despicable policies” the T’ai Kung
clearly advocates. As mentioned in the preceding discussion of the T’ai
Kung’s historicity, they dogmatically insisted that true Sages, such as the
founders of the Chou dynasty and the T’ai Kung, would not debase them-
selves or be compelled to use artifice, deception, sex, and bribes to achieve
their ends. Therefore, from their narrow perspective, the conquest of the
Shang can only be understood as the victory of culture and Virtue over bar-
barism and perversity. 62 Unfortunately, these pedants have systematically ig-
nored the ancient emphasis on both the civil and the martial and thereby
overlooked the decisive nature of the final battle and the conditions preced-
ing it wherein after an extensive forced march, the vastly outnumbered Chou
army decimated the Shang forces. (A few professional soldiers have contra-
dicted the pedants, emphasizing that the realistic character of the Chou’s
military activities and their total commitment to employing every means
possible to vanquish the evil and preserve the populace should be construed
as a clear and certain attestation to the validity of the text.)

Some traditionalists, especially historians with career military service
backgrounds, are apparently anxious to uphold the authenticity of the work
and still claim that it dates from the founding of the Chou dynasty. 6 ' Others
with more moderate viewpoints believe the core teachings could have been
preserved in terse form on bamboo and been transmitted orally by the T’ai
Kung’s descendants in the state of Ch’i, becoming the foundation for Ch’i
military studies. They acknowledge that over the centuries the original dis-
cussions probably suffered numerous accretions and losses, as is the case
with Chuang-tzu and Han Fei-tzu, which were finally compiled and revised
late in the Warring States period. 64

The confident assertions that the entire work is a T’ang forgery were dra-
matically destroyed with the discovery of a virtually identical, although only
partial, bamboo slip edition in a Han dynasty tomb in the early 1970s. 65
Combined with other Han historical references, this finding proves that por-
tions of the text assumed their present form by at least the early Han era and
has been cited by proponents of the T’ai Kung’s essential connection with the
book as evidence for their position. However, even those advocates who
staunchly believe a prototype text underlies the current Six Secret Teachings
are compelled to acknowledge several historical anachronisms. The lan-

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

guage and style of writing indicate extensive revisions, and the final commit-
ment to written form could not have occurred before perhaps the fourth cen-
tury b.c . 66 The frequent mention of advanced weapons, such as the
crossbow and sword, 6 and entire chapters devoted to cavalry tactics prove
that the penultimate author lived seven to eight hundred years later than the
T’ai Kung. For example. Chapter 55, “F.quivalent Forces,” discusses the rela-
tive effectiveness of chariots, cavalrymen, and infantrymen even though the
infantry did not become significant for centuries and the cavalry only
emerged in the third century B.c.

Several scholars have asserted that the Six Secret Teachings extensively
quotes passages and borrows concepts from the other military classics, such
as Sun-tzu’s Art of War. 6 * However, questions of priority must always be
considered subjects for debate. The Art of War may in fact be terse and ab-
stract because Sun-tzu benefited from this tradition of military thought and,
as with the authors of such other works as the Wei Liao-tzu, availed himself
of concepts from the embryonic text of the Six Secret Teachings and assidu-
ously assimilated common sayings. 69 In the Warring States period, thorough
familiarity with all extant military thought would have been essential if
states and commanders were to survive. Therefore, the absence of both con-
ceptual and textual borrowing would probably be more remarkable than the
presence thereof because it would indicate highly segmented and strictly pre-
served schools of tactics and secret strategy.

One final viewpoint regarding the text’s transmission holds that the fa-
mous military writing given to Chang Liang in the turbulent years preceding
the Han dynasty’s founding was the Six Secret Teachings rather than the
Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung. 70 This book would be particularly ap-
propriate because of its historical echoes: Its readers were committed to the
populist overthrow of another brutal, oppressive ruling house — the Ch’in.
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the book was actually composed by a
military expert in the third century B.c. when the Ch’in were relentlessly de-
stroying their enemies and consolidating their power.' 1 This would explain
the mature development of concepts and strategies, the extensive knowledge
of weapons and defensive equipment, the emphasis on benevolent govern-
ment, and the efforts to preserve the book’s secrecy.

The Six T’ao

Most commentators characterize the first two Secret Teachings as focusing
on grand strategy and planning for war and the last four as falling within the
category of tactical studies. 72 However, because either the original authors of

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

t’ai kung's six secret teachings

the Six Secret Teachings failed to provide any explanations for their appar-
ently thematic groupings or such prefatory material has been lost, it is diffi-
cult to perceive any intrinsic connection between titles such as “dragon” and
the contents of the section. Only the first two Secret Teachings, the Civil and
the Martial, which focus on the two foundations for conducting warfare —
an economically sound, well-administered state with a motivated populace,
and a strong army — have contents that justify their titles. Although a few at-
tempts have been made to discern thematic issues underlying the six individ-
ual classifications, such distinctions often appear inadequate to support as-
signing a particular chapter to one Teaching or another without knowledge
of the extant work.

Although the Table of Contents for this section provides a general indica-
tion of each Teaching’s topics and the translator’s introduction surveys the
main subjects in some detail, a brief characterization of the individual Teach-
ings may still be useful.

Civil T'ao

Moral, effective government is the basis for survival and the foundation for
warfare. The state must thrive economically while limiting expenditures,
foster appropriate values and behavior among the populace, implement re-
wards and punishments, employ the worthy, and refrain from disturbing or
harming the people . 73

Martial T'ao

The Martial Secret Teaching continues the Civil T’ao’s discussion of politi-
cal, rather than military, measures. It begins with the T’ai Kung’s analysis of
the contemporary political world and his assessment of the Chou’s prospects
for successfully revolting against the Shang if their avowed objective is to
save the world from tyranny and suffering. Attracting the disaffected weak-
ens the enemy and strengthens the state; employing subterfuge and psycho-
logical techniques allows manipulation of the enemy and hastens its demise.

I he ruler must visibly cultivate his Virtue and embrace government policies
that will allow the state to compete for the minds and hearts of the people;
the state will thus gain victory without engaging in battle . 74

Dragon T'ao

The Dragon Secret Teaching focuses primarily on military organization, in-
cluding the specialized responsibilities of the command staff, the characteris-
tics and qualifications of generals and methods for their evaluation and se-
lection, the ceremony appropriate for commissioning a commanding general

to ensure that his independence and awesomeness are established, the impor-
tance of rewards and punishments in creating and maintaining the general’s
awesomeness and authority, and essential behavior if the general is to truly
command in person and foster allegiance and unity in his troops. Secondary
issues concern military communications and the paramount need for se-
crecy; evaluation of the situation and how to act decisively when the mo-
ment arrives; an understanding of basic tactical principles, including flexibil-
ity and the unorthodox, and avoiding the common errors of command;
various cues for fathoming the enemy’s situation; and the everyday basis for
military skills and equipment.

Tiger T'ao

The Tiger Secret Teaching opens with a discussion of the important catego-
ries of military equipment and weapons, then continues with widely ranging
expositions on tactical principles and essential issues of command. Although
types of deployment are considered briefly, and the necessary preparation of
amphibious equipment is addressed, most of the chapters provide tactics for
extricating oneself from adverse battlefield situations. The solutions gener-
ally emphasize speed, maneuverability, unified action, decisive commitment,
the employment of misdirection, the establishment of ambushes, and the ap-
propriate use of different types of forces.

Leopard T'ao

The Leopard Secret Teaching emphasizes tactical solutions for particularly
difficult types of terrain, such as forests, mountains, ravines and defiles,
lakes and rivers, deep valleys, and other constricted locations. It also con-
tains discussions of methods to contain rampaging invaders, confront supe-
rior forces, deploy effectively, and act explosively.

Canine T'ao

The most important chapters in the Canine Secret Teaching expound on de-
tailed principles for appropriately employing the three component forces —
chariots, infantry, and cavalry — in a wide variety of concrete tactical situa-
tions and discuss their comparative battlefield effectiveness. Another section
describes deficiencies and weaknesses in the enemy that can and should be
exploited immediately with a determined attack. Finally, several chapters ad-
dress general issues that seem more appropriate to the Dragon Secret Teach-
ing: the identification and selection of highly motivated, physically talented
individuals for elite infantry units and for the cavalry and chariots; and
methods for training the soldiers.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

CIVIL SECRET TEACHING

I . King Wen’s Teacher

King Wen intended to go hunting, so Pien, the Scribe, performed divination
to inquire about his prospects. The Scribe reported: “While hunting on the
north bank of the Wei river you will get a great catch. It will not be any form
of dragon, nor a tiger or great bear. According to the signs, you will find a
duke or marquis there whom Heaven has sent to be your teacher. If em-
ployed as your assistant, you will flourish and the benefits will extend to
three generations of Chou kings.”

King Wen asked: “Do the signs truly signify this?”

The Scribe Pien replied: “My Supreme Ancestor, the Scribe Ch’ou, when
performing divination for the Sage Emperor Shun , 1 obtained comparable in-
dications. Emperor Shun then found Kao-yao to assist him.”

King Wen then observed a vegetarian regime for three days to purify him-
self, then mounted his hunting chariot. Driving his hunting horses, he went
out to hunt on the northern bank of the Wei river. Finally he saw the T’ai
Kung sitting on a grass mat fishing. King Wen greeted him courteously and
then asked: “Do you take pleasure in fishing?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “The True Man of Worth' takes pleasure in attain-
ing his ambitions; the common man takes pleasure in succeeding in his lordi-
nary) affairs. Now my fishing is very much like this.”

“What do you mean it is like it?” inquired the king.

The T’ai Kung responded: “In fishing there are three forms of authority : 3
the ranks of salary, death, and offices. Fishing is the means to obtain what
you seek. Its nature is deep, and from it much greater principles can be dis-
cerned.”

King Wen said: “I would like to hear about its nature.”

The T’ai Kung elaborated: “When the source is deep, the water flows ac-
tively. When the water flows actively, fish spawn there. This is nature. When

the roots are deep, the tree is tall. When the tree is tall, fruit is produced. This
is nature. When True Men of Worth have sympathies and views in common,
they will be drawn together. When they are drawn together affairs arise . 4
This is nature.

“Speech and response are the adornment of inner emotions. Speaking
about true nature is the pinnacle of affairs. Now if I speak about true nature,
without avoiding any topic, will you find it abhorrent?”

King Wen replied: “Only a man of true humanity' can accept corrections
and remonstrance. I have no abhorrence of true nature, so what is your
meaning?”

The T’ai Kung said: “When the line is thin and the bait glittering, only
small fish will eat it. When the line is heavier and the bait fragrant, medium-
sized fish will eat it. But when the line is heavy and the bait generous, large
fish will eat it. When the fish take the bait, they will be caught on the line.
When men take their salary, they will submit to the ruler. When you catch
fish with bait, the fish can be killed. When you catch men with remunera-
tion, they can be made to exhaust their abilities for you. If you use your fam-
ily to gain the state, the state can be plucked. If you use your state, the world
can be completely acquired.

“Alas, flourishing and florid, although they assemble together they will be
scattered! Silent and still, the Sage Ruler’s glory will inevitably extend far!
Subtle and mysterious, the Virtue of the Sage Ruler as it attracts the people!
He alone sees it. Wondrous and joyful, the plans of the Sage Ruler through
which everyone seeks and returns to their appropriate places, while he
establishes the measures that will gather in their hearts.”

King Wen inquired: “How shall we proceed to establish measures so that
All under Heaven will give their allegiance?”

The T’ai Kung said: “All under Heaven is not one man’s domain. All un-
der Heaven means just that, all under Heaven. Anyone who shares profit
with all the people under Heaven will gain the world. Anyone who monopo-
lizes its profits will lose the world. Heaven has its seasons, Earth its re-
sources. Being capable of sharing these in common with the people is true
humanity. Wherever there is true humanity. All under Heaven will give their
allegiance.

“Sparing the people from death, eliminating the hardships of the people,
relieving the misfortunes of the people, and sustaining the people in their ex-
tremities is Virtue. Wherever there is Virtue, All under Heaven will give their
allegiance.

“Sharing worries, pleasures, likes, and dislikes with the people constitutes
righteousness. Where there is righteousness the people will go.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

“In general, people hate death and take pleasure in life. They love Virtue
and incline to profit. The ability to produce profit accords with the Tao.
Where the Tao resides. All under Heaven will give their allegiance.”

King Wen bowed twice and said: “True wisdom! Do I dare not accept
Heaven’s edict and mandate?”

He had the T’ai Kung ride in the chariot and returned with him, establish-
ing him as his teacher.

2. Fullness and Emptiness 6

King Wen inquired of the T’ai Kung: “The world is replete with a dazzling
array of states — some full, others empty, some well ordered, others in chaos.
How does it come to be thus? Is it that the moral qualities of these rulers are
not the same? Or that the changes and transformations of the seasons of
Heaven naturally cause it to be thus?”

The T’ai Kung said: “If the ruler lacks moral worth, then the state will be
in danger and the people in turbulence. If the ruler is a Worthy or a Sage,
then the state will be at peace and the people well ordered. Fortune and mis-
fortune lie with the ruler, not with the seasons of Heaven.”

King Wen: "May I hear about the Sages of antiquity?”

T’ai Kung: “Former generations referred to Emperor Yao, in his kingship
over the realm in antiquity, as a Worthy ruler.”

King Wen: “What was his administration like?”

T’ai Kung: “When Yao was king of the world he did not adorn himself
with gold, silver, pearls, and jade. He did not wear brocaded, embroidered,
or elegantly decorated clothes. He did not look at strange, odd, rare, or un-
usual things. He did not treasure items of amusement nor listen to licentious
music. He did not whitewash the walls around the palace or the buildings
nor decoratively carve the beams, square and round rafters, and pillars. He
did not even trim the reeds that grew all about his courtyards. He used a
deerskin robe to ward off the cold, while simple clothes covered his body. He
ate coarse millet and unpolished grains and thick soups from rough vegeta-
bles. He did not, through the [untimely imposition of| labor service, injure
the people’s seasons for agriculture and sericulture. He reduced his desires
and constrained his will, managing affairs by nonaction.

“He honored the positions of the officials who were loyal, upright, and
upheld the laws, and made generous the salaries of those who were pure and
scrupulous and loved people. He loved and respected those among the peo-
ple who were filial and compassionate, and he comforted and encouraged
those who exhausted their strength in agriculture and sericulture. Pennants

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

distinguished the virtuous from the evil, being displayed at the gates of the
village lanes. He tranquilized his heart and rectified the constraints [of social
forms ). 8 With laws and measures he prohibited evil and artifice.

“Among those he hated, if anyone had merit he would invariably reward
him. Among those he loved, if anyone were guilty of an offense he would cer-
tainly punish him. He preserved and nurtured the widows, widowers, or-
phans, and solitary elderly and gave aid to the families who had suffered
misfortune and loss.

“What he allotted to himself was extremely meager, the taxes and services
he required of the people extremely few. Thus the myriad peoples were pros-
perous and happy and did not have the appearance of suffering from hunger
and cold. The hundred surnames revered their ruler as if he were the sun and
moon and gave their emotional allegiance as if he were their father and
mother.”

King Wen: “Great is the Worthy and Virtuous ruler!”

3. Affairs of State

King Wen said to the T’ai Kung: “I would like to learn about the affair of ad-
ministering the state. If I want to have the ruler honored and the people set-
tled, how should I proceed?”

T'ai Kung: “Just love the people.”

King Wen: “How does one love the people?”

T’ai Kung: “Profit them, do not harm them. Help them to succeed, do not
defeat them. Give them life, do not slay them. Grant, do not take away. Give
them pleasure, do not cause them to suffer. Make them happy, do not cause
them to be angry.”

King Wen: “May I dare ask you to explain the reasons for these?”

T’ai Kung: “When the people do not lose their fundamental occupations,
you have profited them. When the farmers do not lose the agricultural sea-
sons, you have completed them. [When you reduce punishments and fines,
you give them life. 9 ) When you impose light taxes, you give to them. When
you keep your palaces, mansions, terraces, and pavilions few, you give them
pleasure. When the officials are pure and neither irritating nor troublesome,
you make them happy.

“But when the people lose their fundamental occupations, you harm
them. When the farmers lose the agricultural seasons, you defeat them.
When they are innocent but you punish them, you kill them. When you im-
pose heavy taxes, you take from them. When you construct numerous pal-
aces, mansions, terraces, and pavilions, thereby wearing out the people’s

t’ai kung's six secret teachings

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

strength, you make it bitter for them. When the officials are corrupt, irritat-
ing, and troublesome, you anger them.

Thus one who excels at administering a state governs the people as par-
ents govern their beloved children or as an older brother acts toward his be-
loved younger brother. When they see their hunger and cold, they are trou-
bled for them. When they see their labors and suffering, they grieve for them.

“Rewards and punishments should be implemented as if being imposed
upon yourself. Taxes should be imposed as if taking from yourself. This is
the Way to love the people.”

4. The Great Forms of Etiquette

King Wen asked T ai Kung: “What is the proper form of etiquette (/;) 10 be-
tween ruler and minister?”

The T’ai Kung said: “The ruler only needs to draw near to the people; sub-
ordinates only need to be submissive. He must approach them, not being dis-
tant from any. They must be submissive without hiding anything. The ruler
wants only to be all-encompassing; subordinates want only to be settled |in
their positions!. If he is all-encompassing he will be like Heaven. If they are
settled, they will be like Earth. One Heaven, one Earth — the Great Li is then
complete.”

King Wen: “How should the ruler act in his position?”

I'ai Kung: “He should be composed, dignified, and quiet. His softness
and self-constraint should be established first. He should excel at giving and
not be contentious. He should empty his mind and tranquilize his intentions,
awaiting events with uprightness.”

King Wen inquired: “How should the ruler listen to affairs?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “He should not carelessly allow them nor go
against opinion and oppose them. If he allows them in this fashion, he will
lose his central control; if he opposes them in this way, he will close off his
access.

"He should be like the height of a mountain which— when looked up to—
cannot be perceived, or the depths of a great abyss which— when mea-
sured— cannot be fathomed. Such spiritual and enlightened Virtue is the pin-
nacle of uprightness and tranquility.”

King Wen inquired: “What should the ruler’s wisdom be like?”

The T'ai Kung: “The eye values clarity, the ear values sharpness, the mind
values wisdom. If you look with the eyes of All under Heaven, there is noth-
ing you will not see. If you listen with the ears of All under Heaven, there is
nothing you will not hear. If you think with the minds of All under Heaven,

there is nothing you will not know. When [you receive information from all
directions], just like the spokes converging on the hub of a wheel, your clar-
ity will not be obfuscated.”

5. Clear Instructions

King Wen, lying in bed seriously ill, summoned T’ai Kung Wang and Impe-
rial Prince Fa [King Wu] to his side. “Alas, Heaven is about to abandon me.
Chou’s state altars will soon be entrusted to you. Today I want you, my
teacher, to discuss the great principles of the Tao in order to clearly transmit
them to my son and grandsons.”

T’ai Kung said: “My king, what do you want to ask about?”

King Wen: “May I hear about the Tao of the former Sages — where it stops,
where it begins?”

T’ai Kung: “If one sees good but is dilatory [in doing it], if the time for ac-
tion arrives and one is doubtful, if you know something is wrong but you
sanction it — it is in these three that the Tao stops. If one is soft and quiet, dig-
nified and respectful, strong yet genial, tolerant yet hard — it is in these four
that the Tao begins. Accordingly, when righteousness overcomes desire one
will flourish; when desire overcomes righteousness one will perish. When re-
spect overcomes dilatoriness it is auspicious; when dilatoriness overcomes
respect one is destroyed.”

6. Six Preservations

King Wen asked the T’ai Kung: “How docs the ruler of the state and leader
of the people come to lose his position?”

The T’ai Kung said: “He is not cautious about whom he has as associates.
The ruler has ‘six preservations’ and ‘three treasures.'”

King Wen asked: “What are the six preservations?”

The T’ai Kung: “The first is called benevolence, the second righteousness,
the third loyalty, the fourth trust [good faith), the fifth courage, and the sixth
planning. These are referred to as the ‘six preservations.’”

King Wen asked: “How does one go about carefully selecting men using
the six preservations?”

T’ai Kung: “Make them rich and observe whether they do not commit of-
fenses. Give them rank and observe whether they do not become arrogant.
Entrust them with responsibility and see whether they will not change. Em-
ploy them and see whether they will not conceal anything. Endanger them

t'ai rung’s six secret teachings

and see whether they are not afraid. Give them the management of affairs
and see whether they are not perplexed.

If you make them rich but they do not commit offenses, they are benevo-
lent. If you give them rank and they do not grow arrogant, they are righ-
teous. If you entrust them with office and they do not change, they are loyal.
If you employ them and they do not conceal anything, they are trustworthy.
If you put them in danger and they are not afraid, they are courageous. If you
give them the management of affairs and they are not perplexed, they are ca-
pable of making plans.

“The ruler must not loan the ‘three treasures’ to other men. If he loans
them to other men the ruler will lose his awesomeness.”

King Wen: “May I ask about the three treasures?”

T’ai Rung: “Great agriculture, great industry, and great commerce arc re-
ferred to as the ‘three treasures.’ If you have the farmers dwell solely in dis-
tricts of farmers, then the five grains will be sufficient. If you have the arti-
sans dwell solely in districts of artisans, then the implements will be
adequate. If you have the merchants dwell solely in districts of merchants,
then the material goods will be sufficient."

“If the three treasures are each settled in their places, then the people will
not scheme. Do not allow confusion among their districts, do not allow con-
fusion among their clans. Ministers should nor be more wealthy than the
ruler. No other cities should be larger than the ruler’s state capital. When the
six preservations are fully implemented, the ruler will flourish. When the
three treasures are complete, the state will be secure.”

7. Preserving the State’s Territory

King Wen asked the T’ai Rung: “How does one preserve the state’s territo-
ry?”

T’ai Rung: “Do not estrange your relatives. Do not neglect the masses. Be
conciliatory and solicitous toward nearby states and control the four quar-
ters.

“Do not loan the handles of state to other men . 12 If you loan the handles of
state to other men, then you will lose your authority [ch'iian]. Do not dig
valleys deeper to increase hills. Do not abandon the foundation to govern the
branches. When the sun is at midday you should dry things. If you grasp a
knife you must cut. If you hold an ax you must attack.

“If, at the height of the day, you do not dry things in the sun, this is termed
losing the time. If you grasp a knife but do not cut anything, you will lose the

t'ai rung’s six secret teachings

moment for profits. If you hold an ax but do not attack, then bandits will
come.

“If trickling streams are not blocked, they will become great rivers. If you
do not extinguish the smallest flames, what will you do about a great confla-
gration? If you do not eliminate the two-leaf sapling, how will you use your
ax [when the tree has grown)?

“For this reason the ruler must focus on developing wealth within his
state. Without material wealth he has nothing with which to be benevolent.
If he does not bespread beneficence he will have nothing with which to bring
his relatives together . 11 If he estranges his relatives it will be harmful. If he
loses the common people he will be defeated.

“Do not loan sharp weapons to other men . 14 If you loan sharp weapons to
other men, you will be hurt by them and will not live out your allotted span
of years.”

King Wen said: “What do you mean by benevolence and righteousness?”

The T'ai Rung: “Respect the common people, unite your relatives. If you
respect the common people they will be at peace. And if you unite your rela-
tives they will be happy. This is the way to implement the essential cords of
benevolence and righteousness.

“Do not allow other men to snatch away your awesomeness. Rely on your
wisdom, follow the constant. Those that submit and accord with you, treat
generously with Virtue. Those that oppose you, break with force. If you re-
spect the people and arc decisive, then All under Heaven will be peaceful and
submissive.”

8. Preserving the State

King Wen asked the T’ai Rung: “How does one preserve the state?”

T’ai Rung: “You should observe a vegetarian fast, for I am about to speak
to you about the essential principles of Heaven and Earth, what the four sea-
sons produce, the Tao of true humanity and sagacity, and the nature of the
people’s impulses.”

The King observed a vegetarian regime for seven days, then, facing north,
bowed twice and requested instruction.

The T’ai Rung said: “Heaven gives birth to the four seasons, Earth pro-
duces the myriad things. Under Heaven there are the people, and the Sage
acts as their shepherd.

“Thus the Tao of spring is birth and the myriad things begin to flourish.
The Tao of summer is growth; the myriad things mature. The Tao of autumn
is gathering; the myriad things are full. The Tao of winter is storing away;

t'ai kung’s six secret teachings

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

the myriad things are still. When they are full they are stored away; after they
are stored away they again revive. No one knows where it ends, no one
knows where it begins. The Sage accords with it and models himself on
Heaven and Earth. Thus when the realm is well ordered, his benevolence and
sagacity are hidden. When All under Heaven are in turbulence, his benevo-
lence and sagacity flourish. This is the true Tao.

“In his position between Heaven and Earth, what the Sage treasures is
substantial and vast. Relying on the constant to view it, the people are at
peace. But when the people are agitated it creates impulses. When impulses
stir, conflict over gain and loss arises. Thus it is initiated in yin, but coalesces
in yang. If someone ventures to be the first leader, All under Heaven will
unite with him . 1 5 At the extreme, when things return to normal, do not con-
tinue to advance and contend, do not withdraw and yield. If you can pre-
serve the state in this fashion, you will share the splendor of Heaven and
Earth.”

9. Honoring the Worthy

King Wen asked the T’ai Kung: “Among those I rule , 16 who should be ele-
vated, who should he placed in inferior positions? Who should be selected
for employment, who cast aside? How should they be restricted, how
stopped?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Elevate the Worthy, and place the unworthy in infe-
rior positions. Choose the sincere and trustworthy, eliminate the deceptive
and artful. Prohibit violence and turbulence, stop extravagance and ease.
Accordingly, one who exercises kingship over the people recognizes ‘six
thieves’ and ‘seven harms.’”

King Wen said: “I would like to know about its Tao."

T’ai Kung: “As for the ‘six thieves’:

First, if your subordinates build large palaces and mansions, pools and
terraces, and amble about enjoying the pleasures of scenery and female musi-
cians, it will injure the king’s Virtue.

“Second, when the people are not engaged in agriculture and sericulture
but instead give rein to their tempers and travel about as bravados, disdain-
ing and transgressing the laws and prohibitions, not following the instruc-
tions of the officials, it harms the king’s transforming influence . 17

Third, when officials form cliques and parties — obfuscating the worthy
and wise, obstructing the ruler’s clarity— it injures the king’s authority
[ch'iian\.

“Fourth, when the knights are contrary-minded and conspicuously dis-
play ‘high moral standards’ — taking such behavior to be powerful expres-
sion of their ch’i 18 — and have private relationships with other feudal lords —
slighting their own ruler — it injures the king’s awesomeness.

“Fifth, when subordinates disdain titles and positions, are contemptuous
of the administrators, and are ashamed to face hardship for their ruler, it in-
jures the efforts of the meritorious subordinates.

“Sixth, when the strong clans encroach on others — seizing what they
want, insulting and ridiculing the poor and weak — it injures the work of the
common people.

“The ‘seven harms’:

“First, men without knowledge or strategic planning ability are generously
rewarded and honored with rank. Therefore, the strong and courageous
who regard war lightly take their chances in the field. The king must be care-
ful not to employ them as generals.

“Second, they have reputation but lack substance. What they say is con-
stantly shifting. They conceal the good and point out deficiencies. They view
advancement and dismissal as a question of skill. The king should be careful
not to make plans with them.

“Third, they make their appearance simple, wear ugly clothes, speak
about actionless action in order to seek fame, and talk about non-desire in
order to gain profit. They are artificial men, and the king should be careful
not to bring them near.

“Fourth, they wear strange caps and belts, and their clothes are overflow-
ing. They listen widely to the disputations of others and speak speciously
about unrealistic ideas, displaying them as a sort of personal adornment.
They dwell in poverty and live in tranquility, deprecating the customs of the
world. They are cunning people, and the king should be careful not to favor
them.

“Fifth, with slander, obsequiousness, and pandering, they seek office and
rank. They are courageous and daring, treating death lightly, out of their
greed for salary and position. They are not concerned with major affairs but
move solely out of avarice. With lofty talk and specious discussions, they
please the ruler. The king should be careful not to employ them.

“Sixth, they have buildings elaborately carved and inlaid. They promote
artifice and flowery adornment to the injury of agriculture. You must pro-
hibit them.

“Seventh, they create magical formulas and weird techniques, practice sor-
cery and witchcraft, advance unorthodox ways, and circulate inauspicious
sayings, confusing and befuddling the good people. The king must stop them.

t'ai kung’s six secret teachings

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

"Now when the people do not exhaust their strength, they are not our
people. If the officers are not sincere and trustworthy, they are not our offi-
cers. If the ministers do not offer loyal remonstrance, they are not our minis-
ters. If the officials are not evenhanded, pure, nor love the people, they are
not our officials. If the chancellor cannot enrich the state and strengthen the
army, harmonize yin and yang, and ensure security for the ruler of a state of
ten thousand chariots — and moreover properly control the ministers, set
names and realities, make clear rewards and punishments, and give pleasure
to the people— he is not our chancellor.

“Now the Tao of the king is like that of a dragon’s head. He dwells in the
heights and looks out far. He sees deeply and listens carefully. He displays his
form but conceals his nature. He is like the heights of Heaven, which cannot
be perceived. He is like the depths of an abyss, which cannot be fathomed.
Thus if he should get angry but does not, evil subordinates will arise. If he
should execute but does not, great thieves will appear. If strategic military
power is not exercised, enemy states will grow strong.”

King Wen said: “Excellent!”

10. Advancing the Worthy

King Wen asked the T’ai Kung: “How does it happen that a ruler may exert
himself to advance the Worthy but is unable to obtain any results from such
efforts, and in fact the world grows increasingly turbulent, even to the point
that he is endangered or perishes?”

1 ’ai Kung: "If one advances the Worthy but doesn’t employ them, this is
attaining the name of ‘advancing the Worthy’ but lacking the substance of
‘using the Worthy.’”

King Wen asked: “Whence comes the error?”

T’ai Kung: “The error lies in wanting to employ men who are popularly
praised rather than obtaining true Worthies.”

King Wen: “How is that?”

The T’ai Kung said: “If the ruler takes those that the world commonly
praises as being Worthies and those that they condemn as being worthless,
then the larger cliques will advance and the smaller ones will retreat. In this
situation groups of evil individuals will associate together to obscure the
Worthy. Loyal subordinates will die even though innocent. And perverse
subordinates will obtain rank and position through empty fame. In this way,
as turbulence continues to grow in the world, the state cannot avoid danger
and destruction.”

King Wen asked: “How does one advance the Worthy?”

T’ai Kung replied: “Your general and chancellor should divide the respon-
sibility, each of them selecting men based on the names of the positions. In
accord with the name of the position, they will assess the substance required.
In selecting men, they will evaluate their abilities, making the reality of their
talents match the name of the position. When the name matches the reality,
you will have realized the Tao for advancing the Worthy.” 19

1 1 . Rewards and Punishments

King Wen asked the T’ai Kung: "Rewards are the means to preserve the en-
couragement [of the good), punishments the means to display the rectifica-
tion of evil. By rewarding one man 1 want to stimulate a hundred, by punish-
ing one man rectify the multitude. How can I do it?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In general, in employing rewards one values credibil-
ity; in employing punishments one values certainty. When rewards are
trusted and punishments inevitable wherever the eye sees and the ear hears,
then even where they do not see or hear there is no one who will nor be trans-
formed in their secrecy. Since the ruler’s sincerity extends to Heaven and
Earth and penetrates to the spirits, how much the more so to men?”

12. The Tao of the Military

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “What is the Tao of the military?” 2 "

The T’ai Kung said: “In general, as for the Tao of the military, nothing
surpasses unity. The unified can come alone, can depart alone. The Yellow
Emperor said: ‘Unification approaches the Tao and touches on the spiritual.’
Its employment lies in the subtle; 2 ' its conspicuous manifestation lies in the
strategic configuration of power; its completion lies with the ruler. Thus the
Sage Kings termed weapons evil implements, but when they had no alterna-
tive, they employed them.

“Today the Shang king knows about existence, but not about perishing.
He knows pleasure, but not disaster. Now existence does not lie in existence,
but in thinking about perishing. Pleasure does not lie in pleasure, but in con-
templating disaster. Now that you have already pondered the source of such
changes, why do you trouble yourself about the future flow of events?”

King Wu said: “Suppose two armies encounter each other. The enemy can-
not come forward, and we cannot go forward. Each side goes about estab-
lishing fortifications and defenses without daring to be the first to attack. If I
want to launch a sudden attack but lack any tactical advantage, what should
Ido?”

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

The T'ai Kung said: “Make an outward display of confusion while actu-
ally being well ordered. Show an appearance of hunger while actually being
well fed. Keep your sharp weapons within and show only dull and poor
weapons outside. Have some troops come together, others split up; some as-
semble, others scatter . 22 Make secret plans, keep your intentions secret.
Raise the height of fortifications, and conceal your elite troops. If the officers
are silent, not making any sounds, the enemy will not know our prep-
arations. Then if you want to take his western flank, attack the eastern one.”
King Wu said: “If the enemy knows my true situation and has penetrated
my plans, what should I do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “The technique for military conquest is to carefully
investigate the enemy’s intentions and quickly take advantage of them,
launching a sudden attack where unexpected ." 23

MARTIAL SECRET TEACHING
13. Opening Instructions

King Wen, in the capital of Feng, summoned the T’ai Kung. “Alas! The
Shang king is extremely perverse, judging the innocent guilty and having
them executed. If you assist me in my concern for these people, how might
we proceed?"

The T’ai Kung replied: “You should cultivate your Virtue, submit to the
guidance of Worthy men, extend beneficence to the people, and observe the
Tao of Heaven. If there are no ill omens in the Tao of Heaven, you cannot
initiate the movement [to revolt). If there are no misfortunes in the Tao of
Man, your planning cannot precede them. You must first see Heavenly signs
and moreover witness human misfortune, and only then can you make
plans. You must look at the Shang king’s yang aspects [his government), and
moreover his yin side [personal deportment), and only then will you know
his mind. You must look at his external activities, and moreover his internal
ones, and only then will you know his thoughts. You must observe those dis-
tant from him and also observe those close to him, and only then will you
know his emotions.

“If you implement the Tao, the Tao can be attained. If you enter by the
gate, the gate can be entered. If you set up the proper forms of etiquette [//],
the li can be perfected. If you fight with the strong, the strong can be con-
quered. If you can attain complete victory without fighting, without the
great army suffering any losses, you will have penetrated even the realm of
ghosts and spirits. How marvelous! How subtle!

“If you suffer the same illness as other people and you all aid each other; if
you have the same emotions and complete each other; the same hatreds and
assist each other; and the same likes and seek them together — then without
any armored soldiers you will win; without any battering rams you will have
attacked; and without moats and ditches you will have defended.

t'ai rung’s six secret teachings

7 he greatest wisdom is not wise; the greatest plans not planned; the
greatest courage not courageous; the greatest gain not profitable. If you
profit All under Heaven, All under Heaven will be open to you. If you harm
All under Heaven, All under Heaven will be dosed. All under Heaven is not
the property of one man but of All under Heaven. If you take All under
Heaven as if pursuing some wild animal, then All under Heaven will want to
carve (the realm] up like a piece of meat. If you all ride in the same boat to
cross over the water, after completing the crossing you will all have profited.
However, if you fail to make the crossing, then you will all suffer the harm. 24
| If you act as if you’re all on the same vessel |, the empire will be open to your
aim, and none will be closed to you.

“He who does not take from the people takes the people. He who does not
take (from] 2 ' the people, the people will profit. He who docs not take |from|
the states, the states will profit. He who does not take from All under
Heaven, All under Heaven will profit. Thus the Tao lies in what cannot be
seen; affairs lie in what cannot be heard; and victory lies in what cannot be
known. How marvelous! How subtle!

“When an eagle is about the attack, it will fly low and draw in its wings. 26
When a fierce wild cat is about to strike, it will lay back its ears and crouch
down low. When the Sage is about to move, he will certainly display a stupid
countenance.

“Now there is the case of Shang, where the people muddle and confuse
each other. Mixed up and extravagant, their love of pleasure and sex is end-
less. This is a sign of a doomed state. I have observed their fields— weeds and
grass overwhelm the crops. 1 have observed their people— the perverse and
crooked overcome the straight and upright. I have observed their officials—
they are violent, perverse, inhumane, and evil. They overthrow the laws and
make chaos of the punishments. Neither the upper nor lower ranks have
awakened to this state of affairs. It is time for their state to perish.

“When the sun appears the myriad things are all illuminated. When great
righteousness appears the myriad things all profit. When the great army ap-
pears the myriad things all submit. Great is the Virtue of the Sage! Listening
by himself, seeing by himself, this is his pleasure!”

14. Civil Instructions

King Wen asked the T’ai Kung: "What does the Sage preserve?”

The T’ai Kung said: “What worries does he have? What constraints? The
myriad things all naturally realize their positions. What constraints, what

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

worries? The myriad things all flourish. No one realizes the transforming in-
fluence of government; moreover, no one realizes the effects of the passing of
time. 2 The Sage preserves (the Tao of actionless action], and the myriad
things are transformed. What is exhausted? When things reach the end they
return again to the beginning. Relaxed and complacent he turns about, seek-
ing it. Seeking it he gains it and cannot but store it. Having already stored it
he cannot but implement it. Having already implemented it he does not turn
about and make it clear (that he did so]. Now because Heaven and Earth do
not illuminate themselves, they are forever able to give birth [to the myriad
things]. 28 The Sage does not cast light upon himself so he is able to attain a
glorious name.

“The Sages of antiquity assembled people to comprise families, assembled
families to compose states, and assembled states to constitute the realm of All
under Heaven. They divided the realm and enfeoffed Worthy men to admin-
ister the states. They officially designated (this order] the ‘Great Outline.’

“They promulgated the government’s instructions and accorded with the
people’s customs. They transformed the multitude of crooked into the
straight, changing their form and appearance. Although the customs of the
various states were not the same, they all took pleasure in their respective
places. The people loved their rulers, so they termed (this transformation!
the ‘Great Settlement.’

“Ah, the Sage concentrates on tranquilizing them, the Worthy focuses on
rectifying them. The stupid man cannot be upright, therefore he contends
with other men. When the ruler labors, punishments become numerous.
When punishments are numerous, the people are troubled. When the people
are troubled, they leave and wander off. No one, of whatever position, can
be settled in his life, and generations on end have no rest. This they termed
the ‘Great Loss.’

“The people of the world are like flowing water. If you obstruct it, it will
stop. If you open a way, it will flow. If you keep it quiet, it will be clear. How
spiritual! When the Sage sees the beginning, he knows the end.”

King Wen said: “How does one tranquilize them?”

The T’ai Kung: “Heaven has its constant forms, the people have their nor-
mal lives. If you share life with All under Heaven, then All under Heaven will
be tranquil. The pinnacle accords with them, the next-highest transforms
them. When the people are transformed and follow their government, then
Heaven takes no action but affairs are complete. The people do not give any-
thing [to the ruler| | so] are enriched of themselves. 29 This is the Virtue of the
Sage.”

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

King Wen: "What my lord has said accords with what I embrace. From
dawn to night I will think about it, never forgetting it, employing it as our
constant principle.”

15. Civil Offensive

King Wen asked the T’ai Kung: “What are the methods for civil 30 offen-
sives?”

The T'ai Kung replied: “There are twelve measures for civil offensives.

“First, accord with what he likes in order to accommodate his wishes. He
will eventually grow arrogant and invariably mount some perverse affair. If
you can appear to follow along, you will certainly be able to eliminate him.

“Second, become familiar with those he loves in order to fragment his
awesomeness. When men have two different inclinations, their loyalty in-
variably declines. When his court no longer has any loyal ministers, the state
altars will inevitably be endangered.

“Third, covertly bribe his assistants, fostering a deep relationship with
them. While they will bodily stand in his court, their emotions will be di-
rected outside it. The state will certainly suffer harm.

Fourth, assist him in his licentiousness and indulgence in music in order
to dissipate his will. Make him generous gifts of pearls and jade, and ply him
with beautiful women. Speak deferentially, listen respectfully, follow his
commands, and accord with him in everything. He will never imagine you
might be in conflict with him. Our treacherous measures will then be settled.

“Fifth, treat his loyal officials very generously, but reduce the gifts you
provide |to the ruler]. Delay his emissaries; do not listen to their missions.
When he eventually dispatches other men, treat them with sincerity, embrace
and trust them. The ruler will then again feel you are in harmony with him. If
you manage to treat [his formerly loyal officials] very generously, his state
can then be plotted against . 31

“Sixth, make secret alliances with his favored ministers, but visibly keep
his less-favored outside officials at a distance. His talented people will then
be under external influence, while enemy states encroach upon his territory.
Few states in such a situation have survived.

“Seventh, if you want to bind his heart to you, you must offer generous
presents. To gather in his assistants, loyal associates, and loved ones, you
must secretly show them the gains they can realize by colluding with you.
Have them slight their work, and then their preparations will be futile.

“Eighth, gift him with great treasures, and make plans with him. When the
plans are successful and profit him, he will have faith in you because of the

profits. This is what is termed ‘being closely embraced.’ The result of being
closely embraced is that he will inevitably be used by us. When someone
rules a state but is externally [controlled], his territory will inevitably be de-
feated.

“Ninth, honor him with praise. Do nothing that will cause him personal
discomfort. Display the proper respect accruing to a great power, and your
obedience will certainly be trusted. Magnify his honor; be the first to glori-
ously praise him, humbly embellishing him as a Sage. Then his state will suf-
fer great loss!

“Tenth, be submissive so that he will trust you, and thereby learn about his
true situation. Accept his ideas and respond to his affairs as if you were
twins. Once you have learned everything, subtly gather in |his power]. Thus
when the ultimate day arrives, it will seem as if Heaven itself destroyed him.

“Eleventh, block up his access by means of the Tao. Among subordinates
there is no one who docs not value rank and wealth nor hate danger and mis-
fortune. Secretly express great respect toward them, and gradually bestow
valuable gifts in order to gather in the more outstanding talents. Accumulate
your own resources until they become very substantial, but manifest an ex-
ternal appearance of shortage. Covertly bring in wise knights, and entrust
them with planning great strategy. Attract courageous knights, and augment
their spirit. Even when they are more than sufficiently rich and honored,
constantly add to their riches. When your faction has been fully established
[you will have attained the objective] referred to as ‘blocking his access.' If
someone has a state but his access is blocked, how can he be considered as
having the state?

“Twelfth, support his dissolute officials in order to confuse him. Introduce
beautiful women and licentious sounds in order to befuddle him. Send him
outstanding dogs and horses in order to tire him. From time to time allow
him great power in order to entice him |to greater arrogance]. Then investi-
gate Heaven’s signs, and plot with the world against him.

“When these twelve measures arc fully employed, they will become a mili-
tary weapon. Thus when, as it is said, one ‘looks at Heaven above and inves-
tigates Earth below’ and the proper signs are already visible, attack him.”

16. Instructions on According with the People

King Wen asked the T'ai Kung: “What should one do so that he can govern
All under Heaven?”

The T’ai Kung said: “When your greatness overspreads All under Heaven,
only then will you be able to encompass it. When your trustworthiness has

t’ai kung's six secret teachings

overspread All under Heaven, only then will you be able to make covenants
with it. When your benevolence has overspread All under Heaven, only then
will you be able to embrace it. When your grace has overspread All under
Heaven, only then can you preserve it. When your authority covers the
world, only then will you be able not to lose it. If you govern without doubt,
then the revolutions of Heaven will not be able to shift [your rule] nor the
changes of the seasons be able to affect it. Only when these six are complete
will you be able to establish a government for All under Heaven.

“Accordingly, one who profits All under Heaven will find All under
Heaven open to him. One who harms All under Heaven will find All under
Heaven closed to him. If one gives life to All under Heaven, All under
Heaven will regard him as Virtuous. If one kills All under Heaven, All under
Heaven will regard him as a brigand. If one penetrates to All under Heaven,
All under Heaven will be accessible to him; if one impoverishes All under
Heaven, All under Heaven will regard him as their enemy. One who gives
peace to All under Heaven, All under Heaven will rely on; one who endan-
gers All under Heaven, All under Heaven will view as a disaster. All under
Heaven is not the realm of one man. Only one who possesses the Tao can
dwell [in the position of authority!.”

1 7. Three Doubts

King Wu inquired of the T’ai Kung: “I want to attain our aim [of overthrow-
ing the Shang|, but I have three doubts. I am afraid that our strength will be
inadequate to attack the strong, to estrange his close supporters within the
court, and disperse his people. What should I do?”

The T ai Kung replied: “Accord with the situation, be very cautious in
making plans, and employ your material resources. Now in order to attack
the strong, you must nurture them to make them even stronger, and increase
them to make them even more extensive. What is too strong will certainly
break; what is too extended must have deficiencies . 32 Attack the strong
through his strength. Cause the estrangement of his favored officials by us-
ing his favorites, and disperse his people by means of the people . 33

Now in the Tao of planning, thoroughness and secrecy are treasured.
You should become involved with him in numerous affairs and ply him with
temptations of profit. Conflict will then surely arise.

“If you want to cause his close supporters to become estranged from him,
you must do it by using what they love-making gifts to those he favors, giv-
ing them what they want. Tempt them with what they find profitable,
thereby making them disaffected, and cause them to be unable to attain their

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

ambitions. Those who covet profits will be extremely happy at the prospects,
and their remaining doubts will be ended.

“Now without doubt the Tao for attacking is to first obfuscate the king’s
clarity and then attack his strength, destroying his greatness and eliminating
the misfortune of the people. Debauch him with beautiful women, entice
him with profit. Nurture him with flavors, and provide him with the com-
pany of female musicians. Then after you have caused his subordinates to
become estranged from him, you must cause the people to grow distant from
him while never letting him know your plans. Appear to support him and
draw him into your trap. Do not let him become aware of what is happening,
for only then can your plan be successful.

“When bestowing your beneficence on the people, you cannot begrudge
the expense. The people are like cows and horses. Frequently make gifts of
food and clothing and follow up by loving them . 34

“The mind is the means to open up knowledge; knowledge the means to
open up the source of wealth; and wealth the means to open up the people.
Gaining the allegiance of the people is the way to attract Worthy men. When
one is enlightened by Sagely advisers, he can become king of all the world.”

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

DRAGON SECRET TEACHING

18. The King’s Wings

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “When the king commands the army he must
have ‘legs and arms [top assistants) and ‘feathers and wings' (aides) to bring
about his awesomcness and spiritualness. How should this be done?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Whenever one mobilizes the army it takes the com-
manding general as its fate. Its fate lies in a penetrating understanding of all
aspects, not clinging to one technique. In accord with their abilities assign
duties— each one taking charge of what they are good at, constantly chang-
ing and transforming with the times, to create the essential principles and or-
der. Thus the general has seventy-two ‘legs and arms’ and ‘feathers and
wings’ in order to respond to the Tao of Heaven. Prepare their number ac-
cording to method, being careful that they know its orders and principles.
When you have all the different abilities and various skills, then the myriad
affairs will be complete.”

King Wu asked: “May I ask about the various categories?”

The T’ai Kung said: u Fu-hsin [Chief of Planning ), 55 one: in charge of ad-
vising about secret plans for responding to sudden events; investigating
Heaven so as to eliminate sudden change; exercising general supervision
over all planning; and protecting and preserving the lives of the people.

Planning officers, five: responsible for planning security and danger; an-
ticipating the unforeseen; discussing performance and ability; making clear
rewards and punishments; appointing officers; deciding the doubtful; and
determining what is advisable and what is not.

“Astrologers, three: undertaking responsibility for the stars and calendar;
observing the wind and ch’i; predicting auspicious days and times; investi-
gating signs and phenomena; verifying disasters and abnormalities; and

knowing Heaven’s mind with regard to the moment for completion or aban-
donment. 31 ’

“Topographers, three: in charge of the army’s disposition and strategic
configuration of power when moving and stopped [and of] information on
strategic advantages and disadvantages; precipitous and easy passages, both
near and far; and water and dry land, mountains and defiles, so as not to lose
the advantages of terrain.

“Strategists, nine: responsible for discussing divergent views; analyzing
the probable success or failure of various operations; selecting the weapons
and training men in their use; and identifying those who violate the ordi-
nances.

“Supply officers, four: responsible for calculating the requirements for
food and water; preparing the food stocks and supplies and transporting the
provisions along the route; and supplying the five grains so as to ensure that
the army will not suffer any hardship or shortage.

“Officers for Flourishing Awesomcness, four: responsible for picking men
of talent and strength; for discussing weapons and armor; for setting up at-
tacks that race like the wind and strike like thunder so that (the enemy| does
not know where they come from.

“Secret Signals officers, 3 " three: responsible for the pennants and drums,
for clearly [signaling) to the eyes and ears; for creating deceptive signs and
seals [and| issuing false designations and orders; and for stealthily and hast-
ily moving back and forth, going in and out like spirits.

“Legs and Arms, four: responsible for undertaking heavy duties and han-
dling difficult tasks; for the repair and maintenance of ditches and moats;
and for keeping the walls and ramparts in repair in order to defend against
and repel [the enemy].

“Liaison officers, two: responsible for gathering what has been lost and
supplementing what is in error; receiving honored guests; holding discus-
sions and talks; mitigating disasters; and resolving difficulties.

“Officers of Authority, three: responsible for implementing the unortho-
dox and deceptive; for establishing the different and the unusual, things that
people do not recognize; and for putting into effect inexhaustible transfor-
mations . 38

“Ears and Eyes, seven: responsible for going about everywhere, listening
to what people are saying; seeing the changes; and observing the officers in
all four directions and the army’s true situation.

“Claws and Teeth, five: responsible for raising awesomeness and martial
[spirit); for stimulating and encouraging the Three Armies, causing them to

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

risk hardship and attack the enemy’s elite troops without ever having any
doubts or second thoughts.

Feathers and Wings, four: responsible for flourishing the name and fame
[°f the arm yl; for shaking distant lands [with its image); and for moving all
within the four borders in order to weaken the enemy’s spirit.

“Roving officers, eight: responsible for spying on [the enemy’s] licentious-
ness and observing their changes; manipulating their emotions; and observ-
ing the enemy’s thoughts in order to act as spies.

"Officers of Techniques, two: responsible for spreading slander and false-
hoods and for calling on ghosts and spirits in order to confuse the minds of
the populace.

“Officers of Prescriptions, three: in charge of the hundred medicines; man-
aging blade wounds; and curing the various maladies.

‘Accountants, two: responsible for accounting for the provisions and
foodstuffs within the Three Armies’ encampments and ramparts; for the fis-
cal materials employed; and for receipts and disbursements.”

19. A Discussion of Generals

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “What should a general be?”

The T’ai Rung replied: “Generals have five critical talents and ten
excesses."

King Wu said: “Dare I ask you to enumerate them?”

The T’ai Rung elaborated: “What we refer to as the five talents are cour-
age, wisdom, benevolence, trustworthiness, and loyalty. If he is courageous
he cannot be overwhelmed. If he is wise he cannot be forced into turmoil. If
he is benevolent he will love his men. If he is trustworthy he will not be de-
ceitful. If he is loyal he will not be of two minds.

“What are referred to as the ten errors are as follows: being courageous
and treating death lightly; being hasty and impatient; being greedy and lov-
ing profit; being benevolent but unable to inflict suffering; being wise but
afraid; being trustworthy and liking to trust others; being scrupulous and
incorruptible but not loving men; being wise but indecisive; being resolute
and self-reliant; and being fearful while liking to entrust responsibility to
other men.

“One who is courageous and treats death lightly can be destroyed by vio-
lence. One who is hasty and impatient can be destroyed by persistence. One
who is greedy and loves profit can be bribed. One who is benevolent but un-
able to inflict suffering can be worn down. One who is wise but fearful can
be distressed.

“One who is trustworthy and likes to trust others can be deceived. One
who is scrupulous and incorruptible but does not love men can be insulted.
One who is wise but indecisive can be suddenly attacked. One who is reso-
lute and self-reliant can be confounded by events. One who is fearful and
likes to entrust responsibility to others can be tricked.

“Thus ‘warfare is the greatest affair of state, the Tao of survival or extinc-
tion .’ 39 The fate of the state lies in the hands of the general. ‘The general is
the support of the state ,’ 40 a man that the former kings all valued. Thus in
commissioning a general, you cannot but carefully evaluate and investigate
his character.

“Thus it is said that two armies will not be victorious, nor will both be de-
feated. When the army ventures out beyond the borders, before they have
been out ten days — even if a state has not perished — one army will certainly
have been destroyed and the general killed.”

King Wu: “Marvelous!”

20. Selecting Generals

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “If a king wants to raise an army, how should
he go about selecting and training heroic officers and determining their
moral qualifications?”

The T’ai Rung said: “There are fifteen cases where a knight’s external ap-
pearance and internal character do not cohere. These are:

“He appears to be a Worthy but [actually] is immoral.

“He seems warm and conscientious but is a thief.

“His countenance is reverent and respectful, but his heart is insolent.

“Externally he is incorruptible and circumspect, but he lacks respect.

“He appears perceptive and sharp but lacks such talent.

“He appears profound but lacks all sincerity.

“He appears adept at planning but is indecisive.

“He appears to be decisive and daring but is incapable.

“He appears guileless but is not trustworthy.

“He appears confused and disoriented but on the contrary is loyal and
substantial.

“He appears to engage in specious discourse but is a man of merit and
achievement.

“He appears courageous but is afraid.

“He seems severe and remote but on the contrary easily befriends men.

“He appears forbidding but on the contrary is quiet and sincere.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

“He appears weak and insubstantial, yet when dispatched outside the
state there is nothing he does not accomplish, no mission that he does not ex-
ecute successfully.

"Those who the world disdains the Sage values. Ordinary men do not
know these things; only great wisdom can discern the edge of these matters.
This is because the knight’s external appearance and internal character do
not visibly cohere.”

King Wu asked: “How does one know this?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “There are eight forms of evidence by which you
may know it. First, question them and observe the details of their reply. Sec-
ond, verbally confound and perplex them and observe how they change.

I hird, discuss things which you have secretly learned to observe their sincer-
ity. Fourth, clearly and explicitly question them to observe their virtue. Fifth,
appoint them to positions of financial responsibility to observe their hon-
esty. Sixth, test them with beautiful women to observe their uprightness. Sev-
enth, confront them with difficulties to observe their courage. Eighth, get
them drunk to observe their deportment. When all eight have been fully ex-
plored, then the Worthy and unworthy can be distinguished.”

2 1 Appointing the General

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “What is the Tao for appointing the com-
manding general?”

The T ai Kung said: "When the state encounters danger, the ruler should
vacate the Mam Hall, summon the general, and charge him as follows: ‘The
security or endangerment of the Altars of State all lie with the army’s com-
manding general. At present such-and-such a state does not act properly sub-
missive. I would like you to lead the army forth to respond to it.’

"After the general has received his mandate, command the Grand Scribe to
bore the sacred tortoise shell to divine an auspicious day. Thereafter, to pre-
pare for the chosen day, observe a vegetarian regime for three days, and then
go to the ancestral temple to hand over the fu and yiieh axes . 41

“After the ruler has entered the gate to the temple, he stands facing west.
The general enters the temple gate and stands facing north. The ruler person-
ally takes the yiieh ax and, holding it by the head, passes the handle to the
general, saying: ‘From this to Heaven above will be controlled by the Gen-
eral of the Army.’ Then taking the fu axe by the handle, he should give the
blade to the general, saying: ‘From this to the depths below will be con-
trolled by the General of the Army. When you see vacuity in the enemy you
should advance; when you see substance you should halt . 42 Do not assume

that the Three Armies are large and treat the enemy lightly. Do not commit
yourself to die just because you have received a heavy responsibility. Do not,
because you are honored, regard other men as lowly. Do not rely upon your-
self alone and contravene the masses. Do not take verbal facility to be a sign
of certainty. When the officers have not yet been seated, do not sit. When the
officers have not yet eaten, do not eat. You should share heat and cold with
them. If you behave in this way the officers and masses will certainly exhaust
their strength in fighting to the death.’ 4 '

“After the general has received his mandate, he bows and responds to the
ruler: ‘I have heard that a country cannot follow the commands of another
state’s government, while an army [in the field] cannot follow central gov-
ernment control. Someone of two minds cannot properly serve his ruler;
someone in doubt cannot respond to the enemy. I have already received my
mandate and taken sole control of the awesome power of the fu and yiieh
axes. I do not dare return alive. I would like to request that you condescend
to grant complete and sole command to me. If you do not permit it, I dare
not accept the post of general.’ The king then grants it, and the general for-
mally takes his leave and departs . 44

“Military matters are not determined by the ruler’s commands; they all
proceed from the commanding general. When |the commanding general]
approaches an enemy and decides to engage in battle, he is not of two minds.
In this way there is no Heaven above, no Earth below, no enemy in front, and
no ruler to the rear. For this reason the wise make plans for him, the coura-
geous fight for him. Their spirit soars to the blue clouds; they are swift like
galloping steeds. Even before the blades clash, the enemy surrenders submis-
sively.

“War is won outside the borders of the state, but the general’s merit is es-
tablished within it. Officials are promoted and receive the highest rewards;
the hundred surnames rejoice; and the general is blameless. For this reason
the winds and rains will be seasonable; the five grains will grow abundantly;
and the altars of state will be secure and peaceful.”

King Wu said: “Excellent.”

22. The General’s Awesomeness

King Wu asked: “How does the general create awesomeness? How can he be
enlightened? How can he make his prohibitions effective and get his orders
implemented?”

The T’ai Kung said: “The general creates awesomeness by executing the
great, and becomes enlightened by rewarding the small. Prohibitions are

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

made effective and laws implemented by careful scrutiny in the use of pun-
ishments. Therefore if by executing one man the entire army will quake, kill
him. If by rewarding one man the masses will be pleased, reward him. In exe-
cuting, value the great; in rewarding, value the small. When you kill the
powerful and the honored, this is punishment that reaches the pinnacle.
When rewards extend down to the cowherds, grooms, and stablemen, these
are rewards penetrating downward to the lowest. When punishments reach
the pinnacle and rewards penetrate to the lowest, then your awesomeness
has been effected.”

23. Encouraging the Army

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “When we attack I want the masses of the
Three Armies to contend with each other to scale the wall first, and compete
with each other to be in the forefront when we fight in the field. When they
hear the sound of the gongs |to retreat] they will be angry, and when they
hear the sound of the drums |to advance] they will be happy. How can we ac-
complish this?”

The T’ai Rung said: "A general has three techniques for attaining victory.”

King Wu asked: “May I ask what they are?”

The T’ai Rung: “If in winter the general docs not wear a fur robe, in sum-
mer does not carry a fan, and in the rain does not set up a canopy, he is called
a ‘general of proper form.’ Unless the general himself submits to these obser-
vances, he will not have the means to know the cold and warmth of the offi-
cers and soldiers.

“If, when they advance into ravines and obstacles or encounter muddy ter-
rain, the general always takes the first steps, he is termed a ‘general of
strength.’ If the general does not personally exert his strength, he has no
means to know the labors and hardships of the officers and soldiers.

“If only after the men are settled in their encampment does the general re-
tire; only after all the cooks have finished their cooking does he go in to eat;
and if the army does not light fires to keep warm he also does not have one,
he is termed a ‘general who stifles desire.’ Unless the general himself prac-
tices stifling his desires, he has no way to know the hunger and satiety of the
officers and troops.

“The general shares heat and cold, labor and suffering, hunger and satiety
with the officers and men. Therefore when the masses of the Three Armies
hear the sound of the drum they are happy, and when they hear the sound of
the gong they are angry. When attacking a high wall or crossing a deep lake.

under a hail of arrows and stones, the officers will compete to be first to scale
the wall. When the naked blades clash, the officers will compete to be the
first to go forward. It is not because they like death and take pleasure in be-
ing wounded, but because the general knows their feelings of heat and cold,
hunger and satiety, and clearly displays his knowledge of their labor and suf-
fering.”

24. Secret Tallies 45

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “If we lead the army deep into the territory of
the feudal lords where the Three Armies suddenly suffer some delay or re-
quire urgent action — perhaps a situation to our advantage, or one to our dis-
advantage — and I 46 want to communicate between those nearby and those
more distant, respond to the outside from the inside, in order to supply the
use of the Three Armies — how should we do it?”

The T’ai Rung said: “The ruler and his generals have a system of secret tal-
lies, altogether consisting of eight grades.

“There is a tally signifying a great victory over the enemy, one foot long.

“There is a tally for destroying the enemy’s army and killing their general,
nine inches long.

“There is a tally for forcing the surrender of the enemy’s walls and captur-
ing the town, eight inches long.

“There is a tally for driving the enemy back and reporting deep penetra-
tion, seven inches long.

“There is a tally to alert the masses to prepare for stalwart defensive mea-
sures, six inches long.

“There is a tally requesting supplies and additional soldiers, five inches
long.

“There is a tally signifying the army’s defeat and the general’s death, four
inches long.

“There is a tally signifying the loss of all advantages and the army’s surren-
der, three inches long.

“Detain all those who bring in and present tallies, and if the information
from the tally should leak out, execute all those who heard and told about it.
These eight tallies, which only the ruler and general should secretly know,
provide a technique for covert communication that will not allow outsiders
to know the true situation. Accordingly, even though the enemy has the wis-
dom of a Sage, no one will comprehend their significance.”

King Wu said: “Excellent.”

t'ai kung’s six secret teachings

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

25. Secret Letters

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “The army has been led deep into the territory
of the feudal lords and the commanding general 47 wants to bring the troops
together, implement inexhaustible changes, and plan for unfathomable ad-
vantages. These matters are quite numerous; the simple tally is not adequate
to clearly express them. As they are separated by some distance, verbal com-
munications cannot get through. What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Whenever you have secret affairs and major consid-
erations, letters should be employed rather than tallies. The ruler sends a let-
ter to the general; the general uses a letter to query the ruler. The letters are
|composcd| in one unit, then divided. They are sent out in three parts, with
only one person knowing the contents. ‘Divided’ means it is separated into
three parts. Sent out in three parts, with only one person knowing’ means
there are three messengers, each carrying one part; and when the three are
compared together, only then does one know the contents. This is referred to
as a ‘secret letter.’ Even if the enemy has the wisdom of a Sage, they will not
be able to recognize the contents."

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

26. The Army’s Strategic Power

King Wu asked the T ai Kung: “What is the Tao for aggressive warfare?”

I he Fai Kung replied: “Strategic power is exercised in accord with the en-
emy’s movements. Changes stem from the confrontation between the two ar-
mies. Unorthodox [ch’i\ and orthodox \cheng\ tactics are produced from the
inexhaustible resources |of the mind|. Thus the greatest affairs are not dis-
cussed, and the employment of troops is not spoken about. Moreover, words
which discuss ultimate affairs are not worth listening to . 48 The employment
of troops is not so definitive as to be visible. They go suddenly, they come
suddenly. Only someone who can exercise sole control, without being gov-
erned by other men, is a military weapon.

“If |your plansl 41 * are heard about, the enemy will make counterplans. If
you are perceived, they will plot against you. If you are known, they will put
you in difficulty. If you are fathomed, they will endanger you.

"Thus one who excels in warfare does not await the deployment of forces.
One who excels at eliminating the misfortunes of the people manages them
before they appear. Conquering the enemy means being victorious over the

formless . 5 ’ 1 The superior fighter does not engage in battle. Thus one who
fights and attains victory in front of naked blades is not a good general. One
who makes preparations after [the battle] has been lost is not a Superior
Sage! One whose skill is the same as the masses is not a State Artisan.

“In military affairs nothing is more important than certain victory. In em-
ploying the army nothing is more important than obscurity and silence. In
movement nothing is more important than the unexpected. In planning
nothing is more important than not being knowable.

“To be the first to gain victory, initially display some weakness to the en-
emy and only afterward do battle. Then your effort will be half, but the
achievement will be doubled.

“The Sage takes his signs from the movements of Heaven and Earth; who
knows his principles? He accords with the Tao of yin and yang and follows
their seasonal activity. He follows the cycles of fullness and emptiness of
Heaven and Earth, taking them as his constant. All things have life and death
in accord with the form of Heaven and Earth. Thus it is said that if one fights
before seeing the situation, even if he is more numerous, he will certainly be
defeated.

“One who excels at warfare will await events in the situation without
making any movement. When he sees he can be victorious, he will arise; if he
sees he cannot be victorious, he will desist. Thus it is said he does not have
any fear, he does not vacillate. Of the many harms that can beset an army,
vacillation is the greatest. Of disasters that can befall an army, none
surpasses doubt.

“One who excels in warfare will not lose an advantage when he perceives
it or be doubtful when he meets the moment. One who loses an advantage or
lags behind the time for action will, on the contrary, suffer from disaster.
Thus the wise follow the time and do not lose an advantage; the skillful are
decisive and have no doubts. For this reason when there is a sudden clap of
thunder, there is not time to cover the ears; when there is a flash of lightning,
there is not time to close the eyes. Advance as if suddenly startled; employ
your troops as if deranged . 51 Those who oppose you will be destroyed; those
who come near will perish. Who can defend against such an attack?

“Now when matters are not discussed and the general preserves their se-
crecy, he is spirit-like. When things are not manifest but he discerns them, he
is enlightened. Thus if one knows the Tao of spirit and enlightenment, no en-
emies will act against him in the field, nor will any state stand against him.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

27. The Unorthodox Army

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung, “In general, what are the great essentials in
the art of employing the army?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “The ancients who excelled at warfare were not
able to wage war above Heaven, nor could they wage war below Earth . 52
Their success and defeat in all cases proceeded from the spiritual employ-
ment of strategic power [ shih). Those who attained it flourished; those who
lost it perished.

“Now when our two armies, opposing each other, have deployed their ar-
mored soldiers and established their battle arrays, releasing some of your
troops to create chaos in the ranks is the means by which to fabricate decep-
tive changes.

Deep grass and dense growth are the means by which to effect a con-
cealed escape.

“Valleys with streams and treacherous ravines are the means by which to
stop chariots and defend against cavalry.

“Narrow passes and mountain forests are the means by which a few can
attack a large force.

“Marshy depressions and secluded dark areas are the means by which to
conceal your appearance.

“(Deploying] on clear, open ground without any concealment is the means
by which to fight with strength and courage . 53

“Being as swift as a flying arrow, attacking as suddenly as the release of a
crossbow arc the means by which to destroy brilliant plans.

“Setting up ingenious ambushes and preparing unorthodox troops,
stretching out distant formations to deceive and entice the enemy are the
means by which to destroy the enemy’s army and capture its general.

“Dividing your troops into four and splitting them into five are the means
by which by attack their circular formations and destroy their square ones.

Taking advantage of their fright and fear is the means by which one can
attack ten.

“Taking advantage of their exhaustion and encamping at dusk are the
means by which ten can attack one hundred.

“Unorthodox technical skills are the means by which to cross deep waters
and ford rivers.

“Strong crossbows and long weapons are the means by which to fight
across water.

“Distant observation posts and far-off scouts, explosive haste and feigned
retreats are the means by which to force the surrender of walled fortifica-
tions and compel the submission of towns.

“Drumming an advance and setting up a great tumult are the means by
which to implement unorthodox plans.

“High winds and heavy rain are the means by which to strike the front and
seize the rear.

“Disguising some men as enemy emissaries is the means by which to sever
their supply lines.

“Forging (enemy) commands and orders and wearing the same clothes as
the enemy are the means by which to be prepared for their retreat.

“Warfare which is invariably in accord with righteousness is the means by
which to incite the masses and be victorious over the enemy.

“Honored ranks and generous rewards are the means by which to encour-
age obeying orders.

“Severe punishments and heavy fines are the means by which to force the
weary and indolent to advance.

“Happiness and anger, bestowing and taking away, civil and martial mea-
sures, at times slowly, at others rapidly — all these are the means by which to
order and harmonize the Three Armies, to govern and unify subordinates.

“Occupying high ground is the means by which to be alert and assume a
defensive posture.

“Holding defiles and narrows is the means by which to be solidly en-
trenched.

“Mountain forests and dense growth are the means by which to come and
go silently.

“Deep moats, high ramparts, and large reserves of supplies are the means
by which to sustain your position for a long time.

“Thus it is said, ‘One who does not know how to plan for aggressive war-
fare cannot be spoken with about the enemy. One who cannot divide and
move [his troops about) cannot be spoken with about unorthodox strate-
gies . 54 One who does not have a penetrating understanding of both order
and chaos cannot be spoken with about changes.’

“Accordingly it is said:

“ ‘If the general is not benevolent, then the Three Armies will not be close
to him.

“ ‘If the general is not courageous, then the Three Armies will not be fierce.

“‘If the general is not wise, then the Three Armies will be greatly per-
plexed.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

■"If the general is not perspicacious, then the Three Armies will be con-
founded.

“if the general is not quick-witted and acute, then the Three Armies will
lose the moment . 55

“if the general is not constantly alert, the Three Armies will waste their
preparations.

“if the general is not strong and forceful, then the Three Armies will fail
in their duty.’

“Thus the general is their Master of Fate. The Three Armies are ordered
with him, and they are disordered with him. If one obtains a Worthy to serve
as general, the army will be strong and the state will prosper. If one does not
obtain a Worthy as general, the army will be weak and the state will perish.”
“Excellent,” said King Wu.

28. The Five Notes

King Wu asked the T'ai Kung: “From the sound of the pitch pipes, can we
know the fluctuations of the Three Armies, foretell victory and defeat?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Your question is profound indeed! Now there are
twelve pipes, with five major notes: kung, shang, chiao, cheng, and yu . S6
I hese are the true, orthodox sounds, unchanged for over ten thousand gen-
erations.

“The spirits of the five phases arc constants of the Tao . 57 Metal, wood,
water, fire, and earth — each according to their conquest relationship — [can
he employed to] attack the enemy. In antiquity, during the period of the
I hree Sage Himperors, they used the nature of vacuity and non-action to gov-
ern the hard and strong. They didn’t have characters for writing; everything
proceeded from the five phases. The Tao of the five phases is the naturalness
of Heaven and Earth. The division into the six chia 58 is |a realization] of
marvelous and subtle spirit.

Their method was, when the day had been clear and calm — without any
clouds, wind, or rain— to send light cavalry out in the middle of the night to
approach the enemy’s fortifications. Stopping about nine hundred paces
away, they would all lift their pipes to their ears and then yell out to startle
the enemy. There would be a very small, subtle sound that would respond in
the pitch pipes.

“If the chiao note responded among the pipes, it indicated a white tiger.

“If the cheng note responded in the pipes, it indicated the Mysterious Mili-
tary.

“If the shang note responded in the pipes, it indicated the Vermillion Bird.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

“If you yti note responded in the pipes, it indicated the Hooked Forma-
tion.

“If none of the five notes responded in the pipes, it was kung, signifying a
Green Dragon.

“These signs of the five phases are evidence to assist in the conquest, the
subtle moments of success and defeat.”

"Excellent,” said King Wu.

The T’ai Kung continued: “These subtle, mysterious notes all have exter-
nal indications.”

“How can we know them?” King Wu asked.

The T’ai Kung replied: “When the enemy has been startled into move-
ment, listen for them. If you hear the sound of the pao drum, then it is chiao.
If you see the flash of lights from a fire, then it is cheng. If you hear the
sounds of bronze and iron, of spears and halberds, then it is shang. If you
hear the sound of people sighing, it is yu. If all is silent, without any sound,
then it is kung. These five are the signs of sound and appearance.”

29. The Army’s Indications

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Before engaging in battle I want to first
know the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses, to foresee indications of victory
or defeat. How can this be done?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “Indications of victory or defeat will be first mani-
fest in their spirit. The enlightened general will investigate them, for they will
be evidenced in the men.

“Clearly observe the enemy’s coming and going, advancing and withdraw-
ing. Investigate his movements and periods at rest, whether they speak about
portents, what the officers and troops report. If the Three Armies are exhila-
rated |and| the officers and troops fear the laws; respect the general’s com-
mands; rejoice with each other in destroying the enemy; boast to each other
about their courage and ferocity; and praise each other for their awesome-
ness and martial demeanor — these are indications of a strong enemy.

“If the Three Armies have been startled a number of times, the officers and
troops no longer maintaining good order; they terrify each other |with sto-
ries about | the enemy’s strength; they speak to each other about the disad-
vantages; they anxiously look about at each other, listening carefully; they
talk incessantly of ill omens, myriad mouths confusing each other; they fear
neither laws nor orders and do not regard their general seriously — these are
indications of weakness.

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

“When the Three Armies are well ordered; the deployment’s strategic con-
figuration of power solid — with deep moats and high ramparts — and more-
over they enjoy the advantages of high winds and heavy rain; the army is un-
troubled; the signal flags and pennants point to the front; the sound of the
gongs and bells rises up and is clear; and the sound of the small and large
drums clearly rises — these are indications of having obtained spiritual, en-
lightened assistance, foretelling a great victory.

“When their formations are not solid; their flags and pennants confused
and entangled with each other; they go contrary to the advantages of high
wind and heavy rain; their officers and troops are terrified; and their ch’i
broken while they are not unified; their war horses have been frightened and
run off, their military chariots have broken axles; the sound of their gongs
and bells sinks down and is murky; the sound of their drums is wet and
damp— these are indications foretelling a great defeat.

“In general, when you attack city walls or surround towns, if the color of
their ch'i is liked dead ashes, the city can be slaughtered . 59 If the city’s ch’i
drifts out to the north, the city can be conquered. If the city’s ch’i goes out
and drifts to the west, the city can be forced to surrender. If the city’s ch’i
goes out and drifts to the south, it cannot be taken. If the city’s ch’i goes out
and drifts to the cast, the city cannot be attacked. If the city’s ch’i goes out
but then drifts back in, the city’s ruler has already fled. If the city’s ch’i goes
out and overspreads our army, the soldiers will surely fall ill. If the city’s ch'i
goes out and just rises up without any direction , 60 the army will have to be
employed for a long time. If, when you have attacked a walled city or sur-
rounded a town for more than ten days without thunder or rain, you must
hastily abandon it, for the city must have a source of great assistance.

“Those are the means by which to know that you can attack and then go
on to mount the attack, or that you should not attack and therefore stop.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

30. Agricultural Implements

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “If All under Heaven are at peace and settled,
while the state is not engaged in any conflicts, can we dispense with main-
taining the implements of war? Can we forego preparing equipment for de-
fense?”

The T’ai Kung said: “The implements for offense and defense are fully
found in ordinary human activity. Digging sticks serve as chevaux-de-frise
and caltrops. Oxen and horse-pulled wagons can be used in the encampment
and as covering shields. The different hoes can be used as spears and spear-

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

tipped halberds. Raincoats of straw and large umbrellas serve as armor and
protective shields. Large hoes, spades, axes, saws, mortars, and pestles are
tools for attacking walls. Oxen and horses are the means to transport provi-
sions. Chickens and dogs serve as lookouts. The cloth that women weave
serves as flags and pennants.

“The method that the men use for leveling the fields is the same for attack-
ing walls. The skill needed in spring to cut down grass and thickets is the
same as needed for fighting against chariots and cavalry. The weeding meth-
ods used in summer are the same as used in battle against foot soldiers. The
grain harvested and the firewood cut in the fall will be provisions for the mil-
itary. In the winter well-filled granaries and storehouses will ensure a solid
defense.

“The units of five found in the fields and villages will provide the tallies
and good faith that bind the men together. The villages have officials and the
offices have chiefs who can lead the army. The villages have walls surround-
ing them, which are not crossed; they provide the basis for the division into
platoons. The transportation of grain and the cutting of hay provide for the
state storehouses and armories. The skills used in repairing the inner and
outer walls in the spring and fall, in maintaining the moats and channels are
used to build ramparts and fortifications.

“Thus the tools for employing the military are completely found in ordi-
nary human activity. One who is good at governing a state will take them
from ordinary human affairs. Then they must be made to accord with the
good management of the six animals , 61 to the opening up of wild lands, and
the settling of the people where they dwell. The husband has a number of
acres that he farms, the wife a measured amount of material to weave — this
is the Way to enrich the state and strengthen the army.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

t'ai kung’s six secret teachings

TIGER SECRET TEACHING
3 1 . The Army’s Equipment

King Wu asked the Fai Kung: “When the king mobilizes the Three Armies,
are there any rules for determining the army’s equipment, such as the imple-
ments for attack and defense, including type and quantity?”

The T ai Kung said: “A great question, my king! The implements for at-
tack and defense each have their own categories. This results in the great
awesomeness of the army .” 62
King Wu said: “I would like to hear about them.”

The Tai Kung replied: “As for the basic numbers when employing the
army, if commanding ten thousand armed soldiers the rules for (the various
types of equipment and their| employment are as follows.

“Thirty-six Martial Protective Large Fu-hsii Chariots. Skilled officers,
strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers— total of twenty-four
for each flank [and the rear]. 6 ’ The chariots have eight-foot wheels. On it arc
set up pennants and drums which, according to the Art of War, are referred
to as ‘Shaking Fear.’ They arc used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat
strong enemies.

“Seventy-two Martial-Flanking Large Covered Spear and Halberd Fu-hsii
Chariots . 64 Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and hal-
berdiers comprise the flanks. They have five-foot wheels and winch-powered
linked crossbows which fire multiple arrows for self-protection . 65 They are
used to penetrate solid formations and defeat strong enemies.

“One hundred and forty Flank-supporting Small Covered Fu-hsii Chari-
ots equipped with winch-powered linked crossbows to fire multiple arrows
for self-protection. They have deer wheels and are used to penetrate solid
formations and defeat strong enemies.

Thirty-six Great Yellow Triple-linked Crossbow Large Fu-hsii Chariots.
Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers com-

prise the flanks, with ‘flying duck’ and ‘lightning’s shadow’ arrows for self-
protection. ‘Flying duck’ arrows have red shafts and white feathers, with
bronze arrowheads. ‘Lightning’s shadow’ arrows have green shafts and red
feathers, with iron heads . 66 In the daytime they display pennants of red silk
six feet long by six inches wide, which shimmer in the light. At night they
hang pennants of white silk, also six feet long by six inches wide, which ap-
pear like meteors. They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat in-
fantry and cavalry.

“Thirty-six Great Fu-hsii Attack Chariots. 6 ’ Carrying Praying Mantis
Martial warriors, they can attack both horizontal and vertical formations
and can defeat the enemy.

“Baggage Chariots [for repelling) mounted invaders, also called ‘Lightning
Chariots.’ The Art of War refers to their use in ‘lightning attacks.’ 6 " They are
used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat both infantry and cavalry.

“One hundred and sixty Spear and Halberd Fu-hsii Light Chariots |for re-
pelling] night invaders from the fore. Each carries three Praying Mantis Mar-
tial knights. The Art of War refers to them as mounting ‘thunder attacks.’
They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat both infantry and cav-
alry.

“Iron truncheons with large square heads weighing twelve catties, and
shafts more than five feet long, twelve hundred of them. Also termed ‘Heav-
en’s Truncheon.’

“The Great Handle Fu Ax with an eight-inch blade, weighing eight catties,
and a shaft more than five feet long, twelve hundred of them. Also termed
‘Heaven’s Yiieh Ax.’

“Also the Iron Square-headed Pounder, weighing eight catties, with a shaft
of more than five feet, twelve hundred. Also termed ‘Heaven’s Pounder.’
They are used to defeat infantry and hordes of mounted invaders.

“The Flying Hook, eight inches long. The curve of the hook is five inches
long, the shaft is more than six feet long. Twelve hundred of them. They are
thrown into masses of soldiers.

“To defend the Three Armies deploy Fu-hsii [chariots] equipped with
wooden Praying Mantises and sword blades, each twenty feet across, alto-
gether one hundred and twenty of them. They are also termed chevaux-de-
frise , 69 On open, level ground the infantry can use them to defeat chariots
and cavalry.

“Wooden caltrops which stick out of the ground about two feet five
inches, one hundred twenty. They are employed to defeat infantry and cav-
alry, to urgently press the attack against invaders, and to intercept their
flight. 0

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

“Short-axle Quick-turning Spear and Halberd Fu-hsii Chariots, one hun-
dred twenty. They were employed by the Yellow Emperor to vanquish Ch’ih-
yu. They are used to defeat both infantry and cavalry, to urgently press the
attack against the invaders, and to intercept their flight.

“For narrow roads and small bypaths, set out iron caltrops eight inches
wide, having hooks four inches high and shafts of more than six feet, twelve
hundred. They are for defeating retreating 71 cavalry.

“If, in the darkness of night the enemy should suddenly press an attack
and the naked blades clash, stretch out a ground net and spread out two
arrowheaded caltrops connected together with ‘weaving women’-type cal-
trops on both sides. The points of the blades should be about two feet apart.
Twelve thousand sets.

“For fighting in wild expanses and in the middle of tall grass, there is the
square-shank, arrow-shaped spear, twelve hundred of them. The method for
deploying these spears is to have them stick out of the ground one foot five
inches. They are used to defeat infantry and cavalry, to urgently press the at-
tack against invaders, and to intercept their flight.

“On narrow roads, small bypaths, and constricted terrain, set out iron
chains, one hundred twenty of them, to defeat infantry and cavalry, urgently
press the attack against the invaders, and intercept their flight.

“For the protection and defense of the gates to fortifications, there are
small |mobile] shields with spear and halberd [tips affixed], twelve of them,
and winch-driven, multiple arrow crossbows for self-protection . 72

“For the protection of the Three Armies, there are Heaven’s Net and Ti-
ger’s Drop, linked together with chains, one hundred twenty of them. One
array is fifteen feet wide and eight feet tall. For the Fu-hsti [chariot| with Ti-
ger’s Drop and sword blades affixed, the array is fifteen feet wide and eight
feet tall. Five hundred ten of them.

“For crossing over moats and ditches, there is the Flying Bridge. One sec-
tion is fifteen feet wide and more than twenty feet long. Eight of them . 73 On
top there are swivel winches to extend them by linked chains. 7 '*

“For crossing over large bodies of water, there is the Flying River, eight of
them. They are fifteen feet wide and more than twenty feet long and are ex-
tended by linked chains.

“There is also the Heavenly Float with Iron Praying Mantis, rectangular
inside, circular outside, four feet or more in diameter, equipped with
plantern winches. Thirty-two of them. When the Heavenly Floats are used to
deploy the Flying River to cross a large lake, they are referred to as ‘Heaven’s
Huang’ and also termed ‘Heaven’s Boat.’

“When in mountain forests or occupying the wilds, connect the Tiger’s
Drops to make a fenced encampment. [Employl iron chains, length of more

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

than twenty feet, twelve hundred sets. [Also employ] large ropes with
rings, ' girth of four inches, length of more than forty feet, six hundred;
midsized ropes with rings, girth of two inches, length of forty feet or more,
two hundred sets; and small braided cords with rings, length of twenty feet
or more, twelve thousand.

“Wooden canopies for covering the heavy chariots, called ‘Heaven’s Rain,’
which fit together along serrated seams, each four feet wide and more than
four feet long, one for each chariot. They are erected by using small iron
posts.

“For cutting trees there is the Heavenly Ax, which weighs eight catties. Its
handle is more than three feet long. Three hundred of them. Also the mat-
tock with a blade six inches wide and a shaft more than five feet long, three
hundred.

“Copper rams for pounding, more than five feet long, three hundred.

“Eagle claws with square hafts, iron handles, and shafts more than seven
feet long, three hundred.

“Square-shafted iron pitchforks with handles more than seven feet long,
three hundred.

“Square-shafted double-pronged iron pitchforks with shafts more than
seven feet long, three hundred.

“Large sickles for cutting grass and light trees with shafts more than seven
feet long, three hundred.

“Great oar-shaped blades, weight of eight catties, with shafts more than
six feet long, three hundred.

“Iron stakes with rings affixed at top, more than three feet long, three hun-
dred.

“Large hammers for pounding posts, weight of five catties, handles more
than two feet long, one hundred twenty.

“Armored soldiers, ten thousand. Strong crossbowmen, six thousand.
Halberdiers with shields, two thousand. Spearmen with shields, two thou-
sand. Skilled men to repair offensive weapons and sharpen them, three hun-
dred.

“These then are the general numbers required for each category when rais-
ing an army.”

King Wu said: “I accept your instructions.”

32. Three Deployments

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “In employing the army there are the Heav-
enly Deployment, the Earthly Deployment, and the Human Deployment.
What are these?”

t'ai rung's six secret teachings

The T’ai Kung replied: “When you accord with the sun and moon, the
stars, the planets, and the handle of the Big Dipper — one on the left, one on
the right, one in front, and one to the rear— this is referred to as the Heav-
enly Deployment . 76

"When the hills and mounds, rivers and streams are similarly to your ad-
vantage to the front, rear, left, and right, this is referred to as the Earthly De-
ployment . 77

"When you employ chariots and horses, when you use both the civil and
martial, this is referred to as the Human Deployment .” 78

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

33. Urgent Battles

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “If the enemy surrounds us, severing both our
advance and retreat, breaking off our supply lines, what should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “These are the most distressed troops in the world! If
you employ them explosively, you will be victorious; if you are slow to em-
ploy them, you will be defeated. In this situation if you deploy your troops
into martial assault formations on the four sides, use your military chariots
and valiant cavalry to startle and confuse their army, and urgently attack
them, you can thrust across them."

King Wu asked: “After we have broken out of the encirclement, if we want
to take advantage of it to gain victory, what should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “rhe Army of the Left should urgently strike out to
the left, and the Army of the Right should urgently strike out to the right. But
do not get entangled in protracted fighting with the enemy over any one
road. The Central Army should alternately move to the front and then the
rear. Even though the enemy is more numerous, their general can be driven
off.”

34. Certain Escape

King Wu asked the T ai Kung: “Suppose we have led our troops deep into
the territory of the feudal lords where the enemy unites from all quarters and
surrounds us, cutting off our road back home and severing our supply lines.
The enemy is numerous and extremely well provisioned, while the ravines
and gorges are also solidly held. We must get out — how can we?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In the matter of effecting a certain escape, your
equipment is your treasure while courageous fighting is foremost. If you in-

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

vestigate and learn where the enemy’s terrain is empty and vacuous, the
places where there are no men, you can effect a certain escape.

“Order your generals and officers to carry the Mysterious Dark Pennants
and take up the implements of war. Require the soldiers to put wooden gags
into their mouths. Then move out at night. Men 9 of courage, strength, and
swiftness, who will risk danger, should occupy the front to level fortifica-
tions and open a passage for the army. Skilled soldiers and strong
crossbowmen should compose an ambushing force which will remain in the
rear. Your weak soldiers, chariots, and cavalry should occupy the middle.
When the deployment is complete slowly advance, being very cautious not to
startle or frighten the enemy. Have the Martial Attack Fu-hsii Chariots de-
fend the front and rear and the Martial Flanking Great Covered Chariots
protect the left and right flanks.

“If the enemy should be startled, have your courageous, strong risk-takers
fervently attack and advance. The weaker troops, chariots, and cavalry
should bring up the rear. Your skilled soldiers and strong crossbowmen
should conceal themselves in ambush. If you determine that the enemy is in
pursuit, the men lying in ambush should swiftly attack their rear. Make your
fires and drums numerous, and [attack] as if coming out of the very ground
or dropping from Heaven above. If the Three Armies fight courageously no
one will be able to withstand us!”

King Wu said: “In front of us lies a large body of water, or broad moat, or
deep water hole which we want to cross. However, we do not have equip-
ment such as boats and oars. The enemy has fortifications and ramparts
which limit our army’s advance and block off our retreat. Patrols are con-
stantly watchful; passes are fully defended. Their chariots and cavalry press
us in front; their courageous fighters attack us to the rear. What should we
do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Large bodies of water, broad moats, and deep water
holes are usually not defended by the enemy. If they are able to defend them,
their troops will certainly be few. In such situations you should use the Fly-
ing River with winches and also Heaven’s Huang to cross the army over. Our
courageous, strong, skilled soldiers should move where we indicate, rushing
into the enemy, breaking up his formations, all fighting to the death.

“First of all, burn the supply wagons and provisions, and clearly inform
the men that those who fight courageously will live, while cowards will
die . 80 After they have broken out [and crossed the bridges], order the rear el-
ements to set a great conflagration visible from far off . 81 [The troops sallying
forth] must take advantage of the cover afforded by grass, trees, hillocks,
and ravines. The enemy’s chariots and cavalry will certainly not dare pursue

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

them too far. Using the flames as a marker, the first to go out should be or-
dered to proceed as far as the flames and then stop, reforming a four-sided
attack formation. In this fashion the Three Armies will be fervent and sharp
and fight courageously, and no one will be able to withstand us.”

King Wu said: “Excellent!”

35. Planning for the Army

King Wu asked the T ai Kung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords where we encounter deep streams 82 or water in
large valleys, ravines, and defiles. Our Three Armies have not yet fully
forded them when Heaven lets loose a torrent, resulting in a sudden flood
surge. The rear can not maintain contact with the advance portion. We don’t
have equipment such as pontoon bridges, nor materials such as heavy grass
to stem the waters. I want to finish crossing, to keep the Three Armies from
becoming bogged down. What should I do?”

The T ’ai Kung said: “If the leader of the army and commander of the mas-
ses does not first establish his plans, the proper equipment will not be pre-
pared. If his instructions are not precise and trusted, the officers and men
will not be trained. Under such conditions they cannot comprise a king’s
army.

“In general, when the army is involved in a major campaign, everyone
[should be] trained to use the equipment. For attacking a city wall or sur-
rounding a town there are [armored] assault chariots, overlook carts, and
battering rams, while for seeing inside the walls there are ‘cloud ladders’ and
‘flying towers.' If the advance of the Three Armies is stopped, then there are
the Martial Assault Great Fu-hsu Chariots. For defending both front and
rear, for severing roads and blocking streets, there are the skilled soldiers and
strong crossbowmen who protect the two flanks. If you are encamping or
building fortifications, there arc the Heaven’s Net, the Martial Drop, the
chevaux-de-frise, and the caltrops.

“In the daytime climb the cloud ladder and look off into the distance. Set
up five-colored pennants and flags. At night set out ten thousand fire-cloud
torches, beat the thunder drums, strike the war drums and bells, and blow
the sharp-sounding whistles.

“For crossing over moats and ditches there are Flying Bridges with
plantern-mounted winches and cogs. For crossing large bodies of water
there are [boats called| Heaven’s Huang and Flying River. For going against
the waves and up current there are the Floating Ocean [raftsj and the [rope-

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

pulled] River Severance. When the equipment to be used by the Three Ar-
mies is fully prepared, what worries will the commander-in-chief have?”

36. Approaching the Border

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Both the enemy and our army have reached
the border where we are in a standoff. They can approach, and we can also
advance. Both deployments are solid and stable; neither side dares to move
first. We want to go forth and attack them, but they can also come forward.
What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Divide the army into three sections. Have our ad-
vance troops deepen the moats and increase the height of the ramparts, but
none of the soldiers should go forth. Array the flags and pennants, beat the
leather war drums, and complete all the defensive measures. Order our rear
army to stockpile supplies and foodstuffs without causing the enemy to
know our intentions. Then send forth our elite troops to secretly launch a
sudden attack against their center, striking where they do not expect it, at-
tacking where they are not prepared. Since the enemy does not know our
real situation, they will stop and not advance.”

King Wu asked: “Suppose the enemy knows our real situation and has
fathomed our plans. If we move, they will be able to learn everything about
us. Their elite troops are concealed in the deep grass. They press us on the
narrow roads and are attacking where convenient for them. What should we
do?"

The T’ai Kung said: “Every day have the vanguard go forth and instigate
skirmishes with them in order to psychologically wear them out. Have our
older and weaker soldiers drag brushwood to stir up the dust, beat the
drums and shout, and move back and forth — some going to the left, some to
the right, never getting closer than a hundred paces from the enemy. Their
general will certainly become fatigued, and their troops will become fearful.
In this situation the enemy will not dare come forward. Then our advancing
troops will [unexpectedly] not stop, some [continuing forward] to attack
their interior, others the exterior. With our Three Armies all fervently engag-
ing in the battle, the enemy will certainly be defeated.”

37. Movement and Rest

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose we have led our troops deep into
the territory of the feudal lords and are confronting the enemy. The two de-
ployments, looking across at each other, are equal in numbers and strength,

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

and neither dares to move first. I want to cause the enemy’s general to be-
come terrified; their officers and men to become dispirited; their battle array
to become unstable; their reserve army to want to run off; and those de-
ployed forward to constantly look about at each other. I want to beat the
drums, set up a clamor, and take advantage of it so that the enemy will then
run off. How can we do it?”

The T ai Kung said: “In this case send our troops out about ten li from the
enemy and have them conceal themselves on both flanks. Send your chariots
and cavalry out about one hundred li [and have them return unobserved] to
assume positions cutting across both their front and rear. 83 Multiply the
number of flags and pennants, and increase the number of gongs and drums.
When the battle is joined, beat the drums, set up a clamor, and have your
men all rise up together. The enemy’s general will surely be afraid, and his
army will be terrified. Large and small numbers will not come to each other’s
rescue; upper and lower ranks will not wait for each other; and the enemy
will definitely be defeated.”

King Wu asked: “Suppose because of the enemy’s strategic configuration
of power \shih\ we cannot conceal troops on the flanks, and moreover our
chariots and cavalry have no way to cross behind them and assume positions
to both the front and rear. The enemy anticipates my thoughts and makes
preemptive preparations. Our officers and soldiers are dejected, our generals
are afraid. If we engage in battle we will not be victorious. What then?”

1 he T’ai Kung said: “ I ruly a serious question. In this case five days before
engaging in battle, dispatch distant patrols to observe their activities and an-
alyze their forward movement in order to prepare an ambush and await
them. We must meet the enemy on deadly ground. Spread our flags and pen-
nants out over a great distance, disperse our arrays and formations. We must
race forward to meet the enemy. After the battle has been joined, suddenly
retreat, beating the gongs incessantly. 84 Withdraw about three li [beyond the
ambush), then turn about and attack. Your concealed troops should simulta-
neously arise. Some should penetrate the flanks, others attack their van-
guard and rear guard positions. If the Three Armies fervently engage in bat-
tle, the enemy will certainly run off.”

King Wu said: “Excellent.”

38. Gongs and Drums 85

King Wu asked the T'ai Kung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords where we are confronting the enemy. The
weather has been either extremely hot or very cold, and it has been raining
incessantly day and night for ten days. The ditches and ramparts are all col-

lapsing; defiles and barricades are unguarded; our patrols have become neg-
ligent; and the officers and men are not alert. Suppose the enemy comes at
night. Our Three Armies are unprepared, while the upper and lower ranks
are confused and disordered. What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In general, for the Three Armies, alertness makes for
solidity, laziness results in defeat. Order our guards on the ramparts to un-
ceasingly challenge everyone. Have all those bearing the signal flags, both in-
side and outside the encampment, watch each other, responding to each oth-
er’s orders with countersigns, but do now allow them to make any noise. All
efforts should be externally oriented.

“Three thousand men should comprise a detachment. 86 Instruct and con-
strain them with an oath, requiring each of them to exercise vigilance at his
post. If the enemy approaches, when they see our state of readiness and alert-
ness, they will certainly turn around. [As a result) their strength will become
exhausted and their spirits dejected. [At that moment] send forth our elite
troops to follow and attack them.”

King Wu asked: “The enemy, knowing we are following him, conceals
elite troops in ambush while pretending to continue to retreat. When we
reach the ambush their troops turn back, some attacking our front, others
our rear, while some press our fortifications. Our Three Armies are terrified,
and in confusion fall out of formation and leave their assigned positions.
What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Divide into three forces, then follow and pursue
them, but do not cross beyond their ambush. When all three forces have ar-
rived, some should attack the front and rear, others should penetrate the two
flanks. Make your commands clear, choose your orders carefully. Fervently
attack, advancing forward, and the enemy will certainly be defeated.”

39. Severed Routes

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords where, confronting them, we have each assumed
defensive positions. The enemy has severed our supply routes and occupied
positions cutting across both our front and rear. If I want to engage them in
battle, we cannot win; but if I want to maintain our position, we cannot hold
out for long. What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In general, when you venture deep beyond the ene-
my’s borders you must investigate the configuration and strategic advan-
tages of the terrain, and concentrate on seeking out and improving the ad-
vantages. Rely on mountains, forests, ravines, rivers, streams, woods, and
trees to create a secure defense. Carefully guard passes and bridges, and

t'ai rung’s six secret teachings

moreover be certain you know the advantages of terrain conveyed by the
various cities, towns, hills, and funeral mounds. In this way the army will be
solidly entrenched. The enemy will not be able to sever our supply routes,
nor be able to occupy positions cutting across our front and rear.”

King Wu asked: “Suppose after our Three Armies have passed through a
large forest or across a broad marsh and are on flat, accessible terrain, due to
some erroneous or lost signal from our scouts, the enemy suddenly falls
upon us. If we engage them in battle, we cannot win; if we assume a defen-
sive position, it will not be secure. The enemy has outflanked us on both
sides and occupied positions cutting across our front and rear. The Three Ar-
mies are terrified. What should be done?”

The T ai Kung said: “Now the rule for commanding an army is always to
first dispatch scouts far forward so that when you are two hundred li from
the enemy, you will already know their location. If the strategic configura-
tion of the terrain is not advantageous, then use the Martial Attack chariots
to form a mobile rampart and advance. Also establish two rear guard armies
to the rear— the further one hundred li away, the nearer fifty li away. Thus
when there is a sudden alarm or an urgent situation, both front and rear will
know about it, and the Three Armies will always be able to complete (their
deployment into) a solid formation, never suffering any destruction or
harm.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

40. Occupying Enemy Territory

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose, being victorious in battle, we have
deeply penetrated the enemy’s territory and occupy his land. However, large
walled cities remain that cannot be subjugated, while their second army
holds the defiles and ravines, standing off against us. We want to attack the
cities and besiege the towns, but I am afraid that their second army will sud-
denly appear and strike us. If their forces inside and outside unite in this
fashion, they will oppose us from both within and without. Our Three Ar-
mies will be in chaos; the upper and lower ranks will be terrified. What
should be done?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In general, when attacking cities and besieging
towns, the chariots and cavalry must be kept at a distance. The encamped
and defensive units must be on constant alert in order to obstruct the enemy
both within and without. When the inhabitants have their food cut off —
those outside being unable to transport anything in to them— those within
the city walls will be afraid, and their general will certainly surrender.”

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

King Wu said: “Suppose that when the supplies inside the city are cut off —
external forces being unable to transport anything in — they clandestinely
make a covenant and take an oath, concoct secret plans, and then sally forth
at night, throwing all their forces into a death struggle. Some of their chari-
ots, cavalry, and elite troops assault us from within; others attack from with-
out. The officers and troops are confused, the Three Armies defeated and in
chaos. What should be done?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In this case you should divide your forces into three
armies. Be careful to evaluate the terrain’s configuration and then [strategi-
cally! emplace them. You must know in detail the location of the enemy’s
second army as well as his large cities and secondary fortifications. Leave
them a passage in order to entice them to flee. Pay attention to all the
preparations, not neglecting anything. The enemy will be afraid, and if they
do not enter the mountains or the forests, they will return to the large towns
or run off to join the second army. When their chariots and cavalry are far
off, attack the front; do not allow them to escape. Since those [remaining] in
the city will think that the first to go out have a direct escape route, their
well-trained troops and skilled officers will certainly issue forth, with the old
and weak alone remaining. When our chariots and cavalry have deeply pen-
etrated their territory, racing far off, none of the enemy’s army will dare ap-
proach. Be careful not to engage them in battle; just sever their supply routes,
surround and guard them, and you will certainly outlast them.

“Do not set fire to what the people have accumulated; do not destroy their
palaces or houses, nor cut down the trees at gravesites or altars. Do not kill
those who surrender nor slay your captives. Instead show them benevolence
and righteousness, extend your generous Virtue to them. Cause their people
to say ‘the guilt lies with one man .’ 87 In this way the entire realm will then
submit.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

4 1 . Incendiary Warfare 88

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose we have led our troops deep into
the territory of the feudal lords where we encounter deep grass and heavy
growth which surround our army on all sides. The Three Armies have trav-
eled several hundred li; men and horses are exhausted and have halted to
rest. Taking advantage of the extremely dry weather and a strong wind, the
enemy ignites fires upwind from us. Their chariots, cavalry, and elite forces
are firmly concealed in ambush to our rear. The Three Armies become terri-
fied, scatter in confusion, and run off. What can be done?”

t'ai kung’s six secret teachings

The T’ai Kung said: “Under such circumstances use the cloud ladders and
flying towers to look far out to the left and right, to carefully investigate
front and rear. When you see the fires arise, then set fires in front of our own
forces, spreading them out over the area. Also set fires to the rear. If the en-
emy comes, withdraw the army and take up entrenched positions on the
blackened earth to await their assault. In the same way, if you see flames
arise to the rear, you must move far away. If we occupy the blackened ground
with our strong crossbowmen and skilled soldiers protecting the left and
right flanks, we can also set fires to the front and rear. In this way the enemy
will not be able to harm us.”

King Wu asked: “Suppose the enemy has set fires to the left and right and
also to the front and rear. Smoke covers our army, while his main force ap-
pears from over the blackened ground. What should we do?”

The T ai Kung said: “In this case (assuming you have prepared a burnt sec-
tion of ground |, disperse the Martial Attack chariots to form a fighting bar-
rier on all four sides, and have strong crossbowmen cover the flanks. This
method will not bring victory, but will also not end in defeat.”

42. Empty Fortifications

King Wu asked the T'ai Kung: “How can I know whether the enemy’s fortifi-
cations are empty 89 or full, whether they are coming or going?”

The 1 'ai Kung said: “A general must know the Tao of Heaven above, the
advantages 9 " of Earth below, and human affairs in the middle. You should
mount high and look out far in order to see the enemy’s changes and move-
ments. Observe his fortifications, and then you will know whether they are
empty or full. Observe his officers and troops, and then you will know
whether they are coming or going.”

King Wu asked: “How will I know it?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Listen to see if his drums are silent, if his bells make
no sound. Look to see whether there are many birds flying above the fortifi-
cations, if they were not startled |into flight). If there are no vapors over-
head, you will certainly know the enemy has tricked you with dummies.

“If enemy forces precipitously go off— but not very far — and then return
before assuming proper formation, they are using their officers and men too
quickly. When they act too quickly, the forward and rear are unable to main-
tain good order. When they cannot maintain good order, the entire battle dis-
position will be in chaos. In such circumstances quickly dispatch troops to
attack them. If you use a small number to strike a large force, they will cer-
tainly be defeated.”

LEOPARD SECRET TEACHING

43. Forest Warfare

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose we have led our troops deep into
the territory of the feudal lords where we encounter a large forest which we
share with the enemy in a standoff. If we assume a defensive posture, I want
it to be solid, or if we fight, to be victorious. How should we proceed?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Have our Three Armies divide into the assault for-
mation. Improve the positions the troops will occupy, and station the archers
and crossbowmen outside, with those carrying spear-tipped halberds and
shields inside. Cut down and clear away the grass and trees, and extensively
broaden the passages in order to facilitate our deployment onto the battle
site. Set our pennants and flags out on high, and carefully encourage the
Three Armies without letting the enemy know our true situation. This is re-
ferred to as ‘Forest Warfare’.

“The method of Forest Warfare is to form the spear bearers and halberd-
iers into squads of five. If the woods are not dense, cavalry can be used in
support. Battle chariots will occupy the front. When opportune, they will
fight; when not opportune, they will desist. Where there are numerous ra-
vines and defiles in the forest, you must deploy [your forces] in the Assault
Formation in order to be prepared both front and rear. If the Three Armies
urgently attack, even though the enemy is numerous, they can be driven off.
The men should fight and rest in turn, each with their section. This is the
main outline of Forest Warfare.”

44. Explosive Warfare

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose the enemy’s [advance forces) have
penetrated deep into our territory and are ranging widely, occupying our

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

land, and driving off our cattle and horses. Then their Three Armies arrive
en masse and press us outside our city walls. Our officers and troops are
sorely afraid; our people are in bonds, having been captured by the enemy. If
we assume a defensive posture, I want it to be solid, or if we fight, to be vic-
torious. What should we do?”

The T’ai Rung said: “[An enemy] in situations such as this is referred to as
an 'Explosive Force.’ Their oxen and horses will certainly not have been fed;
their officers and troops will have broken their supply routes, having explo-
sively attacked and advanced. Order our distant towns and other armies to
select their elite soldiers and urgently strike their rear. Carefully consult the
calendar, for wc must unite on a moonless night. The Three Armies should
fight intensely, for then even though the enemy is numerous, their general
can be captured.”

King Wu said: “Suppose the enemy divides his forces into three or four de-
tachments— some fighting with us and occupying our territory, others stop-
ping to round up our oxen and horses. Their main army has not yet com-
pletely arrived, but they have had their swift invaders press us below the city
walls. Therefore our Three Armies are sorely afraid. What should we do?”

The T’ai Rung said: “Carefully observe the enemy. Before they have all ar-
rived, make preparations and await them. Go out about four li from the
walls and establish fortifications, setting out in good order our gongs and
drums, flags and pennants. Our other troops will comprise an ambushing
force. Order large numbers of strong crossbowmen to the top of the fortifi-
cations. Every hundred paces set up an ‘explosive gate,’ outside of which we
should place the chevaux-de-frise. Our chariots and cavalry should be held
outside, while our courageous, strong, fierce fighters should be secreted in
this outer area. If the enemy should reach us, have our light armored foot
soldiers engage them in battle, then feign a retreat. Have the forces on top of
the city wall set out the flags and pennants and strike the war drums, com-
pleting all preparations to defend the city. The enemy will assume we are
going to defend the wall and will certainly press an attack below it. Then re-
lease the forces lying in ambush— some to assault their interior, others to

strike the exterior. Then the Three Armies should urgently press the attack

some striking the front lines, others the rear. Even their courageous soldiers
will not be able to fight, while the swiftest will not have time to flee. This is
termed 'Explosive Warfare.’ Although the enemy is numerically superior,
they will certainly run off.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

45. Strong Enemy

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords until we are opposed by the enemy’s assault
forces. The enemy is numerous, while we are few. The enemy is strong, while
we are weak. The enemy approaches at night — some attacking the left, oth-
ers the right. The Three Armies are quaking. We want to be victorious if we
choose to fight and solid if we choose to maintain a defensive posture. How
should we act?”

The T’ai Rung said: “In this case we refer to them as 'Shaking Invaders.’ It
is more advantageous to go out and fight; you cannot be defensive. Select
skilled soldiers and strong crossbowmen, together with chariots and cavalry,
to comprise the right and left flanks. Then urgently strike his forward forces,
quickly attacking the rear as well. Some should strike the exterior, others the
interior. Their troops will certainly be confused, their generals afraid.”

King Wu asked: “Suppose the enemy has blocked off our forward units
some distance away and is pressing a fervent attack on our rear. He has bro-
ken up our elite troops and cut off our skilled soldiers. Our interior and exte-
rior forces cannot communicate with each other. The Three Armies are in
chaos, all running off in defeat. The officers and troops have no will to fight,
the generals and commanders no desire to defend themselves. What should
wc do?”

The T’ai Rung said: “Illustrious is your question, my king! You should
make your commands clear and be careful about your orders. You should
have your courageous, crack troops who are willing to confront danger sally
forth — each man carrying a torch, two men to a drum. You must know the
enemy’s location then strike both the interior and exterior. When our secret
signals have all been communicated, order them to extinguish the torches
and stop beating all the drums. The interior and exterior should respond to
each other, each according to the appropriate time. When our Three Armies
urgently attack, the enemy will certainly be defeated and vanquished.”
“Excellent,” said King Wu.

46. Martial Enemy

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords where we suddenly encounter a martial, numeri-
cally superior enemy. If his martial chariots and valiant cavalry attack our

t’ai kung's six secret teachings

left and right flanks, and our Three Armies become so shaken that their
flight is unstoppable, what should 1 do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In this situation you have what is termed a defeated
army. Those who are skillful in employing their forces will manage a victory.
Those who are not will perish.”

King Wu asked: “What does one do?”

1 he T’ai Kung replied: “Have our most skilled soldiers and strong crossbow-
men, together with our martial chariots and valiant cavalry, conceal them-
selves on both sides of the retreat route, about three li ahead and behind our
main force. When the enemy pursues us, launch a simultaneous chariot and
cavalry assault from both sides. In such circumstances the enemy will be
thrown into confusion, and our fleeing soldiers will stop by themselves.”
King Wu continued: “Suppose the enemy’s chariots and cavalry are
squarely opposite ours, but the enemy is numerous while we arc few, the en-
emy strong while we are weak. Their approach is disciplined and spirited,
and our formations are unable to withstand them. What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “Select our skilled soldiers and strong cross-
bowmen, and have them lie in ambush on both sides, while the chariots and
cavalry deploy into a solid formation and assume position. When the enemy
passes our concealed forces, the crossbowmen should fire en masse into their
flanks. The chariots, cavalry, and skilled soldiers should then urgently attack
their army— some striking the front, others striking the rear. Even if the en-
emy is numerous they will certainly flee.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

47. Crow and Cloud Formation in the Mountains

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords where we encounter high mountains with large,
flat rock outcroppings on top of which are numerous peaks, all devoid of
grass and trees. We are surrounded on all four sides by the enemy. Our Three
Armies are afraid, the officers and troops confused. I want to be solid if we
choose to defend our position and victorious if we fight. What should we
do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Whenever the Three Armies occupy the heights of a
mountain, they are trapped on high by the enemy. When they hold the land
below the mountain, they are imprisoned by the forces above them. If you
have already occupied the top of the mountain, you must prepare the Crow
and Cloud Formation. 91 The Crow and Cloud Formation should be pre-

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

pared on both the yin and yang sides of the mountain. Some will encamp on
the yin side, others will encamp on the yang side. Those that occupy the yang
side must prepare against (attacks from the] yin side. Those occupying the
yin side must prepare against |artacks from the] yang side. Those occupying
the left side of the mountain must prepare against the right side. Those on
the right, against the left. Wherever the enemy can ascend [the mountain],
your troops should establish external lines. If there are roads passing
through the valley, sever them with your war chariots. Set your flags and
pennants up high. Be cautious in commanding the Three Armies; do not al-
low the enemy to know your true situation. This is referred to as a ‘mountain
wall.’

“After your lines have been set, your officers and troops deployed, rules
and orders already issued, and tactics— both orthodox and unorthodox — al-
ready planned, deploy your assault formation at the outer perimeter of the
mountain, and have them improve the positions they occupy. Thereafter, di-
vide your chariots and cavalry into the Crow and Cloud Formation. When
your Three Armies urgently attack the enemy, even though the latter are nu-
merous, their general can be captured.”

48. Crow and Cloud Formation in the Marshes

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords where we are confronting the enemy across a
river. The enemy is well equipped and numerous; we are impoverished and
few. If we cross the water to attack, we will not be able to advance; while if
we want to outlast them, our supplies are too few. We are encamped on salty
ground. There are no towns in any direction and moreover no grass or trees.
There is nothing the Three Armies can plunder, while the oxen and horses
have neither fodder nor a place to graze. What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “The Three Armies are unprepared; the oxen and
horses have nothing to eat; the officers and troops have no supplies. In this
situation seek some opportunity to trick the enemy and quickly get away,
setting up ambushes to your rear.”

King Wu said: “The enemy cannot be deceived. My officers and troops are
confused. The enemy has occupied positions cutting across both our front
and rear. Our Three Armies are defeated and in flight. What then?”

The T’ai Kung said: “When you are searching for an escape route, gold
and jade are essential. You must obtain intelligence from the enemy’s emis-
saries. In this case cleverness and secrecy are your treasures.”

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

King Wu said: “Suppose the enemy knows I have laid ambushes, so their
main army is unwilling to cross the river. The general of their second army
then breaks off some units and dispatches them to ford the river. My Three
Armies are sorely afraid. What should I do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “In this situation divide your troops into assault for-
mations, and have them improve their positions. Wait until all the enemy’s
troops have emerged, then spring your concealed troops, rapidly striking
their rear. Have your strong crossbowmen on both sides shoot into their left
and right flanks. Divide your chariots and cavalry into the Crow and Cloud
Formation, arraying them against their front and rear. Then your Three Ar-
mies should vehemently press the attack. When the enemy sees us engaged in
battle, their main force will certainly ford the river and advance. Then spring
the ambushing forces, urgently striking their rear. The chariots and cavalry
should assault the left and right. Even though the enemy is numerous, they
can be driven off.

“In general, the most important thing in employing your troops is that
when the enemy approaches to engage in battle, you must deploy your as-
sault formations and have them improve their positions. Thereafter, divide
your chariots and cavalry into the Crow and Cloud Formation. This is the
unorthodox in employing your troops. What is referred to as the Crow and
Cloud Formation is like the crows dispersing and the clouds forming to-
gether. Their changes and transformations are endless.” 92
“Excellent,” said King Wu.

49. The Few and the Many

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “If I want to attack a large number with only a
few, attack the strong with the weak, what should I do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “If you want to attack a large number with only a few,
you must do it at sunset, setting an ambush in tall grass, pressing them on a
narrow road. To attack the strong with the weak, you must obtain the sup-
port of a great state and the assistance of neighboring states.”

King Wu asked: “We do not have any terrain with tall grass, and moreover
there are no narrow roads. The enemy has already arrived; we cannot wait
until sunset. I do not have the support of any great state nor furthermore the
assistance of neighboring states. What then?”

The T’ai Kung said: “You should set out specious arrays and false entice-
ments to dazzle and confuse their general, to redirect his path so that he will
be forced to pass tall grass. Make his route long so you can arrange your en-
gagement for sunset. When his advance units have not yet finished crossing

the water, his rear units have not yet reached the encampment, spring our
concealed troops, vehemently striking his right and left flanks, while your
chariots and cavalry stir chaos among his forward and rear units. Even if the
enemy is numerous, they will certainly flee.

“To serve the ruler of a great state, to gain the submission of the officers of
neighboring states, make their gifts generous and speak extremely deferen-
tially. In this fashion you will obtain the support of a great state and the as-
sistance of neighboring states.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

50. Divided Valleys

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “Suppose we have led the army deep into the
territory of the feudal lords where we encounter the enemy in the midst of a
steep valley. 1 have mountains on our left, water on the right. The enemy has
mountains on the right, water on the left. 9 ’ They divide the valley with us in
a standoff. If we choose to defend our position, I want to be solid, and victo-
rious if we want to fight. How should we proceed?”

The T’ai Kung said: “If you occupy the left side of a mountain, you must
urgently prepare (against an attack from the] right side. If you occupy the
right side of a mountain, then you should urgently prepare (against an attack
from the) left. If the valley has a large river but you do not have boats and
oars, you should use the Heaven’s Huang 94 to cross the Three Armies over.
Those that have crossed should widen the road considerably in order to im-
prove your fighting position. Use the Martial Assault chariots at the front
and rear; deploy your strong crossbowmen into ranks; and solidify all your
lines and formations. Employ the Martial Assault chariots to block off all
the intersecting roads and entrances to the valley. Set your flags out on high
ground. This posture is referred to as an ‘Army Citadel.’

“In general, the method for valley warfare is for the Martial Assault chari-
ots to he in the forefront and the Large Covered chariots to act as a protec-
tive force. Your skilled soldiers and strong crossbowmen should cover the
left and right flanks. Three thousand men will comprise one detachment,
which must be deployed in the assault formation. Improve the positions the
soldiers occupy. Then the Army of the Left should advance to the left, the
Army of the Right to the right, and the Army of the Center to the front — all
attacking and advancing together. Those that have already fought should re-
turn to their detachment’s original positions, the units fighting and resting in
succession until you have won.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

t'ai rung’s six secret teachings

CANINE SECRET TEACHING
5 1 Dispersing and Assembling

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “If the king, leading the army, has dispersed
the Three Armies to several locations and wants to have them reassemble at
a specific time for battle, how should he constrain them with oaths, rewards,
and punishments so that he can achieve it?”

The T’ai Rung said: “In general, the Way to employ the military, the mas-
ses of the Three Armies, must be to have the changes of dividing and reunit-
ing. 1 '' The commanding general should first set the place and day for battle,
then issue full directives and particulars to the generals and commanders set-
ting the time, indicating whether to attack cities or besiege towns, and where
each should assemble. [He should | clearly instruct them about the day for
battle and even the quarter hour by the water clock. The commanding gen-
eral should then establish his encampment, array his battle lines, put up a
gnomon and the official gate, clear the road, and wait. When all the generals
and commanders have arrived, compare their arrival [with the designated
time]. Those who arrived before the appointed time should be rewarded.
Those who arrived afterward should be executed. In this way both the near
and distant will race to assemble, and the Three Armies will arrive together,
uniting their strength to engage in the battle.”

52. Military Vanguard

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “In general, when employing the army it is es-
sential to have military chariots, courageous cavalry, a first-assault wave, a
hand-picked vanguard, and then a perceived opportunity to strike the en-
emy. In which situations can we strike?”

The T’ai Rung said: “Anyone who wants to launch a strike should care-
fully scrutinize and investigate fourteen changes in the enemy. When [any of|

these changes becomes visible, attack, for the enemy will certainly be defeat-
ed.”

King Wu asked: "May I hear about these fourteen changes?”

The T’ai Rung said: “When the enemy has begun to assemble they can be
attacked.

“When the men and horses have not yet been fed they can be attacked.

“When the seasonal or weather conditions are not advantageous to them
they can be attacked.

"When they have not secured good terrain they can be attacked.

"When they arc fleeing they can be attacked.

“When they are not vigilant they can be attacked.

"When they are tired and exhausted they can be attacked.

“When the general is absent from the officers and troops they can be at-
tacked.

"When they are traversing long roads they can be attacked.

“When they are fording rivers they can be attacked.

“When the troops have not had any leisure time they can be attacked.

“When they encounter the difficulty of precipitous ravines or are on nar-
row roads they can be attacked.

“When their battle array is in disorder they can be attacked.

“When they are afraid they can be attacked.”

53. Selecting Warriors

King Wu asked the T’ai Rung: “What is the Way to select warriors?"

The T’ai Rung replied: “Within the army there will be men with great
courage and strength who are willing to die and even take pleasure in suffer-
ing wounds. They should be assembled into a company and called ‘Warriors
Who Risk the Naked Blade.’

“Those who have fierce ch’i, who are robust and courageous, strong and
explosive, should be assembled into a company and called ‘Warriors Who
Penetrate the Lines.’

“Those who are extraordinary in appearance, who bear long swords and
advance with measured tread in good order should be assembled into a com-
pany and called ‘Courageous, Elite Warriors.’

“Those who can jump well, straighten iron hooks, are powerful, have
great strength, and can scatter and smash the gongs and drums [and] destroy
the flags and pennants should be assembled into a company and called ‘War-
riors of Courage and Strength.’

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

“Those who can scale heights and cover great distances, who are light of
foot and excel at running should be assembled into a company and called
‘Warriors of the Invading Army.’

“Those who, while serving the ruler, lost their authority and want to again
display their merit should he assembled into a company and called ‘Warriors
Who Fight to the Death.’

"Those who are relatives of slain generals, the sons or brothers of gener-
als, who want to avenge their deaths, should be assembled into a company
and called ‘Warriors Who Are Angry unto Death.’

“Those who are lowly, poor, and angry, who want to satisfy their desires,
should be assembled into a company and called ‘Warriors Committed to
Death.’

“Adopted sons 96 and slaves, who want to cover up their pasts and achieve
fame, should be assembled into a company and called the ‘Incited Dispirit-
ed.’

“Those who have been imprisoned and then spared corporeal punish-
ment, who want to escape from their shame, should be assembled into a
company and called ‘Warriors Fortunate to Be Used.'

“Those who combine skill and technique, who can bear heavy burdens for
long distances, should be assembled into a company and called ‘Warriors
Awaiting Orders.’

“These are the army’s selected warriors. You cannot neglect their exami-
nation.”

54. Teaching Combat 97

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “When we assemble the masses of the Three
Armies and want to have the officers and men assimilate and become prac-
ticed 98 in the Way for teaching combat, how should we proceed?”

The T ai Kung said: “For leading the Three Armies you must have the con-
straints of the gongs and drums by which to order and assemble the officers
and masses. The generals should clearly instruct the commanders and offi-
cers, explaining the orders three times — thereby teaching them the use of
weapons, mobilization, and stopping, all to be in accord with the method for
changing the flags and signal pennants.

“Thus when teaching the commanders and officers, one man who has
completed his study of combat instructions will extend 99 them to ten men.
Ten men who have completed their study of combat instructions will extend
them to one hundred men. One hundred men who have completed their
study of combat instructions will extend them to one thousand men. One
thousand men who have completed their study of combat instructions will

extend them to ten thousand men. Ten thousand men who have completed
their study of combat instructions will extend them to the masses of the
Three Armies.

“When the methods of large-scale warfare are successfully taught, they will
be extended to the masses of millions. In this fashion you will be able to real-
ize a Great Army and establish your awesomeness throughout the realm.”

“F.xcellent,”said King Wu.

55. Equivalent Forces

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “When chariots and infantry engage in battle,
one chariot is equivalent to how many infantrymen? How many infan-
trymen are equivalent to one chariot? When cavalry and infantry engage in
battle, one cavalryman is equivalent to how many infantrymen? How many
infantrymen are equivalent to one cavalryman? When chariots and cavalry
engage in battle, one chariot is equivalent to how many cavalrymen? How
many cavalrymen are equivalent to one chariot ?” 100

The T’ai Kung said: “Chariots are the feathers and wings of the army, the
means to penetrate solid formations, to press strong enemies, and to cut off
their flight. Cavalry are the army’s fleet observers, the means to pursue a de-
feated army, to sever supply lines, to strike roving forces.

“Thus when chariots and cavalry are not engaged in battle with the enemy,
one cavalryman is not able to equal one foot soldier. However, after the mas-
ses of the Three Armies have been arrayed in opposition to the enemy, when
fighting on easy terrain the rule is that one chariot is equivalent to eighty
infantrymen, and eighty infantrymen are equivalent to one chariot. One cav-
alryman is equivalent to eight infantrymen; eight infantrymen are equivalent
to one cavalryman. One chariot is equivalent to ten cavalrymen; ten
cavalrymen are equivalent to one chariot.

“The rule for fighting on difficult terrain is that one chariot is equivalent
to forty infantrymen, and forty infantrymen are equivalent to one chariot.
One cavalryman is equivalent to four infantrymen; four infantrymen are
equivalent to one cavalryman. One chariot is equivalent to six cavalrymen;
six cavalrymen are equivalent to one chariot.

“Now chariots and cavalry are the army’s martial weapons. Ten chariots
can defeat one thousand men; one hundred chariots can defeat ten thousand
men. Ten cavalrymen can drive off one hundred men, and one hundred
cavalrymen can run off one thousand men. These are the approximate num-
bers.”

King Wu asked: “What are the numbers for chariot and cavalry officers
and their formations?”

100

t’ai rung's six secret teachings

The T’ai Kung said: “For the chariots— a leader for five chariots, a captain
for fifteen, a commander for fifty, and a general for one hundred.

"For battle on easy terrain five chariots comprise one line. The lines are
forty paces apart, the chariots from left to right ten paces apart, with detach-
ments sixty paces apart. On difficult terrain the chariots must follow the
roads, with ten comprising a company and twenty a regiment . 101 Front to rear
spacing should be twenty paces, left to right six paces, with detachments
thirty-six paces apart. For five chariots there is one leader. If they venture off
the road more than a li in any direction, they should return to the original
road.

“As for the number of officers in the cavalry: a leader for five men; a cap-
tain for ten; a commander for one hundred; a general for two hundred.

"The rule for fighting on easy terrain: Five cavalrymen will form one line,
and Iront to back their lines should be separated by twenty paces, left to
right four paces, with fifty paces between detachments.

“On difficult terrain the rule is front to back, ten paces; left to right, two
paces; between detachments, twenty-five paces. Thirty cavalrymen comprise
a company; sixty form a regiment. For ten cavalrymen there is a captain. [In
action] they should not range more than one hundred paces, after which they
should circle back and return to their original positions.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

56. Martial Chariot Warriors

King Wu asked the I 'ai Kung: “How does one select warriors for the chari-
ots?”

The T’ai Kung said: “The rule for selecting warriors for the chariots is to
pick men under forty years of age, seven feet five inches ' 02 or taller, whose
running ability is such that they can pursue a galloping horse, race up to it,
mount it, and ride it forward and back, left and right, up and down, all
around. They should be able to quickly furl up the flags and pennants and
have the strength to fully draw an eight-picul crossbow. They should practice
shooting front and back, left and right, until thoroughly skilled. They are
termed Martial Chariot Warriors.’ You cannot but be generous to them.”

57. Martial Cavalry Warriors

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “How do you select warriors for the cav-
alry?”

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

101

The T’ai Kung said: “The rule for selecting cavalry warriors is to take
those under forty, who are at least seven feet five inches tall, strong and
quick, who surpass the average. Men who, while racing a horse, can fully
draw a bow and shoot. Men who can gallop forward and back, left and
right, and all around, both advancing and withdrawing. Men who can jump
over moats and ditches, ascend hills and mounds, gallop through narrow
confines, cross large marshes, and race into a strong enemy, causing chaos
among their masses. They are called ‘Martial Cavalry Warriors.’ You cannot
but be generous to them.”

58. Battle Chariots

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “What about battle chariots?”

The T’ai Kung responded: “The infantry values knowing changes and
movement; the chariots value knowing the terrain’s configuration; the cav-
alry values knowing the side roads and the unorthodox \ch’i] Way. Thus
these three armies bear the same name, but their employment differs.

“In general, in chariot battles there are ten types of terrain on which death
is likely and eight on which victory can be achieved.”

King Wu asked: “What are the ten fatal terrains 10 ' like?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “If after advancing there is no way to withdraw,
this is fatal terrain for chariots.

“Passing beyond narrow defiles to pursue the enemy some distance, this is
terrain which will exhaust the chariots.

“When the land in front makes advancing easy, while that to the rear is
treacherous, this is terrain that will cause hardship for the chariots.

“Penetrating into narrow and obstructed areas from which escape will be
difficult, this is terrain on which the chariots may be cut off.

“If the land is collapsing, sinking, and marshy, with black mud sticking to
everything, this is terrain which will labor the chariots.

“To the left is precipitous while to the right is easy, with high mounds and
sharp hills. This is terrain contrary to [the use of| chariots.

“Luxuriant grass runs through the fields, and there are deep, watery chan-
nels throughout. This is terrain which thwarts |the use] of chariots.

“When the chariots are few in number, the land easy, and one is not con-
fronted by enemy infantry, this is terrain on which the chariots may be de-
feated.

“To the rear are water-filled ravines and ditches, to the left deep water, and
to the right steep hills. This is terrain on which chariots are destroyed.

102

t’ai rung’s six secret teachings

103

“It has been raining day and night for more than ten days without stop-
ping. The roads have collapsed so that it’s not possible to advance or to es-
cape to the rear. This is terrain which will sink the chariots.

“These ten are deadly terrain for chariots. Thus they are the means by
which the stupid general will be captured and the wise general will be able to
escape.”

King Wu asked: “What about the eight conditions of terrain 104 that result
in victory?”

The T’ai Rung replied: “When the enemy’s ranks — front and rear — are not
yet settled, strike into them.

“When their flags and pennants are in chaos, their men and horses fre-
quently shifting about, then strike into them.

When some of their officers and troops advance while others retreat;
when some move to the left, others to the right, then strike into them.

“When their battle array is not yet solid, while their officers and troops are
looking around at each other, then strike into them.

“When in advancing they appear full of doubt, and in withdrawing they
are fearful, strike into them.

“When the enemy’s Three Armies arc suddenly frightened, all of them ris-
ing up in great confusion, strike into them.

“When you are fighting on easy terrain and twilight has come without be-
ing able to disengage from the battle, then strike into them.

“When, after traveling far, at dusk they arc encamping and their Three Ar-
mies are terrified, strike into them.

“These eight constitute conditions 105 in which the chariots will be victori-
ous.

“If the general is clear about these ten injurious conditions and eight victo-
rious possibilities, then even if the enemy surrounds him on all sides — at-
tacking with one thousand chariots and ten thousand cavalry — he will be
able to gallop to the front and race to the sides and in ten thousand battles
invariably be victorious.”

“Excellent,” said King Wu.

59. Cavalry in Battle

King Wu asked the T’ai Kung: “How should we employ the cavalry in bat-
tle?”

The T’ai Kung said: “For the cavalry there are ten (situations that can pro-
duce) victory and nine (that will result in] defeat.”

King Wu asked: “What are the ten (situations that can produce] victory?”

The T’ai Kung replied: “When the enemy first arrives and their lines and
deployment are not yet settled, the front and rear not yet united, then strike
into their forward cavalry, attack the left and right flanks. The enemy will
certainly flee.

“When the enemy’s lines and deployment are well-ordered and solid,
while their officers and troops want to fight, our cavalry should outflank
them but not go far off. Some should race away, some race forward. Their
speed should be like the wind, their explosiveness like thunder, so that the
daylight becomes as murky as dusk. Change our flags and pennants several
times; also change our uniforms. Then their army can be conquered.

“When the enemy’s lines and deployment are not solid, while their officers
and troops will not fight, press upon them both front and rear, make sudden
thrusts on their left and right. Outflank and strike them, and the enemy will
certainly be afraid.

“When, at sunset, the enemy wants to return to camp 106 and their Three
Armies are terrified, if we can outflank them on both sides, urgently strike
their rear, pressing the entrance to their fortifications, not allowing them to
go in. The enemy will certainly be defeated.

“When the enemy, although lacking the advantages of ravines and defiles
for securing their defenses, has penetrated deeply and ranged widely into dis-
tant territory, if we sever their supply lines they will certainly be hungry.

“When the land is level and easy and we see enemy cavalry approaching
from all four sides, if we have our chariots and cavalry strike into them, they
will certainly become disordered.

“When the enemy runs off in flight, their officers and troops scattered and
in chaos, if some of our cavalry outflank them on both sides while others ob-
struct them to the front and rear, their general can be captured.

“When at dusk the enemy is turning back while his soldiers are extremely
numerous, his lines and deployment will certainly become disordered. We
should have our cavalry form platoons of ten and regiments of one hundred,
group the chariots into squads of five and companies of ten, and set out a
great many flags and pennants intermixed with strong crossbowmen. Some
should strike their two flanks, others cut off the front and rear, and then the
enemy’s general can be taken prisoner. These are the ten (situations in which]
the cavalry can be victorious .” 107

King Wu asked: “What about the nine (situations which produce] defeat?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Whenever the cavalry penetrates the ranks of the en-
emy but does not destroy their formation so that the enemy feigns flight,
only to turn their chariots and cavalry about to strike our rear — this is a situ-
ation 108 in which the cavalry will be defeated.

104

t’ai kung’s six secret teachings

105

“When we pursue a fleeing enemy into confined ground, ranging far into
their territory without stopping, until they ambush both our flanks and sever
our rear — this is a situation in which the cavalry will be encircled.

“When we go forward but there is no road back, we enter but there is no
way out, this is referred to as ‘penetrating a Heavenly Well ,’ 109 ‘being buried
in an Earthly Cave.’ This is fatal terrain for the cavalry.

“When the way by which we enter is constricted but the way out is distant;
their weak forces can attack our strong ones; and their few can attack our
many— this is terrain on which the cavalry will be exterminated.

"When there arc great mountain torrents, deep valleys, tall luxuriant
grass, forests and trees — these are conditions which will exhaust the cavalry.

“When there is water on the left and right, while ahead are large hills, and
to the rear high mountains, and the Three Armies are fighting between the
bodies of water while the enemy occupies both the interior and exterior
ground — this is terrain that means great difficulty for the cavalry.

“When the enemy has cut off our supply lines, and if we advance we will
not have any route by which to return— this is troublesome terrain for the
cavalry.

“When we arc sinking into marshy ground while advancing and retreating
must both be through quagmires— this is worrisome terrain for the cavalry.

“When on the left there are deep water sluices, and on the right there are
gullies and hillocks but below the heights the ground appears level — good
terrain for advancing, retreating, and enticing an enemy— this terrain is a
pitfall for the cavalry.

“These nine comprise fatal terrain for cavalry, the means by which the en-
lightened general will keep [the enemy] far off and escape and the ignorant
general will be entrapped and defeated.”

60. The Infantry in Battle

King Wu asked the T ai Kung: “What about when infantry engage in battle
with chariots and cavalry?”

The T’ai Kung said: “When infantry engage in battle with chariots and
cavalry, they must rely on hills and mounds, ravines and defiles. The long
weapons and strong crossbows should occupy the fore; the short weapons
and weak crossbows should occupy the rear, firing and resting in turn. Even
if large numbers of the enemy’s chariots and cavalry should arrive, they must
maintain a solid formation and fight intensely while skilled soldiers and
strong crossbowmen prepare against |attacks from] the rear.”

King Wu said: “Suppose there are no hills or mounds, ravines or defiles.
The enemy arrives, and it is both numerous and martial. Their chariots and
cavalry outflank us on both sides, and they are making sudden thrusts
against our front and rear positions. Our Three Armies are terrified and flee-
ing in chaotic defeat. What should we do?”

The T’ai Kung said: “Order our officers and troops to set up the cbevaux-
de-frise and wooden caltrops, arraying the oxen and horses by units of five
in their midst, and have them establish a four-sided martial assault forma-
tion. When you see the enemy’s chariots and cavalry are about to advance,
our men should evenly spread out the caltrops and dig ditches around the
rear, making them five feet deep and wide. It is called the ‘Fate of Dragon
Grass.’

“Our men should take hold of the cbevaux-de-frise and advance on foot.
The chariots should be arrayed as ramparts and pushed forward and back.
Whenever they stop set them up as fortifications. Our skilled soldiers and
strong crossbowmen should prepare against the left and right flanks. After-
ward, order our Three Armies to fervently fight without respite.”
“Excellent," said King Wu.

The Methods
of the Ssu-ma

Translator’s Introduction, 1 1 1

1. Benevolence the Foundation, 126

2. Obligations of the Son of Heaven, 1 29

3. Determining Rank, 133

4. Strict Positions, 137

5. Employing Masses, 142

Translator's Introduction

The Ssu-ma Fa is a terse, enigmatic text dating from about the fourth cen-
tury b.c. when it was probably compiled from materials dating back far into
antiquity . 1 Virtually every account of its inception identifies it with the state
of Ch’i, which historically was the fount of the famous military studies that
received their initial impetus from the T’ai Kung, who had been enfeoffed as
the first king of Ch’i a few years before his death. Traditionalists thus assert
that the T’ai Kung’s thoughts may form part of the early material or may
have otherwise provided a foundation for the work . 2 Throughout the Spring
and Autumn and the Warring States periods, military studies flourished in
Ch’i as represented by Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, and Wei I.iao-tzu; certain families
(such as Sun, T’ien, and Ch’en) were particularly noteworthy. The renowned
strategist Sun Pin may have been active at the time of the Ssu-ma Fa’s compi-
lation and may possibly have even been a contributor; in fact, he was a dis-
tant relative of Ssu-ma Jang-chll . 3 Furthermore, the style and character of
the writing reportedly identify it as a product of this era, the fourth century
b.c. Apart from the two books by Sun-Tzu and Sun Pin, it has traditionally
been accorded far more authenticity than any of the other military writings.

The title, Ssu-ma Fa, might best be translated as The Methods of the Min-
ister of War because the character fa — whose basic meaning is law —
encompasses the concepts of “methods,” standards, and techniques or art, as
in Sun-tzu’s Art of War. However, no single term adequately covers the scope
of the content because the Ssu-ma Fa discusses laws, regulations, govern-
ment policies, military organization, military administration, discipline, ba-
sic values, grand strategy, and strategy.

The origin of the military title Ssu-ma — which literally means “the officer
in charge of horses” and which, because of the horse’s vital importance to the
military, eventually came to designate military matters in general — remains
lost in antiquity. As an official title it apparently first appeared in the earliest
dynasties of the Sage Emperors, and by the Chou dynasty it had been ele-
vated to Ta Ssu-ma — “Great” Ssu-ma, or Minister of War. Liu Yin’s intro-

1 12

113

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

duction to the Ssu-ma Fa provides a general appraisal of the minister’s role
and duties under the Chou dynasty:

The Minister of War controlled the government of the dependent states, admin-
istered the Six Armies, and pacified the peripheral territories. Thus he ranked
among the six chief ministers of state. When in court he assisted the Son of
Heaven in administering the government; when he went out he was the chief
general of the army of rectification, settling the rebellious . 4

According to the traditional view espoused by scholars such as Liu Yin,
the central content of the Methods played a historically important role; it
was supposedly instrumental in providing guidance to Duke Huan of Ch’i
(reigned mid-seventh century B.c.) in his successful quest to become hege-
mon (pa) the military ruler of the realm— on the pretext of assisting the
rightful king of the declining Chou state. It is therefore equally associated
with Duke Huan’s famous adviser, Kuan Chung, to whom a complex, com-
posite work on government, philosophy, and military matters— the Kuart-
tzu — is attributed.' Subsequently, King Ching of the same state of Ch’i (who
ruled from 547 to 490 b.c.) reportedly used the teachings to help him regain
land previously lost to Ch’in and subjugate several feudal lords. At that time
the work was untitled, but when a court assembly was convened under King
Wei'’ (reigned 378 to 342 B.c.) to gather and record all vital information on
military matters, it came to be identified as The Methods of the Minister of
War.

Another, somewhat disputed story associated with the book suggests that
the famous general T’ien Jang-chii was instrumental in the great victories
achieved under King Ching. Because he had held the post of Ssu-ma in the
king’s campaign, he was granted the privilege of assuming the title as a fam-
ily surname. The book, when subsequently compiled under King Wei, in-
cluded his ideas and thus acquired the title Ssu-ma Jang-chu Ping-fa (The
Military Methods of Ssu-ma Jang-chii). His brief biography in the Shih chi 7
not only records these events but also illustrates the measures he felt were
necessary to wrest immediate psychological control of the troops and create
the awesomeness that would command obedience:

Ssu-ma Jang-chu was a descendant of T’ien Wan . 8 During the time of Duke
Ching 9 of Ch’i, Chin attacked [the major cities of] A and P’in , 10 and Yen in-
vaded [the river district] Ho-shang . 1 1 Ch’i’s army suffered complete defeat, and
Duke Ching was sorely troubled. Yen Ying then recommended Jang-chu, say-
ing: “Even though Jang-chu is descended from T’ien’s concubine, still, as a man,
in civil affairs he is able to the masses, and in martial affairs he is able to overawe
the enemy. I would like my Lord to test him.” Duke Ching summoned Jang-chu
and spoke with him about military affairs. He was greatly pleased with him and

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

appointed him as General of the Army to lead the soldiers in resisting the armies
of Yen and Chin.

Jang-ChU said: “I was formerly lowly and menial. If my Lord pulls me out
from amidst my village and places me above the high officials, the officers and
troops will not be submissive, and the hundred surnames will not believe in me.
Since the man is insignificant and his authority [ch'Uan] light, I would like to
have one of my Lord’s favored ministers, someone whom the state respects, as
Supervisor of the Army. 1 ’ Then it will be possible.” Thereupon Duke Ching as-
sented, having Chuang Ku go forth.

Jang-chu, who had already taken his leave, made an agreement with Chuang
Ku, saying: “Tomorrow at midday we shall meet at the army’s gate.” Jang-chu
raced ahead to the army, set up the gnomon," and let the water [drip in the wa-
ter clock], awaiting Ku. Ku, who had always been arrogant and aristocratic, as-
sumed that since the general had already reached the army while he was [only]
the Supervisor, it was not extremely urgent. His relatives from all around, who
were sending him off, detained him to drink. Midday came and Ku had not ar-
rived. Jang-chu then lay down the standard, stopped the dripping water, and
went into [the encampment]. He advanced the army [and] took control of the
soldiers, clearly publicizing the constraints and bonds . 14 When the constraints
had been imposed it was already evening, and then Chuang Ku arrived.

Jang-chU said: “How is it that you arrive after the appointed time?” Ku ac-
knowledged his fault, saying: “High officials and relatives saw the simple one
off, thus he was detained." Jang-chu said: “On the day a general receives the
mandate [of command] he forgets his home; when he enters the army and takes
control of the drumsticks and urgently beats the drum he forgets himself. At
present enemy states have already deeply invaded [our land]; within the state
there is unrest and movement. Officers and soldiers lie brutally cut down and
exposed at the borders. Our ruler does not sleep soundly nor enjoy the sweet
taste of his food. The fate of the hundred surnames hangs on you, so what do
you mean by being seen off?”

He summoned the provost marshal and inquired: “What is the army’s law re-
garding those who arrive after the appointed time?” The reply: “They should be
decapitated!” Chuang Ku was terrified, and he ordered a man to race back and
report it to Duke Ching, asking to be saved. He had already left but not yet re-
turned, whereupon [Jang-chU] beheaded Ku in order to publicize [the enforce-
ment of discipline] within the Three Armies . 15 All the officers within the Three
Armies shook with fear.

Somewhat later the emissary that Duke Ching had dispatched, bearing a tally
to pardon Ku, raced into the army. Jang-chii said: “When the general is with the
army, there are orders of the ruler which are not accepted .” 16 He asked the pro-
vost marshal: “What is the law regarding racing into the army?” The provost
marshal said: “He should be beheaded." The emissary was terrified. Jang-chii
said: “We cannot slay the ruler’s emissary.” Then he beheaded the [emissary’s]

114

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

attendant, severed the carriage’s left stanchion, and beheaded the horse on the
left in order to instruct the Three Armies. He dispatched the Duke’s emissary to
return and report and then moved (the army] out.

The officers and soldiers next encamped, dug wells, lit the cook fires, and pre-
pared their drink and food. He asked about those with illness, had physicians
prescribe medicine, and personally looked after them. In all cases when he took
the emoluments of office and his rations, he presented them to the officers and
troops; he himself divided all rations equally with the officers and troops. He
compared the strong and weak among them 17 and only after three days took
control of the soldiers. The sick all sought to go on the march, fighting fervently
to go into battle on his behalf. Chin’s army heard of it, abandoned their posi-
tion, and departed. Yen’s army heard of it, crossed over the river, and dispersed.
Thereupon he pursued and attacked them, subsequently retaking all the terri-
tory within the borders of the old fief, returning with the soldiers. Before he
reached the state capital he disbanded the units, released them from military
constraints, ls swore a covenant, and thereafter entered the city. Duke Ching
and the high officials greeted him in the suburbs, rewarding the troops and com-
pleting the rites, only afterward returning to rest. After that he interviewed
Jang-chu and honored him as Great Master of the Horse | Ta Ssu-ma]. The T’ien
clan daily grew more honored in Ch’i.

After this, subordinates of the high officials Pao, Kao, and Kuo harmed him,
slandering him to Duke Ching. 19 Duke Ching forced Jang-chu to retire. Chu fell
extremely ill and died. From this the followers of T’ien Ch’i and T’ien Pao bore
a grudge against Kao, Kuo, and the others. Later (along] with Tien Ch’ang they
killed Duke Chien and completely exterminated the Kao and Kuo clans. Subse-
quently, Ch’ang’s great-grandson T’ien Ho was thereby able to establish himself
as King Wei of Ch’i. In employing the army to effect Ch’i’s awesomeness he
greatly imitated Jang-chu’s methods, and the feudal lords all paid court to Ch’i.

King Wei of Ch’i had the high officials seek out and discuss the strategy of the
ancient Ssu-mas, appending Jang-chu’s |methods| within them. Thus (the book]
is called the Military Methods of Ssu-ma )ang-chii.

The Grand Historian comments: “I have read the Ssu-ma Ping-fa. It is vast,
expansive, deep, and far-reaching. Even the Three Dynasties, in their campaigns
of rectification, still could not exhaust its meaning. Its language as well deserves
some praise. (However,] how could one such as Jang-chu, commanding the
army in a minor way on behalf of a small country, have the leisure to realize the
Military Methods of the Ssu-ma ? The world already has numerous copies of the
Ssu-ma Ping-fa. For this reason I have not discussed it but have written Jang-
chii’s biography.”

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA 1 1 5

The Grand Historian’s comments eventually stimulated historical doubts
about Jang-chu’s possible role in the book, even though the biography
clearly indicates that his thoughts were merely appended among those of the
early Masters of the Horse. (However, a different account found in the histo-
ries suggests that this general was evil and dissolute, hardly a figure of any
merit. Any work he might have penned has subsequently been lost. 20 ) Re-
gardless of its evolution, the book apparently assumed what was essentially
its final form about the middle of the fourth century B.c. — the approximate
time of Mencius’s youth, more than one hundred years after the death of
Confucius (551-479 b.c.), and contemporary with the probable composi-
tion of Sun-tzu’s Art of War or perhaps Sun Pin’s work.

The condition and even the authenticity of the text have been matters of
scholarly debate for some centuries. Unfortunately, all editions presently
available — including the one translated here from the Seven Military Clas-
sics — appear to be merely remnants of an original, extensive work. Only 5
chapters remain out of 155 purportedly extant in the Han dynasty, 21 al-
though they seem to have been faithfully transmitted since the T’ang dy-
nasty. Ch’ing dynasty textual specialists particularly attacked the work as
spurious, largely on the basis of the great discrepancy in the number of chap-
ters and the book’s failure to include all the fragments preserved in other
writings and in various commentaries. However, recent studies have ad-
vanced arguments to sustain the claim that at the least, the modern text rep-
resents original material — even though much has been lost — and that the
central kernel reports practices that date from before the Western Chou era
supplemented by paragraphs dating from the Warring States period. 22 Al-
though further discussion must be left to the notes, if the Shih chi account is
historically valid, the disjointed, particularized character of the individual
paragraphs would be appropriate to such a book. The numerous concrete
statements — all focusing on aspects of military affairs — having been rescued
from the mists of time by the compilers, could never be reformed and inte-
grated to constitute the systematized work of a single author. 23

Scope and Nature of The Methods

In the Later Han dynasty, Pan Ku, author of the History of the Former Han
Dynasty, classified the Ssu-ma Fa under the section on li — “rites,” or forms
of propriety — when organizing his bibliographical essay. This may have
been because the work was viewed as emphasizing administration, organiza-
tion, and discipline rather than strategy and battlefield tactics. Within the

I 16

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

context of Confucianism’s ascending influence and the growing domination
of orthodox thought in the Later Han as well as the importance being as-
cribed to the major works on ritual such as the Li chi and Chou li ( Rites of
Chou, with which the Ssu-ma La has some similarities), the book may natu-
rally have been regarded as an exposition on the military forms of the an-
cient dynasties — including the Early Chou — and categorized accordingly. 24

Even if the collected fragments are included, the Ssu-ma Fa cannot be con-
sidered a complete work because it rarely discusses tactics or any other as-
pect of battlefield command. Rather, it contains a variety of specific teach-
ings— frequently couched in difficult, terse language — for initiating military
activities, mastering military administration, and managing military cam-
paigns. Limited discussions of strategy and tactics such as those typical of
the Six Secret Teachings appear only in the last three chapters and are fre-
quently passages common to the Six Secret Teachings or Sun-Tzu’s Art of
War. Equally absent are details about government and the implementation of
moral measures, even though both are strongly advocated in the first two
sections (leading to a theory that these two chapters preserve truly ancient.
Sagely portions of the "original” text and the remaining three incorporate
the cruder ideas of Ssu-ma Jang-chu himself). 25

Warfare and Fundamental Values

As a book that focuses on military administration, the Ssu-ma Fa naturally
postulates that warfare is vital to the state and essential to pacifying the
realm. According to the conceptualization of righteousness that was becom-
ing more prevalent in this period, warfare provides the necessary means for
chastising the evil and rescuing the oppressed. Moreover, despite advocating
righteousness and humane government, the Ssu-ma Fa expresses the star-
tling realization that the conscious exploitation of force is the foundation of
political power. 26 As depicted from within the usual historical framework
characterizing the drastic decline from Virtue, the argument runs:

In antiquity, taking benevolence as the foundation and employing righteousness
to govern constituted “uprightness.” However, when uprightness failed to attain
the desired [moral and political] objectives, [they resorted to] authority. Author-
ity comes from warfare, not from harmony among men. For this reason if one
must kill men to give peace to the people, then killing is permissible. If one must
attack a state out of love for their people, then attacking it is permissible. If one
must stop war with war, although it is war it is permissible. 27 ) 1)

It should be noted that the text warns equally strongly against becoming en-
thralled with war: “Thus even though a state may be vast, those who love

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA 117

warfare will inevitably perish. Even though calm may prevail under Heaven,
those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered!”

Distinction of the Civilian and Martial Realms
Although the Ssu-ma Fa falls within the realist tradition, in delineating the
distinction between the civilian and the martial it reflected the changing con-
ditions of the Warring States period. Consciousness of this separation, which
would become even more pronounced later in Chinese history, perhaps re-
ceived impetus from the presence and growing influence of Confucian
thought as popularized by the Master’s true disciples and their immediate
followers. In contrast to the unity of political and military functions that his-
torically characterized the Shang and Early Chou eras, the contributors to
the Ssu-ma Fa stressed that the military and civilian realms should be radi-
cally distinguished because of their contradictory values. The different reali-
ties are clearly perceived — perhaps emphasized — because of the growing in-
fluence of formalistic thinking about propriety and the proper forms of
government that had developed extensively under the aegis of Chou civiliza-
tion. As Liu Pang, founder of the Han dynasty, later discovered, he could
conquer the world on horseback, but he could not maintain civilian rule
without the li (forms of propriety) to establish his image, provide distinc-
tions, and ensure order. The li created and sustained the separation necessary
to elevate him above his uncouth former comrades.

Because the Chou dynasty could devote the resources necessary to nurtur-
ing intellectual pursuits during its initial period of peace and prosperity, war-
fare naturally became somewhat de-emphasized. 28 The products of peace
were intellectual and formal; and although the basic martial values were
never completely rejected, each realm was conceived as requiring a different
orientation:

In antiquity the form and spirit governing civilian affairs would not be found in
the military realm; those appropriate to the military realm would not be found
in the civilian sphere. If the form and spirit [appropriate to the] military realm
enter the civilian sphere, the Virtue of the people will decline. When the form
and spirit [appropriate to the] civilian sphere enter the military realm, then the
Virtue of the people will weaken.

In the civilian sphere words are cultivated and speech languid. In court one is
respectful and courteous and cultivates himself to serve others. Unsummoned,
he does not step forth; unquestioned, he does not speak. It is difficult to advance
but easy to withdraw.

In the military realm one speaks directly and stands firm. When deployed in
formation one focuses on duty and acts decisively. Those wearing battle armor

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

1 19

1 18

do not bow; those in war chariots need not observe the forms of propriety [//];
those manning fortifications do not scurry. In times of danger one does not pay
attention to seniority. Thus the civilian forms of behavior [//] and military stan-
dards \fa\ are like left and right. 29 (2)

The atmosphere of the court is severe, remote, and yet languid; that of the
military is severe, stern, and active. The civilian atmosphere clearly stifles the
martial spirit, whereas in the military the critical problem is forcing men to
be active and courageous and then restraining any individual, disordered ex-
pression of these attributes. 30

The list of important virtues on which government should rely remains es-
sentially unchanged: benevolence, righteousness, faith, trust, loyalty. Virtue,
courage, and wisdom. However, compared with the formalistic nature of
combat in the Early Chou era, the Warring States milcau demanded severity
and total commitment. Yet the Ssu-ma Fa records and thereby advocates re-
straints, the latter affecting battle strategy and measures in terms of both
conceptualization and actual tactics. The ideals of antiquity required that
formations not be attacked before they had been completed or attacks
pressed home with ruthless swiftness. Rather, reaction and restraint were
stressed, with the approach being responsive rather than aggressive. This ci-
vility is sometimes explained in terms of strategic considerations, but such
justifications appear weak. In contrast with the other Seven Military Clas-
sics, a different spirit obviously pervades the Ssu-ma ha; it even affects the
contributors, who clearly rose to positions of power and influence through
military achievements.

Perhaps the best example of this advocacy of restraint can be seen in the
rules for pursuing a fleeing enemy, which were attributed to antiquity for au-
thenticity:

In antiquity they did not pursue a fleeing enemy more than one hundred paces
or follow a retreating enemy more than three days, thereby making clear their
observance of the forms of proper conduct (//]. They did not exhaust the incapa-
ble and had sympathy for the wounded and sick, thereby making evident their
benevolence. They awaited the completions of the enemy’s formation and then
drummed the attack, thereby making clear their good faith. They contended for
righteousness, not profit, thereby manifesting their righteousness. Moreover,
they were able to pardon those who submitted, thereby making evident their
courage. They knew the end, they knew the beginning, thereby making clear
their wisdom. These six virtues were taught together at appropriate times, being
taken as theTao of the people’s guidelines. This was the rule from antiquity. (1)

In a similar passage the ideal is again expressed in terms of the li but with the
ostensible purpose of avoiding ambushes and entrapment. 31 However, traces

of the new combat reality still creep in, as witnessed in such injunctions as
“when following a fleeing army do not rest; if some of the enemy stop while
others run off to the side, then be suspicious.”

Importance of the People

As in all of the Seven Military Classics, the contributors stress that “aiding”
the people provides the only justification for mobilizing forces. Moreover,
sharing benefits while eliminating evil and hardship should be paramount
among the government’s objectives. Avoiding any disruption of seasonal ag-
ricultural activity must be an integral part of governmental efforts to secure
the people’s willing allegiance. Furthermore, military actions that might in-
crease the suffering of the enemy’s populace should also be avoided:

Neither contravening the seasons nor working the people to exhaustion is the
means by which to love our people. Neither attacking a state in national mourn-
ing nor taking advantage of natural disasters is the means by which to love their
people. Not mobilizing the army in either winter or summer is the means by
which to love both our own people and the enemy’s people. ( 1 )

The proscription against mobilizing in winter is somewhat unusual because
the fall was normally the time of military training, with campaigns extending
into the winter — the season of withdrawal, death, and punishment. 32

When advancing into enemy territory, actions that might inflame the peo-
ple or cause them hardship and thereby antagonize them should be severely
prohibited:

When you enter the offender’s territory, do not do violence to his gods; do not
hunt his wild animals; do not destroy earthworks; do not set fire to buildings;
do not cut down forests; do not take the six domesticated animals, grains, or im-
plements. 33 When you see their elderly or very young, return them without
harming them. Even if you encounter adults, unless they engage you in combat,
do not treat them as enemies. If an enemy has been wounded, provide medical
attention and return him. (1)

Because the sole justification for launching a sanctioned attack would be
the eradication of governmental evil, 34 any expedition to chastise wrongdo-
ers must maintain an image congruent with its defining values and teachings.
Accordingly, the Ssu-ma Fa stresses both the ceremonial, accusatory nature
of the preparatory formalities 35 and the vital necessity for all the soldiers’ ac-
tions to be characterized by benevolence. In accord with the military writ-
ings of the age, these policies are formulated and directed toward minimizing
the enemy’s resistance. However, this spirit contrasts starkly with the author-
itarian policies of those who advocated consciously employing warfare as

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THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

the crucial means for enriching the state as well as with the brutality wit-
nessed throughout the Warring States period when men, including those
who made the fatal mistake of surrendering rather than fighting to the death,
were slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands.

Warfare: General Principles and Elements

Training Is Primary

Training men for the army entails certain problems, as indicated by this per-
ceptive passage:

In warfare: It is not forming a battle array that is difficult; it is reaching the point
that the men can be ordered into formation that is hard. It is not attaining the
ability to order them into formation that is difficult; it is reaching the point of
being able to employ them that is hard. It is not knowing what to do that is diffi-
cult; it is putting it into effect that is hard. Men from each [of the four quarters]
have their own nature. Character differs from region to region. Through teach-
ing they come to have regional habits, the customs of each state [thus] being dif-
ferent. | Only] through the Tao (Way| are their customs transformed. (4)

The two points made here are historically important. First, the ability to
train men underlies their potential utilization in battle. Second, regional
character differences will affect the outcome (which is why the T’ai Rung
had advocated not disturbing local customs). This conscious observation of
regionalism is one of the keystones of Chinese psychology, a kernel that later
received extensive development.

All battlefield success results from measures previously implemented to
train and prepare the troops. Once the requisite state of preparation is fully
realized, factors that directly affect the battle can be considered. The general
should restrict his tactics to the army’s capabilities, attempt only what his
men are willing to pursue, 36 and try to force the enemy to undertake tasks
for which it is incapable and unwilling. The soldiers’ armor must be stalwart;
the weapons must be of good quality, intermixed, and integrated. The for-
mations must be capable of effectively utilizing the weapons and equipment.

Movement should be controlled and never allowed to become chaotic.
The proper balance between exertion and exhaustion must be struck; other-
wise there is equal danger of laxity and unwillingness stemming from too
much rest, or inability resulting from being overtired. Quiet and control in
the midst of turbulence are the keys to victory. 3 ' Doubt must never be per-
mitted to creep in.

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

The few concrete tactical suggestions that appear in the text are similar,
sometimes even identical to those found in other works from the period. For
example, the wise general always evaluates the enemy carefully and then at-
tacks its weakness. He employs terrain to his advantage, such as by occupy-
ing and fortifying uphill positions, avoiding water and marshes, and being
alert for ambushes when in confined areas. He should accord with Heaven,
which is generally understood as consisting of the factors of climate, season,
and weather but also as the auguries obtained before battle. This reflects
Shang and Early Chou practices and beliefs. 38

Spirit and Courage

The problems of motivating men, manipulating spirit, and fostering courage
command extensive attention in the Ssu-ma Ha, and several observations are
worth abstracting from the text for systematic consideration. Virtually every
military thinker in Chinese antiquity devoted a few passages to the critical
problem of attaining proper commitment and nurturing courage. In simple
approaches either the positive effects of rewards or the negative effects of
punishments were employed singly, whereas more sophisticated thinkers of-
fered a number of positive methods to stimulate courage and to overcome
fear without the greater fear of punishment and death as the sole motivator.
Righteousness, beneficence, material welfare, and freedom from oppression
constituted the fundamental, positive incentives — all to be thoroughly incul-
cated through instruction and teaching. These need not be discussed further.

The concept of ch'i appears prominently in the Ssu-ma Ha, with much of
the psychology of fear and courage being conceptualized in terms of ch'i. For
example, in protracted conflicts courage suddenly becomes crucial:

In general, in battle one endures through strength and gains victory through
spirit. One can endure with a solid defense bui will achieve victory through be-
ing endangered. When the heart’s foundation is solid, a new surge of ch'i will
bring victory. (IV)

Accordingly, men who are doubtful, worried, afraid, or terrified destroy
an army: “When men have minds set on victory, all they see is the enemy.
When men have minds filled with fear, all they see is their fear” (4). Because
the astute commander is advised to attack doubt and weakness in an ene-
my, 39 regaining control of the army’s spirit is critical. Thus:

Positions should be strictly defined; administrative measures should be severe;
strength should be nimble; the [soldiers’] ch'i should be constrained; and the
minds [of the officers and people] should be unified. (4)

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THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

Among the several techniques advanced for “arousing the ch'i” ritual
oath-taking and the final admonition of the troops ranked high in impor-
tance. Properly worded, the oath would invoke the state deities, glorify the
cause, set out the objectives, condemn the enemy, and generally appeal to
righteousness and similar moral values:

When the oath is clear and stimulating the men will be strong, and you will ex-
tinguish | the effects) of baleful omens and auspicious signs. ... Arouse the men’s
spirits with the fervor of righteousness; prosecute affairs at the right moment
(3)

The former great historical leaders apparently felt the oath would have
maximum effect at particular moments, although there was considerable dis-
agreement among them as to the appropriate timing of its administration in
order to achieve the greatest psychological impact:

Shun made the official announcement of their mission within the state (capital)
because he wanted the people to first embrace his orders. The rulers of the Hsia
dynasty administered their oaths amidst the army for they wanted the people to
first complete their thoughts. The Shang rulers swore their oaths outside the
gate to the encampment for they wanted the people to first fix their intentions
and await the conflict. [King Wu| of the Chou waited until the weapons were
about to clash and then swore his oath in order to stimulate the people’s will |to
fight). (2)

In the field, prior to a potentially decisive battle or in dire circumstances,
visibly abandoning all hope of returning home and destroying supplies were
commonly espoused measures, to which (as Sun-tzu also advocates) the
Methods adds a farewell letter:

Writing letters of final farewell is referred to as “breaking off all thoughts of
life." Selecting the elite and ranking the weapons is termed “increasing the
strength of the men.” Casting aside the implements of office and carrying only
minimum rations is termed “opening the men’s thoughts.” (5)

In the Ssu-nia Fa rewards and punishments continue to provide the pri-
mary incentives and means for enforcement. The contributors accepted a
version of the decline-from-Virtue theory that recognized the necessity for
both rewards and punitive measures, which increased with the passage of
time:

In antiquity the Worthy Kings made manifest the Virtue of the people and fully
(sought out) the goodness of the people. Thus they did not neglect the virtuous
nor demean the people in any respect. Rewards were not granted, and punish-
ments were never even tried.

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

Shun neither granted rewards nor imposed punishments, but the people
could still be employed. This was the height of Virtue.

The Hsia granted rewards but did not impose punishments. This was the
height of instruction.

The Shang imposed punishments but did not grant rewards. This was the
height of awesomeness.

The Chou used both rewards and punishments, and Virtue declined —

The Hsia bestowed rewards in court in order to make eminent the good. The
Shang carried out executions in the marketplace to overawe the evil. The Chou
granted rewards in court and carried out executions in the marketplace to en-
courage gentlemen and terrify the common man. Hence the kings of all three
dynasties manifested Virtue in the same way. (2)

Conceived in terms of military prowess and the need for conquest by arms:

The rulers of the Hsia rectified their Virtue and never employed the sharp blades
of their weapons, so their weapons were not mixed together. The Shang relied
on righteousness, so they first used the sharpness of weapons. The Chou relied
on force, so they fully utilized the sharpness of their weapons. (2)

The normal admonitions about the timely imposition of punishments and
granting of rewards found in the writings of the period are included. More
important is the injunction to reinforce the effectiveness of the system with
bold measures when combat must again be faced. An example of this advice,
which is directed toward the commander, runs as follows:

If in warfare you are victorious, share the achievement and praise with the
troops. If you are about to reengage in battle, then make their rewards excep-
tionally generous and the punishments heavier. If you failed to direct them to
victory, accept the blame yourself. If you must fight again, swear an oath and as-
sume a forward position. Do not repeat your previous tactics. Whether you win
or not, do not deviate from this method, for it is termed the “True Principle.” (4)

This accords with the general policy of visibly implementing rewards and
punishments right after the men have prepared for battle:

After you have aroused [people’s) ch'i [spirit) and moreover enacted govern-
mental measures [such as rewards and punishments), encompass them with a
benign countenance, and lead them with your speeches. Upbraid them in accord
with their fears; assign affairs in accord with their desires. (3)

Although most writers in the period adhere to such doctrines, the Meth-
ods identifies two special situations. In the first, because of the magnitude of
the victory or defeat, the sheer numbers of those involved preclude using the
normal approach:

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THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

Do not reward great victories, for then neither the upper nor lower ranks will
boast of their achievements. If the upper ranks cannot boast they will not seem
arrogant, while if the lower ranks cannot boast no distinctions will be estab-
lished among the men. When neither of them boasts this is the pinnacle of defer-
ence.

In cases of great defeat do not punish anyone, for then both the upper and
lower ranks will assume the disgrace falls on them. If the upper ranks reproach
themselves they will certainly regret their errors, while if the lower ranks feel the
same they will certainly try to avoid repeating the offense. When all the ranks
divide [the responsibility for] the detestable among themselves, this is the pinna-
cle of yielding. (2)

In the second unusual case, the soldiers are so terrified of the enemy that
neither the incentives of large rewards nor the threat of capital punishment
can affect them. A radically different approach, which focuses on gaining
control of their emotions through gathering the soldiers together and execut-
ing a series of set patterns or drills before swearing an oath,'" 1 becomes vital:

If they are terrified, then do not threaten them with execution and severe pun-
ishments but display a magnanimous countenance. Speak to them about what
they have to live for, and go about supervising them in their duties. (2)

Such physical actions as crouching and sitting in a tight formation will pre-
sumably break the individual’s isolation and end his continued immersion
into the fear dominating his mind, permitting the commander to turn the sol-
dier’s attention outward with an inspirational harangue focusing on the
righteousness of their cause, the rewards that can be attained, and the objec-
tives of living. 41 As the Ssu-ma Fa notes elsewhere, it is only through being
endangered that men will truly exhaust their spirit and energies. Doubt and
fear are the greatest enemies; but if plans have been well made, the righteous-
ness of the cause thoroughly proclaimed, and the men well trained, the army
should emerge triumphant.

Concept of Battle Management

A number of principles briefly raised by the text are worthy of notice, but
they are self-explanatory and need not be discussed here. However, concepts
related to engaging the enemy that appear throughout the last three chapters
merit brief consideration. Those of particular importance are outlining the
qualities required for leadership; the necessity for thoroughly analyzing the
enemy, weighing the balance of forces, and employing those forces appropri-
ately; avoiding being misled by minor advantages; concentrating force at the
critical moment after moving forward in a more dispersed fashion; and en-
suring harmony among the men. The advantages of terrain should be fully

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

utilized, whereas the tactical deployment of forces depends on their relative
strength and character — including training, armament, and spirit. Even
though an army’s numbers may be few, tactics can be fashioned to preserve
those numbers and even wrest a victory. The Ssu-ma Fa does not discuss
these principles beyond the briefest indication of method, even though they
are found more extensively in the other military writings. Measure and de-
liberate control — perhaps evidence of the antiquity of much of the mate-
rial — are stressed throughout as the basis of both survival and victory. Ap-
plying psychological principles is also important; these principles include
enervating the enemy’s will to fight by leaving an escape path, never forcing
him into the desperate circumstances that compel fighting to the death, and
sowing doubt in the enemy’s mind.

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

127

1. Benevolence the Foundation

In antiquity, taking benevolence as the foundation and employing righteous-
ness to govern constituted "uprightness." However, when uprightness failed
to attain the desired [moral and political! objectives, [they resorted to) au-
thority [ch'tian). Authority comes from warfare, not from harmony among
men. For this reason if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then
killing is permissible. If one must attack a state out of love for their people,
then attacking it is permissible. If one must stop war with war, although it is
war it is permissible. Thus benevolence is loved; righteousness is willingly
submitted to; wisdom is relied on; courage is embraced; and credibility is
trusted. Within, [the government! gains the love of the people, the means by
which it can be preserved. Outside, it acquires awesomeness, the means by
which it can wage war . 1

The Tao of Warfare: Neither contravening the seasons 2 nor working the
people to exhaustion is the means by which to love our people. Neither at-
tacking a state in national mourning nor taking advantage of natural disas-
ter is the means by which to love their people. Not mobilizing the army in ei-
ther winter or summer is the means by which to love both your own people
and the enemy’s people. Thus even though a state may be vast, those who
love warfare will inevitably perish. Even though calm may prevail under
Heaven, those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered!

When the world had attained peace the Son of Heaven had the “Ta K'ai”
[Great Peace] music performed [in celebration|. Then in the spring he held
the Sou hunt, and in the fall he held the Hsien hunt. In the spring the feudal
lords returned their brigades in good order, while in the fall they trained their
soldiers. In this way they did not forget warfare . 3

haust the incapable and had sympathy for the wounded and sick, thereby
making evident their benevolence. They awaited the completion of the ene-
my’s formation and then drummed the attack, thereby making clear their
good faith. They contended for righteousness, not profit, thereby manifest-
ing their righteousness. Moreover, they were able to pardon those who sub-
mitted , 5 thereby making evident their courage. They knew the end, they
knew the beginning, thereby making clear their wisdom. These six virtues
were taught together at appropriate times, being taken as the Tao of the peo-
ple’s guidelines. This was the rule from antiquity.

The administrative measures of the Former Kings: They accorded with the
Tao of Heaven; they established what was appropriate to Earth. They put the
virtuous among the people into office, rectified names, and governed
things . 6 They established the states, defined the hierarchy of feudal positions,
and apportioned emoluments according to rank. The feudal lords were
pleased and embraced them. Those beyond the seas came to submit. Punish-
ments were eliminated and the army rested. These were the attainments of
Sagely Virtue.

Next came the Worthy Kings: They ordered the rites [//], music, laws, and
measures and then created the five punishments, raising armored troops to
chastise the unrighteous. They made inspection tours [of the feudal lands],
investigated [the customs| of the four quarters, assembled the feudal lords,
and investigated differences . 7 If any [of the feudal lords] had disobeyed or-
ders, disordered the constant , 8 turned his back on Virtue, or contravened the
seasons of Heaven 9 — endangering meritorious rulers — they would publicize
it among all the feudal lords, making it evident that he had committed an of-
fense. They then announced it to August Heaven and to the sun, moon, plan-
ets, and constellations. They prayed to the Gods of Earth, the spirits of the
Four Seasons, mountains, and rivers and at the Great Altar [of state]. Then
they offered sacrifice to the Former Kings . 10 Only thereafter would the Prime
Minister charge the army before the feudal lords, saying, “A certain state has
acted contrary to the Tao. You will participate in the rectification campaign
on such a year, month, and day. On that date the army will reach the [offend-
ing] state and assemble with the Son of Heaven to apply the punishment of
rectification.”

The Prime Minister and other high officials would issue the following or-
ders to the army:

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THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

When you enter the offender’s territory, do not do violence to his gods; do not
hunt his wild animals; do not destroy earthworks; 1 1 do not set fire to buildings;
do not cut down forests; do not take the six domesticated animals, grains, or im-
plements. When you see their elderly or very young, return them without harm-
ing them. Even if you encounter adults, unless they engage you in combat, do
not treat them as enemies. If an enemy has been wounded, provide medical at-
tention and return him.

When they had executed the guilty, the king, together with the feudal
lords, corrected and rectified (the government and customs] of the state.
T ey raised up the Worthy, established an enlightened ruler, and corrected
and restored their feudal position and obligations.

The Ways by which the kings and hegemons governed the feudal lords
were six:

With territory they gave shape to the feudal lords .' 2
With government directives they pacified the feudal lords.

With the rites and good faith they drew the feudal lords close to them.
With men of wisdom and strength they pleased the feudal lords.

Through strategists they constrained the feudal lords. With weapons and
armor they forced the submission of the feudal lords.

By sharing misfortune with them, by sharing benefits 13 with them, they
united the feudal lords. They had the smaller states serve the larger ones in
order to bring the feudal lords into harmony.

They assembled them in order to announce nine prohibitions:

Those who rake advantage of weak |states| or encroach on sparsely popu-
lated ones will have their borders reduced on all sides.

Those who murder the Worthy or harm the people will be attacked |and
deposed].

Those who are brutal within their state and encroach on others outside it
will be purged.

Those whose fields turn wild and whose people scatter will be reduced.
Those who rely on the fastness |of natural advantages] to disobey orders
will be invaded.

Those who harm or kill their relatives will be rectified.

Those who depose or slay their ruler will be exterminated.

Those who oppose orders and resist the government will be isolated.

Those who are chaotic and rebellious both within and without their bor-
ders, who act like animals, will be extinguished . 14

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

129

2. Obligations of the Son of Heaven

The duty of the Son of Heaven must be to concentrate on modeling on
Heaven and Earth and observing (the measures] of the Former Sages . 15 The
duty of officers and common men must be to respectfully serve their parents
and to be upright with their ruler and superiors. Even though there is an en-
lightened ruler, if the officers are not first instructed, they cannot be used.

When the ancients instructed the people they would invariably establish
the relationships and fixed distinctions of noble and common — causing
them not to encroach on each other; the virtuous and righteous not to exceed
each other; the talented and technically skilled not to occlude each other;
and the courageous and strong not to clash with each other. Thus their
strength was united and their thoughts were in harmony.

Superiors valued officers who were not boastful for officers who do not
boast are the greatest talents . 1 If they do not boast they are not self-seeking,
and if they are not self-seeking they will not be contentious. When listening
to affairs of state 18 superiors want to seek out their true nature, but when lis-
tening to affairs within the military they must discuss the appropriateness of
matters . 19 Therefore the talented and skillful cannot conceal each other.
When officers follow orders they should receive the highest rewards, when
they disobey orders the most severe form of execution. 2H Then the coura-
geous and strong will not contend with each other.

Only after effective instructions have been provided to the people can [the
state] carefully select and employ them. Only after government affairs have
been thoroughly ordered can the hundred offices be sufficiently provided.
When instructions are thoroughly examined the people will manifest good-
ness. When practice becomes habit the people will embody the customs. This
is the pinnacle of transformation through education.

In antiquity they did not pursue a fleeing enemy too far or follow a retreat-
ing army too closely. By not pursuing them too far, it was difficult to draw
them into a trap; by not pursuing so closely as to catch up, it was hard to am-
bush them. They regarded the forms of propriety [//] as their basic strength
and benevolence as [the foundation of] their victory. After they were victori-

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ous their teachings could again be employed . 21 For this reason the true gen-
tleman values them.

Shun made the official announcement of their mission within the state
[capital] because he wanted the people to first embrace his orders. The rulers
of the Hsia dynasty administered their oaths amidst the army for they
wanted the people to first complete their thoughts. The Shang rulers swore
their oaths outside the gate to the encampment for they wanted the people to
first fix their intentions and await the conflict. [King Wu| of the Chou waited
until the weapons were about to clash and then swore his oath in order to
stimulate the people’s will [to fight].

The rulers of the Hsia rectified their Virtue and never employed the sharp
blades of their weapons, so their weapons were not mixed together . 22 The
Shang relied on righteousness, so they first used the sharpness of weapons.
The Chou relied on force, so they fully utilized the sharpness of their weap-
ons . 23

The Hsia bestowed rewards in court in order to make eminent the good.
The Shang carried out executions in the marketplace to overawe the evil.
The Chou granted rewards in court and carried out executions in the
marketplace to encourage gentlemen and terrify the common man. Hence
the kings of all three dynasties manifested Virtue in the same way.

When the [five types of| weapons are not intermixed, it will not be advan-
tageous. Long weapons are for protection ; 24 short weapons are for defend-
ing. If the weapons are too long they will be difficult to wield against others;
if they are too short they will not reach the enemy. If they are too light they
will be adroitly brandished, hut such facility will easily lead to chaos. If they
are too heavy they will be too clumsy, and if too clumsy they will not attain
their objectives.

As for their war chariots, those of the rulers of the Hsia were called “hook
chariots” for they put uprightness first. Those of the Shang were called
“chariots of the new moon” for they put speed first. Those of the Chou were
called “the source of weapons” for they put excellence first . 25

For flags, the Hsia had a black one at the head representing control of
men. The Shang’s was white for the righteousness of Heaven. The Chou used
yellow for the Tao of Earth.

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

For insignia 26 the Hsia used the sun and moon, valuing brightness. The
Shang used the tiger, esteeming awesomeness. The Chou used the dragon, es-
teeming culture.

When the army concentrates excessively on its awesomeness the people
will cower, but if it diminishes its awesomeness the people will not be victori-
ous. When superiors cause the people to be unable to be righteous, the hun-
dred surnames to be unable to achieve proper organization, the artisans to be
unable to profit [from their work], oxen and horses to be unable to fulfill
their functions while the officers insult [the people| — this is termed “exces-
sive awesomeness,” and the people will cower. When superiors do not re-
spect Virtue but employ the deceptive and evil; when they do not honor the
Tao but employ the courageous and strong; when they do not value those
who obey commands but instead esteem those who contravene them; when
they do not value good actions but esteem violent behavior so that [the peo-
ple! insult the minor officials — this is termed “diminished awesomeness.” If
the conditions of diminished awesomeness prevail the people will not be vic-
torious.

iff

A campaign army 27 takes measure as its prime concern so that the people’s
strength will be adequate. Then, even when the blades clash, the infantry will
not run and the chariots will not gallop. When pursuing a fleeing enemy the
troops will not break formation, thereby avoiding chaos. The solidarity of a
campaign army derives from military discipline that maintains order in for-
mation, does not exhaust the strength of men or horses, and — whether mov-
ing slowly or rapidly — does not exceed the measure of the commands.

In antiquity the form and spirit governing civilian affairs would not be
found in the military realm; those appropriate to the military realm would
not be found in the civilian sphere . 28 If the form and spirit [appropriate to
the) military realm enter the civilian sphere, the Virtue of the people will de-
cline. When the form and spirit [appropriate to the] civilian sphere enter the
military realm, then the Virtue of the people will weaken.

In the civilian sphere words are cultivated and speech languid. In court
one is respectful and courteous and cultivates himself to serve others. Un-
summoned, he does not step forth; unquestioned, he does not speak. It is dif-
ficult to advance but easy to withdraw.

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In the military realm one speaks directly and stands firm. When deployed
in formation one focuses on duty and acts decisively. Those wearing battle
armor do not bow; those in war chariots need not observe the forms of pro-
priety [//']; those manning fortifications do not scurry. In times of danger one
does not pay attention to seniority. Thus the civilian forms of behavior [//)
and military standards [fa] are like inside and outside; the civil and the mar-
tial are like left and right.

In antiquity the Worthy Kings made manifest the Virtue of the people and
fully [sought out ] 29 the goodness of the people. Thus they did not neglect the
virtuous nor demean the people in any respect. Rewards were not granted,
and punishments were never even tried.

Shun neither granted rewards nor imposed punishments, but the people
could still be employed. This was the height of Virtue.

The Hsia granted rewards but did not impose punishments. This was the
height of instruction.

The Shang imposed punishments but did not grant rewards. This was the
height of awesomeness.

The Chou used both rewards and punishments, and Virtue declined.

Rewards should not be |delayed] beyond the appropriate time for you
want the people to quickly profit from doing good. When you punish some-
one do not change his position for you want the people to quickly see the
harm of doing what is not good.

Do not reward great victories, for then neither the upper nor lower ranks
will boast of their achievements. If the upper ranks cannot boast they will
not seem arrogant, while if the lower ranks cannot boast no distinctions will
be established among the men. When neither of them boasts this is the pinna-
cle of deference.

In cases of great defeat do not punish anyone, for then both the upper and
lower ranks will assume the disgrace falls on them. If the upper ranks re-
proach themselves they will certainly regret their errors, while if the lower
ranks feel the same they will certainly try to avoid repeating the offense.
When all the ranks divide [the responsibility for) the detestable among them-
selves, this is the pinnacle of yielding.

In antiquity those on border duty were not required to serve [labor duty)
for three years thereafter, and the ruler would personally observe the peo-
ple’s labor . 30 Upper and lower ranks recompensed each other in this fashion,
which was the pinnacle of harmony.

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

When they had attained their aim [of pacifying the realm), they sang tri-
umphal songs 31 to show their happiness. They stored away the implements
of war, erected the Spirit Terrace , 32 and responded to the labors of the people
to show that the time for rest had come.

3. Determining Rank

In general, to wage war: | First] determine rank and position; prominently re-
cord accomplishments and offenses; retain mendicant knights ; 33 publicize
instructions and edicts; make inquiries among the populace; seek out arti-
sans; apply methodology to planning; fully exploit things; change [the peo-
ple’s! hatreds ; 34 dispel doubts; nourish strength; search out and employ the
skillful; and take action in accord with the people’s hearts.

In general, to wage war: Solidify the people; analyze the advantages [of
terrain); impose order on the turbulent; | regulate] advancing and stopping;
accept upright (remonstrance); nourish a sense of shame; constrain the laws;
and investigate punishments. Minor offenders should then be executed. If
minor offenders are executed, how can major |offenses| arise?

Accord with Heaven; make material resources abundant; bring joy to the
people; take advantage of the resources of Earth; and value military weap-
ons. These are termed the “Five Plans.” To accord with Heaven follow the
seasons; to increase material resources rely on [seizing them from) the en-
emy. To bring joy to the people encourage and bring them into concord | with
their superiors). To take advantage of terrain defend strategic points. Valu-
ing weapons, there are bows and arrows for withstanding attack, maces and
spears for defense, and halberds and spear-tipped halberds for support.

Now each of these five weapons has its appropriate use: The long protect
the short, the short rescue the long. When they are used in turn, the battle
can be sustained. When they are employed all at once, [the army) will be
strong. When you see [the enemy’s] situation, you can be a match for it. This
is termed “weighting.”

A defending army should stand fast, encourage the people, and bring them
into accord [with their superiors). Only after seeing the invading enemy
should it move. The general’s mind is focused; the minds of the people are at
one with his.

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THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

Horses, oxen, chariots, weapons, relaxation, and an adequate diet are the
army’s strength. Instructions are simply a matter of preparation; warfare is
only a question of constraints. The army’s commanding general is the body,
the companies are the limbs, and the squads of five are the thumb and fin-
gers.

In general, warfare is a question of the strategic balance of power
| ch’iian], and combat is a matter of courage. The deployment of formations
is a matter of skill. Employ what [your men| want, and effect what they are
capable of; abolish what they do not want and are incapable of. Do the oppo-
site of this to the enemy.

In general, warfare is a question of having Heaven, material resources,
and excellence.

When the day and time for battle have been appropriately fixed and it is
not necessary to change them; when augury by the tortoise shell presages vic-
tory; and when events proceed in a subtle, mysterious fashion, this is termed
“having Heaven.”

When the masses have [material resources], [the state] has them. When
they thereby produce what is profitable, this is termed “having resources.”
When the men are practiced in the [relative] advantages of the formations,
and they fully exhaust [the strength of| things in preparation [for battle), this
is referred to as “attaining excellence.”

When the people are encouraged to fulfill their responsibilities, they are
termed “men who take pleasure [in warfare].”

Increasing the army and making the [formations] solid; multiplying its
strength and constantly training [the troops); relying on [exploiting the
strength] of things; perceiving the [nature of) things; and responding to sud-
den |events) are what is meant by “effecting preparations.”

Fast chariots and fleet infantrymen, bows and arrows, and a strong de-
fense are what is meant by “increasing the army.” Secrecy, silence, and great
internal strength are what is meant by “making formations solid.” On this
basis, being able to advance and being able to withdraw are what is meant by
‘multiplying strength.” At times of little activity the upper ranks instruct
[and constantly drill the lower ranks). This is what is meant by “training [the
troops] in formations.” When there are appropriate offices [for both com-

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

135

mand and administration], it is termed “relying on [exploiting the strength
of] things.” When in accord with this things are perceived [and managed], it
is referred to as “simplifying administration.”

Determine the [number of] your masses in accord with the terrain, and de-
ploy your formations in accord with the enemy. When in attacking, waging
battle, defending, advancing, retreating, and stopping, the front and rear are
ordered and the chariots and infantry move in concord, this is termed a well-
planned campaign. If they do not follow orders; do not trust [their officers];
are not harmonious; are lax, doubtful, weary, afraid; avoid responsibility;
cower; are troubled, unrestrained, deflated, or dilatory, it is termed a “disas-
trous campaign.” When they suffer from extreme arrogance, abject terror,
moaning and grumbling, constant fear, or [frequent] regrets over actions be-
ing taken, they are termed “destroyed and broken.” Being able to be large or
small or firm or weak, to change formations, and to use large numbers or
small groups — in all respects being a match [for the enemy] — is referred to as
“[exploiting] the balance of power \ch'iian\ in warfare.”

In general, to wage war: Employ spies against the distant; observe the
near; act in accord with the seasons; take advantage of [the enemy’s] material
resources; esteem good faith; abhor the doubtful. Arouse the soldiers with
fervor of righteousness. Undertake affairs at the appropriate time. Employ
people with kindness. When you see the enemy, remain quiet; when you see
turbulence, do not be hasty to respond. When you see danger and hardship,
do not forget the masses. Within the state be generous and foster good faith.
Within the army be magnanimous and martial. When the blades clash, be
decisive and adroit. Within the state there should be harmony; within the
army there should be standards. When the blades clash, investigate [the bat-
tlefield situation]. Within the state display cooperation; within the army dis-
play uprightness; in battle display good faith.

f f f

As for military formations: When advancing, the most important thing for
the ranks is to be dispersed; when engaged in battle [it is] to be dense and for
the weapons to be of mixed types. Instructions to the people should be thor-
ough; quietness is the basis of order; awesomeness becomes advantageous
when it is made manifest. When people preserve each other according to
righteousness, then they will be stimulated to action. When many well-con-

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ceived plans prove successful, the people submit to them. If they sincerely
submit at the appropriate time, then subsequent affairs will be well ordered.
When things are manifest, then the eye discerns them clearly. When plans
have been decided, the mind is strong. When advancing and withdrawing
are without doubt, one can give the appearance of being without plans . 35
When listening to [legal affairs] and punishing [the guilty], do not wantonly
change their designations or change their flags.

Whenever affairs are well executed they will endure; when they accord
with ancient ways they can be effected. When the oath is clear and stimulat-
ing the men will be strong, and you will extinguish (the effects] of baleful
omens and auspicious signs.

The Tao for eliminating baleful omens |and auspicious signs| is as follows.
One is called righteousness. Charge |the people] with good faith, approach
them with strength, establish the foundation [of kingly government], and
unify the strategic power of All under Heaven. There will not be any men
who are not pleased, so this is termed “doubly employing the people.”

Another is called [advantages conferred by] the strategic balance of power
[ch’Uan\. Increase |the enemy’s] excesses, seize what he loves. Then acting
from without, we can cause a response from within. ’ 7

The first is termed men; the second, uprightness; the third, language; the
fourth, skill; the fifth, fire; the sixth, water; the seventh, weapons. They are
referred to as the Seven Administrative Affairs.

Cdory, profit, shame, and death are referred to as the Four Preservations.

Being tolerant and congenial while yet accumulating awesomeness [is the
way | to prevent transgressions and change intentions. In all cases this is the
Tao.

Only benevolence can attract people; however, if one is benevolent but not
trustworthy, then on the contrary he will vanquish himself. Treat men as
men, be upright with the upright, employ appropriate language, and use fire
only where is should be used.

As for the Tao of Warfare: After you have aroused [the people’s! ch’i
[spirit] and moreover enacted governmental measures |such as rewards and
punishments!, encompass them with a benign countenance, and lead them
with your speeches. Upbraid them in accord with their fears; assign affairs in
accord with their desires. When you have crossed the enemy’s borders and
taken control of his territory, appoint people to the tasks of government.
These are termed “methods of war.”

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

All human qualities must be sought among the masses. Test and evaluate
them in terms of name and action [to see if they cohere], for they must excel
at implementation. If they are to perform some action but do not, then you
yourself should lead them. If they are to perform some action and do so, then
ensure that they do not forget it . 38 If you test them three times successfully,
then make [their talents] evident . 39 What is appropriate to human life is
termed the law.

In general the Tao for imposing order on chaos consists of first, benevo-
lence; second, credibility; third, straightforwardness; fourth, unity; fifth,
righteousness; sixth, change [wrought by authority]; seventh, centralized au-
thority.

The Tao for establishing the laws consists of first, acceptance |of con-
straints]; second, the laws; third, the establishment [of the talented and up-
right]; fourth, urgency [in administration!; fifth, distinguishing them with
insignia; sixth, ordering the colors; seventh, no nonstandard uniforms
among the officers.

As for the army, when the |power of the| law lies solely with oneself, it is
termed “centralized.” When those below the ruler all fear the law, it is termed
“law.” When the army does not listen to minor affairs; when in battle it does
not concern itself with small advantages; and when on the day of conflict it
successfully completes its plans in subtle fashion, it is termed “the Tao.”

t f t

As for warfare: When upright methods do not prove effective, then cen-
tralized control of affairs [must be undertaken], [If the people] do not submit
[to Virtue], then laws must be imposed. If they do not trust each other, they
must be unified. If they are dilatory, move them; if they are doubtful, change
(their doubts]. If the people do not trust the ruler, then whatever is promul-
gated must not be revised. This has been the administrative rule from antiq-
uity.

4. Strict Positions 40

In general, as for the Tao of Warfare: Positions should be strictly defined; ad-
ministrative measures should be severe; strength should be nimble; the [sol-
dier’s] ch’i should be constrained; and the minds [of the officers and people]
should be unified.

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THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

In general, as for the Tao of Warfare: Rank and appoint men to office who
understand the Tao and display righteousness. Establish companies and
squads . 41 Order the rows and files. Set the correct (spacing between] the hor-
izontal and vertical . 42 Investigate whether names and realities [correspond].

Those soldiers who stand (in their formations] should advance and then
crouch down; those who (fire from a] squatting position should advance and
then kneel. 4 ' If they are frightened make the formations dense; if they are in
danger have them assume a sitting position. If |the enemy] is seen at a dis-
tance they will not fear them; if, when they are close, they do not look at
them they will not scatter . 44

When the commanding general dismounts from his chariot, the generals
of the left and right also dismount, those wearing armor all sit, and the oath
is sworn, after which the army is slowly advanced . 45 All officers, from the
generals down to the infantry squad leaders, wear armor . 46 Calculate the de-
ployment of the light and heavy forces. Rouse the horses to action; have the
infantrymen and armored soldiers set up a clamor. If they are afraid also col-
lapse them into a tighter unit. Those who are kneeling should squat down;
those who are squatting should lie down. Have them crawl forward on their
knees, then put them at ease. 4 ' Have them get up, shout, and advance to the
drums. Then signal a halt with the bells. With gagged mouths and minimal
dry rations, swear the oath. Have the troops withdraw, crawling back on
their knees . 48 Seize and summarily execute any deserters to stop the others
from looking about |to desert]. Shout in order to lead them. 4 ’ If they are too
terrified of the enemy, do not threaten them with execution and severe pun-
ishments but display a magnanimous countenance. Speak to them about
what they have to live for ; 50 supervise them in their duties.

Within the Three Armies disciplinary action is not imposed on anyone for
more than half a day. Confinement does not go beyond a rest period, nor is
their food reduced by more than half. If you correct their doubts and delu-
sions they can be led, can be made to submit to orders.

In general, in battle one endures through strength, and gains victory
through spirit. One can endure with a solid defense, but will achieve victory
through being endangered. When the heart’s foundation is solid, a new surge

THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

of cb’i will bring victory. With armor one is secure; with weapons one attains
victory.

t t f

In general, the chariots realize security through close formations; the in-
fantry becomes solid through squatting; armor becomes solid through
weight; si victory is attained through the lightness of the weapons.

t t t

When men have minds set on victory, all they see is the enemy. When men
have minds filled with fear, all they see is their fear. When these two minds
intersect and determine [action], [it is essential that] the advantages (as per-
ceived by each| are as one . 52 It is the [commander’s] duty to create this unifi-
cation. Only from (the perspective of] authority ( ch'iian ] can it be seen.

t f t

In general, in warfare: If you advance somewhat into the enemy’s territory
with a light force it is dangerous. 5 ' If you advance with a heavy force deep
into the enemy’s territory you will accomplish nothing. If you advance with a
light force deep into enemy territory you will be defeated. If you advance
with a heavy force somewhat into the enemy’s territory you can fight suc-
cessfully. Thus in warfare the light and heavy are mutually related.

When halting be careful about the weapons and armor . 54 When on the
march be cautious about the rows and files. When in battle be careful about
advancing and stopping.

In general, in warfare: If you are respectful |the troops] will be satisfied. If
you lead in person they will follow. When orders are annoying they will be
ignored. When commands are issued in proper measure they will be seri-
ously regarded. When the drumbeat is rapid they will move quickly; when
the drumbeat is more measured they will move accordingly. When their uni-
forms are light they will feel quick; if lustrous they will feel stalwart.

In general, when the horses and chariots are sturdy, the armor and weap-
ons advantageous, then even a light force can penetrate deeply . 55 If you es-
teem equality (in rank], then no one will strive for great results. If you value
taking charge, then many will die (for the cause]. If you value life, then there

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THE METHODS OF THE SSU-MA

will be many doubts; if you honor death (itself), then they will not be victori-
ous.

In general, men will die for love, out of anger, out of [fear of] awesome-
ness, for righteousness, and for profit.

In general, it is the lao of Warfare that when they are well instructed men
will regard death lightly. When they are constrained hy the Tao they will die
for the upright.

In general, in warfare act in accord with whether [the troops have the
spirit) to be victorious or not. Accord with Heaven, accord with men . 56

In general, in warfare: The Three Armies should not be on the alert for
more than three days; a single company should not be vigilant more than
half a day; while the guard duty 57 for a single soldier should not exceed one
rest period.

Those that greatly excel in warfare use the foundation; next in greatness
are those that employ the ends . 58 Warfare is taking control of strategy, pre-
serving the subtle. The foundation and the ends are only a question of [ex-
ploiting! the strategic balance of power [ch'iian\.

In general, regarding victory: When the Three Armies are united as one
man they will conquer.

In general, as for the drums: There are drums [directing the deployment
of) the flags and pennants; drums for |advancing| the chariots; drums for the
horses; 5 ’' drums for [directing) the infantry; drums for the different types of
troops; drums for the head ; 60 and drums for the feet . 61 All seven should be
properly prepared and ordered.

In general, in warfare: When the formation is already solid, do not make it
heavier. When your main forces are advancing, do not commit all of them
for by doing so you will be endangered.

In general, in warfare: It is not forming a battle array that is difficult; it is
reaching the point that the men can be ordered into formation that is hard. It
is not attaining the ability to order them into formation that is difficult; it is

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141

reaching the point of being able to employ them that is hard. If is not know-
ing what to do that is difficult; it is putting it into effect that is hard. Men
from each [of the four quarters) have their own nature. Character differs
from region to region. Through teaching they come to have regional habits,
the customs of each state [thus] being different. [Only) through the Tao are
their customs transformed.

In general, whether |the troops] are numerous or few, even though they
have already attained victory, they should act as if they had not been victori-
ous . 62 The troops should not boast about the sharpness of their weapons or
speak of the stoutness of their armor or the sturdiness of their chariots or the
quality of their horses; nor should the masses take themselves to be many —
for they have not yet gained the Tao . 65

In general, if in warfare you are victorious, share the achievement and
praise with the troops. If you are about to reengage in battle, then make their
rewards exceptionally generous and the punishments heavier. If you failed to
direct them to victory, accept the blame yourself. If you must fight again,
swear an oath and assume a forward position. Do not repeat your previous
tactics. Whether you win or not, do not deviate from this method, for it is
termed the “True Principle.”

In general, with regard to the people: Rescue them with benevolence; en-
gage in battle with righteousness; make decisions through wisdom; fight
with courage; exercise sole authority through credibility; encourage them
with profits; and gain victory through achievements. Thus the mind must
embody benevolence and actions should incorporate righteousness. Relying
on [the nature of) things is wisdom; relying on the great is courage; relying
on long-standing [relations leads to) good faith. Yielding results in harmony,
and the men of themselves will be deferential. If men attribute failings to
themselves, they will compete to be worthy . 64 When men are pleased in their
hearts, they will exhaust their strength.

In general, in warfare: Attack the weak and quiet, avoid the strong and
quiet. Attack the tired, avoid the well trained and alert. Attack the truly
afraid, avoid those that [display] only minor fears. From antiquity these
have been the rules for governing [the army).

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143

5. Employing Masses

In general, as for the Tao of Warfare: When you employ a small number they
must be solid . 65 When you employ a large mass they must be well ordered.
With a small force it is advantageous to harass the enemy; with a large mass
it is advantageous to use orthodox | tactics ]. 66 When employing a large mass
advance and stop; when employing a small number advance and withdraw.
If your large mass encounters a small enemy force, surround them at a dis-
tance but leave one side open . 67 [Conversely,] if you divide [your forces] and
attack in turn, a small force can withstand a large mass. If their masses are
beset by uncertainty, you should take advantage of it. If you are contending
for a strategic position, abandon your flags [as if in flight, and when the en-
emy attacks] turn around to mount a counterattack. If the enemy is vast,
then concentrate your troops and let them surround you. If the enemy is
fewer and fearful, avoid them and leave a path open . 68

In general, as for warfare: Keep the wind to your back, the mountains be-
hind you, heights on the right, and defiles on the left. Pass through wetlands,
cross over damaged roads. Complete double the normal march before en-
camping; select ground [for encamping] configured like a turtle’s back.

In general, as for warfare: After deploying observe their actions. Watch the
enemy and then initiate movement. If they are waiting [for our attack], then
act accordingly. Do not drum the advance, but await the moment when their
masses arise. If they attack, entrench your forces and observe them.

In general, when nearing an enemy’s capital, you must have a road by
which to advance; when about to withdraw, you must ponder the return
route.

In general, as for warfare: If you move first [it will be easy] to become ex-
hausted. If you move after [the enemy, the men] may become afraid. If you
rest, [the men may] become lax; if you do not rest, they may also become ex-
hausted. Yet if you rest very long, on the contrary, they may also become
afraid.

t f 1

Writing letters of final farewell is referred to as “breaking off all thoughts
of life.” Selecting the elite and ranking the weapons is termed “increasing the
strength of the men.” Casting aside the implements of office and carrying
only minimal rations is termed “opening the men’s thoughts.” From antiq-
uity this has been the rule.

In general, as for warfare: [Employ] large and small numbers to observe
their tactical variations; advance and retreat to probe the solidity of their de-
fenses. Endanger them to observe their fears. Be tranquil to observe if they
become lax. Move to observe if they have doubts. Mount a surprise attack
and observe their discipline.

Mount a sudden strike on their doubts. Attack their haste . 69 Force them to
constrict their deployment. Launch a sudden strike against their order. Take
advantage of | their failure] to avoid harm . 70 Obstruct their strategy. Seize
their thoughts. Capitalize on their fears.

In general, when pursuing a fleeing enemy do not rest. If some of the en-
emy stop on the road, then be wary ! 71

Sun-tzu’s

Art of War

Translator’s Introduction, 149

1. Initial Estimations, 157

2. Waging War, 159

3. Planning Offensives, 160

4. Military Disposition, 163

5. Strategic Military Power, 164

6. Vacuity and Substance, 166

7. Military Combat, 168

8. Nine Changes, 171

9. Maneuvering the Army, 172

10. Configurations of Terrain, 175

11. Nine Terrains, 178

12. Incendiary Attacks, 183

13. Employing Spies, 184

Translator's Introduction

O F the Seven Military Classics only Sun-tzu’s Military Strategy , tradition-
ally known as the Art of War, has received much exposure in the West. First
translated by a French missionary approximately two hundred years ago, it
was reportedly studied and effectively employed by Napoleon and possibly
by certain members of the Nazi High Command. For the past two thousand
years it remained the most important military treatise in Asia, where even the
common people knew it by name. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean military
theorists and professional soldiers have all studied it, and many of the strate-
gies have played a significant role in Japan’s storied military history, com-
mencing about the eighth century A.D. 1 Over the millennia the book’s con-
cepts have stimulated intense debates and vehement philosophical discus-
sions, commanding the attention of significant figures in many realms.
Although the book has been rendered into English numerous times, with the
translations of Lionel Giles 2 and Samuel B. Griffith* still widely available,
further translations continue to appear. Some of these are merely versions of
Giles — acknowledged or otherwise — under a different cover, whereas others
represent entirely new works.'*

Sun-tzu and the Text

It has long been claimed that the Art of War is China’s oldest and most pro-
found military treatise, with all other works relegated to secondary status at
best. Traditionalists attribute the book to the historical Sun Wu, who is re-
corded in the Shih chi and the Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yiieh as
having been active in the last years of the sixth century B.C., beginning about
512 b.c. In their view the book should therefore date from this period and
should contain his theories and concepts of military strategy. However, other
scholars have (1) identified numerous historical anachronisms in the extant
text that encompass terms, events, technology, and philosophical concepts; 5
(2) emphasized the absence of any evidence (such as should appear in the Tso

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

chuan, the classic record of the period’s political events) corroborating Sun
Wu’s strategic role in the wars between Wu and Yiieh; 6 and (3) focused on
the disparity between the advanced concepts and nature of large-scale war-
fare discussed in the Art of War and the more limited, primitive battles that
characterized the end of the sixth century b.c. 7

The traditionalist interpretation derives critical support from the numer-
ous passages from the Art of War that are visible in most other military writ-
ings because, it is asserted, such extensive borrowing could only have been
possible from the earliest text. 8 Moreover, this widespread copying is
thought to provide ample evidence that the Art of War was considered early
on the most important military treatise and was valued far more than any
other work, oral or written. The origination of certain analytical concepts,
such as terrain classification, is also credited to Sun-tzu; therefore, their utili-
zation by the compilers of the Ssu-ma Fa is thought to prove Sun-tzu’s histor-
ical priority indisputably rather than to raise the possibility that Sun-tzu ben-
efited from other works.

However, even if the likelihood of later accretions and revisions is disre-
garded, the traditionalist position still ignores the development and exis-
tence of more than two thousand years of warfare and tactics prior to 500
b.c. and attributes the virtual creation of military strategy to Sun-tzu alone. 9
The concise, often abstract nature of his passages is cited as evidence that the
book was composed at an early stage in the development of Chinese writing,
but an equally compelling argument can be advanced that such a philosophi-
cally sophisticated style would only be possible from a foundation of exten-
sive battlefield experience and a solid tradition of serious military contem-
plation." 1 Basic concepts and common passages seem to argue in favor of a
comprehensive military tradition and evolving expertise rather than creation
ex nihilo.

Excluding the now-untenable position of those skeptics who dismissed the
book as a late fabrication," three major views seem to prevail regarding the
composition date of the Art of War. The first identifies it with the historic
Sun Wu, with final compilation occurring shortly after his death in the early
fifth century B.c. 1 ' The second, which is based on internal evidence, con-
signs it to the middle-to-late Warring States period, or the fourth to third
centuries B.c. 13 The third, also founded on internal evidence supplemented
by recently discovered texts, places it somewhere in the last half of the fifth
century B.c. 14 It is unlikely that a final determination can ever be realized, es-
pecially because traditionalists tend to be very emotional in their defense of
Sun-tzu’s authenticity. However, it seems likely that the historical figure ex-
isted and that he not only served as a strategist and possibly a general but

sun-tzu’s art of war

also composed the core of the book that bears his name. Thereafter, the es-
sential teachings were probably transmitted within the family or a close-knit
school of disciples, being improved and revised with the passing decades
while gradually gaining wider dissemination. The early text may even have
been edited by Sun-tzu’s famous descendant Sun Pin, who also extensively
employed its teachings in his own Military Methods .' 5

The Shih chi incorporates the biographies of numerous distinguished mili-
tary strategists and generals, including Sun-tzu. 16 However, the Spring and
Autumn Annals of Wu and Yiieh recounts the somewhat more interesting
version that follows:

In the third year of King Ho-lu’s reign Wu’s generals wanted to attack Ch’u, but
no action was taken. Wu Tzu-hsli 17 and Po Hsi spoke with each other: “We nur-
ture officers and make plans on behalf of the king. These strategies will be ad-
vantageous to the state, and for this reason the king should attack Ch’u. But he
has put off issuing the orders and does not have any intention to mobilize the
army. What should we do?”

After a while the King of Wu queried Wu Tzu-hsU and Po Hsi: “I want to send
forth the army. What do you think?” Wu Tzu-hsU and Po Hsi replied: “We
would like to receive the order.” The King of Wu secretly thought the two of
them harbored great enmity for Ch’u. He was deeply afraid that they would
take the army out, only to be exterminated. He mounted his tower, faced into
the southern wind, and groaned. After a while he sighed. None of his ministers
understood the king’s thoughts. Wu Tzu-hsU secretly realized the king would
not decide, so he recommended Sun-tzu to him.

Sun-tzu, whose name was Wu, was a native of Wu. 18 He excelled at military
strategy but dwelled in secrecy far away from civilization, so ordinary people
did not know of his ability. Wu Tzu-hsU, himself enlightened, wise, and skilled
in discrimination, knew Sun-tzu could penetrate and destroy the enemy. One
morning when he was discussing military affairs he recommended Sun-tzu seven
times. The King of Wu said: “Since you have found an excuse to advance this
shih, I want to have him brought in.” He questioned Su-tzu about military strat-
egy, and each time that he laid out a section of his book the king could not praise
him enough.

Greatly pleased he inquired: “If possible, I would like a minor test of your
military strategy.” Sun-tzu said: “It is possible. We can conduct a minor test with
women from the inner palace.” The king said: “I agree." Sun-tzu said: “I would
like to have two of your Majesty’s beloved concubines act as company com-
manders, each to direct a company.” He ordered all three hundred women to
wear helmets and armor, to carry swords and shields, and [to] stand. He in-
structed them in military methods, that in accord with the drum they should ad-
vance, withdraw, go left or right, or turn around. He had them know the prohi-
bitions and then ordered: “At the first beating of the drum you should all assem-

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

ble, at the second drumming you should advance with your weapons, and at the
third deploy into military formation.” At this the palace women all covered
their mouths and laughed.

Sun-tzu then personally took up the sticks and beat the drums, giving the or-
ders three times and explaining them five times. They laughed as before. Sun-tzu
saw that the women laughed continuously and would not stop.

Sun-tzu was enraged. His eyes suddenly opened wide, his sound was like a
terrifying tiger, his hair stood on end under his cap, and his neck broke the tas-
sels at the side. He said to the Master of Laws: “Get the executioner’s axes.”

Sun-tzu |then] said: “If the instructions are not clear, if the explanations and
orders are not trusted, it is the general’s offense. When they have already been
instructed three times and the orders explained five times, if the troops still do
not perform, it is the fault of the officers. According to the rescripts for military
discipline, what is the procedure?" The Master of Laws said: "Decapitation!"
Sun-tzu then ordered the beheading of the two company commanders, the
king’s favorite concubines. 19

The King of Wu ascended his platform to observe just when they were about
to behead his beloved concubines. He had an official hasten down to them with
orders to say: “I already know the general is able to command forces. Without
these two concubines my food will not be sweet. It would be appropriate not to
behead them.”

Sun-tzu said: “I have already received my commission as commanding gen-
eral. According to the rules for generals, when I, as a general, am in command of
the army even though you issue orders to me, I do not |have to] accept them."

|He then had them beheaded.]

He again beat the drum, and they went left and right, advanced and with-
drew, and turned around in accord with the prescribed standards without dar-
ing to blink an eye. The two companies were silent, not daring to look around.
Thereupon Sun-tzu reported to the King of Wu: “The army is already well-or-
dered. I would like your Majesty to observe them. However you might want to
employ them, even sending them forth into fire and water, will not present any
difficulty. They can be used to settle All under Heaven."

The King of Wu was suddenly displeased. He said: “I know that you excel at
employing the army. Even though I can thereby become a hegemon, there is no
place to exercise them. General, please dismiss the army and return to your
dwelling. I am unwilling to act further.”

Sun-tzu said: “Your Majesty only likes the words, he is not able to realize
their substance.” Wu Tzu-hsU remonstrated: “I have heard that the army is an
inauspicious affair 20 and cannot be wantonly tested. Thus if one forms an army
but does not go forth to launch a punitive attack, then the military Tao will be
unclear. Now if your Majesty sincerely seeks talented shih and wants to mobi-
lize the army to execute the brutal state of Ch'u, become hegemon of All under
Heaven, and overawe the feudal lords, if you do not employ Sun-tzu as your

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

general, who can ford the Huai, cross the Ssu, and traverse a thousand li to en-
gage in battle?” Thereupon the King of Wu was elated. He had the drum beaten
to convene the army’s staff, assembled the troops, and attacked Ch'u. Sun-tzu
took Shu, killing the two renegade Wu generals Kai Yu and Chu Yung. 21

The Shih chi biography further states that “to the West he defeated the
powerful state of Ch’u and advanced into Ying. To the north he overawed
Ch’i and Chin, and his name became manifest among the feudal lords. This
was due to Sun-tzu’s power among them.” Some military historians identify
him with several campaigns against Ch’u that followed, commencing in 51 1
b.c. — the year after his initial interview with King Ho-lli — although he is
never mentioned in any recorded source as having sole command of the
troops. Presumably, Sun-tzu realized the difficulty of surviving under the
evolving, unstable political conditions of his time and set an example for
later ages by retiring to obscurity, leaving his work behind. 22

The Shih chi biography differs in another fundamental aspect from the
Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yiieh because it identifies Sun-tzu as a
native of Ch’i rather than of Wu. 2 ’ This would place his background in a
state that enjoyed the heritage of the T’ai Kung’s thought — one originally on
the periphery of the ancient Chou political world, which was known for its
diversity of views and imaginative theories. Because the Art of War clearly
reflects many Taoist conceptions 24 and is philosophically sophisticated, Sun-
tzu may well have been a man of Ch’i.

Main Concepts in the Art of War

Sun-tzu’s Art of War, as transmitted through the ages, consists of thirteen
chapters of varying length — each ostensibly focused on a specific topic. Al-
though most contemporary Chinese military scholars continue to character-
ize the entire work as an organic whole, marked by the logical progression
and development of themes from start to finish, obvious relationships be-
tween supposedly connected passages are frequently difficult to determine or
are simply nonexistent. However, the major concepts generally receive fre-
quent, logically consistent treatment throughout, which supports the attri-
bution of the book to a single figure or a well-integrated school of thought. 2 '

The military writings unearthed in the Lin-i Han dynasty tomb include a
copy of the Art of War essentially in its traditional form, together with signif-
icant additional material such as the “King of Wu’s Questions.” 26 The trans-
lation that follows has been based on the heavily annotated classical version
because that version reflects the understanding and views of the past one
thousand years and the beliefs on which government and military officials

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

based their actions in real history. The traditional text has been revised only
when the tomb materials resolve otherwise-opaque passages, although the
impact of such changes on the overall content remains minimal. Significant
variations in characters and sentences are discussed in notes supplementing
the translation.

Because the Art of War is remarkably lucid, if compressed and sometimes
enigmatic, only a brief introduction of the major topics is undertaken here.
General Griffith’s translation, published by Oxford, remains widely avail-
able, and his detailed introduction to Sun-tzu’s thought can be consulted by
those who wish a more extensive, systematic English presentation . 27 The an-
alytical literature in Chinese and Japanese is too copious to enumerate; se-
lected works are cited in the notes because the commentators may cast light
on different concepts .or passages.

t t f

At the time the Art of War was probably composed, warfare had evolved
sufficiently to endanger the very existence of virtually every state. Therefore
Sun-tzu felt that mobilizing a nation for war and committing its army to bat-
tle could only be undertaken with the greatest gravity. 2 * His entire approach
to employing the army is thoroughly analytical, mandating careful planning
and the formulation of an overall strategy before commencing the campaign.
The focus of all grand strategy must be the development of a prosperous,
contented populace whose willing allegiance to the ruler is unquestioned . 29
Thereafter, diplomatic initiatives can be effected, but military preparations
should never be neglected. The primary objective should be to subjugate
other states without actually engaging in armed combat, thereby realizing
the ideal of complete victory. Whenever possible this should be achieved
through diplomatic coercion, thwarting the enemy’s plans and alliances, and
frustrating its strategy. The government should resort to armed combat only
if the enemy threatens the state with military action or refuses to acquiesce
without being forced into submission through warfare. Even when exercis-
ing this option, every military campaign should focus on achieving maxi-
mum results with minimum risk and exposure, limiting as far as possible the
destruction that is inflicted and suffered.

Sun-tzu emphasizes rational self-control throughout the Art of War,
stressing the vital necessity to avoid all engagements not based on extensive,
detailed analyses of the situation and combat options and of one’s own capa-
bilities . 30 Haste, fear of being labeled a coward, and personal emotions such
as anger and hatred should never be permitted to adversely influence state
and command decisionmaking . 51 The army should never be thrown rashly

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

into an engagement, thrust into a war, or mobilized unnecessarily. Instead,
restraint should be exercised, although measures should be implemented to
ensure that the army cannot be defeated. Accordingly, certain tactical situa-
tions and configurations of terrain should be avoided and instead be turned
to one’s advantage when opportune. Thereafter, the focus can be directed to-
ward realizing the predetermined campaign strategy and implementing ap-
propriate tactics to defeat the army.

Sun-tzu’s basic strategy focuses on manipulating the enemy, creating the
opportunity for an easy victory. To this end he classifies the types of terrain
and their exploitation; advances numerous tactics for probing, manipulat-
ing, and weakening the enemy; conceptualizes the tactical situation in terms
of extensive series of mutually defining elements ; 32 and advocates the em-
ployment of both orthodox ( cheng ) and unorthodox (ch’i) troops to wrest
the victory . 33 The enemy is lured into untenable positions with prospects of
gain, enervated by being wearied and exhausted before the attack, and pene-
trated by forces that are suddenly concentrated at vulnerable points. The
army should always be active, even when assuming a defensive posture, in
order to create and seize the temporary tactical advantage ( ch’iiati ) that will
ensure victory. Avoiding a strong force is not cowardice but indicates wis-
dom because it is self-defeating to fight when and where it is not advanta-
geous . 34

The basic principle is “go forth where they do not expect it; attack where
they are not prepared.” This principle can only be realized through secrecy in
all activities, through complete self-control and strict discipline within the
army, and by being unfathomable. Warfare is a matter of deception — of con-
stantly creating false appearances, spreading disinformation, and employing
trickery and deceit. When such deception is imaginatively created and effec-
tively implemented, the enemy will neither know where to attack nor what
formations to employ and thus will be condemned to making fatal errors.

The corollary to being unknowable is seeking out and gaining detailed
knowledge of the enemy through all available means, including the rigorous
employment of spies. The fundamental principle is never to rely on the good-
will of others or on fortuitous circumstances but to guarantee through
knowledge, active study, and defensive preparation that the enemy cannot
mount a surprise attack or gain a victory through simple coercion.

Throughout the book Sun-tzu discusses the essential problem of com-
mand: forging a clearly defined organization that is in control of thoroughly
disciplined, well-ordered troops. The critical element is spirit, technically
known as ch’i — the essential, vital energy of life . 35 This is the component as-
sociated with will and intention; when the men are well trained, properly

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SUN-TZU’s ART OF WAR

fed, clothed, and equipped, and if their spirits are roused, they will fight vig-
orously. However, if physical or material conditions have blunted their
spirit; if an imbalance exists in the relationship between command and
troops; if for any reason the troops have lost their motivation, they will be
defeated. Conversely, the commanding general must manipulate the situa-
tion so as to avoid the enemy when its spirits are strong — such as early in the
day— and exploit any opportunity presented by its diminishment, attacking
when its troops no longer have any inclination to fight, such as when they
are about to return to camp. Prolonged warfare can only lead to enervation;
therefore, careful planning is paramount to guarantee the swift execution of
the campaign strategy. Certain situations, such as fatal terrain on which a
desperate battle must be fought, are conducive to eliciting the army’s greatest
efforts. Others are debilitating, dangerous, and even fatal and must be scru-
pulously avoided. Rewards and punishments provide the basis for control,
but every effort must be made to foster and maintain the proper attitude of
desire and commitment on the part of the men. Accordingly, all detrimental
stimuli, such as omens and rumors, must be prohibited . 36

Finally, Sun-tzu sought to maneuver the army into a position where it en-
joyed such a great tactical advantage that the impact of its attack, the im-
pulse of its “strategic configuration of power” [shih , ) 37 would be like the
sudden onrush of water cascading down from mountain peaks. Deploying
the troops into a suitable configuration [hsing\; M creating a favorable “im-
balance of power” | ch'uan];''* concentrating forces on focused targets; ex-
ploiting advantages of terrain; and stimulating the men’s spirits would all be
directed toward this moment, toward this decisive objective.

1. Initial Estimations'

Sun-tzu said:

“Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way
|Tao] to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and ana-
lyzed.

“Therefore, structure it according to [the following] five factors, evaluate
it comparatively through estimations, and seek out its true nature . 2 The first
is termed the Tao, the second Heaven, the third Earth, the fourth generals,
and the fifth the laws [for military organization and discipline].

“The Tao 3 causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler . 4 |Thus]
they will die with him; they will live with him and not fear danger . 3

“Heaven encompasses yin and yang, cold and heat, and the constraints of
the seasons . 6

“Earth encompasses far or near, difficult or easy, expansive or confined,
fatal or tenable terrain . 7

“The general encompasses wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and
strictness.

“The laws (for military organization and discipline] encompass organiza-
tion and regulations, the Tao of command, and the management of logistics . 8

“There are no generals who have not heard of these five. Those who un-
derstand them will be victorious; those who do not understand them will not
be victorious.

“Thus when making a comparative evaluation through estimations, seek-
ing out its true nature, ask:

Which ruler has the Tao?

Which general has greater ability?

Who has gained [the advantages of] Heaven and Earth?

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented?

Whose forces 9 are stronger?

Whose officers and troops are better trained?

Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?

“From these I will know victory and defeat!

“If a general follows my [methods for] estimation and you employ him, he
will certainly be victorious and should be retained. If a general does not fol-
low my [methods for] estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be
defeated, so dismiss him . 10

“After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put
it into effect with strategic power \shih]" supplemented by field tactics
which respond to external factors . 12 As for strategic power, [it is] controlling
the tactical imbalance of power [ch’Uan] in accord with the gains to be real-
ized . 13

“Warfare is the Way [Tao] of deception . 14 Thus although [you are] capa-
ble, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces,
feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant;
when far away, create the illusion of being nearby . 15

“Display profits to entice them. Create disorder (in their forces] and take
them . 16

“If they are substantial, 1 " prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them.

“If they are angry, perturb them ; 18 be deferential to foster their arro-
gance . 19

“If they are rested, force them to exert themselves.

“If they are united, cause them to be separated.

“Attack where they are unprepared.

“Go forth where they will not expect it.

“These are the ways military strategists are victorious. They cannot be
spoken of in advance . 20

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

“Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that
he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor.
Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he
will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.

“If one who finds that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious
while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about
someone who finds no factors in his favor ? 21

“If I observe it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent.”

2. Waging War

Sun-tzu said:

“In general, the strategy for employing the military (is this ]: 22 If there are
one thousand four-horse attack chariots, one thousand leather-armored sup-
port chariots, one hundred thousand mailed troops, and provisions are
transported one thousand li, then the domestic and external campaign ex-
penses, the expenditures for advisers and guests, materials such as glue and
lacquer, and providing chariots and armor will be one thousand pieces of
gold per day. Only then can an army of one hundred thousand be mobilized.

“When employing them in battle, a victory that is long in coming will
blunt their weapons and dampen their ardor. 2 ' If you attack cities, their
strength will be exhausted . 24 If you expose the army to a prolonged cam-
paign, the state’s resources will be inadequate.

“When the weapons have grown dull and spirits depressed, when our
strength has been expended and resources consumed, then the feudal lords
will take advantage of our exhaustion to arise. Even though you have wise
generals, they will not be able to achieve a good result.

“Thus in military campaigns I have heard of awkward speed but have
never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country has ever profited from
protracted warfare. Those who do not thoroughly comprehend the dangers
inherent in employing the army are incapable of truly knowing the potential
advantages of military actions.

f t t

“One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the people
twice or transport provisions a third time . 25 If you obtain your equipment

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from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the
army’s foodstuffs will be sufficient.

“The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far
off. When provisions are transported far off, the hundred surnames 26 are im-
poverished.

“Those in proximity to the army will sell their goods expensively . 27 When
goods are expensive, the hundred surname’s wealth will be exhausted. When
their wealth is exhausted, they will be extremely hard pressed [to supply|
their village’s military impositions . 28

“When their strength has been expended and their wealth depleted, then
the houses in the central plains will be empty . 29 The expenses of the hundred
surnames will be some seven-tenths 30 of whatever they have. The ruler’s irre-
coverable expenditures — such as ruined chariots, exhausted horses, armor,
helmets, arrows and crossbows, halberd-tipped and spear-tipped [large,
movable) protective shields, strong oxen , 31 and large wagons — will consume
six-tenths of his resources.

“Thus the wise general will concentrate on securing provisions from the
enemy. One bushel of the enemy’s foodstuffs is worth twenty of ours; one
picul of fodder is worth twenty of ours.

“Thus what [motivates men| to slay the enemy is anger; what [stimulates
them] to seize profits ' 2 from the enemy is material goods. Thus in chariot en-
counters, when ten or more chariots are captured, reward the first to get one.
Change their flags and pennants to ours; intermix and employ them with our
own chariots. Treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them [for
our use|. This is referred to as ‘conquering the enemy and growing stronger.’

“Thus the army values being victorious; it does not value prolonged war-
fare. Therefore, a general who understands warfare is Master of Fate for the
people, ruler of the state’s security or endangerment.”

3. Planning Offensives

Suti-tzu said:

“In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the
[enemy’s) state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best . 33

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best . 34 Preserving
their battalions is best, destroying their battalions second-best. Preserving
their companies is best, destroying their companies second-best. Preserving
their squads is best, destroying their squads second-best. For this reason at-
taining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of
excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinna-
cle of excellence.

fit

“Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans;
next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to
attack their fortified cities.

“This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when unavoidable.
Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault wagons, and
other equipment and devices will require three months. Building earth-
works" will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot
overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men
swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and
troops, and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results
from attacking | fortified cities].

“Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people’s
armies without engaging in battle, captures other people’s fortified cities
without attacking them, and destroys others people’s states without pro-
longed fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of
‘preservation .’ 36 Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can
be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives.

“In general, the strategy for employing the military is this: If your strength
is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, then
divide your forces . 37 If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can en-
gage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid
him. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly 38 will become the captives of a
large enemy.

“The general is the supporting pillar of state. If his talents are all-encom-
passing, the state will invariably be strong. If the supporting pillar is marked
by fissures, the state will invariably grow weak.

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

“Thus there are three ways by which an army is put into difficulty by a
ruler:

“He does not know that the Three Armies should not advance but in-
structs them to advance or does not know that the Three Armies
should not withdraw and orders a retreat. This is termed ‘entan-
gling the army.’

“He does not understand the Three Armies’ military affairs but [directs
them] in the same way as his [civil] administration . 39 Then the offi-
cers will become confused.

“He does not understand the Three Armies’ tactical balance of power
[ch'iian] but undertakes responsibility for command. Then the offi-
cers will be doubtful.

“When the Three Armies are already confused and doubtful, the danger of
the feudal lords [taking advantage of the situation] arises. This is referred to
as ‘a disordered army drawing another on to victory.’

“Thus there are five factors from which victory can be known:

“One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be
victorious.

“One who recognizes 40 how to employ large and small numbers will
be victorious.

“One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be vic-
torious.

“One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious.

“One whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will
be victorious.

“These five are the Way [Tao] to know victory.

“Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself 41 will
not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the
enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with
defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be de-
feated in every engagement.”

SUN-TZU’s ART OF WAR

163

4. Military Disposition 42

Sun-tzu said:

“In antiquity those that excelled in warfare first made themselves uncon-
querable 43 in order to await [the moment when] the enemy could be con-
quered.

“Being unconquerable lies with yourself; being conquerable lies with the
enemy.

“Thus one who excels in warfare 44 is able to make himself unconquerable,
but cannot necessarily cause the enemy to be conquerable.

“Thus it is said a strategy for conquering the enemy can be known but yet
not possible to implement.

“One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can
be victorious attacks. In these circumstances by assuming a defensive pos-
ture, strength will be more than adequate, whereas in offensive actions it
would be inadequate . 411

“Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest
depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense 46 move from above the greatest
heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain com-
plete victory.

“Perceiving a victory that does not surpass what the masses could know is
not the pinnacle of excellence. Wrestling victories for which All under
Heaven proclaim your excellence is not the pinnacle of excellence.

“Thus lifting an autumn hair cannot be considered great strength; seeing
the sun and moon cannot be considered acute vision; hearing the sound of
thunder cannot be considered having sensitive ears.

“Those that the ancients 47 referred to as excelling at warfare conquered
those who were easy to conquer. Thus the victories of those that excelled in
warfare were not marked by fame for wisdom or courageous achievement . 48
Thus their victories were free from errors. One who is free from errors di-
rects his measures toward |certain| victory, conquering those who are al-
ready defeated.

164

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

“Thus one who excels at warfare first establishes himself in a position
where he cannot be defeated while not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the
enemy.

“For this reason, the victorious army first realizes the conditions for vic-
tory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first,
and then seeks victory.

“One 4 ** who excels at employing the military cultivates the Tao 50 and pre-
serves the laws; therefore, he is able to be the regulator of victory and de-
feat . 51

“As for military methods 52 : the first is termed measurement; the second,
estimation [of forces]; the third, calculation [of numbers of men]; the fourth,
weighing [relative strength]; and the fifth, victory.

“Terrain gives birth to measurement ; 51 measurement produces the estima-
tion [of forces |. 54 Estimation |of forces | gives rise to calculating [the numbers
of men]. Calculating [the numbers of men] gives rise to weighing [strength].
Weighing [strength] gives birth to victory.

“Thus the victorious army is like a ton compared with an ounce, while the
defeated army is like an ounce weighed against a ton! The combat of the vic-
torious 55 is like the sudden release of a pent-up torrent down a thousand-
fathom gorge. This is the strategic disposition of force \hsing \.” S6

5. Strategic Military Power 57

Sun-tzu said:

“In general, commanding a large number is like commanding a few. It is a
question of dividing up the numbers. Fighting with a large number is like
fighting with a few. It is a question of configuration and designation . 58

“What enable the masses of the Three Armies to invariably withstand the
enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox [ch’i] and orthodox
[cheng ]. 59

“If wherever the army attacks it is like a whetstone thrown against an egg,
it is due to the vacuous and substantial . 60

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

“In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory
through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unortho-
dox is as inexhaustible as Heaven , 61 as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow
rivers . 62 What reach an end and begin again are the sun and moon. What die
and are reborn 61 are the four seasons.

“The notes do not exceed five, but the changes 64 of the five notes can never
be fully heard. The colors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five col-
ors can never be completely seen. The flavors do not exceed five, but the
changes of the five flavors can never be completely tasted. In warfare the
strategic configurations of power \shih\ do not exceed the unorthodox and
orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be
completely exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce
each other, just like an endless cycle . 65 Who can exhaust them?

t « *

“The strategic configuration of power \shih] [is visible in] the onrush of
pent-up 66 water tumbling stones along. The [effect of] constraints 67 [is visi-
ble in] the onrush 68 of a bird of prey breaking the bones of its | target]. Thus
the strategic configuration of power \shih] of those that excel in warfare is
sharply focused, their constraints are precise. 6 '' Their strategic configuration
of power \shih ] is like a fully drawn crossbow, their constraints like the re-
lease of the trigger.

“Intermixed and turbulent, the fighting appears chaotic, but they cannot
be made disordered. In turmoil and confusion, their deployment is circular , 70
and they cannot be defeated.

“[Simulated] chaos is given birth from control ; 71 [the illusion of] fear is
given birth from courage; [feigned] weakness is given birth from strength.
Order and disorder are a question of numbers; courage and fear are a ques-
tion of the strategic configuration of power [shih\\ strength and weakness
are a question of the deployment [of forces (hsing ) ].

“Thus one who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration
\hsing\ to which the enemy must respond. He offers something which the en-
emy must seize. With profit he moves them, with the foundation 72 he awaits
them.

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

167

. , , know where to attack. Subtle! Subtle! It approaches the formless . 79 Spiri-

“Tliiic r,r,a „ i c ... tual ! Spiri tual ! It attains the soundless. Thus he can be the enemy’s Master of

Thus one who excels at warfare seeks [victory] through the strategic con- Fate

figuration of power [shih\, not from reliance on men. Thus he is able to select
men and employ strategic power [shih ]. 73

“One who employs strategic power [sh,h\ commands men in battle as if he
were rolling logs and stones. The nature of wood and stone is to be quiet
when stable but to move when on precipitous ground. If they are square they
stop if round they tend to move. Thus the strategic power [shih] of one who
excels at employing men in warfare is comparable to rolling round boulders
down a thousand-fathom mountain. Such is the strategic configuration of
power [shih]."

6 . Vacuity and Substance 4

Sun-tzu said:

“In general, whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy
will be at ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterward and must race
to the conflict will be fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men
and is not compelled by other men . 75

“In order to cause the enemy to come of their own volition, extend some
[apparent) profit. In order to prevent the enemy from coming forth, show
them [the potential) harm.

“Thus if the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is well fed you can make
him hungry; if he is at rest you can move him. Go forth to positions to which
he must race. 6 Race forth where he docs not expect it . 77

“To travel a thousand li without becoming fatigued, traverse unoccupied
terrain. To ensure taking the objective in an attack, strike positions that are
undefended. To be certain of an impregnable defense, secure positions which
the enemy will not attack . 78

“Thus when someone excels in attacking, the enemy does not know where
to mount his defense; when someone excels at defense, the enemy does not

“To effect an unhampered 80 advance, strike their vacuities. To effect a re-
treat that cannot be overtaken, employ unmatchable speed . 81 Thus if I want
to engage in combat, even though the enemy has high ramparts and deep
moats, he cannot avoid doing battle because I attack objectives he must res-
cue.

“If I do not want to engage in combat, even though I merely draw a line on
the ground and defend it, he will not be able to engage me in battle because
we thwart his movements.

“Thus if I determine the enemy’s disposition of forces [ hsirtg \ while I have
no perceptible form , 82 I can concentrate |my forces) while the enemy is frag-
mented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into
ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and
the enemy is few. If we can attack his few with our many, those who we en-
gage in battle will be severely constrained.

“The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to
them. If it is not known, then the positions which they must prepare to de-
fend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are nu-
merous, then the forces we will engage will be few. Thus if they prepare to
defend the front, to the rear there will be few men. If they defend the rear, in
the front there will be few. If they prepare to defend the left flank, then on the
right there will be few men. If they prepare to defend the right flank, then on
the left there will be few men. If there is no position left undefended, then
there will not be any place with more than a few. The few [are the ones) who
prepare against others; the many [are the ones] who make others prepare
against them . 83

“Thus if one knows the field of battle and knows the day of battle, he can
traverse a thousand li and assemble to engage in combat . 84 If he does not
know the field of battle nor know the day for battle, then the left flank can-
not aid the right nor the right flank aid the left; the front cannot aid the rear

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

nor the rear aid the front. s ' How much more so when the distant are some
tens of li away and the near several li apart? As I analyze it, even though
Ytieh’s army is numerous, of what great advantage is it to them for attaining
victory ? 86 Thus I say victory can be achieved . 87 Even though the enemy is
more numerous, they can be forced not to fight.

“Thus critically analyze them to know the estimations for gain and loss.
Stimulate them to know the patterns of their movement and stopping. Deter-
mine their disposition of force \hsing] to know the tenable and fatal terrain.
Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency.

“Thus the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless. If it is
formless, then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise make plans
against it.

“In accord with the enemy’s disposition we impose measures on

the masses that produce victory, but the masses are unable to fathom them.
Men all know the disposition \hsing\ by which we attain victory, but no one
knows the configuration \hsing\ through which we control the victory. Thus
a victorious battle [strategy! is not repeated, the configurations \hsing\ of re-
sponse |to the enemy] are inexhaustible . 88

"Now the army’s disposition of force [hsing\ is like water. Water’s configu-
ration [fesmg| 8 ' avoids heights and races downward. The army’s disposition
of force \hsing\' m avoids the substantial and strikes the vacuous. Water con-
figures \hsing\ its flow 91 in accord with the terrain; the army controls its vic-
tory in accord with the enemy. Thus the army does not maintain any con-
stant 92 strategic configuration of power | shih]; water 93 has no constant shape
\hsing\. One who is able to change and transform in accord with the enemy
and wrest victory is termed spiritual ! 94 Thus |none of] the five phases con-
stantly dominates; the four seasons do not have constant positions; the sun
shines for longer and shorter periods; and the moon wanes and waxes .” 95

7. Military Combat 96

Sun-tzu said:

“In general, the strategy for employing the army is this: |From the time]
the general receives his commands from the ruler, unites the armies, and as-

sembles the masses, to confronting the enemy and encamping, there is noth-
ing more difficult than military combat. In military combat what is most dif-
ficult is turning the circuitous into the straight, turning adversity into
advantage.

“Thus if you make the enemy’s path circuitous and entice them with
profit, although you set out after them you will arrive before them. This re-
sults from knowing the tactics 97 of the circuitous and the direct.

“Thus combat between armies is advantageous; combat between masses is
dangerous . 98 If the entire army contends for advantage, you will not arrive in
time. If you reduce the army’s size to contend for advantage, your baggage
and heavy equipment will suffer losses.

“For this reason if you abandon your armor |and heavy equipment ] 99 to
race forward day and night without encamping, covering two days normal
distance at a time, marching forward a hundred li to contend for gain, the
Three Armies’ generals will be captured. The strong will be first to arrive,
while the exhausted will follow. With such tactics only one in ten will reach
|the battle site]. If one contends for gain fifty li away, it will cause the general
of the Upper Army to stumble, and by following such tactics half the men
will reach (the objective]. If you contend for gain at thirty li, then two-thirds
of the army will reach [the objective].

“Accordingly, if the army does not have baggage and heavy equipment it
will be lost; if it does not have provisions it will be lost; if it does not have
stores it will be lost.

* * f

Thus one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot prepare
alliances beforehand. Someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests,
gorges and defiles, the shape of marshes and wetlands cannot advance the
army. One who does not employ local guides cannot gain advantages of ter-
rain.

“Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes
through segmenting and reuniting. Thus its speed is like the wind, its slow-
ness like the forest; its invasion and plundering like a fire ; 100 unmoving, it is
like the mountains. It is as difficult to know as the darkness; in movement it
is like thunder.

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

171

“When you plunder a district, divide the wealth among your troops.
When you enlarge your territory, divide the profits. Take control of the stra-
tegic balance of power [ch’uan\ and move. The one who first understands
the tactics of the circuitous and the direct will be victorious. This is the strat-
egy for military combat.

“The Military Administration states: ‘Because they could not hear each
other they made gongs and drums; because they could not see each other
they made pennants and flags.’ Gongs, drums, pennants, and flags are the
means to unify the men’s ears and eyes. When the men have been unified the
courageous will not be able to advance alone, the fearful will not be able to
retreat alone. This is the method for employing large numbers.

“Thus in night battles make the fires and drums numerous, and in daylight
battles make the flags and pennants numerous in order to change the men’s
ears and eyes . 101

“The ch’i of the Three Armies can be snatched away; the commanding
general’s mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their ch’i is ar-
dent; during the day their ch’i becomes indolent; at dusk their ch ’/ is exhaust-
ed.'"’ Thus one who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch’i
and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate
ch’i.

“In order await the disordered; in tranquility await the clamorous. This is
the way to control the mind.

“With the near await the distant; with the rested await the fatigued; with
the sated await the hungry. This is the way to control strength.

“Do not intercept well-ordered flags; do not attack well-regulated forma-
tions . 101 This is the way to control changes.

“Thus the strategy for employing the military: Do not approach high
mountains; do not confront 104 those who have hills behind them. Do not
pursue feigned retreats. Do not attack animated troops. Do not swallow an

army acting as bait. Do not obstruct an army retreating homeward. If you
besiege an army you must leave an outlet . 105 Do not press an exhausted in-
vader. These are the strategies for employing the military .” 106

8. Nine Changes 107

Sun-tzu said:

“In general, the strategy for employing the military is this. After the gen-
eral has received his commands from the ruler, united the armies, and assem-
bled the masses : 108

“Do not encamp on entrapping terrain. 10 ''

“Unite with your allies on focal terrain . 110

“Do not remain on isolated terrain.

“Make strategic plans for encircled terrain.

“On fatal terrain you must do battle . 111

“There are roads that are not 112 followed.

“There are armies that are not attacked.

“There are fortified cities that are not assaulted.

“There is terrain for which one does not contend ." 1

“There are commands from the ruler which are not accepted . 1 14

“Thus the general who has a penetrating understanding of the advantages of
the nine changes knows how to employ the army. If a general does not have a
penetrating understanding of the advantages of the nine changes, even
though he is familiar with the topography, he will not be able to realize the
advantages of terrain.

“One who commands an army but does not know the techniques for the
nine changes, even though he is familiar with the five advantages , 1 15 will not
be able to control men.

“For this reason the wise must contemplate the intermixture of gain and
loss. If they discern advantage [in difficult situations], their efforts can be
trusted. If they discern harm [in prospective advantage), difficulties can be
resolved.

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

173

“Accordingly, subjugate the feudal lords with potential harm; labor the
feudal lords with numerous affairs; and have the feudal lords race after prof-
its.

“Thus the strategy for employing the army: Do not rely on their not com-
ing, but depend on us having the means to await them. Do not rely on their
not attacking, but depend on us having an unassailable position.

“Thus generals have five dangerous (character traits):

“One committed to dying can be slain.

“One committed to living can be captured.

"One (easily | angered and hasty (to act) can be insulted.

“One obsessed with being scrupulous and untainted can be shamed.

“One who loves the people can be troubled.

“Now these five dangerous traits are excesses in a general, potential disaster
for employing the army. The army’s destruction and the general’s death will
invariably stem from these five, so they must be investigated.”

9. Maneuvering the Army

Sun-tzu said:

“As for deploying the army and fathoming the enemy:

“To cross mountains follow the valleys, search out tenable ground , 116
and occupy the heights. If the enemy holds the heights, do not climb up
to engage them in battle. This is the way to deploy an army in the moun-
tains.

“After crossing rivers ' 1 you must distance yourself from them. If the
enemy is forging a river to advance, do not confront them in the water.
When half their forces have crossed, it will be advantageous to strike
them. If you want to engage the enemy in battle, do not array your
forces near the river to confront the invader but look for tenable ground
and occupy the heights. Do not confront the current’s flow . 118 This is
the way to deploy the army where there are rivers.

“When you cross salt marshes and wetlands, concentrate on quickly
getting away from them; do not remain. If you engage in battle in
marshes or wetlands, you must stay in areas with marsh grass and keep
groves of trees at your back. This is the way to deploy the army in
marshes and wetlands.

“On level plains deploy on easy 119 terrain with the right flank posi-
tioned with high ground to the rear, fatal terrain to the fore, and tenable

terrain to the rear. This is the way to deploy on the plains.

“These four (deployments!, advantageous to the army, are the means by
which the Yellow Emperor conquered the four emperors . 120

“Now the army likes heights and abhors low areas, esteems the sunny
(yang) and disdains the shady (yin). It nourishes life and occupies the sub-
stantial . 121 An army that avoids the hundred illnesses is said to be certain of
victory . 122

f 1 t

“Where there are hills and embankments you must occupy the yang side,
keeping them to the right rear. This is to the army’s advantage and (exploits
the natural| assistance of the terrain.

“When it rains upstream, foam appears. 12 ' If you want to cross over, wait
until it settles.

“You must quickly get away from deadly configurations of terrain such as
precipitous gorges with mountain torrents, Heaven’s Well , 124 Heaven’s
Jail , 125 Heaven’s Net , 126 Heaven’s Pit , 127 and Heaven’s Fissure . 128 Do not ap-
proach them. When we keep them at a distance, the enemy |is forced to) ap-
proach them. When we face them, the enemy (is compelled to| have them at
their rear.

“When on the flanks the army encounters ravines and defiles, wetlands
with reeds and tall grass, mountain forests , 129 or areas with heavy, entangled
undergrowth, you must thoroughly search them because they are places
where an ambush or spies would be concealed . 130

* t f

“If (an enemy) > n dose proximity remains quiet, they are relying on their
tactical occupation of ravines . 131 If while far off they challenge you to battle,
they want you to advance [because! they occupy easy terrain to their advan-
tage.

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

175

“If large numbers of trees move, they are approaching. If there are many
[visible! obstacles in the heavy grass, it is to make us suspicious . 132 If the
birds take flight, there is an ambush. If the animals are afraid, [enemy] forces
are mounting a sudden attack.

If dust rises high up in a sharply defined column, chariots are coming. If it
is low and broad, the infantry is advancing. If it is dispersed in thin shafts,
they are gathering firewood. If it is sparse, coming and going, they are en-
camping.

“One who speaks deferentially but increases his preparations will ad-
vance. One who speaks belligerently and advances hastily will retreat.

“One whose light chariots first fan out to the sides is deploying |for bat-
tle ]. 133

“One who seeks peace without setting any prior conditions is [executing)
a stratagem.

One whose troops race off but |who| deploys his army into formation is
implementing a predetermined schedule.

“One [whose troops| half advance and half retreat is enticing you.

“Those who stand about leaning on their weapons are hungry. If those
who draw water drink first, they are thirsty. When they see potential gain
but do not know whether to advance, they are tired.

“Where birds congregate it is empty. If the enemy cries out at night, they
are afraid. If the army is turbulent , 134 the general lacks severity. If their flags
and pennants move about, they are in chaos. If the officers are angry, they are
exhausted.

“If they kill their horses and eat the meat, the army lacks grain . 135 If they
hang up their cooking utensils and do not return to camp, they are an ex-
hausted invader . 136

“One whose troops repeatedly congregate in small groups here and there,
whispering together, has lost the masses. One who frequently grants rewards
is in deep distress. One who frequently imposes punishments is in great diffi-

culty. One who is at first excessively brutal and then fears the masses is the
pinnacle of stupidity . 137

ft*

“One who has emissaries come forth with offerings wants to rest for a
while.

“If their troops are aroused and approach our forces, only to maintain
their positions without engaging in battle or breaking off the confrontation,
you must carefully investigate it.

“The army does not esteem the number of troops being more numerous
for it only means one cannot aggressively advance . 118 It is sufficient for you
to muster your own strength, analyze the enemy, and take them. Only some-
one who lacks strategic planning and slights an enemy will inevitably be cap-
tured by others.

f t f

“If you impose punishments on the troops before they have become at-
tached, they will not be submissive. If they are not submissive, they will be
difficult to employ. If you do not impose punishments after the troops have
become attached, they cannot be used.

t * f

“Thus if you command them with the civil 139 and unify them through the
martial, this is what is referred to as ‘being certain to take them .’ 140

“If orders are consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the
people will submit. If orders are not consistently implemented to instruct the
people, then the people will not submit. One whose orders are consistently
carried out has established a mutual relationship with the people.”

10. Configurations of Terrain 141

Sun-tzu said:

“The major configurations [hsing] of terrain are accessible, suspended,
stalemated, constricted, precipitous, and expansive.

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

177

“It we can go forth and the enemy can also advance, it is termed •ac-
cessible.'' In an accessible configuration, first occupy the heights and
yang (side), and improve the routes for transporting provisions. Then
when we engage in battle, it will be advantageous.

“If we can go forth but it will be difficult to return, it is termed ‘sus-
pended.’ - In a suspended configuration, if they are unprepared go
forth and conquer them. If the enemy is prepared and we sally forth
without being victorious, it will be difficult to turn back and (is) not ad-
vantageous.

“If it is not advantageous for us to go forth nor advantageous for the
enemy to come forward, it is termed ‘stalemated .’ 143 In a stalemated
configuration, even though the enemy tries to entice us with profit we
do not go forth. Withdraw [our forces) and depart .’ 44 If we strike them
when half the enemy has come forth, it will be advantageous.

“As for constricted configurations, if we occupy them first we must
fully deploy throughout them in order to await the enemy . 145 If the en-
emy occupies them first and fully deploys in them, do not follow them
in. If they do not fully deploy in them, then follow them in.

“As for precipitous configurations , 146 if we occupy them we must
hold the heights and yang sides to await the enemy. If the enemy
occupies them first, withdraw [our forces! and depart. Do not follow
them.

‘^ s | |° r ex pansive configurations, if our strategic power [shih\ is
equal, it will be difficult to provoke |them to] combat. Engaging in
combat will not be advantageous.

"Now these six are the Tao of terrain. Any general who undertakes re
sponsibility for command cannot but investigate them.

“Thus there are [six types of ill-fated) armies: running, lax, sinking, crum-
bling, chaotic, and routed. Now these six are not disasters brought about by
Heaven and Earth bur by the general’s errors.

“Now if, when their strategic power \shih] is equal, one attacks ten,
this is called ‘running [off ].’ 148

“If the troops are strong but the officers are weak, it is termed ‘lax.’

If the officers are strong but the troops weak, it is termed ‘sinking.’

“If the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, engaging the en-
emy themselves out of unrestrained anger while the general does not yet
know their capability, it is termed ‘crumbling.’

If the general is weak and not strict, unenlightened in his instructions
and leadership; the officers and troops lack constant [duties]; and their
deployment of troops into formation is askew, it is termed ‘chaotic.’

“If the general, unable to fathom the enemy, engages a large number

with a small number, attacks the strong with the weak while the army

lacks a properly selected vanguard, it is termed ‘routed.’

“Now these six are the Tao of defeat. Any general who undertakes respon-
sibility for command cannot but investigate them.

“Configuration of terrain is an aid to the army. Analyzing the enemy, tak-
ing control of victory, estimating ravines and defiles, the distant and near, is
the Tao of the superior general . 149 One who knows these and employs them
in combat will certainly be victorious. One who does not know these nor
employ them in combat will certainly be defeated.

“If the Tao of Warfare [indicates] certain victory, even though the ruler has
instructed that combat should be avoided, if you must engage in battle it is
permissible. If the Tao of Warfare indicates you will not be victorious, even
though the ruler instructs you to engage in battle, not fighting is permissible.

“Thus |a general] who does not advance to seek fame, nor | fail to retreat|
to avoid [being charged with the capital] offense of retreating, but seeks only
to preserve the people and gain advantage for the ruler is the state’s treasure.

“When the general regards his troops as young children, they will advance
into the deepest valleys with him. When he regards the troops as his beloved
children, they will be willing to die with him. 15 "

“If they are well treated but cannot be employed, if they are loved but can-
not be commanded, or when in chaos they cannot be governed, they may be
compared to arrogant children and cannot be used.

“If I know our troops can attack, but do not know the enemy cannot be
attacked, it is only halfway to victory. If I know the enemy can be attacked,
but do not realize our troops cannot attack, it is only halfway to victory.

“Knowing that the enemy can be attacked, and knowing that our army
can effect the attack, but not knowing the terrain is not suitable for combat,
is only halfway to victory. Thus one who truly knows the army will never be
deluded when he moves, never be impoverished when initiating an action.

“Thus it is said if you know them and know yourself, your victory will not
be imperiled. If you know Heaven and know Earth, your victory can be com-
plete .” 151

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SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

1 1. Nine Terrains

Sun-tzu said:

“The strategy for employing the military is (this]: There is dispersive ter-
rain, light terrain, contentious terrain, traversable terrain, focal terrain,
heavy terrain, entrapping terrain, encircled terrain, and fatal terrain . 152

“When the feudal lords fight in their own territory, it is ‘dispersive
terrain .’ 153

“When they enter someone else’s territory, but not deeply, it is ‘light
terrain .’ 154

“If when we occupy it, it will be advantageous to us while if they oc-
cupy it, it will be advantageous to them, it is ‘contentious terrain .’ 155

“When we can go and they can also come, it is ‘traversable terrain .’ 156

“Land of the feudal lords surrounded on three sides such that who-
ever arrives first will gain the masses of All under Heaven is ‘focal ter-
rain .’ 157

“When one penetrates deeply into enemy territory, bypassing numer-
ous cities, it is ‘heavy terrain .’ 158

“Where there are mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wet-
lands and marshes, wherever the road is difficult to negotiate, it is ‘en-
trapping terrain .’ 159

“Where the entrance is constricted , 160 the return is circuitous, and
with a small number they can strike our masses, it is ‘encircled ter-
rain .’ 161

“Where if one fights with intensity he will survive but if he does not
fight with intensity he will perish, it is ‘fatal terrain .’ 162

“For this reason on dispersive terrain do not engage the enemy.

“On light terrain do not stop.

“On contentious terrain do not attack . 163

“On traversable terrain do not allow your forces to become isolated.
“On focal terrain unite and form alliances [with nearby feudal lords .] 164
“On heavy terrain plunder for provisions.

“On entrapping terrain move [through quickly ]. 165
“On encircled terrain use strategy . 166
“On fatal terrain engage in battle.

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

179

“In antiquity those who were referred to as excelling in the employment of
the army were able to keep the enemy’s forward and rear forces from con-
necting; the many and few from relying on each other; the noble and lowly
from coming to each other’s rescue; the upper and lower ranks from trusting
each other; the troops to be separated, unable to reassemble, or when assem-
bled, not to be well-ordered . 167 They moved when it was advantageous,
halted when it was not advantageous.

f f *

“If I dare ask, if the enemy is numerous, disciplined, and about to advance,
how should we respond to them? I would say, first seize something that they
love for then they will listen to you.

“It is the nature of the army to stress speed; to take advantage of the ene-
my’s absence; to travel unanticipated roads; and to attack when they are not
alert.

t * *

“In general, the Tao of an invader is that when one has penetrated deeply
[into enemy territory], the army will be unified, and the defenders will not be
able to conquer you.

“If one forages in the fertile countryside, then the Three Armies will have
enough to eat. If you carefully nurture them and do not [over-]labor them,
their ch'i will be united and their strength will be at maximum.

“When you mobilize the army and form strategic plans, you must be un-
fathomable.

“Cast them into positions from which there is nowhere to go and they will
die without retreating. If there is no escape from death, the officers and sol-
diers will fully exhaust their strength.

f t f

“When the soldiers and officers have penetrated deeply into [enemy terri-
tory], they will cling together. When there is no alternative, they will fight.

180

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

181

“For this reason even though the soldiers are not instructed, they are pre-
pared; without seeking it, their cooperation is obtained; 168 without cove-
nants they are close together; without issuing orders they are reliable. Pro-
hibit omens, eliminate doubt so that they will die without other thoughts.

"If our soldiers do not have excessive wealth, it is not because they detest
material goods. If they do not live long lives, 169 it is not because they abhor
longevity. On the day that the orders are issued the tears of the soldiers who
are sitting will soak their sleeves, while the tears of those lying down will roll
down their cheeks. However, if you throw them into a hopeless situation,
they will have the courage of Chu or Kuei.

“Thus one who excels at employing the army may be compared to the
shuaijan [snake]. The shuaijan is found on Mt. Ch’ang. If you strike its head
the tail will respond; if you strike its tail the head will respond. If you strike
the middle |of the body] 170 both the head and tail will react. If I dare ask, can
we make the army like the shuaijan , I would say we can. For example, the
people of Wu and Yiieh hate each other; but if, when fording a river in the
same boat they encounter severe wind, their efforts to rescue each other will
be like the left and right hands.

“For this reason fettering the horses 171 and burying the chariot wheels are
inadequate to rely on |to prevent the soldiers from fleeing]. Unify their cour-
age to be as one through the Tao of administration. Realize the appropriate
employment of the hard and soft 172 through the patterns of terrain.

“Thus one who excels at employing the army leads them by the hand as if
they were only one man, so they cannot avoid it.

“It is essential for a general to be tranquil and obscure, upright and self-
disciplined, and able to stupefy the eyes and ears of the officers and troops,
keeping them ignorant. 1 3 He alters his management of affairs and changes
his strategies to keep other people 174 from recognizing them. He shifts his
position and traverses indirect routes to keep other people from being able to
anticipate him.

“At the moment the general has designated with them, it will be as if they
ascended a height and abandoned their ladders. The general advances with
them deep into the territory of the feudal lords and then releases the trig-
ger. 1 ' He commands them as if racing a herd of sheep — they are driven
away, driven back, but no one knows where they are going.

“Assembling the masses of the Three Armies, casting them into danger, is
the responsibility of the general.

“The nine transformations of terrain — the advantages deriving from con-
traction and expansion, the patterns of human emotions — must be investi-
gated.

“In general, the Tao of the invader is [this]: 1 6

“When the troops have penetrated deeply, they will be unified, but
where only shallowly, they will | be inclined to] scatter.

“When |the army] has left the state, crossed the (enemy’s] border, and
is on campaign, it is ‘isolated terrain.’

“When the four sides are open |to others], this is ‘focal terrain.’

“When you have advanced deeply, it is ‘heavy terrain.’

“If you have penetrated only shallowly, it is ‘light terrain.’

“If you have strongholds behind you and constrictions before you, it
is ‘encircled terrain.’

“If there is no place to go, it is ‘fatal terrain.’ 177

“For this reason on dispersive terrain I unify their will.

“On light terrain I have them group together.

“On contentious terrain I race our rear elements forward. 178

“On traversable terrain I focus on defense. 179

“On focal terrain I solidify our alliances. 180

“On heavy terrain I ensure a continuous supply of provisions. 181

“On entrapping terrain I [speedily] advance along the roads.

“On encircled terrain 1 obstruct any openings. 182

“On fatal terrain I show them that we will not live.

182

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

183

“Thus it is the nature of the army to defend when encircled ; 183 to fight fer-
vently when unavoidable; and to follow orders when compelled (by circum-
stances].

“For this reason one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords can-
not forge preparatory alliances. One who does not know the topography of
mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes cannot
maneuver the army. One who does not employ local guides will not secure
advantages of terrain. One who does not know one of these four or five can-
not [command] the army of a hegemon or a true king . 184

“For this reason on the day the government mobilizes the army, close the
passes, destroy all tallies, and do not allow their emissaries to pass through.
Hold intense strategic discussions 187 in the upper hall of the temple in order
to bring about the execution of affairs.

ft*

“If the enemy opens the door, you must race in.

f f «

“( Attack] what they love first. Do not fix any time for battle; assess and re-
act to the enemy in order to determine the strategy for battle.

“Now when the army of a hegemon or true king attacks a great state, their
masses are unable to assemble. When it applies its awesomeness to the en-
emy, their alliances cannot be sustained. For this reason it does not contend
with any alliances under Heaven . 185 It does not nurture the authority
[ch'iian] of others under Heaven. Have faith in yourself, apply your awe-
someness to the enemy. Then his cities can be taken, his state can be subju-
gated.

“Bestow rewards not required by law, impose exceptional governmental
orders. Direct the masses of the Three Armies as though commanding one
man. Press affairs upon them, do not explain the purpose to them. Compel
them with Iprospects for] profit, but do not inform them about the (poten-
tial] harm.

f f t

“Cast them into hopeless situations and they will be preserved; have them
penetrate fatal terrain and they will live. Only after the masses have pene-
trated dangerous (terrain] will they be able to craft victory out of defeat.

“For this reason at first be like a virgin |at home]; later — when the enemy
opens the door — be like a fleeing rabbit. The enemy will be unable to with-
stand you.”

12. Incendiary Attacks

Suti-tzu said:

“There are five types of incendiary attack: The first is to incinerate men,
the second to incinerate provisions, the third to incinerate supply trains, the
fourth to incinerate armories, and the fifth to incinerate formations . 188

iff

“Implementing an incendiary attack depends on the proper conditions.
Equipment for incendiary attack should be fully prepared before required.
Launching an incendiary attack has its appropriate seasons, igniting the fire
the proper days. As for the seasons, it is the time of the dry spell; as for the
day, when the moon is in chi, pi, i, or chen. When it is in these four lunar
lodges, these are days the wind will arise.

“The prosecution of military affairs lies in according with and [learning]
in detail the enemy’s intentions . 186 If one then focuses [his strength] toward
the enemy, strikes a thousand li away, and kills their general, it is termed ‘be-
ing skillful and capable in completing military affairs.’

“In general, in incendiary warfare you must respond to the five changes of
fire:

“If fires are started within [their camp], then you should immediately
respond [with an attack] from outside.

“If fires are ignited but their army remains quiet, then wait; do not at-
tack.

184

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

185

"When they flare into a conflagration, if you can follow up, then do
so; if you cannot, then desist.

If the attack can be launched from outside without relying on inside
|assistance|, initiate it at an appropriate time.

"If fires are ignited upwind, do not attack downwind.

“Winds that arise in the daytime will persist; those that arise at night will
stop.

and the contributions of the feudal house will be one thousand pieces of gold
per day. Those inconvenienced and troubled both within and without the
border, who are exhausted on the road or unable to pursue their agricultural
work, will be seven hundred thousand families.

“Armies remain locked in a standoff for years to fight for victory on a sin-
gle day, yet [generals| begrudge bestowing ranks and emoluments of one
hundred pieces of gold and therefore do not know the enemy’s situation.
This is the ultimate inhumanity. Such a person is not a general for the people,
an assistant for a ruler, or the arbiter of victory.

“Now the army must know the five changes of fire in order to defend
against them at the astrologically appropriate times. Thus using fire to aid an
attack is enlightened, using water to assist an attack is powerful. Water can
be used to sever, but cannot be employed to seize.

“Now if someone is victorious in battle and succeeds in attack but does
not exploit the achievement, it is disastrous, and his fate should be termed
‘wasteful and tarrying.’ Thus it is said the wise general ponders it, the good
general cultivates it.

If it is not advantageous, do not move. If objectives cannot be attained,
do not employ the army. Unless endangered do not engage in warfare. The
ruler cannot mobilize the army out of personal anger. The general cannot en-
gage in battle because of personal frustration. When it is advantageous,
move; when not advantageous, stop. Anger can revert to happiness, annoy-
ance can revert to joy, but a vanquished state cannot be revived, the dead
cannot be brought back to life.

“Thus the enlightened ruler is cautious about it, the good general respect-
ful of it. This is the Tao for bringing security to the state and preserving the
army intact.”

13. Employing Spies

Sun-tzu said:

When you send forth an army of a hundred thousand on a campaign,
marching them out a thousand li, the expenditures of the common people

“The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved
and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was ad-
vance knowledge.

“Advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred
from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be
gained from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy’s true situation.

“Thus there are five types of spies to be employed: local spy, internal spy,
turned spy |double agent), dead |cxpendable| spy, and the living spy. When
all five are employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed
“spiritual methodology.” They are a ruler’s treasures.

“Local spies — employ people from the local district.

“Internal spies — employ their people who hold government posi-
tions.

“Double agents — employ the enemy’s spies.

“Expendable spies — are employed to spread disinformation outside
the state. Provide our [expendable] spies (with false information) and
have them leak it to enemy agents . 189

“Living spies — return with their reports.

“Thus of all the Three Armies’ affairs, 1 ''" no relationship is closer than
with spies; no rewards are more generous than those given to spies; no af-
fairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies.

“Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he
is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and
perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is
subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.

186

SUN-TZU’S ART OF WAR

“If before the mission has begun it has already been exposed, the spy and
those he informed should all be put to death.

“In general, as for the armies you want to strike, the cities you want to at-
tack, and the men you want to assassinate, you must first know the names of
the defensive commander, his assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants.
You must have our spies search out and learn them all.

“You must search for enemy agents who have come to spy on us. Tempt
them with profits, instruct and retain them. Thus double agents can be ob-
tained and employed. Through knowledge gained from them, you can re-
cruit both local and internal spies. Through knowledge gained from them,
the expendable spy can spread his falsehoods, can be used to misinform the
enemy. Through knowledge gained from them, our living spies can be em-
ployed as times require.

“The ruler must know these five aspects of espionage work. This knowl-
edge inevitably depends on turned spies; therefore, you must be generous to
double agents.

Wu-tzu

“In antiquity, when the Yin arose, they had I Chih in the Hsia. When the
Chou arose, they had Lu Ya |the T’ai Kung| in the Yin . 191 Thus enlightened
rulers and sagacious generals who are able to get intelligent spies will invari-
ably attain great achievements. This is the essence of the military, what the
Three Armies rely on to move.”

Translator’s Introduction, 191

1. Planning for the State, 206

2. Evaluating the Enemy, 210

3. Controlling the Army, 214

4. The Tao of the General, 217

5. Responding to Change, 219

6. Stimulating the Officers, 223

Translator's Introduction

Unlike the semilegendary Sun-tzu, Wu Ch’i — who was also called Wu-tzu
by later generations — was a famous historical figure. His exploits and
achievements, both military and administrative, are portrayed as truly out-
standing, and shortly after his death his name became inextricably linked
with Sun-tzu’s. According to the Shih chi, whenever people discussed mili-
tary theory Sun and Wu were invariably mentioned together, and Ssu-ma
Ch’ien’s famous biographical chapter permanently canonized that bond.

Wu Ch’i was a complex man of many contradictions, and even his biogra-
phy in the Shih chi does not depict him favorably. He was an extremely tal-
ented individual who advocated the fundamental Confucian beliefs, al-
though his behavior visibly contradicted them. He embraced the concept of
benevolence as the essential foundation for government, yet he reputedly
killed his own wife. He ignored his mother’s mourning rites — a heinous of-
fense in Confucian eyes — in order to keep a vow, clearly emphasizing trust-
worthiness over filial emotion and its respectful expression. Although he at-
tained great power and encouraged the development and preservation of
distinctions, he personally eschewed the visible comforts available to a com-
manding general and shared every misery and hardship with his troops.

Born about 440 B.c. into the tumultuous era that witnessed the initial con-
flicts of the incessant warfare that eventually reduced the number of power-
ful states in China from seven to one, Wu Ch’i realized that states could sur-
vive only if they fostered both military strength and sound government. As a
young man he reportedly studied with two of the founding disciples of Con-
fucianism, perhaps for as long as three years. Subsequently, he journeyed to
find a receptive ear, yet lost favor even after great accomplishments. Eventu-
ally he was murdered in Ch’u around 361 B.C., a victim of the enmity in-
curred because of his draconian measures to strengthen the military and the
state.

According to subsequent historical writings, not only was Wu Ch’i never
defeated in battle but he rarely suffered the ignominy of a stalemate, while

192

WU-TZU

compiling a remarkable record of decisive victories against the superior
forces of entrenched states. He has been widely regarded as China’s first
great general— a view that obviously ignores the T’ai Kung and Ssu-ma
Jang-chti— and has been credited with such notable achievements as govern-
ing and holding the West Ho region, pacifying Yiieh (the south China re-
gion), commanding the forces of Lu to gain an overwhelming victory against
Ch i, fading Wei numerous times to thrash Ch’in’s growing power, and sta-
bilizing the government of Ch’u. Thus his views and methods, to the extent
that they may be preserved in Wu-tzu, are not merely theoretical but were
founded and thoroughly tested in reality.

Wu-tzu’s reputation for having made impressive administrative contribu-
tions especially for instituting innovative measures and controls to orga-
nize the state and instill order, first as Protector of the West River command-
ery and later as prime minister of Ch’u-have frequently caused him to be
ranked with the famous Legalist Lord Shang. 1 Numerous anecdotes describe
his emphasis on certitude, one of the few virtues he both espoused and per-
sonally embodied. Stories about him abound in works originating in the cen-
turies after his death, such as the Chan-kuo tse ( Intrigues of the Warring
States), the Han Fei-tzu, and the Lii-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 2

The Wu-tzu not only constitutes one of the Seven Military Classics but
also has long been valued as one of the basic foundations of Chinese military
thought. Although less strident than the Art of War, it seriously considers all
aspects of war and battle preparation and suggests generally applicable strat-
egies for resolving certain tactical situations. Over the centuries traditional
Confucian scholars— with their classical prejudices toward style and arti-
fi*- c denigrated the Wu-tzu because of the comparative simplicity of the
language; they also condemned its realistic policies and perceived brutality. 3
However, the text remains lucid and commanding.

The core of the Wu-tzu was probably composed by Wu Ch’i himself, then
expanded and revised by his disciples— perhaps from their own memories or
from court records. Much of the original version appears to have been lost;
what remains has been edited into a succinct, fairly systematic, and remark-
ably comprehensive work. Although earlier versions of the text apparently
date back to at least the fourth century b.c., it probably assumed its present
form during the Han dynasty. Fortunately, unlike some of the military clas-
sics, few textual problems exist, and only small differences are found among
the various editions. Naturally, some passages are common to other, presum-
ably later works; but the focus, concepts, and stage of development are dis-
tinctly different. 4

WU-TZU

193

Wu Ch’i’s life and values were closely intertwined, and because of his ap-
parent historical importance his biography from the Shih chi — which was
composed around 100 b.c. — demands inclusion here: 5

Wu Ch’i, a native of Wey, loved military operations. 6 He once studied with
Tseng-tzu, then went on to serve the ruler of Lu. When the state of Ch’i at-
tacked Lu, Lu’s ruler wanted to commission Wu Ch’i as a general, but since he
had taken a woman of Ch’i as his wife, 8 he was suspicious. Thereupon Wu Ch’i,
who wanted to become famous, killed his wife ‘ to show he had no connection
with Ch’i. Lu finally appointed him as a general, and in this capacity he attacked
Ch’i, destroying their forces.

Someone in Lu who hated Wu Ch’i said to the ruler: "Wu Ch’i is cruel and
suspicious. When he was young his family had accumulated a thousand chin of
gold. He traveled about seeking official appointment but was never successful,
eventually exhausting the family’s resources. When members of his district
laughed at him he killed more than thirty of his detractors and then went east,
through the gate of Wey’s outer wall. On parting from his mother he bit his arm
(so that it bled] and swore an oath: ‘Until I become a ranking minister I will not
reenter Wey.’ Then he went to serve Tseng-tzu. He had only been there a short
while when his mother died, but he didn’t return home. Tseng-tzu despised him
(for failing lo perform the mourning rites 10 ] and severed all relationship with
him.

“Wu Ch’i then went to Lu and studied military arts in order to serve you. You
doubted his intentions, so he killed his wife to obtain the post of general. Now
Lu is a small state, and if it should attain a reputation for being victorious in bat-
tle, the other feudal lords will plot against it. Moreover Lu and Wey are broth-
ers, so if you employ Wu Ch’i you will be casting aside Wey.”

The ruler grew suspicious of Wu Ch’i and dismissed him.

At that time Wu Ch’i happened to hear that Marquis Wen of Wei" was a
Worthy and wanted so serve in his court. Marquis Wen questioned Li K’o 1 ’
about him: "What sort of a man is Wu Ch’i?” Li K’o replied: “Ch’i is greedy and
licentious, but in the employment of troops even the famous general Ssu-ma
Jang-chll 13 could not surpass him.” Upon hearing this Marquis Wen appointed
him as a general. Wu Ch’i (commanded the army] in an attack on Ch’in, seizing
five cities.

In his position as general, Wu Ch’i’s custom was to wear the same clothes and
eat the same food as the men in the lowest ranks. When sleeping he did not set
out a mat, while on the march he did not ride a horse 14 or in a chariot. He per-
sonally packed up his leftover rations, and shared all labors and misery with the
troops.

Once when one of his soldiers had a blister, he personally sucked out the pus
for him. The soldier’s mother heard about it and wept. Someone said to her:

194

WU-TZU

195

"Your son is only an ordinary soldier, while the general himself sucked out the
pus. What is there to weep about?" The mother retorted: “That isn’t it. In years
past Duke Wu sucked his father's blister. His father went to war without hesitat-
ing and subsequently died at the hands of the enemy. Now Duke Wu again sucks
my son’s blister, so I don’t know where he will die. For this reason I weep .” 15

Because Marquis Wen felt that Wu Ch’i excelled in employing the army, was
scrupulous and fair-handed, and able to obtain the complete allegiance of his
troops, he appointed him as Protector of the West River 16 commandery to fend
off the states of Ch’in and Han.

When Marquis Wen died Wu Ch’i continued to serve his son. Marquis Wu.
Marquis Wu voyaged by boat down the West River. In midstream he looked
back and exclaimed to Wu Ch’i: “Isn’t it magnificent! The substantiality of the
mountains and rivers, this is the jewel of Wei." Wu Ch’i replied: “[The real
jewel] lies in Virtue, not in precipitous defiles. Formerly the Three Miao had
Tung-t’ing Lake on the left and P’eng-li Lake on the right, but they didn’t culti-
vate Virtue and righteousness and Yu obliterated them. The place where Chich
of the Hsia dynasty resided had the Yellow and Chi rivers on the left, Mt. T’ai
and Mt. Hua on the right, the cliffs of l-ch’Ueh in the south, and the slopes of
Yang-ch ang to the north. But in his practice of government he didn't cultivate
benevolence, and T’ang displaced him. The state of [ the tyrant] Chou of the Yin
dynasty had Mt. Meng-men on the left, Mt. T'ai-hang on the right, Mt. Ch’ang
to the north, and the great Yellow River flowing to the south, but in his practice
of government he didn’t cultivate Virtue, and King Wu killed him. From this
perspective (the state’s jewel| is Virtue, not the precipitousness of its defiles. If
you do not cultivate Virtue, all the men in the boat will comprise an enemy
state .” 17 “Excellent!” said Marquis Wu. Thereupon he enfeoffed Wu Ch'i as
Protector of the West River commandery, and his reputation grew enormously.

Wei then established the post of Minister, naming T’icn Wen to the office. Wu
Ch’i was unhappy so he accosted T’ien Wen: “Could we please discuss merit and
attainments?” T’ien Wen agreed. Wu Ch’i asked: “Who is better at commanding
the Three Armies, causing the officers and soldiers to take pleasure in dying in
battle, and ensuring that enemy states do not dare plot against us— you or me?"
“I am not as capable as you,” T’ien Wen replied. Wu Ch’i then asked him: “Who
is better, you or I, in administering the bureaucracy, gaining the support of the
people, and filling the storehouses and arsenals?” T’ien Wen again replied: “I am
not as good as you.” “In serving as Protector of the West River commandery so
that the Ch’in troops dare not establish villages in their eastern regions, while
Han and Chao act submissively as honored guests, who is better?” T’ien Wen
acknowledged: “You are.” Wu Ch’i then proceeded: “In all three of these you
are inferior to me, yet your position has been placed above me. Why?” T’ien
Wen said: “The ruler is young, the state doubtful, the major ministers not yet
supportive, while the common people 18 do not trust [the government]. At this
time should the role fall to you or to me?" After Ch’i was silent for a very long

time he said: “It should belong to you. This is why I am placed over you.” Wu
Ch’i then knew he was not as good as T'ien Wen.

After T’ien Wen died Kung Shu became Minister. He had married a princess
of Wei and [wanted to] damage Wu Ch’i. Kung Shu’s servant said to him: “It is
easy to get rid of Wu Ch’i.” Kung Shu asked how, and his servant replied: “Wu
Ch’i is constrained, incorruptible, and likes fame. First you should accordingly
say to Marquis Wu: ‘Wu Ch’i is a Worthy while your state is small. Moreover
you have a border area of fertile land abutting the strong state of Ch’in. There-
fore I fear Wu Ch’i will not remain loyal.’ The marquis will then ask: ‘What
should we do,’ and you should say: ‘Test him by extending |an offer of mar-
riage] with a princess. If Ch’i intends to stay he will certainly accept her; if not
he will invariably decline. With this divine his intent.’ Then you should summon
Wu Ch’i and return with him, while also making the princess angry so that she
treats you contemptuously. When Wu Ch’i sees that the princess holds you in
contempt, he will certainly decline her."

Thereupon, when Wu Ch’i saw the princess treat the Minister of Wei con-
temptuously, he did in fact decline Marquis Wu’s offer. Marquis Wu grew suspi-
cious and did not trust him any longer. Wu Ch’i, fearing he might be charged
with some offense, subsequently left and went to the state of Ch’u.

King Tao of Ch'u had previously heard that Wu Ch’i was a Worthy, so when
he arrived he appointed him as Minister. Wu Ch’i made the laws clear, examined
the ordinances, eliminated unimportant offices, and dispersed distant royal rel-
atives in order to nourish and support fighting men. He emphasized strengthen-
ing the army and destroying the vociferous proponents of the horizontal and
vertical alliances . 19 To the south he pacified the Pai YUeh. In the north he seized
Ch’en and Ts’ai and forced the Three Chin to withdraw. To the west he [success-
fully] attacked Ch’in. The other feudal lords were troubled by Ch’u’s growing
strength, while all the members of the royal family wanted to harm him. When
King Tao died the imperial relatives and chief ministers revolted and attacked
Wu Ch’i. He ran to the king’s body and hid beneath it. When his assailants shot
their arrows, striking him, they thereby struck King Tao as well.

When King Tao had been buried and the prince enthroned, he had the Minis-
ter of Justice execute all those who had shot at Wu Ch’i and also struck the
king’s corpse. Those that were judged guilty and executed, together with having
their families exterminated, numbered more than seventy . 20

The Grand Historian says: “The habit of the contemporary age, when refer-
ring to armies and regiments, is to always speak of Sun-tzu’s thirteen chapters
and Wu Ch’i’s strategy. At this time many (people] have them. Thus I have not
discussed them but instead discussed what their actions effected and established.
There is a common saying: ‘One able to perform an action cannot invariably
speak about it; one able to speak about something is not invariably able to per-
form it.’ Sun Pin’s plotting of strategy against P’ang Chiian was enlightened, but
he was still unable to extricate himself from the misfortune of suffering severe

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corporeal punishment . -1 Wu Ch’i [tried to] persuade Marquis Wen that the
strategic advantages of power [conferred by the substantiality of the terrain’s!
configuration are not as good as Virtue. However, his actions in Ch’u, on ac-
count of his harsh oppressiveness and the paucity of his beneficence, caused him
to lose his life. Isn't it tragic!”

Even in death Wu Ch’i managed to execute a successful strategy and gain re-
venge because he knew that in trying to kill him, his enemies would desecrate
the king’s body and eventually be executed.

Modern scholars such as Chauncey Goodrich, troubled by the inclusion
of such detrimental material as Wu Ch’i killing his wife, have studied the bi-
ography in considerable detail and concluded that it is an amalgamation of
the disparate, even condemnatory materials probably available to the Grand
Historian . 22 Opinion is divided about Wu Ch’i’s overall historical accom-
plishments, with much of the biographical record being viewed as romantic
embellishment, anachronistic, or simply dubious. However, given the nu-
merous references to Wu-tzu in the extant literature from the two centuries
following his death, it seems likely that Wu Ch’i served in the capacities enu-
merated and was a highly effective strategist and commander. A brief consid-
eration of the more significant stories and anecdotes in these other writings
not only provides information about the man and his character but also indi-
cates the important principles generally associated with his name that are il-
lustrated prominently by his lifelong behavior.

Wu Ch’i, who is often mentioned with Lord Shang as emphasizing the role
of law and revising government policies to strengthen the state, valued credi-
bility (which can only be established through preserving one’s word in com-
plete sincerity) above everything. An anecdote preserved in the Han Fei-tzu,
followed by Han Fci-tzu’s comments, portrays this paramount commitment:

Wu Ch'i went out and happened to encounter an old friend. He stopped him
and invited him to eat dinner with him. The friend replied: “I will. In a short
time I will go back and eat with you.” Wu-tzu said: “I will wait for you to dine.”

By nightfall the friend had not come, but Wu Ch'i waited for him without eat-
ing. Early the next morning he had someone seek out his friend, and only when
the friend had come back did he eat with him.

[Han Fei-tzu’s comment:) When small acts of faith are achieved, great faith is
established. Therefore the wise ruler accumulates good faith. When rewards and
punishments are not trusted, prohibitions and ordinances will not be effected.
The explanation is seen in Duke Wen attacking Yuan and Chi Cheng rescuing
the starving. For this reason Wu Ch’i waited for his friend to eat . 23

Another incident from the Han Fei-tzu portrays Wu Ch’i as divorcing his
wife for a minor transgression (rather than killing her, as reported in the Shih

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197

chi biography) in order to preserve his credibility. His brother-in-law ratio-
nalizes this action in terms of a zealous commitment to the law:

Wu Ch’i, who was a native of Tso-shih in Wey, had his wife weave a silk band.
When he measured it and found it to be narrower than desired, he had her
change it. “I will,” she said. When it was complete he measured it again, but the
result was still not accurate. Wu Ch’i was enraged. His wife replied: “When I be-
gan I set the warp, and it could not be changed.” Wu-tzu sent her away. She then
asked her older brother to seek her readmission, but her brother said: “Wu Ch’i
is a man of law. He works with the laws so that he may attain great achieve-
ments in a large state. Therefore he must first put the laws into practice with his
wife, and thereafter implement them [in government]. You have no hope of
seeking to return.” His wife’s younger brother was well-favored by Wey’s ruler,
so she sought the ruler’s intercession with Wu-tzu on her behalf. Wu-tzu did not
listen but instead left Wey and went to Ching [Ch’u]. - ‘ <

Yet another version of the story perceives her dismissal as resulting from
working too assiduously, thereby surpassing — rather than falling short of —
what Wu Ch’i had required:

Wu Ch'i, showing his wife a silk band, said: "Weave a silk band for me, making
it like this.” When it was finished he compared them, and the one she had made
was especially good. Wu Ch’i said: “I had you weave a silk band, to make it like
this one, but now this is especially good. How is that?” His wife replied: “The
materials employed arc alike, but I concentrated on making it better.” Wu Ch’i
said: "It is not what I said to do.” He had her change her clothes and return [to
her family]. Her father went to request [that he take her back], but Wu Ch’i
said: “In the Ch’i family there are no empty words!” - '

This explanation is in full accord with the Legalist emphasis on not exceed-
ing one’s prescribed role, which is generally proclaimed a canonical virtue by
military thinkers within the context of battlefield situations.

Another cardinal doctrine of the strategists is the inviolate nature of re-
wards and punishments because they embody and symbolize the credibility
of the administrative system. To motivate men successfully requires not only
both rewards and punishments but also the absolute certainty that these will
invariably be implemented in every single instance. Wu-tzu believed un-
flinchingly in the power of the “twin handles,” as Lord Shang termed them,
and especially in the ability of rewards to motivate men so strongly that they
would risk their lives and chance everything. Although instruction, organi-
zation, training, and the development of a sense of shame should precede
any manipulation of the human spirit, the underlying effect of credibility in
attaining a desired objective is well illustrated by the following incident:

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WU-TZU

When Wu Ch’i was serving as Protector of the West River commandery, [the
state of Ch'in] had a small fortified watchtower near the border. Wu Ch’i
wanted to attack it for if he did not eliminate it, it would be extremely harmful
to the farmers. However, it was not worth summoning armored troops to elimi-
nate it. Therefore he leaned a carriage shaft against the North Gate and issued
an ordinance which stated: “Anyone who can move this outside the South Gate
will be rewarded with superior lands and an excellent house.” For a while no
one moved it, then someone did succeed in moving it. Upon his return [from the
South Gate|, Wu Ch’i rewarded him in accord with the ordinance. Shortly
thereafter he set a picul of red beans outside the East Gate and issued an ordi-
nance which stated: “Anyone able to move this outside the West Gate will be re-
warded as in the first case." The people competed to move it. Then Wu Ch’i sent
down an order: “Tomorrow when we attack the tower, whoever can ascend it
first will be [enfeoffed as ta-fu 26 \ and rewarded with superior lands and a
house." The people fought to race to the tower, attacking and seizing it in a sin-
gle morning . 27

The Shih chi biography states that Wu Ch’i studied with Tseng-tzu; how-
ever, because this is chronologically impossible, it was probably Tseng-tzu’s
son Tseng Shen, with whom Wu Ch’i may have studied for as long as three
years . 28 If the biography is credible and Tseng Shen condemned Wu Ch’i for
blatantly violating the precepts of filial behavior— one of the cornerstones of
Tseng-tzu’s recension of Confucianism— Wu Ch’i may have rejected formal
studies in favor of military pursuits, which were presumably his first inclina-
tion. However, throughout the Wu-tzu he advocates policies based on four
fundamental Confucian virtues: benevolence, righteousness, the forms of
propriety (//), and the Way (Tao) of Heaven. This accords with the new real-
ity of the Warring States period wherein state governments had become sig-
nificantly dependent on the willing consent and participation of the popu-
lace in any military enterprise . 29 The famous (probably fabricated) dis-
cussion with Marquis Wu while they were floating down the West River,
which is recorded in other texts as well, clearly expresses Wu Ch’i’s belief in
Virtue rather than in simple strategic advantage. Another interview with the
marquis at the start of his reign reflects the same concern, but it is coupled
with an advocacy of practicing accessible government while retaining politi-
cal power and preventing the nobles from encroaching on the people:

Marquis Wu asked Wu-tzu about the initial reign year. Wu-tzu replied: “It is said
that the ruler of a state must be cautious about the beginning." “How does one
go about being cautious about the beginning?” “Make it upright." “How does
one make it upright?” “Make wisdom enlightened. If wisdom is not enlightened,
how can you perceive the upright? Listen widely and select from what you hear
so as to make wisdom enlightened. For this reason in antiquity, when the ruler

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199

first held court, the ta-fu each had one speech, the officers one audience, and if
the common people requested admittance they would be heard. If the nobles
made any inquiries they would certainly be answered, and they would not re-
fuse any who came from the four quarters. This can be termed ‘not plugged up
or obscured.’ In apportioning salaries they made certain to extend them to ev-
eryone, while in the employment of punishments they were invariably accurate.
The ruler’s mind had to be benevolent. He thought of the ruler’s profit and the
elimination of the people’s harm. This can be termed ‘not losing the people.’ The
ruler personally had to be upright, the intimate ministers carefully selected. The
ta-fu could not hold more than one office concurrently, while the handles for
controlling the people did not lie with one clan. This can be referred to as ‘not
[losing] the balance of authority [ch'iian] and strategic power [shih].' This is the
meaning of the Spring and Autumn Annals and the basis of the initial reign
year .” 30

A dramatic passage in the Lii-shih Ch’un-ch’iu describes Wu Ch’i’s pro-
phetic words as he departed from Wei, providing another version of the
story of slander incorporated in the Shih chi biography:

When Wu Ch’i governed the area outside the West River, Wang Ts’o slandered
him to Marquis Wu of Wei. Marquis Wu had an emissary summon him. When
Wu Ch’i reached the gate on the far shore, he stopped the carriage and rested.

As he looked toward the West River, several tears fell from his eyes. His servant
addressed him: “I have observed your intentions. You have cast aside the world
as if throwing a way a pair of straw sandals. Yet now as you leave the West River
region you weep. Why is it?” Wu Ch’i wiped the tears away and replied: “You
do not understand. If the ruler truly knew me and had me exhaust my abilities,
Ch’in could certainly be destroyed, and with the West River region he could be-
come a true king. But now the ruler listens to the ideas of slanderers and does
not know me. It will not be long before the West River region belongs to Ch’in.
From henceforth the state of Wei will diminish.” Wu Ch’i subsequently left Wei
and entered Ch’u. Day by day Wei diminished while Ch’in grew greater every
day. This is what Wu Ch’i saw first and wept about. ' 1

Wu Ch’i’s radical, emotional commitment to his political beliefs and his de-
sire to exert himself on behalf of the state clearly manifest themselves in such
passages.

Several incidents provide glimpses of Wu Ch’i’s activities in Ch’u, appar-
ently confirming that King Tao quickly entrusted him with power and influ-
ence. Seeking to strengthen the central government and thereby the state and
the army, Wu Ch’i proposed policies that invariably antagonized entrenched
interests:

Formerly, Wu Ch’i instructed King Tao of Ch’u about Ch’u’s customs. “The
chief ministers are too powerful, the hereditary lords too numerous. In this sort

200

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WU-TZU

of situation, above they press upon the ruler while below they oppress the peo-
ple. This is the Way [Tao) to impoverish the state and weaken the army. It would
be better to take back all ranks and emoluments from the hereditary lords after
three generations; diminish the salaries and allowances of the hundred officials;
and reduce all unnecessary offices in order to support selected, well-trained offi-
cers. King Tao had implemented his suggestion for a year when he died. Wu
Ch’i was then torn apart in Ch’u . 32

Another version of the story in the Lii-shih Ch’un-ch’iu (which dates from
the third century B.c.) provides a further explanation of Wu Chis policy to
populate the countryside and emasculate the power of the stagnant nobility:

Wu Ch’i addressed the King of Ch’u: "What Ch’u has a surplus of is land, but
what is insufficient is people. Now if your lordship takes what is insufficient to
increase what is in surplus, then I cannot do anything." Thereupon the king or-
dered the nobles to go out and fill the vast, empty lands. Thev all found this to
be extremely bitter. When the king of Ch’u died, the nobles all came [to the capi-
tal). The king’s corpse was lying in the upper hall. The nobles, acting together
shot arrows at Wu Ch’i. Wu Ch'i yelled: "I will show you how I use weapons."

He pulled out an arrow and ran. Prostrating himself over the corpse, he stuck
the arrow in and yelled out: "The ministers are revolting against the king!” Then
Wu Ch’i died. However, according to Ching law anyone who exposed a weapon
before the king’s body should be subject to the severest penalty, with the extirpa-
tion of their families to three degrees. Wu Ch’i’s wisdom can certainly be said to
have been acute . 33

Chinese tradition has long held that the military arts belong to the cate-
gory “contrary Virtue,” a concept perhaps originally espoused by the mythi-
cal Lao-tzu and later expounded in many of the military writings, including
the Wu-tzn . 34 Consequently, the longer one’s involvement and the more ex-
tensive one’s experience, the more likely it becomes that disaster will befall
the individual. This is made clear in two fictional interviews found in the
Sbuo yuan:

When Wu Ch’i was serving as Protector of Yuan, during his tour of inspection
of the commandery he reached Hsi where he asked Ch’u I-chiu: “The king, not
knowing that I am a petty man, has made me Protector of Yuan. Sir, how would
you instruct me?” Duke Ch'U did not reply.

After a year the king made him Director of Ordinances. During his tour of in-
spection of the commandery he reached Hsi. He asked Ch’U I-chiu: “I inquired
of you, but you did not instruct me. Now the king, not knowing I am a petty
man, has made me Director of Ordinances. Sir, would you examine how I am
acting?” Duke Ch’U said: "What are you going to do?” Wu Ch’i said: “I am
going to level the ranks of nobility in Ch’u and even their emoluments; reduce

WU-TZU

what is in excess and continue what is insufficient; and polish the armor and
weapons in order to contend for All under Heaven at the appropriate time.”
Duke Ch’U said: "I have heard that in the past, those that excelled at governing
states did not change the old nor alter the usual. Now you are about to level the
ranks of Ch'u’s nobility and even their emoluments, reduce what is surplus and
continue what is insufficient. This is changing the old and altering the usual.
Moreover I have heard that weapons are inauspicious implements and that con-
flict is a contrary Virtue. Now you secretly plot the contrary Virtue and love to
employ inauspicious implements. Reaching out for what men abandon is the ex-
treme of contrariness; implementing licentious and dissolute affairs is not ad-
vantageous. Moreover when you employed the troops of Lu, you should not
have gained your intentions in Ch’i, but you realized them. When you employed
the troops of Wei, you should not have been able to realize your intentions
against Ch’in, but you gained them. I have heard it said, ‘If one is not the man
for disaster, he cannot complete disaster.’ I formerly found it strange that my
ruler had frequently acted contrary to the Way [Tao| of Heaven but up to now
not met with any misfortune. Alas, it was probably waiting for you.”Wu Ch'i
fearfully said: “Can it still be altered?” Duke Ch’U said: “It cannot.” Wu Ch'i
said: “I plan on behalf of others.” Duke Ch’U said: “A prisoner whose punish-
ment has been determined cannot change himself. You would best be honest
and sincerely implement (the affairs of government) for the state of Ch’u has
nothing more valued than raising up the worthy .” 35

From a historical perspective that had witnessed Ch’in’s slow evolution to
power and subsequent meteoric collapse, the milieu that saw the rise of state
Confucianism and the pervasive expression of Taoism in such syncretic texts
as the Huai-nan tzu gave voice to a condemnatory view:

On behalf of Ch’in, Lord Shang instituted the mutual guarantee laws, and the
hundred surnames were resentful. On behalf of Ch’u, Wu Ch’i issued orders to
reduce the nobility and their emoluments, and the meritorious ministers re-
volted. Lord Shang, in establishing laws, and Wu Ch’i, in employing the army,
were the best in the world. But Lord Shang’s laws (eventually) caused the loss of
Ch'in for he was perspicacious about the traces of the brush and knife , 36 but did
not know the foundation of order and disorder. Wu Ch’i, on account of the mili-
tary, weakened Ch’u. He was well practiced in such military affairs as deploying
formations, but did not know the balance of authority [ch’iian] involved in
court warfare . 3

From such passages it appears that Wu Ch’i actually wielded significant po-
litical power and tried to implement typically Legalist reforms. Determining
whether he enjoyed such influence in Wei’s central government is more prob-
lematic because although Li K’o and other ministers apparently embarked
on similar programs, Wu Ch’i’s administrative impact and power were prob-

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WU-TZU

ably confined to the West River region, where he may have been virtual dic-
tator.

Need for Military Forces

Wu Ch’i lived during the period in which warfare was becoming increasingly
specialized, bronze weapons had attained the peak of their development,
and bronze swords and numerous iron weapons had begun to appear. Chari-
ots which were still manned hy three men (driver, howman, and spearman)
and drawn by four horses— theoretically continued to provide the funda-
mental offensive weapon, although they were diminishing in effectiveness
and were perhaps being relegated to functioning as transport and as a com-
mand platform . 38 Use of crossbows had just become widespread, and armies
were now composed of conscripted commoners and the shih (knights, who
were now officers), who had previously shouldered the burden of fighting.

However brief the time of Wu Ch’i’s devotion to formal Confucian stud-
ies, it apparently constituted a formative period during which he absorbed
the fundamental beliefs he later propounded as essential to good govern-
ment. However, although he was a strong proponent of benevolence and
righteousness, Wu-tzu equally stressed military strength and preparation.
Without an effective fighting force, the Confucian virtues would become
hollow mockeries and evil would dominate the world:

In antiquity the ruler of the Cheng Sang clan cultivated Virtue but neglected
military affairs, thereby leading to the extinction of his state. The ruler of the Yu
Hu clan relied on his masses and loved courage and thus lost his ancestral altars.
The enlightened ruler, observing this, will certainly nourish culture and Virtue
within the domestic sphere while, in response to external situations, putting his
military preparations in order. Thus when opposing an enemy if you do not ad-
vance, you have not attained righteousness. When the dead lie stiff and you
grieve for them, you have not attained benevolence. (“Planning for the State”]

WU-TZU

Accordingly, the commanding general must be selected carefully and must
be a man of complete and diverse talents who is capable of effectively direct-
ing both military and civilian administrations. Naturally, courage is basic,
but other characteristics — such as wisdom and self-control — are emphati-
cally required.

Measure in All Matters

In Wu-tzu’sera the army depended heavily on the horse for its overall mobil-
ity and for powering its focal assault weapon, the chariot. Consequently, Wu
Ch’i stressed that the enlightened management of horses was primary and
that men were secondary. However, certain vital principles apply to both,
such as ensuring proper nourishment and appropriate eating times, adequate
rest periods, the erection of temporary shelters, and the implementation of
extensive, ongoing training. All the equipment for the army, and especially
that for the horses, must be of good quality and kept in proper repair. Only
then would the army be adequately prepared for its mission and the men
given the means to execute their orders without the distraction and hin-
drance of material failure.

People as the Basis

Because of the shift from warfare fought by the nobility to mass mobilization
and reliance on a basically civilian army, the strong support and willing alle-
giance of the people became essential. Wu Ch’i therefore advocated enlight-
ened Confucian policies that would provide the people with adequate mate-
rial welfare, gain their emotional support, and inculcate the basic virtues.
When impositions are light and the government visibly expresses its concern
for the people, the populace will respond and the state can withstand exter-
nal challenges. Harmony — which can then be forged — must be present in the
state, the army, the formations, and among the men themselves.

Training and Unification

Harmony and organization are counterparts: Without harmony the organi-
zation will not be cohesive, but without organization harmony is ineffectual.
Wu Ch’i only briefly touched on the civilian hierarchy necessary to provide
this basic organization; he mainly emphasized the need for order and distinc-
tions and urged the selection and appointment of worthy men. Self-reliance
on the part of those at the pinnacle of government can only lead to disaster,
whereas accepting wise counsel results in victory.

The means required to attain a disciplined, effective fighting force are
quite simple: Organize properly, train extensively, and motivate thoroughly.

Fundamental Concepts and Strategies

The present text of the Wu-tzu consists of six chapters focusing on topics
critical to military affairs: Planning for the State; Evaluating the Enemy;
Controlling the Army; the Iao of the General; Responding to Change; and
Stimulating the Officers. Although none of the sections concentrates solely
on a single topic because strategic considerations are interspersed through-
out, these traditional chapter headings essentially depict the scope of the re-
spective subject matter.

204

WU-TZU

205

Thereafter it becomes a question of strategy and tactics, and most of Wu
Ch’i’s book is devoted to military matters such as the composition of units,
methods of control, formations, and the selection of men. He also focuses on
general questions of training based on the traditional composition of the
Three Armies and their employment in normal formations. Repetitive train-
ing furnishes the means for coordinated, articulated movement on the battle-
field. Solidarity provides the possibility of effecting strategy, whereas disor-
der dooms one’s tactics and turns the conflict into a shambles. A small, well-
disciplined force can usually defeat a numerically superior one if the latter
lacks cohesion and direction. All the forces should be completely integrated
and immediately responsive to the commands of one man. Then the army
will not succumb to battle pressure but will emerge victorious.

Selection, Evaluation, and Motivation of Men

Men should be selected, evaluated, and assigned duties including both com-
bat specialties and administrative positions, that are appropriate to their in-
dividual talents and expertise. Because attitude and motivation are critical,
Wu-tzu suggested policies that would consciously employ his psychological
insights to forge a spirited fighting force. Given a settled, well-treated popu-
lace, the essential catalyst would be shame because men striving to avoid
shame would prefer death in battle to living ignominiously. On the positive
side, being committed to fighting and to dying in battle would ensure the
survival not only of the individual soldier but of the entire army.

In contrast to the famous Legalist thinkers of the Warring States period,
Wu-tzu felt that by themselves, rewards and punishments would be unreli-
able and inadequate to guarantee discipline and elicit the desired forms of
behavior. Excessive rewards could easily prove counterproductive, encour-
aging individual rather than coherent unit action, stimulating the soldiers to
break ranks in their personal quests for glory and profit. The imposition of
extremely strict punishments to constrain discontent would ultimately prove
similarly ineffective because the offenders would simply flee rather than face
the painful consequences of failure or defeat. Only when all measures were
properly implemented — including honoring and sustaining the families of
those who died in combat — would a disciplined, spirited, strongly motivated
force result.

Waging War and Engaging in Battle

The key to victory is impartially assessing the situation, including relative
strength, to discern and develop potential tactical advantages. Wu Ch’i pro-
vides extensive instructions and techniques for evaluating the enemy and its

commander and correlates national character with fighting qualities. He
also analyzes general classes of battlefield situations in terms of their poten-
tial, elucidating a series in which superiority dictates attacking and another
in which withdrawing and defending are advisable. Finally, he considers a
number of circumstances in which the enemy either enjoys a significant ad-
vantage or encounters difficulty due to terrain, weather, or other adverse
conditions; and he recommends countermeasures.

Deviations from the standards of good order, training, material supply,
and similar factors create the requisite opening for attack. Any sign of inter-
nal disorder or disaffection, any character flaw or excessive strength in an
enemy commander promises an exploitable opportunity. Spies should ferret
out vital information, and probing attacks should be undertaken to discover
the enemy’s tactics and degree of integrity. Probable combat behavior can be
extrapolated from national character and regional differences, and tactics
can be developed for predictable responses.

Some circumstances — such as confronting an exhausted enemy — are re-
markably clear and require that the commander initiate aggressive move-
ments without hesitation, whereas others indicate that engaging the enemy
would be folly. The well-ordered, rested, integrated, entrenched, and prop-
erly commanded forces of an enemy state are to be avoided until feints, de-
ception, and other techniques can be brought to bear. Certain types of ter-
rain and disadvantageous circumstances should also be treated with caution
unless they can be turned to advantage. Armies that are outnumbered or in
difficulty must make every effort to utilize the natural advantages of con-
fined terrain, inclement weather, and water.

WU-TZU

207

in command he fought seventy-six major battles with the other feudal lords,
winning sweeping victories in sixty-four of them and faring no worse than a
draw in the remainder. He expanded Wei’s land in all four directions, broad-
ening its territory some thousand li. All these were Wu Ch’i’s accomplish-
ments.

1 . Planning for the State

Wu Ch’i, wearing the distinctive garb of a Confucian, had an audience with
Marquis Wen of Wei to discuss the strategic crux of warfare. Marquis Wen
said: “I do not like military affairs.”

Wu Ch’i replied: “From the visible I can fathom the concealed. From the
past I can discern the future. How can your lordship say this topic does not
accord with his thoughts? Right now, throughout the four seasons you have
the skins of slaughtered animals covered with Vermillion lacquer, painted
with variegated colors, and embellished with glistening images of rhinocer-
oses and elephants. Wearing them in winter one would not be warm; wear-
ing them in summer one would not be cool.

“You make long spear-tipped halberds of twenty-four feet and short spear-
tipped halberds of twelve feet. Your leather armored chariots block the
doors; their wheels are covered and the hubs protected. 1 Looking at them
they are certainly not beautiful to the eye; riding in them to hunt they are cer-
tainly not mobile. 1 do not know how you use them!

“If you are preparing them to advance into battle or withdraw and protect
[the state | without seeking men capable of employing them, the situation is
comparable to a nesting hen rushing at a fox or a puppy attacking a tiger.
Even though they have great fighting spirit, they will die!

“In antiquity the ruler of the Ch’eng Sang clan cultivated Virtue but ne-
glected military affairs, thereby leading to the extinction of his state. The
ruler of the Yu Hu clan relied on his masses and loved courage and thus lost
his ancestral altars. The enlightened ruler, observing this, will certainly nour-
ish culture and Virtue within the domestic sphere while, in response to exter-
nal situations, putting his military preparations in order. Thus when oppos-
ing an enemy force if you do not advance, you have not attained
righteousness. When the dead lie stiff and you grieve for them, you have not
attained benevolence.”

Thereupon Marquis Wen personally arranged a mat for Wu Ch’i, and his
wife presented him with a goblet of wine. The duke then made a sacrifice in
the ancestral temple, announcing his intended employment of Wu Ch’i, and
posted him as gencral-in-chief to protect the West River commandery. While

Wu-tzu said: “In antiquity those who planned government affairs would
invariably first instruct the hundred surnames and gain the affection of the
common people.

“There are four disharmonies. If there is disharmony in the state, you can-
not put the army into the field. If there is disharmony within the army, you
cannot deploy into formations. If you lack harmony within the formations,
you cannot advance into battle. If you lack cohesion during the conduct of
the battle, you cannot score a decisive victory. 2

“For this reason when a ruler who has comprehended the Way |Tao| is
about to employ his people, he will first bring them into harmony, and only
thereafter embark on great affairs. He will not dare rely solely on his own
plans, but will certainly announce them formally in the ancestral temple, di-
vine their prospects by the great tortoise shell, and seek their confirmation in
Heaven and the seasons. Only if they are all auspicious will he proceed to
mobilize the army. 3

“Because the people know the ruler values their lives and is sorrowed by
their deaths, when such circumstances arise and they must confront danger
with him, the officers will consider death while advancing glorious, but life
gained through retreating disgraceful.”

Wu-tzu said: “Now the Way [Tao] is the means by which one turns back to
the foundation and returns to the beginning. Righteousness is the means by
which to put affairs into action and realize accomplishments. Plans are the
means by which to keep harm distant and gain profit. The essence [provides
the constraints] by which to preserve duty and conserve achievements. Now
if behavior does not accord with the Way [TaoJ, and actions do not accord
with righteousness, but instead one dwells in magnificence and enjoys nobil-
ity, disaster will inevitably befall him.

“For this reason the Sage rests the people in the Way [Tao], orders them
with righteousness, moves them with the forms of propriety [/»'[, and con-
soles them with benevolence. Cultivate these four virtues and you will flour-
ish. Neglect them and you will decline.

208

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“Thus when Ch’eng T’ang extirpated the evil tyrant Chieh, Chieh’s people
rejoiced, and when King Wu of Chou attacked the vile King Chou |of the Yin
dynasty), the people of Yin did not condemn him. Because their actions ac-
corded with Heaven and Man, they were able to succeed.”

Wu-tzu said: “In general to govern the state and order the army, you must
instruct them with the forms of propriety [/#], stimulate them with righteous-
ness, and cause them to have a sense of shame. For when men have a sense of
shame, in the greatest degree it will be sufficient to wage war, while in the
least degree it will suffice to preserve the state.'*

“Now being victorious in battle is easy, but preserving the results of vic-
tory is difficult.' Thus it is said that among the states under Heaven that en-
gage in warfare, those that garner five victories will meet with disaster; those
with four victories will be exhausted; those with three victories will become
hegemons; those with two victories will be kings; and those with one victory
will become emperors. For this reason those who have conquered the world
through numerous victories are extremely rare, while those who thereby per-
ished are many.”

Wu-tzu said: “In general the reasons troops are raised are five: to contend
for fame; to contend for profit; from accumulated hatreds; from internal dis-
order; and from famine. The names [of the armies 6 | are also five: ‘righteous
army,' ‘strong army,’ ‘hard army,’ ‘fierce army,’ and ‘contrary army.’ Sup-
pressing the violently perverse and rescuing the people from chaos is termed
‘righteousness.’ Relying on |the strength of] the masses to attack is termed
‘strong.’ Mobilizing the army out of anger is termed ‘hard.’ Abandoning the
forms of propriety |//| and greedily seeking profit is termed ‘fierce.’ While the
country is in turmoil and the people are exhausted, embarking on military
campaigns and mobilizing the masses is termed ‘contrary.’ These five each
have an appropriate Way )TaoJ. In the case of the righteous you must use
propriety to subjugate them. Toward the strong you must be deferential to
subjugate them. Against the hard you must use persuasive language to subju-
gate them. Against the fierce you must employ deceit to subjugate them.
Against the contrary you must use the tactical balance of power | ch'iian] to
subjugate them.”

Marquis Wu asked: “Could I hear about the Way |Tao) for ordering the
troops, evaluating 7 men, and making the state secure?” Wu Ch’i replied:

WU-TZU

“The enlightened kings of antiquity always exerted every effort to maintain
the forms of propriety [//] between themselves and their ministers, manifest
the distinctions of rank, settle and assemble the officials and people, accord
with their customs to instruct them, and select and recruit the talented in or-
der to prepare for the unexpected.

“In the past Duke Huan of Ch’i 8 enlisted the support of fifty thousand
men and thereby attained hegemony over the feudal lords. Duke Wen of
Chin summoned forty thousand men to serve as his lead troops and there-
after realized his intention |of becoming hegemon). Duke Mu of Ch’in orga-
nized thirty thousand men into penetrating formations and subdued neigh-
boring enemies.

“Thus the ruler of a strong state must evaluate his people. Among the peo-
ple those who have courage and strength should be assembled into one unit.
Those who take pleasure in advancing into battle and exerting their strength
to manifest their loyalty and courage should be assembled into another unit.
Those who can climb high and traverse far, who are nimble and fleet should
be assembled into a unit. Officials of the king who have lost their positions
and want to show their merit to their ruler should be assembled into a unit.
Those who abandoned their cities or left their defensive positions and want
to eradicate the disgrace should also be assembled into a unit. These five will
constitute the army’s disciplined, elite troops. With three thousand such
men, from within one can strike out and break any encirclement or from
without break into any city and slaughter the defenders .” 9

Marquis Wu inquired: “I would like to hear about the Way |Tao| for mak-
ing battle formations invariably stable, defenses inevitably solid, and victory
in battle certain.” Wu Ch’i replied: “This can immediately be made clear, but
why ask only about this? If you are able to have worthy men hold high posi-
tions and the unworthy occupy low positions, then your battle formations
will already be stable. If the people are settled in their farming and homes
and [are] attached to their local authorities, then your defenses will already
be solid. When the hundred surnames all acclaim my lord and condemn
neighboring states, then in battle you will already be victorious.”

Once when Marquis Wu was planning government affairs, none of his nu-
merous ministers could equal him. After dismissing the court he had a happy,
self-satisfied look. Wu Ch’i entered and said: “Once in antiquity when King
Chuang of Ch’u was planning state affairs, he discovered none of his minis-
ters could equal his talents. After he had dismissed the court he wore a trou-

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bled countenance. Duke Shen inquired: ‘Why does your lordship have a
troubled countenance?’ He replied: ‘I have heard it said that there is no lack
of Sages in the world and no shortage of Worthies in a state. One who can
get them to be his teachers will be a king, while one who has them as his
friends can become a hegemon. Now I am not talented, yet none of my min-
isters can even equal me in ability. Our state of Ch’u is in deep trouble.’ This
is what the king of Ch’u found troublesome, yet you are pleased by it. I
therefore dare to be fearful!” Marquis Wu immediately looked embar-
rassed . 10

2. Evaluating the Enemy

Marquis Wu addressed Wu Ch’i: “At present Ch’in coerces me on the west,
Ch’u encircles me in the south, Chao collides with me in the north, Ch’i
encroaches on us in the east, Yen cuts off my rear, and Han occupies land to
the front. Defending against the troops of six nations in all four directions,
our strategic configurations of power \shih] is extremely disadvantageous. I
am worried. What can be done about this?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “In general first being cautious is the true treasure in the
Way [Tao| for ensuring the security of the state. As you have now awakened
to the trouble, disaster can be kept away. Let me discuss the character and
customs of these six countries . 1 1

“Although Ch’i’s battle array is dense in number, it is not solid. That of
Ch’in is dispersed, with the soldiers preferring to fight individually. Ch’u’s
formations have good order, but they cannot long maintain their positions.
Yen’s formations are adept at defense, but they are not mobile . 12 The battle
arrays of the Three Chin are well controlled, but they prove useless.

“Now Ch’i’s character is hard; their country is prosperous; the ruler and
ministers are arrogant and extravagant and insulting to the common people.
The government is expansive, but salaries are inequitable. Each formation is
of two minds, with the front being heavy and the rear light. Thus while they
are dense, they are not stable. The Way |Tao| to attack them is to divide them
into three, harrying and pursuing the left and right, coercing and following
them for then their formations can be destroyed.

Ch in s character is strong, the land treacherous, and the government se-
vere. Their rewards and punishments are believed in; the people never yield
but instead are all fiery and contentious. Thus they scatter and individually
engage in combat. The Way |Tao] to attack them is to first entice them with
profits for their soldiers are greedy and will abandon their generals to pursue
them. Capitalizing on their misjudgment you can hunt down their scattered

21 1

ranks, establish ambushes, take advantage of the moment, and then their
generals can be captured.

“Ch’u’s character is weak, its lands broad, its government troubling [to
the people], and its people weary. Thus while they are well-ordered, they do
not long maintain their positions. The Way [Tao] to attack them is to sud-
denly strike and cause chaos in the encampments. First snatch away their
ch’i — lightly 13 advancing and then quickly retreating, tiring and laboring
them, never actually joining battle with them. Then their army can be de-
feated.

“Yen’s character is sincere and straightforward. Its people are careful; they
love courage and righteousness and rarely practice deception in their plans.

Thus they will defend their positions but are not mobile. The Way [Tao] to
attack them is to strike and press them; insult them and then put distance be-
tween you; then race and get behind them so that their upper ranks will be
doubtful and their lower ranks fearful. Be cautious about our chariots and
cavalry, avoiding conflict on the open road, and then their general can be
captured.

“The Three Chin are central countries. Their character is harmonious and
their governments equitable. The populace is weary from battle but experi-
enced in arms, and they have little regard for their generals. Salaries are mea-
ger, and as their officers have no commitment to fight to the death, they are
ordered but useless. The Way |Tao] to attack them is to press [points in| their
formations, and when large numbers appear oppose them. When they turn
back, pursue them in order to wear them out. That then is the strategic con-
figuration of power [shih\ in these countries.

“Within the army you must have soldiers with the courage of tigers, the
strength to easily lift tripods, and the fleetness of barbarian horses. To attack
their flags and seize their generals you must have men with such abilities. If
you have men such as these, select and segregate them [into special units]; fa-
vor and honor them. They are referred to as the ‘army’s fate.’ Those who are
expert in the use of the five weapons , 14 who are strong and quick and are in-
tent on swallowing the enemy should be given rank and prominence for they
can make victory decisive. If you are generous to their parents, wives, and
children; encourage them with rewards; and awe them with punishments,
these strong soldiers, when in formation, will solidly hold their positions for
a long time. If you can discern and evaluate men such as these, you can at-
tack a force double your strength.”

Marquis Wu exclaimed: “Good!”

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Wu-tzu said: “In general when evaluating the enemy there are eight condi-
tions under which one engages in battle without performing divination. 15

“First, in violent winds and extreme cold, they arise early and are on the
march while |barely| awake, breaking ice to cross streams, unfearing of any
hardship. 16

“Second, in the burning heat of midsummer, they arise late and without
delay press forward in haste, through hunger and thirst, concentrating on at-
taining far-off objectives.

Third, the army has been out in the field for an extended period; their
food supplies are exhausted; the hundred surnames are resentful and angry;
and numerous baleful portents have arisen, with the superior officers being
unable to squash their effects.

“Fourth, the army’s resources have already been exhausted; firewood and
hay are scarce; the weather frequently cloudy and rainy; and even if they
wanted to plunder for supplies, there is nowhere to go.

Fifth, the number mobilized is not large; the terrain and water not advan-
tageous; the men and horses both sick and worn out; and no assistance
comes from their allies.

Sixth, the road is far and the sun setting; the officers and men have la-
bored long and are fearful. I hey are tired and have not eaten; having cast
aside their armor, they are resting.

“Seventh, the generals are weak; the officials irresponsible; the officers
and troops are not solid; the Three Armies are frequently frightened; and the
forces lack any assistance.

F.ighth, their formations arc not yet settled; their encampment | is) not yet
finished; or they are traversing dangerous territory and narrow defiles, half
concealed and half exposed.

“In these eight conditions attack them without any doubts.

There are six circumstances in which, without performing divination,
you should avoid conflict.

First, the land is broad and vast, the people wealthy and numerous.

“Second, the government loves the people, the ruler’s beneficence extends
and flows [to all of them).

I hird, rewards are trusted, punishments based on investigation, and
both are invariably implemented in a timely fashion.

“Fourth, people are ranked according to their military accomplishments;
they award official positions to the Worthy and employ the able.

"Fifth, their forces are massive, and their weapons and armor are all first-
rate.

WU-TZU

213

“Sixth, they have the assistance of all their neighbors and the support of a
powerful state.

“In general in these situations you are not a match for the enemy, so with-
out doubt avoid them. This is what is meant by ‘seeing possibility and ad-
vancing, knowing difficulty and withdrawing.’”

t 1 f

Marquis Wu inquired: “From external observation of the enemy I would
like to know their internal character, from studying their advance know at
what point they will stop in order to determine victory and defeat. 1 May 1
hear about this?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “If the enemy approaches in reckless disarray, unthink-
ing; if their flags and banners are confused and in disorder; and if the men
and horses frequently look about, then one unit can attack ten of theirs, in-
variably causing them to be helpless.

“If the feudal lords have not yet assembled; ruler and ministers are not yet
in agreement; ditches and embankments not yet complete; prohibitions and
orders not yet issued; and the Three Armies clamoring — wanting to advance
but being unable to, wanting to retreat but not daring to — then you can at-
tack with half the enemy’s force and never lose in a hundred encounters.”

t t t

Marquis Wu asked: “Is there a Way |Tao| by which the enemy can invari-
ably be attacked?”

Wu Ch’i said: "In employing the army you must ascertain the enemy’s
voids and strengths and then race [to take advantage of[ his endangered
points. When the enemy has just arrived from afar and their battle forma-
tions are not yet properly deployed, they can be attacked. If they have eaten
but not yet established their encampment, they can be attacked. If they are
running about wildly, they can be attacked. If they have labored hard, they
can be attacked. If they have not yet taken advantage of the terrain, they can
be attacked. When they have lost the critical moment and not followed up
on opportunities, they can be attacked. When they have traversed a great
distance and the rear guard has not yet had time to rest, they can be attacked.
When fording rivers and only half of them have crossed, they can be at-
tacked. On narrow and confined roads, they can be attacked. When their
flags and banners move about chaotically, they can be attacked. When their
formations frequently move about, they can be attacked. When a general is
separated from his soldiers, they can be attacked. When they are afraid, they

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can be attacked. In general in circumstances such as these, select crack troops
to rush on them, divide your remaining troops, and continue the assault-
pressing the attack swiftly and decisively.”

3. Controlling the Army

Marquis Wu asked: “In employing the troops what is primary?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “First make clear the four [principles) of lightness, the
two of heaviness, and the one of belief.”

The Duke asked: “What do you mean?”

He replied: “You should arrange the employment of terrain so that it will
be easy for the horses; the horses so that they will easily pull the chariots; the
chariots so that they will easily convey the men; and the men so that they will
easily engage in battle. If you are clear about treacherous and easy ground,
then the terrain will be light for the horses. If they have hay and grain at the
proper times, the horses will easily pull the chariots. If the axles are well
greased, the chariots will easily convey the men. If the weapons are sharp
and armor sturdy, the men will easily engage in battle. For advancing there
should be generous rewards; for retreating heavy penalties; and they should
both be properly implemented so that they will be believed in. If your exami-
nation can realize this, it will be the key to victory .” 18

Marquis Wu asked: “What measures will ensure the soldiers will be victo-
rious?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “Control 19 is foremost.”

Marquis Wu again asked: “It is not large numbers?”

* If t f ,c l aws an ^ orders are not clear, rewards and punishments not
trusted; when sounding the gongs will not cause them to halt or beating the
drum to advance, then even if you had one million men, of what use would
they be? What is meant by control is that when stationary [in camp| they ob-
serve the forms of propriety [/;') and when in action they are awesome. When
they advance they cannot be withstood; when they withdraw they cannot be
pursued. Their advancing and withdrawing are measured; the left and right
flanks respond to the signal flags. Even if broken off from the main order
they preserve their formations; even if scattered they will reform lines. They
will hold together in peace; they will hold together in danger. Their number
can be assembled together, but cannot be forced apart. They can be em-
ployed, but they cannot be exhausted. No matter where you can dispatch

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215

them, no one under Heaven will be able to withstand them. They are called
‘the troops of a father and son .’” 20

Wu-tzu said: “In general the Way [Tao] to command an army on the
march is to not contravene the proper measure of advancing and stopping;
not miss the appropriate times for eating and drinking; and not completely
exhaust the strength of the men and horses. These three are the means by
which the troops can undertake the orders of their superiors. When the or-
ders of superiors are followed, control is produced. If advancing and resting
are not measured; if drinking and eating are not timely and appropriate; and
if, when the horses arc tired and the men weary, they are not allowed to relax
in the encampment, then they will be unable to put the commander’s orders
into effect. When the commander’s orders are thus disobeyed, when en-
camped they will be in turmoil, and in battle they will be defeated.”

Wu-tzu said: “In general, on the battlefield — soon to become a grave-
yard — if the soldiers are committed to fight to the death they will live,
whereas if they seek to stay alive they will die. A good general will act as if
[they are) in a sinking boat or trapped in a burning building — there is not
enough time for the wise to make plans or the courageous to get angry. Only
engaging the enemy will do! Thus it is said that the greatest harm that can be-
fall the army’s employment |stems from] hesitation, while the disasters that
strike the Three Armies are born in doubt.”

Wu-tzu said: “Now men constantly perish from their inabilities and are
defeated by the unfamiliar. Thus among the methods for using the military,
training and causing them to be alert are first. One man who has been
trained in warfare can instruct ten men. Ten men who have studied warfare
can train one hundred men. And one hundred such men can train one thou-
sand. One thousand, ten thousand; and ten thousand who have been trained
in warfare can train the entire body of the Three Armies.

“With the nearby await the distant; with the well-ordered await the la-
bored; with the surfeited await the hungry . 21

“Have them deploy in circular formations, then change to square ones.
Have them sit, then get up; move, then halt. Have them move to the left, then
the right; forward and to the rear. Have them divide and combine, unite and

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217

disperse. When all these changes are familiar, provide them with weapons.
These are what are termed ‘the general’s affairs.’”

Wu-tzu said: “The basic rule of warfare that should be taught is that men
short in stature should carry spears and spear-tipped halberds, while the tall
should carry bows and crossbows . 22 The strong should carry the flags and
banners; the courageous should carry the bells and drums. The weak should
serve in supply work, while the wise should supervise the planning.

"Districts and villages should be organized together, with squads of five
and ten forming the basis for mutual protection and guarantee. To a single
drum beat they should prepare their weapons; to the double beat they should
drill in various deployments; to a triple beat they should hasten to eat; to a
quadruple beat they should have final inspection; and to a five-beat cadence
they should move out. Only after you hear the drums sound in unison
should you raise the banners.”

Marquis Wu asked: "Is there a Way [Tao| for advancing and halting the
Three Armies?”

Wu Ch i replied: "Do not confront ‘Heaven’s Furnace’ or ‘Dragon’s
Head.’ Heaven’s Furnace is the mouth of a deep valley. Dragon’s Head is the
base of a high mountain. You should keep the Green Dragon banner on the
left, White Tiger on the right, Vermillion Bird in the front, Mysterious Mili-
tary to the rear, with Twinkler above from where military affairs will be con-
trolled. When about to engage in combat determine the wind’s direction. If
favorable, yell and follow it; if contrary, assume a solid formation and await
the enemy.”

Marquis Wu asked: “In general are there methods for taking care of the
chariots and cavalry ?” 23

Wu Ch’i replied: “Now the horses must be properly settled, with appropri-
ate grass and water and correct feeding so as to be neither hungry nor full. In
the winter they should have warm stables, in the summer cool sheds. Their
mane and hair should be kept trimmed and their hooves properly cared for.
Blinders and ear protectors should be used so as to keep them from being
startled and frightened. Practice their galloping and pursuit, exercise con-
straint over their advancing and halting. Men and horses must be attached to
each other; only thereafter can they be employed.

“The equipment for the chariots and cavalry — such as saddles, bridles,
bits, and reins — must all be complete and durable. Normally, the horses do
not receive their injuries near the end of the battle but invariably they are in-
jured at the start. Similarly, they are not injured so much by hunger as by be-
ing overfed. When the sun is setting and the road long, the riders should fre-
quently dismount for it is better to have the men weary than to overlabor the
horses. You should always direct movements so as to keep some strength in
reserve against the enemy suddenly turning on us. Anyone who is clear about
this can traverse the realm without hindrance.”

4. The Tao of the General

Wu-tzu said: “Now the commanding general of the Three Armies should
combine both military and civilian abilities. The employment of soldiers re-
quires uniting both hardness and softness. In general when people discuss
generalship, they usually focus on courage. However, courage is but one of a
general’s many characteristics for the courageous will rashly join battle with
the enemy. To rashly join battle with an enemy without knowing the advan-
tages and disadvantages is not acceptable. Now the affairs to which the gen-
eral must pay careful attention arc five: first, regulation; second, prep-
aration; third, commitment; fourth, caution; and fifth, simplification. Regu-
lation is governing the masses just as one controls a few. Preparation is going
out the city gate as if seeing the enemy. Commitment means entering combat
without any concern for life. Caution means that even after conquering, one
maintains the same control and attitude as if just entering a battle. Simplifi-
cation means the laws and orders are kept to a minimum and are not abra-
sive.

“To accept the mandate |of command | without ever declining, destroy the
enemy, and only afterward speak about returning is the proper form of
behavior [//'] for a general. Thus when the army goes forth, his only thought
should be of the glory that death will bring, not the shame of living.”

Wu-tzu said: “In general warfare has four vital points: ch’i, terrain, affairs,
and strength. When the masses of the Three Armies — the million soldiers of
the forces — are strategically deployed in appropriate formations according
to varying degrees of strength by one man, this is termed the ‘vital point [chi \
of ch’i.’ When the road is narrow and the way perilous; when famous moun-
tains present great obstacles; and if ten men defend a place one thousand
cannot pass, this is termed a ‘vital point [ chi] of earth.’ Being good at con-

218

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WU-TZU

trolling clandestine operatives; with a few light troops harassing the enemy,
causing them to scatter; and forcing rulers and ministers to feel mutual an-
noyance and higher and lower ranks to reproach each other, this is termed
the ‘vital point \chi\ of affairs.’ When the chariots have solid axles and secure
pins; the boats |have] well-suited rudders and oars; the officers are thor-
oughly familiar with the fighting formations; and the horses practiced in
pursuit and maneuvers, this is termed the ‘vital point [chi] of strength.’ One
who knows these four is qualified to be a general. However, his awesome-
ness, Virtue \te\, benevolence, and courage must be sufficient to lead his sub-
ordinates and settle the masses. Furthermore, he must frighten the enemy
and resolve doubts. When he issues orders, no one will dare disobey them.
Wherever he may be, rebels will not dare oppose him. Gaining him, the state
will grow strong; losing him, the state will perish. This is what is referred to
as a good general.”

Wu-tzu said: “Now the different drums, gongs, and bells are the means to
awe the car; flags and banners, pennants and standards the means to awe the
eye; and prohibitions, orders, punishments, and fines the means to awe the
mind. When the ear has been awestruck by sound, it cannot but be clear.
When the eye has been awestruck by color, it cannot but be discriminating.
When the mind has been awestruck by penalties, it cannot but be strict. If
these three are not established, even though you have the support of the state
you will invariably be defeated by the enemy. Thus it is said that wherever
the general’s banners are, everyone will go, and wherever the general points,
everyone will move forward — even unto death .” 24

Wu-tzu said: “In general the essentials of battle are as follows. You must
first attempt to divine 25 the enemy’s general and evaluate his talent. In ac-
cord with the situation exploit the strategic imbalance of power [ch’iian];
then you will not labor but will still achieve results. A commanding general
who is stupid and trusting can be deceived and entrapped. One who is
greedy and unconcerned about reputation can be given gifts and bribed. One
who easily changes his mind and lacks real plans can be labored and dis-
tressed. If the upper ranks are wealthy and arrogant while the lower ranks
are poor and resentful, they can be separated and divided. If their advancing
and withdrawing are often marked by doubt and the troops have no one to
rely on, they can be shocked into running off. If the officers despise the com-
manding general and are intent on returning home, by blocking off the easy

WU-TZU

roads and leaving the treacherous ones open, they can be attacked and cap-
tured. If the terrain over which they advance is easy but the road for with-
drawal difficult, they can be forced to come forward. If the way to advance is
difficult but the road for retreating easy, they can be pressed and attacked. If
they encamp on low wetlands where there is no way for the water to drain
off, if heavy rain should fall several times, they can be flooded and drowned.
If they make camp in a wild marsh or fields dense with a heavy tangle of
grass and stalks, should violent winds frequently arise you can burn the
fields and destroy them. If they remain encamped for a long time — the gener-
als and officers growing lax and lazy, the army becoming unprepared — you
can sneak up and spring a surprise attack.”

Marquis Wu asked: “When our two armies are confronting each other but
I do not know their general, if I want to fathom him what methods are
there?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “Order some courageous men from the lower ranks to
lead some light shock troops to test him. (When the enemy responds] they
should concentrate on running off instead of trying to gain some objective.
Then analyze the enemy’s advance, whether their actions — such as sitting
and standing — are in unison and their organization well preserved; whether
when they pursue your retreat they feign being unable to catch you, or when
they perceive easy gain they pretend not to realize it. A commander like this
may be termed a ‘wise general.’ Do not engage him in battle.

“If their troops approach yelling and screaming, their flags and pennants
in confusion, while some of their units move of their own accord and others
stop, some weapons held vertically, others horizontally — if they pursue our
retreating troops as if they are afraid they will not reach us, or seeing advan-
tage are afraid of not gaining it, this marks a stupid general. Even if his
troops are numerous they can be taken.”

5. Responding to Change

Marquis Wu asked: “If the chariots are sturdy, the horses excellent, the gen-
erals courageous, and the soldiers strong, but when you suddenly encounter
the enemy they are thrown into turmoil and break formation, what can be
done?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “In general it is a rule of battle that during daylight hours
the flags, banners, pennants, and standards provide the measure, while at
night the gongs, drums, pipes, and whistles provide the constraints . 26 When

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left is signaled, they should go left; when right, then right. When the drum is
beaten, they should advance; when the gongs sound, they should halt. At the
first blowing they should form ranks; at the second assemble together. Exe-
cute anyone who does not follow the orders. When the Three Armies submit
to your awesomeness and the officers and soldiers obey commands, then in
combat no enemy will be stronger than you, nor will any defenses remain
impenetrable to your attack.”

Marquis Wu asked: “If the enemy is numerous while we are few, what can
I do?”

Wu Ch'i replied: “Avoid them on easy terrain, attack them in narrow
quarters. Thus it is said, for one to attack ten, nothing is better than a nar-
row defile. For ten to attack one hundred, nothing is better than a deep ra-
vine. For one thousand to attack ten thousand, nothing is better than a dan-
gerous pass.* Now if you have a small number of troops, should they
suddenly arise— striking the gongs and beating the drums— to attack the en-
emy on a confined road, then even though his numbers are very great, they
will all be startled and move about. Thus it is said, when employing larger
numbers concentrate on easy terrain; when using small numbers concentrate
on naturally confined terrain.”

Marquis Wu asked: “Their forces are extremely numerous, martial, and
courageous. Behind them are ravines and dangerous passes; on their right
mountains; on the left a river. They have deep moats and high ramparts and
arc defending their position with strong crossbowmen. Their withdrawal is
like a mountain moving, their advance like a tempest. As their food stocks
arc also plentiful, it will be difficult to defend against them for very long.
What should be done?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “A great question indeed! This is not |a problem] of the
strength of chariots and cavalry 28 but [of having] the plans of a Sage. If you
can prepare one thousand chariots and ten thousand cavalry and support
them with foot soldiers, you can divide them into five armies, each one tra-
versing a different route. Now if the five armies simultaneously move along
five different routes, the enemy will certainly be confused and will not know
where to concentrate his efforts. If the enemy fortified his defenses in order
to solidify his troops, quickly dispatch spies in order to observe their plans.
If they listen to our persuasions, they will abandon their positions and de-
part. If they do not listen to our persuasions, they will kill our emissaries and

WU-TZU

burn the treaties. Then divide your forces and engage them in five battles.
However, if you win any of the battles do not pursue the retreating enemy. If
you do not win then withdraw in extreme haste, thereby feigning a retreat.
After reforming, swiftly attack them, with one force tying them up in the
front, another cutting off their rear, while two of your armies move silently
to the left and right flanks to suddenly attack them. If the five armies strike
simultaneously, they will certainly gain the advantage. This is the Way [Tao]
for attacking the strong.”

f * f

Marquis Wu asked: “The enemy is nearby, pressing us. Even if I want to
retreat, there is no road. My soldiers are terrified. What can 1 do?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “The technique for dealing with this is as follows. If your
troops are numerous and his few, divide them and attack. If, on the contrary,
his troops are numerous and yours few, then use improvised measures to
harry him, never giving him any rest. Then, even though he is numerous, he
can be forced to submit.”

t t f

Marquis Wu asked: “If I encounter the enemy in a deep valley where
gorges and defiles abound to the sides, while his troops are numerous and
ours few, what should I do?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “Traverse hilly regions, forests, valleys, deep mountains,
and vast wetlands quickly, departing from them posthaste. Do not be dila-
tory. If in high mountains or a deep valley the armies should suddenly en-
counter each other, you should first beat the drums and set up a clamor —
taking advantage of it to advance your archers and crossbowmen, both
shooting the enemy and taking prisoners. Carefully investigate their degree
of control; if they are confused, then attack without doubt.”

Marquis Wu asked: “On the left and right are high mountains, while the
land is extremely narrow and confined. If when we meet the enemy we dare
not attack them yet cannot escape, what shall we do?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “This is referred to as ‘valley warfare.’ Even if your
troops are numerous, they are useless. Summon your talented officers to
confront the enemy, the nimble-footed and the sharpest weapons to be at the
forefront. Divide your chariots and array your cavalry, concealing them on
all four sides several li apart so that they will not show their weapons. The
enemy will certainly assume a solid defensive formation, not daring either to

222

WU-TZU

223

advance or retreat. Thereupon display your flags and array your banners,
withdraw outside the mountains, and encamp. The enemy will invariably be
frightened, and your chariots and cavalry should then harass them, not per-
mitting them any rest. This is the Way [Tao] for valley warfare.”

Marquis Wu asked: “If we encounter the enemy in a vast, watery marsh
where the chariot wheels sink down to the point that the shafts are under
water; our chariots and cavalry are floundering; and we have not prepared
any boats or oars so we cannot advance or retreat, what should we do?”

Wu Ch’i replied: “This is referred to as ‘water warfare.’ Do not employ
chariots or cavalry, but have them remain on the side. Mount some nearby
height and look all about. You must ascertain the water’s condition, know its
expanse, and fathom its depth. Then you can conceive an unorthodox strat-
agem [ch /] for victory. If the enemy begins crossing the water, press them
when half have crossed.”

Marquis Wu asked: “When it has been continuously raining for a long
time so the horses sink into the mire and the chariots are stuck, while we are
under enemy attack on all four sides and the Three Armies are terrified, what
should I do?”

Wu Ch i replied: In general desist from employing chariots when the
weather is rainy and the land wet, but mobilize them when it is hot and dry.
Value high terrain, disdain low ground. When racing your strong chariots,
whether advancing or halting, you must adhere to the road. If the enemy
arises, be sure to follow their tracks.”

Marquis Wu asked: “If a savage raiding force suddenly appears— plunder-
ing our lands and fields, seizing our cattle and horses— what should I do?”
Wu Ch’i replied: “When a savage raiding force appears, you must care-
fully consider its strength and well maintain your defensive position. Do not
respond to their attacks |by going out to engage them). When they are about
to withdraw at the end of the day, their packs will certainly be heavy and
their hearts will invariably be afraid. In withdrawing they will concentrate
on speed, and inevitably there will be stragglers. You should then pursue and
attack them, and their troops can be overcome.”

Wu-tzu said: “Now as to the Way [Tao] for attacking the enemy and be-
sieging his cities: After his cities and towns have already been shattered, en-
ter each of the palaces, take control of their bureaucrats, and collect their im-
plements |of administration]. However, wherever your army goes do not cut
down the trees, destroy houses, take the grain, slaughter the animals, or burn
their supplies. Thus you will show the populace that you do not harbor vi-
cious intentions. Accept those who seek to surrender and settle them.”

6. Stimulating the Officers

Marquis Wu asked: “Is making punishments severe and rewards clear ade-
quate for victory?"

Wu Ch’i replied: “As to these matters of severity and clarity I do not have
all the answers. Even so, they are not what can be relied on. Now if when
you issue commands and promulgate orders the people take pleasure in
hearing them; when you raise the army and mobilize the masses the people
take pleasure in battle; and when the weapons clash and blades cross the
people take pleasure in death, then these three are what a ruler of men can
rely on.”

Marquis Wu asked: “How does one attain this result?”

Wu Ch’i answered: “You should identify men of accomplishment and
honor them with a grand feast while also stimulating those who failed to ac-
complish anything notable.”

Thereupon Marquis Wu had sitting mats set out in the ancestral temple
hall, arrayed into three rows, and held a feast for the officers and chief offi-
cials. Those distinguished by their achievements sat in the front row and
were feasted with the finest foods together with three meats served on the
most valuable dishes. Those who ranked next in accomplishment sat in the
middle row and were feasted with fine food served on less lavish vessels.
Those who had not accomplished anything noteworthy sat in the last row
and were feasted with fine food served on ordinary utensils. When the feast
was over and they came out, he also honored the parents and families of the
meritorious outside the temple gate, again according to their accomplish-
ments. He annually sent emissaries to call on the families of those who had
died in the service of the country, bestowing aid on their parents. By so doing
he showed that they would not be forgotten.

After he had performed these actions for three years, Ch’in happened to
mobilize its army and approach the West River commandery. When Wei’s of-
ficers heard about it, those that buckled on their armor and enthusiastically

224

WU-TZU

attacked them without waiting for any orders from their superiors num-
bered in the tens of thousands.

Marquis Wu summoned Wu Ch’i and said: “Your previous instructions
have all been effected.”

Wu Ch’i replied: “I have heard that men have strengths and weaknesses,
that their ch’i flourishes and ebbs. If your lordship is willing to test fifty
thousand previously undistinguished men, I would like to lead them to en-
gage the enemy. If Ch’in is not victorious, it will be laughed at by the feudal
lords and lose the balance of authority [ch'iian] over the world . 29

“Now if there is a murderous villain hidden in the woods, even though one
thousand men pursue him they all look around like owls and glance about
like wolves. Why? They are afraid that violence will erupt and harm them
personally . ,0 Thus one man oblivious to life and death can frighten one
thousand. Now if I can take a mass of fifty thousand and turn them into a
single murderous villain, leading them to punish Ch’in, we will surely make
it difficult for the enemy!”

Thereupon Marquis Wu assented to his plan, granting him another five
hundred strong chariots and three thousand cavalry. They destroyed Ch’in’s
five-hundred-thousand-man army as a result of this policy to encourage the
officers.

The day before the battle Wu Ch’i spoke to the Three Armies: “All the
aides and officers must confront, follow, and capture the enemy’s chariots,
cavalry, and infantry. If the chariots do not make prisoners of the enemy’s
chariots, the cavalry does not make prisoners of the enemy’s cavalry, and the
infantry does not take the enemy’s infantry, then even if we forge an over-
whelming victory no one will be credited with any achievements.” Thus on
the day of the battle his orders were not onerous, but his awesomeness shook
the world.

Wei Liao-tzu

Translator’s Introduction, 229

1. Heavenly Offices, 242

2. Military Discussions, 243

3. Discussion of Regulations, 244

4. Combat Awesomeness, 247

5. Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks, 250

6. Tactical Balance of Power in Defense, 252

7. Twelve Insults, 254

8. Martial Plans, 254

9. The General as a Law Official, 258

10. The Source of Offices, 259

11. Governing the Foundation, 260

12. Tactical Balance of Power in Warfare, 261

13. Orders for Severe Punishments, 263

14. Orders for the Squads of Five, 263

15. Orders for Segmenting and Blocking Off Terrain, 264

16. Orders for Binding the Squads of Five, 265

17. Orders for Regulating the Troops, 265

18. Orders for Restraining the Troops, 266

19. Orders for the General, 267

20. Orders for the Vanguard, 268

21. Military Instructions I, 269

22. Military Instructions II, 271

23. Army Orders I, 273

24. Army Orders II, 275

Translator’s Introduction

The Wei Liao-tzu is purportedly named after a historical figure whose sur-
name was Wei (although this is not the same Chinese character as the state of
Wei) and personal name was Liao. The character “tzu,” meaning master and
indicating respect, was added by the compilers of his book. One notation
suggests he had once been a student of Lord Shang, the famous L.egalist theo-
rist and fabled administrator who advocated the creation of a strong central-
ized government marked by strict control of the people and resources. In an-
other tradition, Wei Liao is recorded as having been an important adviser to
the first Ch’in emperor in his successful quest to wrest control over all of
China, but scant historical evidence sustains either view.'

Whatever his personal history, Wei Liao was a brilliant strategist and a
perceptive observer who realized that only by integrating the civil and the
martial could a state be assured of surviving in the tumultuous Warring
States environment. He never illustrated his discussions with examples from
personal military experience; he is not historically noted as a commander;
and the book is almost devoid of actual tactics — therefore he appears to have
been strictly a theoretician. However, his extensive military knowledge is evi-
dent from the frequent inclusion of passages that are found in the present Six
Secret Teachings, the Art of War, and other military books 2 and from his de-
tailed description of army organization and discipline.’

One view holds that Wei Liao probably lived in the last half of the fourth
century B.C., an era in which mendicant persuaders indiscriminately sought
receptive ears among the feudal lords regardless of their moral qualifications
or state identification. Although most of them propounded doctrines that
emphatically required loyalty and good faith, they themselves apparently re-
mained unencumbered by such virtues until being accorded respectful treat-
ment and proper employment. Even then, as exemplified by the famous gen-
eral Wu Ch’i, if times changed and favor was lost, they suffered few qualms
about shifting their allegiance to another regime.

230

WEI LIAO-TZU

Wei was among the states confronted by the new, terrible reality of the
Warring States period (as discussed in the introduction). One of the three
feudal domains formed by the disintegration of Chin, Wei not only retained
the strength to be numbered among the seven major powers but initially also
grew in military prowess. With a western border along the future Great
Wall, it encompassed the central region north of the Chou imperial domain.
However, Wei’s fortunes began to fade under King Hui (reigned 370-319
B.c.) 4 when it suffered two significant defeats and was forced to move its
capital to Ta-liang. The major defeat was at Ma-ling at the hands of Ch’i in
341 B.c., but the next twenty years also witnessed a series of losses to
Ch’in— the emerging power that eventually unified the empire in 221 b.c.—
and another to the large southern state of Ch’u. After shifting the capital the
king renamed the state Liang and referred to himself as the “king of Liang.”
The opening chapter of the Wei Liao-tzu makes it appear as though the
book records Wei Liao’s response to King Hui’s obsessive search for the mili-
tary and political knowledge that would not only strengthen Wei’s sagging
defenses but would also furnish the means hy which to defeat his enemies
and avenge his losses. When Mencius— the famous Confucian standard-
bearer visited King Hui in about the same period, the king initiated their
interview by saying:' “As for ourselves, in the east I was defeated by Ch’i,
and my eldest son died there. In the west we suffered the loss of some several
hundred /; to Ch’in. In the south we have been insulted by Ch’u. I am
ashamed of this.”

King Hui brusquely initiated his interview with Wei Liao with the same
theme: “Is it true that the Yellow Emperor, through punishments and Virtue,
achieved a hundred victories [without a defeat]?” Wei Liao immediately re-
directed the focus with a reply that emphasized human effort: 6 “Punishment
was employed to attack [the rebellious!, Virtue was employed to preserve
[the people]. This is not what is referred to as ‘Heavenly Offices, [auspicious]
hours and days, yin and yang, facing toward and turning your back to.’ The
Yellow Emperor’s (victories] were a matter of human effort, that is all.” Wei
Liao departed when he failed to secure employment in Wei, apparently be-
cause the king lacked confidence in policies that in addition to military mea-
sures would require the cultivation and pursuit of virtue.

The only other textual reference to a “Wei Liao” appears in the Shih chi
annals depicting Ch in s ascension to power roughly eighty years later. A
man identified only as “Wei Liao, a man of Ta-liang” (the capital of Wei) of-
fers advice to the youthful king of Ch’in, the eventual unifier of the empire
known as Ch’in Shih Huang-ti. In 237 b.c. the king seized the reins of power

WEI LIAO-TZU

231

from his ministers and immediately began to expel all foreign advisers and
favored retainers:

The king had a sweeping search conducted in order to expel the foreign retain-
ers. Li Ssu sent up a memorial [in opposition] and the king stayed the expulsion
order. Li Ssu then persuaded the king of Ch’in to consider first taking Han in or-
der to frighten the other states. Thereupon he had Li Ssu plan the fall of Han.
The king of Han was worried and plotted with Han Fei-tzu how to weaken
Ch’in.

[At this time] Wei Liao, a native of Ta-liang, advised the king of Ch’in, saying:
“With respect to [the vastness of] Ch’in’s borders, the feudal lords may be com-
pared to the rulers of provinces and districts. My only fear is that the feudal
lords will form an alliance, uniting to do something unexpected. This is how
Chih Po, Fu Ch’ai, and King Min perished. I request your Majesty not begrudge
the expense of his wealth to bribe the great ministers and thereby cause confu-
sion in their plans. Without expending more than thirty thousand chin the feu-
dal lords can be eliminated.” The king of Ch’in followed his plan, never stood
on ceremony in his interviews with Wei Liao, and wore the same clothes and ate
the same food.

Liao said [to others]: “As for the king of Ch’in’s character, he has a nose like a
wasp, elongated eyes, shoulders like a vulture, and sounds like a wolf. He has
little kindness and generosity for others but has the heart of a tiger or a wolf.
When in straightened circumstances he easily humbles himself to others, but
when he attains his ambition he will just as easily consume people. I am a com-
mon man, but when he sees me he is always very deferential. If I truly enable the
king of Ch'in to gain his objective of ruling All under Heaven, then All under
Heaven will become prisoners. I cannot consort with him for long." Then he de-
parted. The king of Ch’in realized it, stopped him, and appointed him as a Com-
mander, using his plans and strategies. Li Ssu was in charge of governmental af-
fairs . 7

No further mention of Wei Liao’s activities or his role in Ch’in survives, al-
though the policy he suggested was apparently implemented with consider-
able success.

The historical picture is complicated further by the former existence of
two distinct works entitled Wei Liao-tzu , based on their inclusion in two dif-
ferent Han shu bibliographic categories. One, which is identified with the
Wei Liao who is noted as a disciple of Lord Shang, appears in the “miscella-
neous” category, whereas the other is found under “military” books. The
text incorporated in the present Seven Military Classics, although essentially
consistent, also appears to combine two distinct works. (The first twelve
chapters are more philosophical and general in scope and frequently deal

232

WEI LIAO-TZU

233

with grand strategy, whereas the last twelve focus on the nature and prob-
lems of organization, discipline, command, and structure.) This dichotomy
has prompted various theories about the possible authors and their relation-
ship with these texts, which are discussed in the last part of this introduction.

Scholarly interest in the Wei Liao-tzu has recently increased because sev-
eral chapters, still fairly well preserved on bamboo slips, were discovered in
1 972 in the Han dynasty tomb at Lin-i. Although there are numerous minor
differences in wording— especially in the choice of particles— and the bam-
boo slip edition is characterized by a somewhat more philosophical orienta-
tion than the current Wei Liao-tzu, only a few of the differences significantly
affect the traditional understanding of the historically received passages.

The style and historical content of the book suggest a composition date
around the end of the fourth century b.c., and based on the bamboo slip edi-
tion, 8 the book clearly assumed its present form before the inauguration of
the Han in 206 b.c. — contrary to skeptical claims that denigrate it as a much
later fabrication. Therefore, it might tentatively be concluded that the Wei
Liao-tzu may actually be based on Wei Liao’s court conversations with King
Hui in the fourth century B.c., perhaps with additional, detailed material
about military organization appended by someone from his family or school
within the century after his death.

Basic Measures and Policies

Wei Liao must have been painfully aware of the military developments and
famous engagements of the fourth century b.c. as well as of the escalating
magnitude and brutality of battle. When he began his audiences with King
Hui, he should have been thoroughly familiar with Wei’s defeats at Kui-ling
and Ma-ling, and he had probably studied and reflected on the strategies em-
ployed within the context of evolving military theory. Analyzing the state’s
situation, he apparently concluded that only radical, thoroughly imple-
mented policies could provide any hope for preserving the state and perhaps
achieving the king’s virtually unobtainable objectives. Thus his conversa-
tions — as portrayed in the Wei Liao-tzu — propose drastic measures requir-
ing strict enforcement and advocate a thorough revision of the state’s values,
policies, and basic approach to political and military issues.

The Basis: Agriculture and the People

Because the state of Wei had suffered devastating territorial, military, and
economic losses in the preceding wars, increasing the population became an
immediate priority. From Wei Liao’s viewpoint, a state’s prosperity de-

pended mainly on fully developing and exploiting its agricultural resources.
In order to increase productivity, new lands must be cultivated and energetic
farmers nurtured. Government policies that emphasize agriculture and offer
incentives to attract disaffected, displaced, or vanquished migrant peoples si-
multaneously accomplish both objectives.'’ Greater harvests rapidly provide
the populace with adequate nourishment while creating economic wealth.
When they are well fed, clothed, and sheltered, the people will be healthy,
strong, and content and will naturally give their allegiance to the benevolent
ruler who nurtured them. They will thus become loyal citizens capable of be-
ing inculcated with values, instructed in the virtues and demands of the state.

Humanistic Values and Authoritarian Government
The government must embrace the full range of humanistic values associated
with Confucianism, although the Wei Liao-tzu never refers to Confucius nor
attributes them to his school. The ruler must be the foremost exemplar of the
Tao, personally cultivating and embodying Virtue. He should severely limit
his desires and follow the path of moderation and restraint. 1 " His actions
must always be righteous, his motives benevolent. His policies must be di-
rected toward aiding and sustaining the people rather than toward self-ag-
grandizement and the glorious exercise of power. The forms of propriety,
good faith, filial behavior, the family, friendship, and shame must all be fos-
tered among the populace. When the agricultural seasons are respected and
the government imposes few taxes and minimizes corvee duties, the people
can be virtuous. As their faith in the government develops, they can be in-
structed in and rewarded for appropriate performance. When the laws, stan-
dards of propriety, and righteousness are taught, a sense of shame will de-
velop and the government can then properly punish deviant behavior." As
long as the government does not exhaust the people, moral behavior and so-
cial conformance can be expected.

Although Wei Liao believed in the fundamental Confucian, humanistic
virtues, he also advocated draconian measures to ensure that only those
values sanctioned by the state as productive and acceptable would be hon-
ored. Therefore, he proposed strictly prohibiting heterodoxy and vigorously
suppressing any tendencies inimical to agriculture and warfare, the twin
foundations of the state. The government must establish the proper tone by
not permitting desires nor extravagance, by eliminating decoration and fri-
volity. Talented administrators must be employed to supervise all the activi-
ties of both the state and the people, with the people’s welfare being para-
mount. Commercial enterprises and the pursuit of profit, although essential
to the state’s economic strength and welfare, 12 must be appropriately di-

234

235

WEI LIAO-TZU

rected and constrained to prevent them from harming the people and the en-
tire value system. Harmony, cooperation, and unity must be fostered and en-
sured in all activities.

Conquest and the Path to Victory

If the government can truly establish Virtue and foster the people’s welfare,
the state should be able to develop the internal strength to vanquish its ene-
mies without resorting to force of arms. Although there are many prerequi-
sites to military success, proper preparation and thorough planning coupled
with careful evaluation of the enemy and the battlefield situation are para-
mount. Accordingly:

In general, (in employing) the military there are those who gain victory through
the Tao; those that gain victory through awesomeness; and those that gain vic-
tory through strength. Holding careful military discussions and evaluating the
enemy, causing the enemy’s ch’i to be lost and his forces to scatter so that even if
his disposition is complete he will not be able to employ it, this is victory
through the Tao.

Being precise about laws and regulations, making rewards and punishments
clear, improving weapons and equipment, causing the people to have minds to-
tally committed to fighting, this is victory through awesomeness.

Destroying armies and slaying generals, mounting barbicans and firing cross-
bows, overwhelming the populace and seizing territory, returning only after be-
ing successful, this is victory through strength.

(Chapter 4: Combat Awesomeness)

Wei Liao extended the mandatory observance of humanitarian measures
to campaign armies, reflecting the time-honored Confucian idea that puni-
tive military actions should be directed against evil monarchs and their co-
horts and not against the populace, except as armed adults might actively at-
tack them. Implemented as military policy, this idea includes preserving the
fields and orchards; not plundering the towns nor disturbing the populace;
never destroying the people’s means of livelihood; and generally securing the
welfare of the people." In proposing such benevolent constraints, Wei Liao
was probably reacting to the almost unimaginable scale of the carnage
witnessed in his era— when several hundred thousand died in battles— and
the brutal policies of states such as Ch’in, which awarded rank based on the
number of heads taken in combat. Therefore, rather than foraging and plun-
dering, as Sun-tzu advocated, Wei Liao felt the army should follow practices
that minimize enemy opposition and encourage the enemy to surrender to
the humane ruler who will return them to their lands. Although the Wei
Liao-tzu is not alone among the Seven Military Classics in advocating such

WEI LIAO-TZU

measures, its author differed consciously from the practices of his time, no
doubt because of the policy’s strategic advantages rather than from any na-
ive commitment to virtue.

Organization and Unity

Wei Liao believed in a strict hierarchical organization solidified by a mutual
guarantee system that bonds men into units of five and ten and imposed
linkages at all levels . 14 The ruler exercises supreme authority, although the
commanding general replaces him in the field. The civilian populace as well
as the members of the army should respond as “the limbs respond to the
mind.” Strict enforcement of the mutual guarantee system, originated by
Lord Shang, implicates all of the unit or squad members in the transgres-
sions of any one of them. Whether in society or in battle, failure to discover
and report another’s crime, prevent a comrade’s death, or fight with deter-
mination was punished with the same severity as if the negligent person had
committed the offense himself. Contrary to Confucian belief, under this sys-
tem a father could not conceal his son’s crimes nor a son his father’s. System-
atic drilling and army training ensures that the soldiers are solidly bonded
into squads, respond to commands, are fully cognizant of their responsibili-
ties to each other and their commanders, and are capable of executing ma-
neuvers and engaging the enemy without panicking in the chaos and stress
of battle."

Rewards and Punishments

Every military analyst emphasized the irreplaceable function of rewards and
punishments in society and the army. Much of the Wei Liao-tzu is devoted to
explicating the essential principles for implementing an effective system of
rewards and punishments, the majority of which are common to the other
military and Legalist writings of the time. The most basic principles include
establishing severity in punishments and (contrary to the belief of Lord
Shang) generosity in rewards, strictly imposing punishments on even the
highest ranks and granting rewards to the lowest ranks, and never pardon-
ing offenses — although certain losses and reversals in battle could be re-
deemed by valiant actions that result in commensurate or surpassing
achievements. The standards of conduct as well as the laws and regulations
must all be clear and well publicized. No deviation — such as spontaneous
acts of individual courage — is to be tolerated. Rewards should be granted
solely in accord with battlefield achievements, and rank should similarly be
restricted to those who have proven themselves in the test of combat. Delays

236

237

WEI LIAO-TZU

in punishing and rewarding should never be allowed because their impact is
diminished accordingly.

Spirit and Courage

Wei Liao believed that the army’s ch’i essentially determined a battle’s out-
come; thus he extensively analyzed the nature and effects of spirit and cour-
age, virtually formulating a detailed psychology of combat. The fundamen-
tal problem is simply that people fear danger and do not want to die, even
for their native state. Comprehensive measures are necessary to forge an ef-
fective army:

People do not take pleasure in dying, nor do they hate life, (but) if the com-
mands and orders are clear and the laws and regulations carefully detailed, you
can make them advance. When, before [combat], rewards are made clear and
afterward punishments are made decisive, then when [the troops| issue forth
they will be able to realize an advantage, and when they move they will be suc-
cessful.

(Chapter 3: Discussion of Regulations)

Wei Liao believed that by nurturing the people’s allegiance to their ruler
and the soldiers’ love for their commander and combining the resultant posi-
tive motivation with their fear of harsh, certain punishment, a powerful
well-disc.phned army could be fashioned. The key lies in ensuring that when
attlefield fears of death and of the enemy inevitably arise, they are insignifi-
cant compared with the soldier’s terror at the thought of the punishment
they will certainly suffer for cowardice or defeat:

Now the people do not have two things they fear equally. If they fear us then
they will despise the enemy; if they fear the enemy they will despise us. The one
who ,s despised will be defeated; the one who establishes h.s awesomeness will
be victorious. In general, when the general is able to implement the Way [to awe-
somenessl, his commanders will fear him. When the commanders fear their gen-
eral, the people will fear their commanders. When the people fear their com-
manders, then the enemy will fear the people. For this reason those who would
know the Tao of victory and defeat must first know about the balance of power
of “fearing” and “despising.” 16

(Chapter 5: Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks)

Creating certainty and fostering commitment are paramount because
when the commander exudes confidence and the orders are clear, when
doubts have no chance to arise, the men will be confident and assured in
their actions. Enthusiastic, unquestioned commitment will dispel doubt,

WEl LIAO-TZU

carry men through battle, and terrorize the enemy — as does a warrior in the
marketplace:

If a warrior wields a sword to strike people in the marketplace, among ten thou-
sand people there will not be anyone who does not avoid him. If I say it is not
that only one man is courageous but that the ten thousand are unlike him, what
is the reason? Being committed to dying and being committed to seeking life are
not comparable.

(Chapter 3: Discussion of Regulations)

Wei Liao-tzu accordingly believed in Sun-tzu’s tactics to “rob the enemy of
his spirit,” to cause fear, consternation, and confusion. A general’s weak-
nesses can be exploited to create doubt, and deception employed to surprise
and terrorize the unprepared. When neither Virtue can cause the enemy’s sol-
diers to be ashamed and willingly submit nor awesomeness compel them to
flee without being overwhelmed in battle, then such measures must be em-
ployed and the victory delivered.

Strategic and Tactical Conceptions

If we accept the Wei Liao-tzu as a product of the mid- to late Warring States
period, the development and refinement of certain topics previously ex-
pressed in the Ssu-ma Fa, Art of War, Wu-tzu, Mo-tzu, and Sun Pin’s Military
Methods become apparent. Of particular importance is the new, self-reliant
attitude expressed from the inception of the conversations because Wei Liao
rejected not only the yin-yang practices flourishing in his time but also all re-
liance on Heaven and the spirits. Human effort constitutes the sole means to
achievement; therefore, the ruler must ensure that the state creates regula-
tions and implements practices appropriate to the contemporary situation
and fully exploits human potential. This is attained through the develop-
ment of surpassing internal strength — both economic and military — in some
views synonymous with the concept of hsing (shape, form) and its unfolding
throughout the empire as necessary as shih (strategic advantage conveyed by
deployment of force). 17

Wei Liao’s campaign army would be characterized by a complete disci-
pline and thorough integration that would allow great flexibility in deploy-
ing and subsequently executing complex battle plans. His tactics emphasized
selected principles advanced in the other military texts, particularly speed;
deception; concentration of force; assaulting weak points while avoiding
strengths; acting on the most complete intelligence; seizing and maintaining
the initiative; and always being active rather than passive. Sun-tzu’s vision of
orthodox [cheng] and unorthodox \ch ’/] forces, which is generally equated

238

WEI LIAO-TZU

with orthodox forces initiating a direct attack and unorthodox ones execut-
ing flanking or indirect attacks, evolved further into a concept of interrela-
tionship, as one changes into the other. 18 When discipline, speed, command
expertise, and the orthodox/unorthodox are integrated and fully realized,
dramatic results can be attained with small forces. 19

Wei Liao and the History of the Text

The We, Liao-tzu was undoubtedly composed between the late fourth and
late third centuries B.C., or roughly the middle to late Warring States period.
However, contemporary scholarship continues to debate whether the early
texts had any connection with either of the historical Wei Liaos, when they
attained final form, and whether the present book has been accurately trans-
mitted from the originals. Because the various positions draw radically dif-
ferent conclusions from the textual materials, they merit brief summation
here and in the accompanying notes.

Traditional studies have all observed that the Han shu bibliography lists a
Wei Liao-tzu in twenty-nine sections in the miscellaneous category 20 — with
Pan Ku’s annotation that it is by a Wei Liao of the Six States (Warring States)
period— and another, identically titled book of thirty-one sections in the
Ping bsing-shih 21 military subclassification. Prior to the 1972 discovery of
the bamboo slip edition at Lin-i, virtually all writings from the Sung dynasty
onward labeled the Seven Military Classics edition a forgery or bemoaned
the heavy losses that had reduced the original to only twenty-four sections.
Those critics who condemned the Six Secret Teachings as an obvious forgery
because of its purported brutality and the espousal of doctrines that could
not possibly have been associated with true Sages equally found fault with
the Wei Liao-tzu; they especially objected to the passage which asserts that a
truly effective commander can “kill” half of his men. 22 Among the latter
group of critics, Yao Chi-heng also observed that the Wei Liao-tzu not coin-
cidentally contains a passage from Mencius — which states that the “seasons
of Heaven are not as good as the advantages of Earth”— and cited it as evi-
dence that the author borrowed extensively from such writings to fabricate
the book found in the miscellaneous category. 23

Traditionalists have also tended to recognize the existence of two distinct
texts, speculating on which one provides the basis for the present work.
Commenting on the miscellaneous entry, Yen Shih-ku identified Wei Liao as
a student of Lord Shang, 24 which caused some analysts to focus almost ex-
clusively on this aspect and ignore many concepts historically associated
with the Confucians and Taoists. 25 Others have held that the military text

WEI LIAO-TZU

239

has been largely preserved and faithfully transmitted whereas the miscella-
neous work has vanished, thus equally ignoring significant contents. 2 '’ A
third view, discussed below, proposed that there was only a single book but
that it existed in different versions.

Inherently connected with the issue of textual transmission is the intricate
question regarding the possible relationship of the present Wei Liao-tzu with
the historically identified authors. One contemporary viewpoint suggests
that in the absence of reliable proof to the contrary, particularly with the dis-
covery of the bamboo slip edition, the contents should be attributed to the
mendicant persuader Wei Liao because they are a record of the advice he
proffered to King Hui. (The possibility of later accretions, revisions, and ad-
justments can easily be encompassed within this view.) This judgment is
founded on the reference to Wei Liao at the beginning of the book; the con-
tinued submissive viewpoint of a subject speaking to a ruler throughout; the
king’s weakness and ignorance coupled with the state’s debilitated condi-
tion; and the nature of the historical references. 2

A second perspective holds that the concepts expressed within the Wei
Liao-tzu and the scope of warfare it reflects clearly indicate that it should
date from the late Warring States period and its authorship be identified with
the Wei Liao who ventured to advise the king of Ch’in. 28 Moreover, this Wei
Liao’s surname was perhaps Liao, and he held the essentially honorary posi-
tion of “wei," or commandant. 29 This would account for the detailed knowl-
edge of what appears to be Ch’in’s military organization preserved in the last
half of the present book 30 but unfortunately not for the pretense of advising
King Hui because the political realities of the two states were radically differ-
ent.

Chang Lieh, who has written several articles on the dates and background
of the military writings, is a proponent of the late Warring States viewpoint
for several interesting reasons.' 1 First, because King Hui and Lord Shang
were known historical protagonists, if Wei Liao had been associated with
the latter in any way or had espoused doctrines associated with him, he
would hardly have dared to seek an audience with King Hui. 32 Second, the
amalgamation of Confucian concepts of righteousness and benevolence with
a state policy sanctioning aggressive warfare (ostensibly to chastise the evil)
did not evolve until late in the Warring States period, when it was synthe-
sized by HsUn-tzu. Earlier, during King Hui’s reign — in direct opposition to
Confucians such as Mencius — Lord Shang had advocated eliminating virtue
and its associated concepts from society and political life and relying instead
on strength, rewards, and punishments. The Wei Liao-tzu, on the contrary,
integrates virtue and might while stressing both severe punishments and gen-

240

WEI L1AO-TZU

WEI LIAO-TZU

241

erous rewards — the latter in direct contradiction of Lord Shang. Accord-
ingly, the historical author should intellectually and temporally postdate
Lord Shang and Hsun-tzu." Third, he embraces and continues other ideas
of HsUn-tzu, such as relying on men rather than Heaven and enriching the
people. 5 '' Finally, noting Wei Liao’s trepidations as chronicled by the Shih
chl ' Chang suggests they stemmed from his daunting championship of virtue
and righteousness within an extremely inhospitable context of brutality and
militarism. Chang therefore concludes that the text was written near the end
of the Warring States period and that it is properly attributed to the late his-
torical adviser to the young king. 35

In one of the initial articles analyzing the bamboo slips and the contempo-
rary Wei Liao-tzu, Ho Fa-chou offers some general observations and conclu-
sions. 6 First, he believes that the bamboo slip edition, the four chapters pre-
served in the Ch'iln-shu chih-yao” and the text classified in the miscel-
laneous category were originally identical. However, he feels that the Seven
Military Classics version originates in the one subsumed under the military
category. Furthermore, an analysis of the extant writings causes him to con-
clude that both Han shu texts were originally variations of the same book,
the miscellaneous version simply being characterized by more Confucian
and Taoist terms and concepts. Correspondingly, the military materials in
the military text were given greater prominence and the language was simpli-
fied, but the subject matter and conclusions remain congruent. 3 *

Ho also raises the intriguing question as to why, if the work is posited as a
forgery, it would be imputed to an unknown sophist in an obscure presenta-
tion to a ruler remembered mostly for his failures. Because the Wei Liao-tzu
contains numerous admonitions and correctives that could only have been
directed to a weak ruler— rather than to the despot of a strong state such as
Ch’in— Ho concludes it must be a record of an actual audience rather than a
later confabulation. Further evidence is garnered from the historical events
and figures Wei Liao cites— in particular his employment of Wu Ch’i as an
exemplar and the likelihood that Wei Liao was merely continuing to es-
pouse practices and measures in concord with Wei’s strong administrative
and early Legalist tradition. 39 Furthermore, Wei’s debilitated condition had
prompted King Hui to actively seek external advice and receive proponents
of virtually every position, thus stimulating an interchange of ideas and prin-
ciples among Confucians, Taoists, Legalists, and others— such as Wei Liao. 40

Robin D. S. Yates, in a seminal article, has summarized many of these
views and contributed his own interpretations. 41 He finds internal evidence
for having classified the Wei Liao-tzu under the military subcategory “form
and positional advantage” ( hsing-shih ) lacking and questions whether the

extant texts are actually the ones seen by the Han shu bibliography’s compil-
ers. 42 He further suggests that the book’s identification with Wei Liao is es-
sentially a matter of convenient attribution to foster a sense of authority and
lacks any inherent justification. 43 Based on its Confucian and Taoist materi-
als coupled with the diatribes against the use of divination, Yates then postu-
lates a likely composition date that is slightly post-Mencius. 44

Finally, in the critical introduction to his 1989 annotated Wei Liao-tzu
ch’ien-shuo , 45 Hsu Yung thoroughly reviews the above material — only to
creatively revive the original theory that naively believed the historical fig-
ures, although active in two distinct periods, were actually a single individ-
ual. Unconvinced by the arguments for attributing the text to either the ear-
lier or the later Wei Liao, HsU emphasizes the minimal likelihood that two
men with identical names could have appeared within a century of each
other in the Warring States era. 4 " In addition, the contents of the second part
of the book dearly detail the forms of military organization and principles
for army practice that probably characterized Ch’in’s forces. 4 The concept
of benevolence constituting the proper foundation for all warfare, which is
prominent in the first part of the Wei Liao-tzu, is also thought to have arisen
late in the Warring States period. Because HsU Yung believes the book is ba-
sically homogeneous, he consciously draws the inevitable conclusion that it
is the work of a single thinker. He is then compelled to resolve the problem
apparently posed by the unbelievable longevity required for Wei Liao to have
been active in two courts nearly a century apart by redefining King Hui’s
period of reign. In brief, HsU calculates that King Hui did not die until 310
B.C., nine years after the traditionally ascribed date. 4 * Therefore, if a very
young Wei Liao — a native of Wei — had been granted an audience at a time
when the king was soliciting advice from all persons and quarters, including
Mencius, his subsequent interview with a very youthful king of Ch’in would
have occurred when he was in his early nineties. 4 '* Nothing is heard of him
thereafter because he probably died from old age rather than actively assum-
ing some post. 50 Accordingly, the first twelve chapters of the present book
would stem from the miscellaneous text — a product of his youth — and the
remaining twelve from the writings consigned to the military classification —
the work of his final years. 51 Thus in HsU’s view, all sixty sections originally
existed in Pan Ku’s time— with the historian perhaps separating them into
two works — but they were combined, with losses and accretions over the
ages, until constituting the present Wei Liao-tzu . 52

1. Heavenly Offices 1

King Hui of Liang inquired of Wei Liao-tzu: “Is it true that the Yellow Em-
peror, through punishments and Virtue, 2 achieved a hundred victories [with-
out a defeat)?”

Wei Liao-tzu replied: “Punishment was employed to attack (the rebel-
hous), Virtue was employed to preserve [the people]. 3 This is not what is re-
ferred to as ‘Heavenly Offices, [auspicious| hours and days, yin and yang
facing toward and turning your back to.’ The Yellow Emperor’s [victories!
were a matter of human effort, that is all. Why was that?

“Now if there is a fortified city and one attacks it from the east and west
but cannot take it, and attacks from the south and north but cannot take it,
can it be that all four directions failed to accord with an |auspicious| mo-
ment that could be exploited? If you still cannot take it, it is because the
walls are high, the moats deep, the weapons and implements fully prepared,
the materials and grains accumulated in great quantities, and their valiant
soldiers unified in their plans. If the wall is low, the moats shallow, and the
defenses weak, then it can be taken. From this perspective, ‘moments,’ ‘sea-
sons, and ‘Heavenly Offices’ are not as important as human effort.

According to the Heavenly Offices , 4 ‘deploying troops with water to the
rear is referred to as “isolated terrain.”' Deploying troops facing a long ridge
is termed “abandoning the army.”’' 1 When King Wu attacked King Chou of
the Shang, he deployed his troops with the Chi 7 River behind him, facing a
mountain slope. With 22,500 men he attacked King Chou’s hundreds of
thousands and destroyed the Shang dynasty. Yet, had not King Chou de-
ployed in accord with the Heavenly Offices?

“The Ch’u general Kung-tzu Hsin was about to engage Ch’i in battle. At
that time a comet appeared, with its tail over Ch’i. [According to such be-
liefs) wherever the tail pointed would be victorious, and they could not be at-
tacked. Kung-tzu Hsin said: ‘What does a comet know? Those who fight ac-
cording to the comet will certainly be overturned and conquered.’ 8 On the
morrow he engaged Ch’i and greatly defeated them. The Yellow Emperor
said: ‘Putting spirits and ghosts first is not as good as first investigating my

242

WEI LIAO-TZU

243

own knowledge.’ This means that the Heavenly Offices are nothing but hu-
man effort."' 1

2. Military Discussions

“Measure the fertility and barrenness of the earth, and then establish towns.
To construct the city walls, determine the appropriate terrain. 10 In accord
with the city walls, determine the appropriate |number of) men." In accord
with [the number of) men, determine the appropriate amount of grain.
When all three have been mutually determined, then internally one can be
solid in defense, and externally one can be victorious in battle. 12 Being victo-
rious in battle externally and preparations" being controlled internally, vic-
tory and preparations are mutually employed, 14 like the halves of a tally ex-
actly matching each other.

“Control of the army is as secretive as the |depths of) Earth, as dark and
obscure as the [heights of) Heaven, 15 and is given birth from the nonexistent.
Therefore it must be opened. 16 The great is not frivolous, the small is not
vast. 1

“One who is enlightened about prohibitions, pardons, opening," and
stopping up 19 will attract displaced people and bring unworked lands under
cultivation. 20

“When the land is broad and under cultivation, the state will be wealthy;
when the people are numerous and well-ordered, the state will be gov-
erned. 21 When the state is wealthy and well governed, although the people
do not remove the blocks [from the chariots] nor expose their armor, their
awesomeness instills order on All under Heaven. 22 Thus it is said ‘the army’s
victory stems from the court.’ 23 When one is victorious without exposing his
armor, it is the ruler’s victory; when victory comes after deploying [the
army), it is the general’s victory. 24

“The army cannot be mobilized out of personal anger. 25 If victory can be
foreseen, then the troops can be raised. If victory cannot be foreseen, then
[the mobilization) should be stopped. If trouble arises within a hundred li,
do not spend more than a day mobilizing the forces. If trouble arises within a
thousand li, do not spend more than a month mobilizing the forces. If the
trouble lies within the Four Seas, do not spend more than a year mobilizing
the forces. 26

“As for the commanding general: Above he is not governed by Heaven, be-
low he is not controlled by Earth, in the middle he is not governed by men.
He should be composed so that he cannot be stimulated to anger. He should

244

WEI LIAO-TZU

be pure so that he cannot be inveigled by wealth. 2 " Now if the mind is de-
ranged [by emotion), the eyes are blind, and the ears are deaf — to lead men
with these three perversities is difficult!

“Wherever the army ventures— whether it is along byways that wind
about like sheep’s intestines, along roads as bumpy as a saw’s teeth, curling
about the mountains, or entering a valley— it will be victorious. Whether de-
ployed in a square formation or deployed in a round formation, it will be
victorious . 28

“A heavy army is like the mountains, like the forests, like the rivers and
great streams. A light force is like a roaring fire; like earthen walls it presses
upon them, like clouds it covers them . 29 They cause the enemy’s troops to be
unable to disperse and those that are dispersed to be unable to reassemble . 30
Those on the left are unable [to rescue those on| the right, those on the right
are unable [to rescue those on| the left . 31

“ The weapons are like a mass of trees, the [effects of thej crossbows like a
goat’s horns . 32 Every man, without exception, steps high and displays his
courage. Casting off all doubts, fervently and determined, they go forth deci-
sively!”

3. Discussion of Regulations

“As for the military, regulations must first be established. When regulations
are established first, the soldiers will not be disordered. When the soldiers
are not disordered, punishments will be clear. If wherever the gongs and
drums direct them a hundred men all contend; to penetrate the enemy’s
ranks and cause chaos among his formations a thousand men all strive; and
to overturn the enemy’s army and kill his generals ten thousand men raise
their blades in unison, no one under Heaven will be able to withstand them
in battle.

“In antiquity the soldiers were organized into squads of five and ten, the
chariots into companies and rows. When the drums sounded and the pen-
nants flew , 33 it never happened that the first to scale the walls were not out-
standing state soldiers of great strength! The first to die were also always
outstanding state soldiers of great strength. If the enemy suffers a loss of one
man and we lose a hundred, it enriches the enemy and greatly diminishes 34
us! Through the ages ' 5 generals have been unable to prevent this.

“When conscripts have been assigned to the army but they run off to their
native places, or flee when they approach a battle, the harm caused by the de-
serters is great. Through the ages generals have been unable to prevent it.

WEI LIAO-TZU

245

“What can kill men beyond a hundred paces are bows and arrows. What
can kill a man within fifty paces are spears and halberds. When the general
drums [the advance] but the officers and troops yell at each other, twist their
arrows to break them, smash their spears, cradle their halberds , 36 and find it
advantageous to go to the rear, and when the battle commences these all oc-
cur, it will be internally self-defeating. Through the ages generals have been
unable to prevent them.

“Soldiers losing their squads of five and ten; chariots losing their compa-
nies and rows; unorthodox 3 " forces abandoning their generals and fleeing;
the masses also running off — these are things which generals through the
ages have been unable to prevent. Now if a general can prevent these four, he
will be able to traverse high mountains, cross over deep rivers, and assail
strong formations. Being unable to prevent these four is like losing your boat
and oars and crossing the Yangtze and Yellow rivers. It cannot be done!

“People do not take pleasure in dying, nor do they hate life, [but] if the
commands and orders are clear, and the laws and regulations carefully de-
tailed, you can make them advance. When, before |combat[, rewards are
made clear, and afterward punishments are made decisive, then when [the
troops| issue forth they will be able to realize an advantage, and when they
move they will be successful.

“Order that a company |commander | 38 be established for one hundred
men, a Ssu-ma for one thousand men, and a general for ten thousand men.
With a small number you can punish a mass, with the weak you can punish
the strong. If you test my words |you will find] their techniques sufficient to
ensure that within the masses of the Three Armies, if you execute a single
man none will escape punishment. Fathers will not dare conceal their sons,
and sons will not dare conceal their fathers, so how much the more so the cit-
izens of the state?

“If a warrior wields a sword to strike people in the marketplace, among
ten thousand people there will not be anyone who does not avoid him. If I
say it is not that only one man is courageous, but that the ten thousand are
unlike him, what is the reason? Being committed to dying and being commit-
ted to seeking life are not comparable. If you listen to my techniques, [you
will find] they are sufficient to cause the masses of the Three Armies to be-
come a brigand 39 committed to dying. No one will stand before them, no one
will follow them. They will be able to come and go alone, being the army of a
king or hegemon.

“Who led a mass of one hundred thousand and no one under Heaven op-
posed him? Duke Huan . 40

246

247

wEI LIAO-TZU

“Who led a mass of seventy thousand and no one under Heaven opposed
him? Wu Ch’i.

“Who led a mass of thirty thousand and no one under Heaven opposed
him? Sun-tzu.

Today among the armies led by commanders from the various feudal
states, there is not one that does not reach a mass of two hundred thousand
men. Yet if they are unable to succeed in establishing their merit, it is because
they do not understand prohibitions, pardons, opening (the path to life],
and stopping up [excessive severity]. If you make the ordinances clear so
that one man will be victorious, then ten men will also thereby be victorious.
If ten men can be victorious, then one hundred, one thousand, or ten thou-
sand men can also thereby be victorious. Thus I say if you improve our
weapons and equipment, nurture our martial courage, when you release
[our forces] it will be like a bird attacking, like rushing down a thousand-
fathom valley. 41

Now a state that finds itself in difficulty sends its valuable treasures out
with emissaries to other states, sends its beloved sons out as hostages, and
cedes land along its borders in order to obtain the assistance of All under
Heaven. Although the troops |coming to assist| arc said to number one hun-
dred thousand, in actuality they do not exceed several tens of thousands.
When their troops come forth there are none to whom [the ruler] has not
said to his commanding general: ‘Do not be beneath anyone nor be the first
to fight.’ In reality one cannot enter battle with them.

If we measure the population within our borders, without the [system of]
five no one could order them. The ordinances regulate the mass of one hun-
dred thousand, and the king must be able to have them wear our uniforms
and eat our food. If they are not victorious in battle nor stalwart in defense,
it is not the fault of our people for it was internally brought on. The various
feudal states under Heaven aiding us in battle are like worn-out old horses
with their manes flying trying to compete with legendary swift steeds. How
can they supplement our ch'if

“We should employ all the resources under Heaven for our own use, we
should govern with all the regulations under Heaven as our own regulations.
We should revise our commands and orders and make punishments and re-
wards clear. We should cause that apart from engaging in agriculture there
will be no means to eat, and apart from engaging in battle there will be no
means to attain rank. We should cause the people to bump into each other in
competing to go out to the farms and into battle. Then under Heaven we will
not have any enemies! Thus I say that when a command is promulgated, an
order issued, its credibility will extend throughout the state.

WEI LIAO-TZU

“If among the populace there are those who say they can vanquish the en-
emy, do not allow them to speak idly but absolutely test their ability to fight.

“To look at other peoples’ lands and gain them, to divide up other rulers’
subjects and nourish them, one must be able to absorb their Worthies. If you
are unable to bring in and employ their Worthies but want to possess All un-
der Heaven, you must destroy armies and slay generals. In this way, even
though you may be victorious in battle, the state will grow increasingly
weak. Even though you gain territory, the state will be increasingly impover-
ished. All this proceeds from the state’s regulations being exhausted.”

4. Combat Awesomeness

“In general, |in employing] the military there are those who gain victory
through the Tao; those that gain victory through awesomeness; and those
that gain victory through strength. Holding careful military discussions and
evaluating the enemy, causing the enemy’s ch’i to be lost and his forces to
scatter so that even if his disposition 4 ’ is complete he will not be able to em-
ploy it, this is victory through the Tao.

“Being precise about laws and regulations, making rewards and punish-
ments clear, improving weapons and equipment, causing the people to have
minds totally committed to fighting, this is victory through awesomeness.

“Destroying armies and slaying generals, mounting barbicans and firing
crossbows, overwhelming the populace and seizing territory, returning only
after being successful, this is victory through strength. When kings and feu-
dal lords know these, the three ways to victory will be complete.

“Now the means by which the general fights is the people; the means by
which the people fight is their ch’i. When their ch’i is substantial they will
fight; when their ch’i has been snatched away they will run off.

“Before punishment has been applied [to the enemy], before the soldiers
have clashed, the means by which one seizes the enemy are five:

1. Discussing the way to victory in the court

2. Discussing [the general] receiving his mandate 44

3. Discussing crossing the borders 4 '

4. Discussing making the moats deep and the fortifications high

5. Discussing mobilizing, deploying, and applying punitive measures
[to the enemy]

“In these five cases first evaluate the enemy and afterward move. In this way
you can attack their voids and seize them.

“One who excels at employing the army is able to seize men and not be
seized by others. This seizing is a technique of mind. Orders [unify] 46 the

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WEI LIAO-TZU

minds of the masses. When the masses are not understood, the orders will
have to be changed frequently. When they are changed frequently, then even
though orders are .ssued the masses will not have faith in them . 47

“Thus the rule for giving commands is that small errors should not be
changed, minor doubts should not be publicized. Thus when those above do
not [issue] doubtful orders, the masses will not listen to two different [vcr-
T'- When actions do not have any questionable aspects, the multitude
w" " 0 t J\ ave d ' V, ? ed intent '°ns- There has never been an instance where the
people did not believe the mind of their leader and were able to attain their
strength. It has never been the case that one was unable to realize their
strength and yet attain their deaths in battle.

"Therefore a state must have the righteousness of the forms of etiquette
trUSt ’ famihar,t y> and love, and then it can exchange hunger for surfeit
The state must first have the customs of filiality, parental love, honesty, and
shame, and then it can exchange death for life. When the ancients led the
people they invariably placed the rites and trust first, and afterward ranks
and emoluments. They put honesty and shame first, and punishments and
fines afterward; close relationships and love first, and imposed constraints
on their persons afterward . 49

“Thus those who engage in combat must take leading in person as their
foundation in order to incite the masses and officers, just as the mind con-
trols the four limbs. If their minds are not incited, then the officers will not

die for honor. When the officers will not die for honor, then the masses will
not do battle.

“In order to stimulate the soldiers, the people’s material welfare cannot
but be ample. The ranks of nobility, the degree of relationship in death and
mourning, the activities by which the people live cannot but be made evi-
dent. One must govern the people in accord with their means to life, and
make distinctions clear in accord with the people’s activities. The fruits of
the held and their salaries, the feasting of relatives (through the rites of] eat-
ing and drinking, the mutual encouragement in the village ceremonies, mu-
tual assistance in death and the rites of mourning, sending off and greeting
the troops — these are what stimulate the people . 50

“Ensure that the members of the squads of five and ten are like relatives,
the members of the companies and their officers 51 like friends. When they
stop they will be like a solid, encircling wall, when they move like the wind

T rai "; The chariots wil! not wheel to ^e rear, the soldiers will not turn
about. This is the Way to establish the foundation for combat.

“Land is the means for nourishing the populace; [fortified] cities the
means for defending the land; combat the means for defending the cities.

WEI I.IAO-TZU

249

Thus if one concentrates on plowing the people will not be hungry; if one
concentrates on defense the land will not be endangered; if one concentrates
on combat the cities will not be encircled. These three were the fundamental
concerns of the Former Kings, and among them military affairs were the
most urgent.

“Therefore the Former Kings concentrated on five military affairs: When
the store of accumulated foodstuffs is not substantial, the soldiers do not set
out. When rewards and salaries are not generous, the people are not stimu-
lated. When martial warriors arc not selected, the masses will not be strong.
When weapons and implements are not prepared, their strength will not be
great. When punishments and rewards are not appropriate, the masses will
not respect them. If one emphasizes these five, then at rest |the army] will be
able to defend any place it secures, and in motion it will be able to attain its
objectives . 52

“As for remaining within the state and going forth to attack, you want
those remaining behind to be ‘heavy.’ In deploying your troops you want the
formations to be solid. In launching an attack you want to make the utmost
effort. And in going forth to battle you want to be of one mind.

“The state of a |true| king enriches the people; the state of a hegemon
enriches the officers. A state that merely survives enriches the high officials,
and a state that is about to perish enriches its own granaries and storehouses.
This is termed ‘the top being full while the bottom leaks.’ When disaster
comes there will be no means to effect a rescue.

“Thus I say that if you raise the Worthy and give responsibility to the capa-
ble, |even| without the time being propitious affairs will still be advanta-
geous. If you make the laws clear and are cautious in issuing orders, then
without performing divination with the tortoise shell or milfoil you will ob-
tain good fortune. If you esteem achievement and nurture effort, without
praying you will attain blessings. Moreover it is said, ‘The seasons of
Heaven are not as good as the advantages of Earth. Advantages of Earth are
not as good as harmony among men.’ What Sages esteem is human effort,
that is all!

“Now when the army is toiling on the march, the general must establish
himself (as an example]. In the heat he does not set up an umbrella; in the
cold he does not wear heavier clothes. On difficult terrain he must dismount
and walk. Only after the army’s well is finished does he drink. Only after the
army’s food is cooked does he eat. Only after the army’s ramparts are com-
plete does he rest. He must personally experience the same toil and respite. In
this fashion even though the army is in the field for a long time, it will be nei-
ther old nor exhausted .” 53

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5. Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks

‘The military is victorious through being quiet; a state is victorious through
being united .' 4 One whose strength is divided will be weak; one whose mind
has doubts will be turned against . 55 Now when one’s strength is weak, ad-
vancing and retreating will not be bold, and pursuing an enemy will not re-
sult in capturing anyone. Generals, commanders, officers, and troops should
be a single body both in action and at rest. But if the commander’s mind is
already doubtful and the troops inclined to rebellion, then even though a
plan has been decided on they will not move, or if movement has been initi-
ated they cannot be controlled. When different mouths speak empty words,
the general lacks the proper demeanor, and the troops have not had constant
tests |during training], if they set out to attack they will inevitably be de-
feated. This is what is referred to as a ‘hasty, belligerent army.’ It is inade-
quate for engaging in warfare.

"Now the general is the mind of the army, while all those below are the
limbs and joints. When the mind moves in complete sincerity, then the limbs
and joints are invariably strong. When the mind moves in doubt, then the
limbs and joints are invariably contrary. Now if the general does not govern
his mind, the troops will not move as his limbs. Then even though the army
might be victorious, it will be a lucky victory, not (the result of] the tactical
imbalance of power in the attack . 56

“Now the people do not have two things they fear equally. If they fear us
then they will despise the enemy; if they fear the enemy they will despise us.
The one who is despised will be defeated; the one who establishes his awe-
somencss will be victorious. In general, when the general is able to imple-
ment the Way [to awesomeness ], 57 his commanders will fear him. When the
commanders fear their general, the people will fear their commanders. When
the people fear their commanders, then the enemy will fear the people. For
this reason those who would know the Tao of victory and defeat must first
know about the balance of power of ‘fearing’ and ‘despising.’

“Now one who is not loved and cherished in the minds |of his men] cannot
be employed by me; one who is not respected and feared in the minds |of his
men | cannot be appointed by me . 58 Love follows from below, awesomeness
is established from above. If they love | their general] they will not have di-
vided minds; if they are awestruck | by their general | they will not be rebel-
lious. Thus excelling at generalship is merely a question of love and awe-
someness.

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251

“One who engages in battle but does not invariably win cannot be said to
‘do battle.’ One who attacks an enemy but does not invariably seize them
cannot be said to have ‘attacked .’ 59 If it were otherwise, their punishments
and rewards were not sufficiently trusted. Credibility [must be established]
before the moment of need; affairs [must be managed] before the first signs
appear. Thus the masses, when once assembled, should not be fruitlessly dis-
persed. When the army goes forth it should not return empty-handed. They
will seek the enemy as if searching for a lost son; they will attack the enemy
as if rescuing a drowning man.

“One who occupies ravines lacks the mind to do battle . 6 ' 1 One who lightly
provokes a battle lacks fullness of ch’i. One who is belligerent in battle lacks
soldiers capable of victory.

“Now in general, one who presumes upon righteousness to engage in war-
fare values initiating the conflict. One who contends out of personal animos-
ity responds only when it is unavoidable. Even though hatreds have formed
and troops have been mobilized, await them and value acting after them . 61
During the conflict you must await their advance . 62 When there is a lull you
must prepare |against sudden attacks].

“There are armies that are victorious in the court; those that achieve vic-
tory in the plains and fields; and those that attain victory in the marketplace.
There are those who fight and gain victory; those that submit and are lost;
and those that are fortunate not to be defeated, as in cases where the enemy
is unexpectedly frightened and victory is gained by a turn of events. This sort
of victory ‘by turn of events’ is said not to be a complete victory. What is not
a complete victory lacks any claim to having effected a tactical imbalance in
power. Thus the enlightened ruler, on the day for the attack, will [concen-
trate on] having the drums and horns sound in unison and regulating their
armed might. Without seeking victory he will then be victorious.

“Among armies there are those who abandon their defenses, abolish their
awesomeness, and are yet victorious because they have methods. There are
those who have early established the use of their weapons so that their re-
sponse to the enemy is all-encompassing and their general leadership is per-
fected.

“Thus for five men there is a squad leader, for ten men a lieutenant, for one
hundred men a company captain, for one thousand men a battalion com-
mander, and for ten thousand men a general. (This organization] is already
all-encompassing, already perfected. If a man dies in the morning, another
will replace him that morning; if a man dies in the evening, another will re-
place him that evening. (The wise ruler] weighs the tactical balance of power

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with the enemy, evaluates the generals, and only thereafter mobilizes the
army.

“Thus in general, when assembling an army a thousand li away, ten days
are required and when a hundred li, one day, while the assembly point
should be the enemy’s border. 63 When the troops have assembled and the
general has arrived, the army should penetrate deeply into their territory,
sever their roads, and occupy their large cities and large towns. Have the
troops ascend the walls and press the enemy into endangered positions. Have
the several units of men and women each press the enemy in accord with the
configuration of the terrain and attack any strategic barriers. If you occupy
|the terrain around] a city or town and sever the various roads about it, fol-
low up by attacking the city itself. If the enemy’s generals and armies are un-
able to believe in each other, the officers and troops unable to be in harmony,
and there are those unaffected by punishments, we will defeat them. Before
the rescue party has arrived a city will have already surrendered.

“If fords and bridges have not yet been constructed, 64 strategic barriers
not yet repaired, dangerous points in the city walls not yet fortified, and the
iron caltrops not yet set out, then even though they have a fortified city, they
do not have any defense!

“If the troops from distant forts have not yet entered (the city], the border
guards and forces in other states 65 not yet returned, then even though they
have men, they do not have any men! If the six domesticated animals have
not yet been herded in, the five grains not yet harvested, the wealth and ma-
terials for use not yet collected, then even though they have resources they do
not have any resources!

“Now when a city is empty and void and its resources are exhausted, we
should take advantage of this vacuity to attack them. The Art (of War] 66
says, They go out alone, they come in alone. Even before the enemy’s men
can cross blades with them, they have attained |victory].’ This is what is
meant.”

6. Tactical Balance of Power in Defense

In general, when the defenders go forth, if they do not |occupy| the outer
walls of the cities nor the borderlands 6 ' and when they retreat do not [estab-
lish! watchtowers and barricades for the purpose of defensive warfare, they
do not excel [at defense |. The valiant heroes and brave stalwarts, sturdy ar-
mor and sharp weapons, powerful crossbows and strong arrows should all
be within the outer walls, and then all [the grain stored outside) in the
earthen cellars and granaries collected, and the buildings [outside the outer

WEI LIAO-TZU

walls) broken down and brought into the fortifications. This will force the
attackers to expend ten or one hundred times the energy, while the defenders
will not expend half of theirs. 68 The enemy aggressors will be harmed
greatly, yet generals through the ages have not known this.

“Now the defenders should not neglect their strategic points. The rule for
defending a city wall is that for every chang |ten feet), you should employ ten
men to defend it — artisans and cooks not being included. Those who go out
[to fight) do not defend the city; those that defend the city do not go out |to
fight). One man [on defense] can oppose ten men |besieging them|; ten men
can oppose one hundred men; one hundred men can oppose one thousand
men; one thousand men can oppose ten thousand men. 1 hus constructing |a
city’s] interior and exterior walls by accumulating loose soil [and tamping it
down| 69 does not wantonly expend the strength of the people for it is truly
for defense.

“If a wall is one thousand chang, then ten thousand men should defend 0
it. The moats should be deep and wide, the walls solid and thick, the soldiers
and people prepared, 71 firewood and foodstuffs provided, the crossbows
stout and arrows strong, the spears and halberds well suited. This is the
method for making defense solid.

“If the attackers are not less than a mass of at least a hundred thousand 72
while | the defenders! have an army outside that will certainly come to the
rescue, it is a city that must be defended. If there is no external army to inevi-
tably rescue them, then it is not a city that must be defended.

“Now if the walls are solid and rescue certain, then even stupid men and
ignorant women will all— without exception— protect the walls, ’ exhaust-
ing their resources and blood for them. For a city to withstand a siege for one
year, the [strength ofl 74 the defenders should exceed that of the attackers and
the [strength of| the rescue force exceed that of the defenders.

“Now if the walls are solid but rescue uncertain, then the stupid men and
ignorant women — all without exception — will defend the parapets, but they
will weep. This is normal human emotion. Even if you thereupon open the
grain reserves in order to relieve and pacify them, you cannot stop it. You
must incite the valiant heroes and brave stalwarts with their sturdy armor,
sharp weapons, strong crossbows, and stout arrows to exert their strength
together in the front and the young, weak, crippled, and ill to exert their
strength together in the rear. '

“If an army of a hundred thousand is encamped beneath the city walls, the
rescue force must break open |the siege), and the city’s defenders must go out
to attack. When they sally forth they must secure the critical positions [along
the way]. But the rescue forces to the rear [of the besiegers| should not sever

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WEI LIAO-TZU

other/* PPly lineS ’ 3nd thC f ° rCeS Withi " 3nd W ' thOUt Sh ° uld reSp ° nd tC> each
In this sort of rescue display a half-hearted commitment. If you display a
half-hearted commitment, it will overturn 77 the enemy and we can await
them. They will put their stalwarts in the rear, and place the old in the fore-
ront. Then the enemy will not be able to advance, nor be able to stop the de-
fenders [from breaking out). This is what is meant by the ‘tactical balance of
power in defense.’

7. TVvelve Insults^ 8

“Awesomeness lies in 77 not making changes. Beneficence lies in according
with the seasons. Percept iv.ty 81 lies in [promptly] responding to affairs.
[Success in] warfare lies in controlling ch 7. [Skill in) attacks lies in fathoming
externals. Defense lies in manipulating external appearance. Not being ex-
cessive lies in measuring and counting. Not encountering difficulty lies in
oresight and preparation. Being cautious lies in respecting the small. Wis-
dom lies m controlling the large. Eliminating harm lies in being decisive.
Darning the masses lies in deferring to other men.

“Regret arises from relying on what is doubtful. Evil lies in excessive exe-
cutions. Prejudiced views come from frequently following one’s own desires
Inauspicious events arise from detesting to hear about one’s errors. Extrava-
gance lies in exhausting the people’s resources. Unenlightenment consists in
accepting advice |which| separates you [from reality]. Being insubstantial
stems from lightly initiating movements. Stubbornness and ignorance lie in
separating yourself from the Worthy. Misfortune lies in loving profits. Harm
hes in drawing common men near. Disaster lies in lacking any place to de-
fend. Danger lies in lacking [clear] commands and orders.”

8. Martial Plans

In general, [when employing) the military do not attack cities that have not
committed transgressions or slay men who have not committed offenses 83
Whoever kills people’s fathers and elder brothers; whoever profits himself
with the riches and goods of other men; whoever makes slaves of the sons
and daughters of other men is in all cases a brigand. For this reason the mili-
tary provides the means to execute the brutal and chaotic and to stop the un-
righteous. Whenever the army is applied the farmers do not leave their oc-
cupations in the fields, the merchants do not depart from their shops, and
the officials do not leave their offices, due to the martial plans 85 all proceed-

WEI LIAO-TZU

255

ing from one man. 86 Thus even without the forces bloodying their blades. All
under Heaven give their allegiance.

“A state of ten thousand chariots [concentrates on| both agriculture and
warfare. A state of one thousand chariots [focuses] on rescuing [others] and
on defending [itself]. 87 A state of one hundred chariots [commits itself] to
serving and supporting [other states]. 88 Those engaged in agriculture and
warfare do not seek any authority [ ch'iian ] outside themselves; those who
rescue others and defend themselves do not seek aid outside themselves; and
those who serve and support other states do not seek material resources out-
side themselves. Now if [one’s resources] are neither sufficient to go forth to
wage battle nor adequate to remain within the borders and defend the state,
one must correct [the insufficiency] with markets. Markets are the means to
provide for both offensive and defensive warfare. If a state of ten thousand
chariots lacks states of one thousand chariots to assist it, it must have mar-
kets able to furnish one hundred chariots.

“In general, executions provide the means to illuminate the martial. If by
executing one man the entire army will quake, kill him. If by rewarding 89
one man ten thousand men will rejoice, reward him. In executing, value the
great; in rewarding, value the small. If someone should be killed, then even
though he is honored and powerful, he must be executed, for this will be
punishment that reaches the pinnacle. When rewards extend down to the
cowherds and stable boys, this is rewards flowing down [to the lowest|. Now
the ability to implement punishments that reach the pinnacle, and rewards
that flow down [to the lowest], is the general’s martial charisma. Thus rulers
value their generals. 90

“Now when the commanding general takes up the drum, brandishes the
drumsticks, and approaches danger for a decisive battle so that the soldiers
meet and the naked blades clash — if he drums the advance and they respond
to wrest the victory, then he will be rewarded for his achievements and his
fame will be established. If he drums the advance but they fail, then he him-
self will die and the state will perish. For this reason survival 9 ' and extinc-
tion, security and danger all lie at the end of the drumstick! How can one not
value the general?

“Now taking up the drums and wielding the drumsticks, having the sol-
diers collide and the blades clash so that the ruler achieves great success
through military affairs I do not find to be difficult. The ancients said, ‘At-
tacking without chariots with protective covering, 92 defending without
equipment such as the caltrops, this is what is meant by an army that does
not excel at anything!’ Looking without seeing and listening without hearing
stem from the state not having markets.

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“Now markets are offices for sundry goods . 93 |The government should)
buy items which are cheap in the market and sell those that have grown ex-
pensive in order to restrain the aristocrats and people. People |on!y| eat one
ton ’’ 4 of grain, and horses eat three tou of beans, so why is it the people have
a famished look and the horses an emaciated appearance? The markets have
goods to deliver, but the office lacks a controller. Now if you raise the best-
trained army under Heaven but do not manage the sundry goods, this is not
what is referred to as ‘being able to conduct warfare.’

“[To retain men in service| straight from their mobilization to the time
when their armor and helmets have become worm infested, they must be
men whom we can employ. [This is like] a bird of prey pursuing a sparrow
which flies into a man’s arms or enters someone’s dwelling. It is not that the
bird is casting away its life, but that to the rear there is something to fear.

“When T’ai Kung Wang was seventy, he butchered cows at Ch’ao Ko and
sold food in Meng Chin. He was more than seventy years old, but the ruler
did not listen to him, and people all referred to him as a mad fellow. Then
when he met King Wen he commanded a mass of thirty thousand and with
one battle All under Heaven was settled. Without his understanding or mar-
tial plans, how could they have achieved this unification? Thus it is said, if a
good horse has a whip, a distant road can be traversed; if Worthies and men
of rank unite together, the Great Tao can be illuminated.’

“When King Wu attacked King Chou, the army forded [the Yellow River|
at Meng Chin. On the right was the king's pennant, on the left the ax of pun-
ishment, together with three hundred warriors committed to die and thirty
thousand fighting men. King Chou’s formation deployed several hundred
thousand men, with [the infamous ministers! Fei Liao and O Lai personally
leading the halberdiers and ax bearers. Their lines stretched across a hun-
dred li. King Wu did not exhaust the warriors or people, the soldiers did not
bloody their blades, but they conquered the Shang dynasty and executed
King Chou. There was nothing auspicious nor abnormal; it was merely a
case of perfecting oneself, or not perfecting oneself, in human affairs.

“Generals of the present generation investigate ‘singular days’ and ‘empty
mornings,’ divine about Hsien-ch’ih, 9 ' interpret full and disastrous days, ac-
cord with tortoise shell augury, look for the auspicious and baleful, and ob-
serve the changes of the planets, constellations, and winds — wanting to
thereby gain victory and establish their success. I view this as very difficult!

“Now the commanding general is not governed by Heaven above, con-
trolled by Earth below, nor governed by men in the middle. Thus weapons
are evil implements. Conflict is a contrary virtue. The post of general is an
office of death. Thus only when it cannot be avoided does one employ

WEI LIAO-TZU

them . 96 There is no Heaven above, no Earth below, no ruler to the rear, and
no enemy in the front. The [unified] army of one man is like the wolf and ti-
ger, like the wind and rain, like thunder and lightning. Shaking and mysteri-
ous, All under Heaven are terrified by it.

“The army that would be victorious is like water. Now water is the softest
and weakest of things, but whatever it collides with — such as hills and
mounds — will be collapsed by it for no other reason than its nature is con-
centrated and its attack is totally committed . 9 Now if one has the sharpness
of the famous sword Mo Yeh, the toughness of rhinoceros hide |for armor],
the masses of the Three Armies, and orthodox and unorthodox methods,
then under All Heaven no one can withstand him in battle.

“Thus it is said that if you raise the Worthy and employ the talented, even
if the hour and day [are not auspicious], your affairs will still be advanta-
geous. If you make the laws clear and are cautious about orders, without di-
vining with the tortoise shell or milfoil you will obtain propitious results. If
you honor achievement and nurture effort, without praying you will obtain
good fortune. It is also said that ‘the seasons of Heaven are not as good as
the advantages of Earth; the advantages of Earth are not as good as harmony
among men.’ The Sages of antiquity stressed human effort, that is all.

"When Wu Ch’i engaged Ch’in in battle, wherever he encamped the army
did not flatten the paths between the fields. Young saplings provided protec-
tive covering against the frost and dew. Why did he act like this? Because he
did not place himself higher than other men. If you want men to die, you do
not require them to perform [perfunctory acts of | respect. If you want men to
exhaust their strength, you do not hold them responsible for performing the
rites. Thus, in antiquity an officer wearing a helmet and armor did not bow,
showing people that he is not troubled by anything . 98 To annoy people yet
require them to die, to exhaust their strength, from antiquity until today has
never been heard of.

“When the commanding general receives his mandate, he forgets his fam-
ily. When he commands the army and they encamp in the field, he forgets
those close to him. When he takes up the drumsticks and drums [the ad-
vance], he forgets himself.

“When Wu Ch’i approached the time for battle, his attendants offered
their swords. Wu Ch’i said: ‘The general takes sole control of the flags and
drums, and that is all. Approaching hardship he decides what is doubtful,
controls the troops, and directs their blades. Such is the work of the general.
Bearing a single sword, that is not a general’s affair.’

“When the Three Armies have assumed formation, they should advance
for a day and |on the next day] make a forced march to complete a total of

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three days’ distance." Beyond three days' distance they should be like un-
blocking the source of a river . 100 Observing the enemy in front, one should
employ their strength. If the enemy is white, then whiten them; if they are
red, then redden them . 101

“When Wu Ch’i engaged Ch’in in battle, before the armies clashed one
man — unable to overcome his courage — went forth to slay two of the enemy
and return with their heads. Wu Ch’i immediately ordered his decapitation.
An army commander remonstrated with him, saying: ‘This is a skilled war-
rior. You cannot execute him.’ Wu Ch’i said: ‘There is no question that he is
a skilled warrior. But it is not what I ordered.’ He had him executed .” 102

9. The General as a Law Official 103

“In general, a general is an officer of the law, the ruler of the ten thousand
things. It cannot be the personal domain of one man. When it is not the per-
sonal domain of one man, the ten thousand things will all come [of them-
selves) and be governed there, the ten thousand things will all come and be
commanded there.

“The perfected man \chtin-tzu\ does not stop criminals more than five
paces away. Even though they may shoot at him with barbed arrows, he does
not pursue them. He excels at discovering the nature of a criminal’s offense.
Without relying on thorn branches, he can obtain a complete understanding
of the offender’s situation . 104

“If you flog a person’s back, brand his ribs, or compress his fingers in or-
der to question him about the nature of his offense, even a state hero could
not withstand this cruelty and would falsely implicate himself . 105

“There is a saying in our age: ‘One who has thousands of pieces of gold
will not die; one who has hundreds of pieces of gold will not suffer corporeal
punishment.’ If you listen to my techniques and try them in practice, then
even a person with the wisdom of Yao or Shun will not be able to affect a
word [of the charge against him], nor one with ten thousand pieces of gold
be able to use the smallest silver piece [to escape punishment].

“At present those in prison awaiting judgment number no less than several
tens in the smallest gaols, no less than several hundred in the middle-sized
jails, and no less than several thousand in the largest prisons. Ten men entan-
gle one hundred men in their affairs; one hundred men drag in one thousand;
and one thousand trap ten thousand. Those that have become entangled are
parents and brothers; next relatives by marriage; and next those who are ac-
quaintances and old friends. For this reason the farmers all leave their occu-
pations in the fields, the merchants depart from their stores, and the officials

WEI LIAO-TZU

leave their posts . 106 These good people have all been dragged in because of
the nature of our criminal proceedings. The Art of War says: ‘When an army
of ten thousand goes forth, its daily expense is a thousand pieces of gold .’ 10
Now when there are ten thousand good people thus entangled and impris-
oned, yet the ruler is unable to investigate the situation — I take it to be dan-
gerous!”

10. The Source of Offices

“Bureaucratic offices are the means to control affairs and [are) the founda-
tion of administration. Regulations which divide the people into four groups
according to their occupations are the parameters of administration . 108
Honor, rank, riches, and salaries must be appropriately determined for they
are the embodiment of nobility and humbleness. Treating the good well and
punishing the evil, rectifying the laws for organizing the people, and collect-
ing taxes and impositions are implements for governing the people. 101 ' Mak-
ing land distributions equitable and restraining taxes and other impositions
on the people provide measure to what is levied and bestowed. Regulating
the artisans and [ordering] the preparation of implements for use is the con-
tribution of the master artisans . 110 Dividing the territory and occupying the
strategic points is the work of eliminating oddities and stopping licentious-
ness. Preserving the laws, investigating affairs, and making decisions are the
roles of subordinates. Illuminating the laws and examining their application
are functions of the ruler. Illuminating the duties of the bureaucrats, setting
responsibilities as light or heavy — these fall under the authority [cb’tian] of
the ministers and ruler . 111

“Making rewards and bestowals clear, being strict in executing and pun-
ishing are methods for stopping evil. Being cautious about opening and clos-
ing and preserving the single Tao are the essentials of government . 112 When
[information] from below reaches to high and [the concerns of | high pene-
trate to below, this is the most sensitive of perceptions. By knowing the ex-
tent of the state’s resources, you can plan to use the surplus . 113 Knowing the
weakness of others is [the way] to embody strength; knowing the movements
of others is [the way] to determine quietness . 114 Offices are divided into the
civil and the martial, and only the ruler exercises power over both.

“The ceremonial vessels are all regulated for the Son of Heaven’s convoca-
tion. When itinerant persuaders and spies have no means [to gain entrance),
this is the technique for rectifying discussions. The feudal lords have their
rites for honoring the Son of Heaven, and rulers and their people — genera-
tion after generation — continue to acknowledge the king’s mandate [ to rule].

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WEI LIAO-TZU

261

If someone changes or creates new rites, alters what is normal, or contra-
venes the king’s illustrious Virtue, then in accord with the li (rites) the king
can attack them . 115

“Officials with no affairs to administer, a ruler without rank or rewards
(that need to be| bestowed, a populace without criminal cases or lawsuits, a
state without traders or merchants' l6 — how perfected the king’s rule! What I
have so clearly proposed should be well heeded by your Majesty.”

1 1. Governing the Foundation

In general, what is the Way to govern men? I say that without the five
grains" you have nothing to fill their stomachs, without silk and hemp
nothing to cover their form. Thus to fill their stomachs there are grains, and
t° cover their form there is thread. Husbands work at weeding and plowing,
wives at weaving. If the people do not have secondary occupations, then
there will be goods accumulated in the storehouses. The men should not en-
grave nor make decorative carving; the women should not embroider nor do
decorative stitching.

“|Carved| wooden vessels emit secretions, |engraved| metal utensils smell
offensive. The Sage drinks from an earthen | vessel | and eats from an earthen
| vessel | . Thus when clay is formed to make utensils there is no waste under
Heaven. Today Ipeople think) the nature of metal and wood is not cold for
they embroider their clothes |with thcm|. The original nature of horses and
oxen is to eat grass and drink water, but they give them beans and grains.
This is governing which has lost its foundation, and it would be appropriate
to establish regulations to control it.

“If in the spring and summer the men go out to the southern fields, and in
the fall and winter the women work at weaving cloth, the people will not be
impoverished. Today, when their short, coarse clothing does not even cover
their bodies nor the dregs of wine and husks of grain fill their stomachs, |the
foundation) of government has been lost.

"In antiquity the land was not (classified) as fertile or barren, the people
were not (classified! as diligent or lazy. How could the ancients have attained
this, how could we have lost it now? The men do not finish plowing their
fields, the women daily break their shuttles, so how could they not be hungry
and cold? Probably, the administration of the ancients was fully effected,
while that of today stops | before thorough implementation).

“Now what I term ’governing well’ means causing the people not to have
any selfish interests. If the people do not have selfish interests, then All under
Heaven will be one family. In the absence of private plowing and weaving,
they will suffer the cold together, they will experience hunger together. Then

even if they have ten sons they will not have (the expense of] even an extra
bowl of rice, while if they have one son their expenses will not be reduced by
even one bowl. Thus where would there be any clamoring and drunken in-
dulgence to ruin the good people?

“When the people stimulate each other to frivolity and extravagance, the
misfortunes of the desiring mind and of the competition to seize (things]
arise. Perversity begins with one fellow, and then the people seek to selfishly
accumulate some extra food and have some stored wealth. If the people then
commit a single offense and you arrest them and impose corporeal punish-
ments to control them, how is one acting as the ruler of the people? Those
that excel at governing take hold of the regulations, causing the people not
to have any selfish interests. When those below do not dare to be selfish,
there will not be any who commit evil.

“Return to the foundation, accord with principle, have all issue forth from
one Tao, and then the desiring mind will be eliminated. Competition will be
stopped, the jails will be empty, the fields full, and the grains plentiful. You
will settle the people and embrace the distant. Then outside your borders
there will not be any difficulty under Heaven, while within the state there
will be neither violence nor turbulence. This is the perfection of administra-
tion.

“The azure sky — no one knows its extremity! Of the ancient emperors and
Sage kings, who should be your model? Ages that have passed cannot be re-
gained, future ages cannot be awaited. Seek them in yourself.

“There are four qualities for one referred to as the Son of Heaven: ‘Spiri-
tual enlightenment,’ ‘display of brilliance ,’" 8 ‘vast discourse,’" 1 ' and ‘being
without enemies.’ These are the aspects of the Son of Heaven.

“Wild animals are not used for sacrificial offerings, miscellaneous studies
do not make a scholar of attainment. Today people say: ‘The hundred li of
the sea cannot quench one man’s (uncontrolled) thirst; a spring three feet
deep can slake the thirst of the Three Armies.’ I say: ‘Desire is born from lack
of measure, perversity is born from lacking prohibitions.’ The highest ruler
transforms in spiritlike fashion, the next relies on things, the lowest relies on
not taking the people away from their seasonal work nor seizing the people’s
wealth. Now prohibitions must be completed through the martial, rewards
must be completed through the civil.”

12. Tactical Balance of Power in Warfare

“The Art of War 120 states: ‘One thousand men provide the means to exercise
the tactical balance of power \ch'uan], ten thousand men constitute martial
prowess. If you apply the force of tactical power to the enemy first, he will

WEI LIAO-TZU

not be able to commit in strength. If you apply martial prowess first, the en-
emy will not be able to engage you with his full awesomeness.’ Thus the
army values being first. If it is victorious in this, then it will conquer the en-
emy. If it is not victorious in this, then it will not conquer them.

“Now when we go, they come; when we come, they go. These mutually
produce victory and defeat. The pattern of battle is thus.

“Now essential sincerity lies in spiritual enlightenment. The tactical bal-
ance of power [ch’tian | lies in the extremities of the Tao. If you have some-
thing, pretend not to have it; if you lack something, appear to have it . 121
Then how can the enemy trust the appearance?

“The reason the Former Kings are still heard about is that they entrusted
the upright with responsibility and eliminated the deceitful. They always
preserved their benevolent and congenial hearts but were decisive, without
delaying, in effecting punishments. One who understands the Tao of War-
fare will invariably first plan against the defeats which arise from not know-
ing where to stop. Why must one always advance to be successful? If you ad-
vance too lightly and seek to engage the enemy in battle, should they — on the
contrary — plan to stop your going forth, the enemy will control the victory.
Thus the Art of War says: ‘If they seek us, pursue them; when you see them,
attack. When the aggressors dare not oppose us, press the attack, and they
will inevitably lose their tactical power .’ 122

“Those from whom (the initiative] has been taken have no ch’i; those who
are afraid are unable to mount a defense; those who have suffered defeat
have no men. 12 ' They are all cases of an army lacking the Tao |of the mili-
tary]. When you decide to go forth and have no doubts, then follow your
plan. When you rob the enemy |of his plans] and still no one confronts you,
press the attack home. If you can see clearly and occupy the high ground,
then overawe them |into submission]. This is the pinnacle of the Tao of the
military.

“Those who are unguarded in their discussion can be clandestinely lis-
tened to. Those who come forth to insult and taunt |your forces] without
proper discipline can be destroyed. Those whose attack is like water rushing
forth, like lightning striking can throw their army into chaos . 124 You must
settle those [of your troops who are] in crisis, eliminate their worries, and de-
cide matters through wisdom. Be superior to the enemy through discussions
in the court; be more majestic and severe than they through discussions on
bestowing the mandate [of command]; and arouse their fighting spirit
through discussions of crossing the enemy’s borders . 125 Then the enemy state
can be forced to submit without fighting.”

13. Orders for Severe Punishments

“If a general commanding one thousand men or more retreats from battle,
surrenders his defenses, or abandons his terrain and deserts his troops, he is
termed a ‘state brigand.’ He should be executed, his family exterminated, his
name expunged from the registers, his ancestral graves broken open, his
bones exposed in the marketplace, and his male and female children pressed
into government servitude. If the commander of one hundred or more men
retreats from battle, surrenders his defenses, or abandons his terrain and des-
erts his troops, he is termed an ‘army brigand.’ He should be executed, his
family exterminated, and his male and female children pressed into govern-
ment servitude.

“If you cause the people to fear heavy punishments within the state, then
outside the state they will regard the enemy lightly. Thus the Former Kings
made the regulations and measures clear before making their awesomeness
and punishments heavy. When punishments are heavy, then they will fear
them within the state. When they fear them within the state, then they will be
stalwart outside it.”

14. Orders for the Squads of Five

“Within the army the regulations for organization should be as follows: Five
men comprise a squad of five, with all the members being mutually responsi-
ble for each other. Ten men comprise a double squad of ten, with all the
members being mutually responsible for each other. Fifty men compose a
platoon, with all the members being mutually responsible for each other.
One hundred men comprise a company, with all the members being mutu-
ally responsible for each other.

“If a member of the squad of five violates an order or commits an offense,
should the others report it their punishment will be remitted. If they know
about it but do not report it, then the entire squad will be punished. If a
member of the double squad of ten violates an order or commits an offense,
should the others report it their punishment will be remitted. If they know
about it but do not report it, then the entire double squad will be punished. If
a member of a platoon violates an order or commits an offense, should the
others report it their punishment will be remitted. If they know about it but
do not report it, then the entire platoon will be punished. If a member of a
company violates an order or commits an offense, should the others report it

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their punishment will be remitted. If they know about it but do not expose
him, the entire company will be punished.

“All the officers-from the level of the double squad often up to the gener-
als of the right and left, superiors and inferiors— are mutually responsible
tor each other. If someone violates an order or commits an offense, those that
report it will be spared from punishment, while those who know about it but
do not report it will all share the same offense.

“Now when the [members of the) squads of five and ten are mutually
bonded and the upper and lower ranks mutually linked, no perversity will
remain undiscovered, no offense will remain unreported. Fathers will not be
able to cover for their sons, older brothers will not be able to conceal their
younger brothers. How much less so will the people of the state, living and
eating together, be able to violate orders and conceal each other?”

15. Orders for Segmenting
and Blocking Off Terrain

“The Central, Left, Right, Forward, and Rear armies all have their seg-
mented terrain— each surrounded on all four sides by temporary walls—
with no passage or communication among them permitted.

“The general has his segmented terrain; the regimental commander has his
segmented terrain; and the company 126 commander has his segmented ter-
rain. They should all construct ditches and sluices and make the orders
blocking [communications! explicit so that it is impossible for someone who
is not a member of [the company of| one hundred to pass through. If some-
one who is not a member [of the company| of one hundred enters, then the
commander should execute him. 12 ' If he fails to execute him, he will share
the offense with him.

Along the roads crisscrossing the encampment, set up administrative
posts - every 120 paces. Measure the men and the terrain. The road posts
should be within sight of each other. Prohibit crossing over the roads and
clear them. If a soldier does not have a tally or token issued by a general or
other commanding officer, he cannot pass through. Wood gatherers, fodder
seekers, and animal herders all form and move in squads of five. If they are
not moving in squads of five, they cannot cross through. If an officer does not
have a token, if the soldiers arc not in squads of five, [the guards| at the
crossing gates should execute them. If anyone oversteps the demarcation
lines, execute him. Thus if within the army no one contravenes orders nor vi-

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265

dates the prohibitions, then without there will not be any perversity that is
not caught.”

16. Orders for Binding the Squads of Five

"The orders which bind the squad of five state: ‘Five men comprise the squad
of five. They collectively receive a tally from command headquarters. If | in
battle) they lose men but capture |or kill | an equivalent number of the enemy,
they negate each other. If they capture members of an enemy squad without
losing anyone themselves, they will be rewarded. If they lose members with-
out capturing [or killing] equal numbers of the enemy, they will be killed and
their families exterminated.

“ if they lose their squad leader but capture a squad leader, the two negate
each other. If they capture a squad leader without losing their own, they will
be rewarded. If they lose their squad leader without capturing an enemy
squad leader, they will be killed and their families exterminated. However, if
they rejoin the battle and take the head of a squad leader, then their punish-
ment will be lifted.

“if they lose their general but capture [or kill | one, the two negate each
other. If they capture a general without losing their own, they will be re-
warded. If they lose their general and do not kill an enemy general, they
should be considered according to the Law for Abandoning Their Positions
and Fleeing.' l2v

“The Law for Battlefield F.xecutions states: ‘The leader of a double squad
of ten can execute the other nine. A company commander can execute the
double squad leaders. The general of one thousand men can execute com-
pany commanders. The general of ten thousand men can execute the general
of one thousand men. The generals of the Armies of the Left and Right can
execute the generals of ten thousand men. The Grand General has no one he
cannot execute.’"

1 7. Orders for Regulating the Troops

“To regulate the troops, employ the orders for regulating them to segment
them into three |armies[. The Army of the Left will have green flags, and the
troops will wear green feathers. 130 The Army of the Right will have white
flags, and the troops will wear white feathers. The Central Army will have
yellow flags, and the troops will wear yellow feathers.

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267

“The troops will have five emblems: The front line will have green em-
blems, the second row red emblems, the third row yellow emblems, the
fourth row white emblems, and the fifth row black emblems.

“The next (rulej for regulating the troops is that anyone who loses his em-
blem will be executed. The first five lines place their emblems on their heads,
the next five lines place their emblems on their necks, the next five on their
chests, the next five on their stomachs, and the last five on their waists . 131 In
this fashion it will never happen that the troops will have someone other
than their own officers nor officers other than their own troops. If someone
sees a case where it is incorrect but does not inquire about it, or sees confu-
sion but does not act to stop it, the crime will be comparable to that of the
offender.

“When the drums sound for (the troops] to move and engage in battle,
those lines that move forward confront the danger, while those that retreat
to the rear are reviled by the people. Those who venture forward past the five
lines will be rewarded; those that race past the five lines to the rear will be ex-
ecuted. By this means it can be known that advancing and retreating, moving
to the fore and rear are achievements of the commanders . 132 Thus it is said:
'If you beat the drum and they advance like a thunderclap, they move like the
wind and rain, no one will dare oppose you to the fore, no one will dare fol-
low you to the rear.’ This speaks about having regulations.”

1 8. Orders for Restraining the Troops

“Gongs, drums, bells, and flags — these four each have their methods of em-
ployment. When the drums sound, the army should advance; when the
drums arc beat again, they should attack. When the gongs sound, they
should stop; when the gongs are struck again, they should withdraw. Bells
arc used to transmit orders. When the flags point to the left, |the army
should] go left; when the flags point to the right, then to the right. Unortho-
dox units are the opposite . 133

“Beat the drum once and the left (foot steps forward]; beat it again and the
right | foot advances ]. 134 If for each step there is one beat, this is the pace
beat. If for ten steps there is one beat, this is the quickstep beat. If the sound
is unbroken, this is the racing beat. The shang note is that of the general’s
drum. The chiao note is that of a regimental commander’s drum. The small
drum is that of a company commander. When the three drums sound to-
gether the generals, regimental commanders, and company commanders are
all of one mind. The unorthodox army is the opposite of this.

“If a drummer misses a beat he is executed. Those that set up a clamor are
executed. Those that do not obey the gongs, drums, bells, and flags but move
by themselves are executed.

“When combat methods are taught to one hundred men, after their in-
struction is complete unite them [with other companies] to comprise one
thousand men . 135 When the instruction of one thousand men is complete,
unite them [with other regiments] to comprise ten thousand. When the in-
struction of (the armies of] ten thousand is complete, assemble them into the
Three Armies. When the masses of the Three Armies can divide and unite,
they can execute the methods of large-scale combat. When their instruction
is complete, test them with maneuvers.

“In a square formation they are victorious; in a circular formation they are
also victorious; in a jagged array they are also victorious; and if they encoun-
ter difficult terrain they will also emerge victorious. If the enemy is in the
mountains, climb up after him. If the enemy is in the depths, plunge in after
him. Seek the enemy as if searching for a lost child, follow him without any
doubt. In this way you will be able to defeat the enemy and control his fate.

“Now one must make decisions early and determine plans beforehand. If
plans are not first determined, if intentions are not decided early, then nei-
ther advancing nor retreating will be ordered. When doubts arise defeat is
certain. Thus an orthodox army values being first; an unorthodox army
values being afterward. Sometimes being first, sometimes being afterward —
(this is the way| to control the enemy. Generals throughout the ages who
have not known this method, after receiving their commission to go for-
ward, were first to launch an attack — relying on courage alone. There were
none who were not defeated.

“Their actions seem hesitant but are not; their movements seem to be con-
fident but are not; their movement is at times slow, at times rapid, but is nei-
ther slow nor rapid. These three present entanglements in battle.”

1 9. Orders for the General

“When the commanding general is about to receive his commission, the ruler
must first discuss military strategy in the ancestral temple, then issue the or-
der in the court. The ruler personally grants the fu and yiieh axes to the gen-
eral , 136 saying: ‘The Left, Right, and Central armies have their separate re-
sponsibilities. If anyone oversteps the bounds of their responsibility to seek
the intercession of higher ranks, he shall be put to death. Within the army
there cannot be two (sources of] orders. Anyone who issues a second order

WEI LIAO-TZU

shall be executed. Anyone who delays the implementation of an order shall
be executed. Anyone who disobeys an order shall be executed.’

“The General of the Army makes the announcement: ‘To those about to go
out beyond the gates of the state [capital], the time [for assembling] is set as
midday. Within the encampment we shall set up a gnomon and place it at the
axle gate. Those who arrive past the designated time will be subject to the
provisions of the law .’ 11

“When the General of the Army has entered the encampment, he closes the
gate and has the streets cleared. Anyone that dares to travel through them
will be executed. Anyone that dares to talk in a loud voice will be executed.
Those that do not follow orders will be executed.”

20. Orders for the Vanguard

“What is referred to as ‘the vanguard ’ 1,8 moves off from the main force
about one hundred li, assembling at a designated place and an appointed
time. It carries a three-day [supply of| prepared food. It moves in front of the
main army. Pennants are made for uniting to engage in battle . 139 Then when
a pennant for engaging in battle is raised , 140 the vanguard feasts its sol-
diers 141 and has them deploy into a strategic configuration of power \shih]
for battle. They are referred to as ‘racing to battle.’

“The advance army moves in front of the vanguard. When the pennant for
engaging in battle is raised, it moves off from the main force double the [van-
guard’s) distance — about one hundred li ahead of the vanguard — assembling
at a designated place and time. They carry a six-day [supply of| prepared
food. They are ordered to prepare for the battle and deploy troops to occupy
the strategic positions. If the battle turns to the [army’s] advantage, they pur-
sue the retreating enemy; if the forces are stalemated, they race into [the ene-
my |. If the vanguard encounters anyone who has turned back, they should
execute him. What are termed the ‘armies of the various generals,’ consisting
of four unorthodox forces , 142 will wrest victory.

“The army has its squads of ten and five and |the methods of] dividing and
reuniting. Before [engaging in battle] duties are assigned, and designated
units should occupy the strategic locations, passes, and bridges. When the
pennant for uniting to engage in battle is raised, they should all assemble.
The main army sets out with a fixed daily ration and their combat equip-
ment all complete. The orders are issued and they move; anyone who does
not follow orders is executed.

“Now determine and assign forces to the strategic points within the four
borders of the state. After the advance army and vanguard have already set

out, the people within the borders are not able to move about. Those who
have received the king’s commands, who have been given and carry the
proper tallies and tokens are called ‘officers acting in accord with their du-
ties.’ Officers who are not acting in accord with their duties but yet move
about should be executed. When the pennant for uniting to engage in battle
is raised, these officers — acting in accord with their duties — travel about and
are employed to ensure that affairs are mutually regulated . 143 Accordingly,
one who wants to wage warfare must first secure the interior.”

2 1 . Military Instructions I

“Orders for instructing the soldiers: Disperse them to their encampments,
and have them assume formation. Those who advance or retreat contrary to
orders should be punished for the crime of contravening instructions.

“The front lines are instructed (by the commander of| the front lines; the
rear lines are instructed [by the commander of] the rear lines; the lines to the
left are instructed | by the commander of] the lines on the left; the lines to the
right arc instructed |by the commander of] the lines to the right. When all
five men [in a line] have been successfully instructed, their squad leader is re-
warded. Failing to successfully instruct all of them will result in | being pun-
ished! as though one had committed the crime of contravening instruc-
tions . 144 If someone who has fallen ill 143 brings it to the attention of the
squad by himself and the squad members jointly report it, they will be spared
from punishment.

“In general, when the squad of five assumes formation for battle, if one of
the men does not advance and face death at the enemy, his instructor [will be
punished] as if he had committed the crime of contravening the law. The
double squad of ten guarantees the ten men within it. If they lose a man and
the other nine men do not fight to the death in a desperate battle with the en-
emy, then their instructor [will be punished] as if he had committed the crime
of contravening the law. From the double squad up to the subordinate gener-
als, if anyone does not follow the laws, their instructors | will be punished| as
if they had committed the crime of contravening the law. In general, to make
punishments and fines clear and incentives and rewards correct, they must
fall within the laws for instructing the soldiers.

“Generals have different flags, companies have different emblems. The
Army of the Left wears their emblems on the left shoulder; the Army of the
Right wears their emblems on the right shoulder; the Central Army wears
their emblems on the front of the chest. Record their emblems as ‘a certain
armored soldier’ and ‘a certain officer.’ From front to rear, for |each platoon

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of] five lines the most honored emblems are placed on the head, the others
accordingly lower and lower . 146

"The squad leader instructs the other four men using a board as a drum, a
piece of tile as a gong, and a branch as a flag. When he strikes the drum they
should advance; when he lowers the flag they should race forward; when he
strikes the gong they should withdraw. When he points (left| they should go
to the left; when he points [right] they should go to the right. When the gongs
and drums are struck together they should sit.

“When the squad leader has completed instructing the squad, they should
be united |with another squad] under a leader for a double squad of ten.
When the double squad leader has completed instructing them, they should
be united under a platoon commander. When the platoon commander has
completed instructing them, they should be united under a company com-
mander. When the company commander has completed instructing them,
they should be united under an army commandant . 147 When the army com-
mandant has completed instructing them, they should be united under a sub-
ordinate general. When the subordinate general has completed instructing
them, they should be united under the commanding general.

“When the commanding general has completed instructing them, he has
them deploy into formation in the countryside. He sets up three large posts,
one every hundred paces, and has the formation move away from them.
They advance one hundred paces and practice weaponry . 148 They quickstep
for a hundred paces and then race for another hundred paces. They practice
battle tactics in order to attain the measure |set by the general |. Afterward,
rewards and punishments should be implemented.

“From the commandant down, every officer has a flag. When the battle
has been won, in each case look at the rank of the flags that have been cap-
tured in order to stimulate their hearts with clear rewards . 149

“Victory in war lies in establishing awesomcness. Establishing awesome-
ness lies in uniting strength . 150 Uniting strength lies in rectifying punish-
ments. By rectifying punishments rewards are illuminated.

“Today if the people turn their backs to the border gates and decide the is-
sue of life and death, if they have been taught to die without hesitation there
is a reason . 151 (Training and instructions] have caused the defenders to inevi-
tably be solid; those engaged in battle to inevitably fight; perverse plans not
to be put into action; perverse people not to speak; orders to be effected
without any changes; the army to advance without doubt; and the light units
to be like a clap of thunder— to rush at the enemy like the terrified. Raise
those of merit, distinguish those of virtue, making their distinction as clear as
black and white. Cause the people to follow the orders of their superiors just
as the four limbs respond to the mind.

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271

“If the forward units break up the enemy’s ranks, throw his formation into
chaos, and crush his hardness like water bursting through, there is a basis for
it. This is termed the ‘army’s instructions.’ They provide the means to open
sealed borders, preserve the altars of state, eliminate disaster and harm, and
complete Martial Virtue.”

22. Military Instructions II

"I have heard that a ruler of men must attain the Tao of certain victory. Thus
to be able to unite others and become expansive and great, to unify the ordi-
nances and regulations and have his awesomeness prevail in the world, there
are twelve essential matters:

“The first is called ‘connected punishment’ and refers to the method of
joint criminal responsibility for all members of the squad of five.

“The second is ‘terrain restrictions,’ which refers to prohibiting and stop-
ping passage along the roads in order to ensnare external, perverse forces.

“The third, ‘preserving the chariots ,’ 152 refers to the chariot commanders
and infantry leaders being mutually dependent, the three [officers in the
chariot] and the squads of five being cohesive in order to bind them together.

“The fourth, ‘opening and plugging up,’ 1 ” refers to dividing the terrain
with boundaries and having each man die performing his appointed func-
tion, securely defending his position.

“The fifth, ‘demarking boundaries,’ refers to the left and right restraining
each other, front and rear awaiting each other, and a wall of chariots creating
a solid defense in order to oppose the enemy and stop [them ]. 154

“The sixth, ‘commands are distinguished,’ refers to the forward rows con-
centrating on advancing, thereby being distinguished from those in the rear
who are not able to compete to be the first to ascend 155 nor overstep their po-
sitions.

“The seventh, ‘five emblems,’ refers to distinguishing the rows |with em-
blems] so that the troops will not be disordered . 156

“The eighth, ‘preserving the units,’ refers to the units breaking up and fol-
lowing each other, each having their appointed sections.

“The ninth, ‘gongs and drums,’ refers to stimulating them to achievement
and compelling them to virtue.

“The tenth, ‘arraying the chariots,’ refers to making the formation tight,
with the spears deployed to the front , 15 and putting blinders on the horses’
eyes.

“The eleventh, ‘warriors of death,’ refers to selecting the talented and
wise 158 from among masses of the army to ride in the war chariots. They race

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forward and back, across and about, using unorthodox tactics to gain mas-
tery over the enemy.

The twelfth, strong troops,’ refers to regulating the flags 159 and preserv-
ing the units. Without the flags [signaling an order], they do not move.

When the instructions for these twelve have been successfully taught,
anyone who contravenes an order should not be pardoned. If the army is
weak, they will be able to strengthen it. If a ruler is unknown, they will be
able to honor him. If orders become enervated, they will be able to revitalize
them. If the people become migrants, they will be able to attract them. If the
people arc numerous, they will be able to govern them. If the territory is vast,
they will be able to defend it. Without the state’s chariots crossing the thresh-
olds nor the variegated armor being taken out of the storage bags, your awe-
someness will cause All under Heaven to submit.

“Soldiers have five defining commitments : 160 For their general they forget
their families; when they cross the border they forget their relatives; when
they confront the enemy they forget themselves; when they are committed to
die they will live; urgently seeking victory is the lowest. One hundred men
willing to suffer the pain of a blade can penetrate a line and cause chaos in a
formation. One thousand men willing to suffer the pain of a blade can seize
the enemy and kill its general. Ten thousand men willing to suffer the pain of
a blade can transverse under Heaven at will.”

King Wu asked T’ai Rung Wang: “In a short time 161 I want to exhaustively
attain the essentials of employing men.” Wang replied: “Your rewards should
be like mountains, your punishments like valleys. The supreme makes no er-
rors, the next corrects his mistakes . 162 Now anyone who, when about to be
punished, requests that he not be punished should die. Anyone who, when
about to be rewarded, requests that he not be rewarded should die. 16 ’
“Attack a country according to its changes . 164 Display riches in order to
observe their poverty. Display exhaustion in order to observe their illness. If
the ruler is immoral and the people disaffected, in cases such as these one has
a basis for attack.

“In general, whenever about to mobilize the army, you must first investi-
gate the strategic balance of power \ch’iian\ both within and without the
borders in order to calculate whether to mount a campaign. [You must
know| whether the army is well prepared or suffers from inadequacies,
whether there is a surplus or shortage of foodstuffs. You must determine the
routes for advancing and returning. Only thereafter can you mobilize the
army to attack the chaotic and be certain of being able to enter his state.

“If the territory is vast but the cities small, you must first occupy their
land. If the cities are large but the land narrow, you must first attack their cit-

WEI LIAO-TZU

ies. If the country is vast and the populace few, then isolate their strategic
points. If the land is confined but the people numerous, then construct high
mounds in order to overlook them. Do not destroy their material profits nor
seize the people’s agricultural seasons. Be magnanimous toward his govern-
ment |officials[, stabilize [the people’s] occupations, and provide relief for
their impoverished for then [your Virtue| will be sufficient to overspread All
under Heaven.

“Today warring states attack each other and mount large-scale assaults on
the virtuous. From the squads to the platoons, from the platoons to the
army, none have unified orders. They cause the people to have unsettled
minds; they only incline toward arrogance and extravagance. Their plans are
calamities; they are constantly involved in disputes, so the officers spend
their time investigating matters. These are entanglements and moreover
bring about defeat. Even after the sun has set the road remains long, and
when [the soldiers) return to camp they are dispirited. The army is old, the
general covetous. Since he will fight to seize material gains, he is easily de-
feated.

“When the general is light, the fortifications low, and the people’s minds
unstable, they can be attacked. If the general is weighty and the fortifications
are high but the masses are afraid, they can be encircled. In general, when-
ever you encircle someone you must provide them with a prospect for some
minor advantage, causing them to become weaker day by day . 165 Then the
defenders will be forced to reduce their rations until they have nothing to
eat. When their masses fight with each other at night, they are terrified. If the
masses avoid their work, they have become disaffected . 166 If they just wait
for others to come and rescue them and when the time for battle arrives they
are tense, they have all lost their will 167 and are dispirited. Dispirit defeats an
army; distorted plans defeat a state.”

23. Army Orders' 68 1

“Weapons are inauspicious implements. Conflict is a contrary Virtue . 169 All
affairs must have their foundation. Therefore when a true king attacks the
brutal and chaotic, he takes benevolence and righteousness as the founda-
tion for it. [At the present time] the warring states then establish their awe-
someness, resist their enemies, and plot against each other. Thus they cannot
abandon their armies.

“The military takes the martial as its trunk, and takes the civil as its
seed . 170 It makes the martial its exterior, and the civil the interior. One who
can investigate and fathom the two will know victory and defeat. The civil is

274

WEI LIAO-TZU

the means to discern benefit and harm, to discriminate security and danger.
The martial is the means to contravene a strong enemy, to forcefully attack
and defend.

“One who is unified will be victorious ; 1 1 one who is beset by dissension
will be defeated. When formations are tight they are solid; when the front is
dispersed it can attain its [objectives ]. 1 2 One whose troops fear their general
far more than the enemy will be victorious. One whose troops fear the en-
emy far more than their general will be defeated. Thus to know who will be
victorious, who defeated, weight your general with the enemy. The enemy
and your general are like a steelyard and balance. If [the general| is settled
and quiet, [the troops| are well-ordered; if he is brutal and hasty, they are in
chaos . 173

“Sending troops forth and deploying the army have standard orders; the
dispersal and density of the lines and squads have standard methods; and ar-
raying the rows from front to rear has its appropriateness and suitability.
Standard orders are not employed when pursuing a fleeing enemy or sud-
denly striking a city. If the front and rear are disordered, then [the army]
loses [its integrity). If anyone causes confusion among the lines, behead him.

“The standard deployment for formations is always facing toward the en-
emy. There are also internally oriented formations, externally oriented for-
mations, standing formations, and sitting formations. Internally oriented
formations provide the means to preserve the center; externally oriented for-
mations provide the means to prepare against external threats. Standing for-
mations arc the means to move, sitting formations the means to stop. Mixed
formations — with some soldiers standing, others sitting — respond to each
other in accord with the need to move or stop, with the general being in the
middle. The weapons of the seated soldiers are the sword and ax; the weap-
ons of the standing soldiers are the spear-tipped halberd and crossbow; the
general also occupies the middle.

“Those who excel at repulsing the enemy first join battle with orthodox
troops, then fuse unorthodox ones] to control them. This is the technique for
certain victory.

“Array the fu and yiieh axes [for punishment|, make a display of the em-
blems and flags [used as rewards). Those who have merit must be rewarded;
those who contravene orders must die. The preservation or destruction of
the state and the life or death of the soldiers lie at the tips of the [general’s]
drumsticks. Even though there are those under Heaven who excel at com-
manding armies, no one will be able to repulse them.

“Before arrows have been shot and cross in flight, before the long blades
have clashed, those who yell out first are termed ‘vacuous,’ those who yell

WEI LIAO-TZU

275

out afterward are termed ‘substantial,’ and those who do not yell are termed
‘secretive.’ ‘Vacuous’ and ‘substantial’ are the embodiment of warfare.”

24. Army Orders 17 " II

“Units are dispatched from the main army to undertake advance prep-
arations for defense. They should set up observation posts along the borders
every three to five //. When they hear that the main army is making
preparations to advance, mount a defense, and engage in battle, they should
prohibit all movement in order to provide security to the state.

“When troops from the interior are about to set out for border duty, have
the commanding officer provide them with their flags, drums, halberds, and
armor. On the day for issuing forth, anyone who arrives after the command-
ing officer has gone out beyond the district border shall be liable for the law
for late arrival for border duty.

“The term of border duty for a soldier is one year. Anyone who leaves be-
fore being replaced shall be punished analogously to the law for deserting
the army. If his parents, wife, or children know about it, they will share the
crime with him. If they do not know about it, pardon them.

“If a soldier arrives at the headquarters of the Grand General a day after
his commanding officer, his parents, wife, and children should all share the
crime with him. If a soldier abandons his post to return home for a day and
his parents, wife, or children do not arrest [him), hold him, or report it, they
should also share the crime with him.

“If they should lose their commanding officer in battle, or if their com-
manding officer should abandon his troops and flee by himself, behead them
all. If a forward officer should abandon his troops and flee, any officer to the
rear who is able to kill him and reassemble his troops should be rewarded.
Anyone [among such troops) who has not achieved merit within the army
must serve three years at the border . 175

“If the Three Armies engage in a major battle and the Grand General dies,
all of the subordinate officers commanding units of more than five hundred
men who were not able to fight to the death with the enemy should be be-
headed. All the troops near to the commanding general, on the left and right
in [protective) formation, should be beheaded. As for the remaining officers
and men in the army, those who have military merit should be reduced one
grade. Those who do not have military merit should be rescripted to three
years’ border duty.

“If the squad of five loses a man in battle, or if a squad member dies in bat-
tle but they do not retrieve his corpse, then take away all the merit of all his

276

WEI LIAO-TZU

squad members. If they retrieve his corpse, then their crimes should all be
pardoned.

“The army’s advantage and disadvantage lie with name and substance [co-
hering throughout] the state. Today if a person’s name appears as holding a
particular [military) office but in reality he is at home, then the office has not
gained the substance [of his presence), and the household has not gained the
[registration of| his name. When troops are assembled to compose an army,
it will have an empty name without substance. Outside the state it will be in-
adequate to repel enemies, while within the borders it will be inadequate to
defend the state. This is the way in which the army becomes insufficient, in
which the general has his awesomeness taken away.

“I believe that when soldiers abandon their units and return home, the
other members of their squad in the same barracks and their officers should
be punished for taking their rations for their own consumption, [the desert-
crs’l names being shown as the army’s substance. Thus a person is nominally
with the army, but in reality double the ration is expended . 176 The resources
of the state are then empty, and the harvests of the people are naturally ex-
hausted. How can the disaster of defeat be avoided?

"Today if they are stopped from returning home by the laws, this prevents
the loss of an army and is the first military victory. When the squads of five
and ten are mutually bound to the point that in battle the troops and officers
will aid each other, this is the second military victory. If the general is able to
establish his awesomeness, the soldiers to master and follow their instruc-
tions, while the commands and orders are clear and trusted, and attacking
and defending are both properly executed, this is the third military victory.

“I have heard that in antiquity those who excelled in employing the army
could [bear to| kill 1 half of their officers and soldiers. The next could kill
thirty percent and the lowest ten percent. The awesomeness of one who
could sacrifice half of his troops affected all within the Four Seas. The
strength of one who could sacrifice thirty percent could be applied to the feu-
dal lords. The orders of one who could sacrifice ten percent would be imple-
mented among his officers and troops. Thus I say that a mass of a hundred
ten thousands that does not follow orders is not as good as ten thousand
men who fight. Ten thousand men who fight are not as good as one hundred
men who are truly aroused.

“When rewards are like the sun and moon, credibility is like the four sea-
sons, orders are like the fu and yiieh axes, and regulations are as [sharp as
the famous sword | Kan-chiang, I have never heard of officers and troops not
following orders!”

Three
Strategies
of Huang
Shih-kung

Translator’s Introduction, 281

Superior Strategy

292

Middle Strategy

300

III

Inferior Strategy

303

Translator's Introduction

Origin of the Three Strategies

Popular Chinese tradition has historically attributed three military writ-
ings— the Six Secret Teachings, the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung,
and the esoteric Yin Fu ( Hidden Symbols) — to the famous general, strategist,
and political thinker Chiang Shang, best known as the T’ai Rung. As with
most ancient Chinese works there are numerous problems with the text of
the Three Strategies and the usual questions about its authenticity. However,
even if the hook were a “valueless forgery” — as claimed by the numerous
Confucians who vehemently denounced its purported brutality — it would
still demand serious study because of its antiquity, complex content, and
manifest influence on subsequent military thinkers in China and eventually
in Japan . 1 In its present form the language, subject matter, and presentation
suggest it dates from near the end of the first century B.c ., 2 although four
other views (which are summarized below) propose rather different interpre-
tations.

The Three Strategies attained historical prominence through Chang Li-
ang’s critical accomplishments in establishing the power and consolidating
the authority of the Han dynasty during the turmoil and violent insurrec-
tions that overthrew the repressive, short-lived Ch’in dynasty. The story of
its sudden appearance typifies semilegendary Chinese historical accounts, al-
though circumstances can be construed to suggest a possible line of transmis-
sion extending back through the obscurity of time to the T’ai Rung himself.
According to this tradition, the Three Strategies records the aging Sage’s pro-
nouncements after being enfeoffed as king of Chi’i — a state on the periphery
of Chou culture — following the conquest of the Shang dynasty. Subse-
quently, the individual spontaneous statements — recorded in disjointed
fashion — were collected, edited, and systematized. This task was probably
performed by Ch’i’s official court historian, with the work thereafter being
secretly preserved by successive generations because of its great military

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